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The State of Freedom in Russia: A Regional Analysis of Freedom of Religion, Media and Markets[1]

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> 'Man is born free, but dies in chains.' There is nothing more false than this remarkable assertion .... Rousseau really wanted to say: Man must be free; or: Man is created to be free; and the eternal truth of Rousseau lies here. But this is not at all the same thing as saying that man is born free .... Freedom is the late, refined flower of culture. (Fedotov, 1977, pp. 281–82)

The lack of freedom was perhaps the most repugnant characteristic of the Soviet Union, and its attainment was a dream not only of dissidents, but of ordinary people and government reformers as well. Although the system was ultimately unable to reform itself without collapsing in the process, now more than a decade later the citizens of postsoviet Russia are still struggling to attain and maintain the freedoms that seemed to be within their grasp during the heady days of *perestroika*, *glasnost'* and *demokratizatsiya*.

While even a casual observer can plainly see that Russian citizens today enjoy greater freedom than they did twenty years ago, the creation of an autonomous civil sphere in which freedoms will be consistently guaranteed is still very much a work in progress. A growing body of scholarship reveals great diversity and spatial variation across various substantive areas, such as freedom of religion, a free press and the establishment of free markets. This disparate body of work, based upon different methodologies and written from diverse theoretical perspectives, makes generalisation and the discernment of trends difficult. It also raises several questions. How do the different areas of freedom relate to each other? Are there observable patterns? Are certain regions more free generally, while others enjoy fewer freedoms? Or do some regions enjoy certain freedoms while different regions enjoy others? The answers to these questions have implications not only for those who live in Russia, but also for scholars and policymakers who seek to understand the state of freedom in Russia and the role it plays in the country's postcommunist transformation. The case of Russia also offers a unique window into the process of liberalisation and provides an opportunity to test some basic theoretical assumptions concerning freedom in transitional societies.

The issue of freedom has not received sufficient attention in the discourse on Russia's postsoviet transformation. There has been a plethora of work documenting specific areas of freedom, such as freedom of religion, freedom of the press and the free market, but such work often remains disconnected from the more general discussion of civil society in Russia. These studies of specific areas of freedom all have at their core the same concern, however: 'freedom of the individual from society – more precisely, from the state and from all such compelling social bonds', as the Russian Christian philosopher Georgi

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Fedotov described it almost half a century ago (Fedotov, 1977, p. 285). As Fedotov argued in his emigre writings, 'freedom in this sense is simply a setting of limits to the power of the state in terms of the inalienable rights of the individual' (Fedotov, 1977). It is a limiting of the power of the state that allows an autonomous realm between the state and the private sphere – a civil society – to emerge. And it is within this sphere that individuals can exercise their freedom – freedom of conscience, of thought, of speech, of assembly, and even the freedom of exchange and economic activity.

Various descriptions of modernisation in Western Europe indicate that an ideational shift occurred within all institutional domains to elevate the importance of individual freedoms (Durham, 1996). Individual liberty is seen as the product of Enlightenment ideas concerning human rationality and the primacy of individual choice in creating a just society. It might be expected, then, that freedom of choice in all areas of life should emerge simultaneously. A growing body of literature, however, shows that religious freedom in particular responds to various religious market conditions and varies widely within modern Western European countries (Stark and Iannaccone, 1994; Finke and Iannaccone, 1993). In addition, this literature explains the origins of religious laws with specific factors that are theoretically distinct from those that explain other civil liberties. Specifically, Gill argues that political actors will tend to grant hegemonic religions special status and actively regulate religious competitors, thereby limiting freedom of religious expression (Gill, 2004). These legal actions are theoretically independent of how political actors deal with freedom of the press, property rights and a variety of other civil liberties. Current research on religious liberty, therefore, indicates that laws concerning individual freedoms do not necessarily act in tandem with other freedoms but respond separately to a variety of political and social pressures.

This hypothesis contradicts a basic assumption about how individual freedom came to be valued in Western Europe. As Casanova argues, 'religious freedom, in the sense of freedom of conscience, is chronologically the first freedom as well as the precondition of all modern freedoms' (Casanova, 1994, p. 40). Russia is an ideal case to test this perceived symbiotic relationship between all individual freedoms. Nevertheless, there has been no real attempt to look at multiple areas of freedom in Russia in order to take stock of what progress is being made across the different areas and how they might relate to each other. Our analysis of the general state of freedom in contemporary Russia offers an important insight into the creation of civil society. Specifically, we find that regions in Russia that enjoy freer media and demonstrate more progress in developing free markets are precisely the ones that passed more restrictive religion laws between 1993 and 1997. In other words, religious freedoms do not predicate other freedoms but, in fact, appear to vary inversely with them.

To make our empirical case, we begin by building upon the innovative work of Homer and Uzzell (1999) on regional religion laws in Russia, which we attempt to convert into a quantitative measure. After briefly analysing the results, we continue by exploring how this empirical indicator relates to other forms of freedom in Russia, focusing primarily on freedom of the press and the free market. We employ in this task a survey on media freedom in Russia and various statistics on market development and performance. The results are quite surprising: the disconnection between religious freedoms on the one hand and freedom of the press and free markets on the other is striking. We conclude our study by exploring why this might be the case, including the idea that the regions which are more restrictive of religion tend to share a common vision of a postsoviet future, a vision based upon Russia's traditions and traditional religion (Orthodoxy): hence the move to restrict other religions. Differences between types of freedom appear to be the result of

political actors responding to different pressures within religious, social and economic domains.

Religious Freedom in Russia's Regions

As the Soviet Union began to liberalise itself under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev, the church was one of the first social institutions to benefit from the Kremlin's new policies. In April 1988 Gorbachev met the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church and agreed to recognise the church as a legitimate public institution. Thus ended the policy of militant atheism which had stood for almost 70 years, and which had recently been confirmed in the 1986 CPSU party programme where religion is listed among other 'vices' such as corruption, alcoholism and theft of state property. In Pospielovsky's phrase, 'faith in God was still treated as a pathological deviation from the norm' (Pospielovsky, 1998, p. 353). From that point on, however, religion in Russia underwent a renaissance and official persecution came to an end, a process symbolically marked by the millennial celebrations of the baptism of Rus' in 1988.

The new situation was soon codified with the 1990 law 'Freedom of Conscience and Religious Belief'.[2] This very liberal law introduced legal religious equality for the first time in Russian history, including the separation of church and state. As with all new policies, however, its exact effects could not be known in advance. One consequence of the law, which might have been predictable, but was probably unintended, was a dramatic increase in evangelism and proselytism (Ramet, 1998). As western religious organisations began to operate in Russia and new religious movements began to emerge, they were met with resistance not only by many of their intended converts, but by government officials and the Russian Orthodox Church as well, as presenting a threat to Orthodoxy and even to Russian national identity (Metropolitan Kirill of Smolensk, 1999, pp. 66–76).

This resistance resulted in 1993 in an attempt to change the 1990 law with the amendment 'Introducing Changes and Additions to the RSFSR Law on Freedom of Religion'. This amendment, which was passed by the Supreme Soviet but rejected by President Yel'tsin, proposed to alter religious freedom in Russia fundamentally by restricting sharply the rights of foreign religious associations and by rendering state support to Russia's 'traditional confessions' (Orthodoxy, Islam, Judaism and Buddhism) (Berman, 1999, pp. 275–76). Although the Supreme Soviet tried to submit a slightly revised draft to Yel'tsin, the situation was ultimately resolved by the latter's dissolution of parliament later that autumn.

Now that the situation was no longer being addressed at the federal level, many regions began to take it upon themselves to draft and enact regional laws on religion, which were more restrictive than the 1990 federal law. The first region to do so was Tula, which passed a restrictive law in November 1994. This law was quickly used as a model by other regions, and in a brief period of time many regions had placed on the books laws that violated the federal law and constitutional guarantees (Homer and Uzzell, 1999, p. 304). The contradiction between the federal law and an increasing number of regional laws was resolved in 1997 with the passage of a new religion law at the federal level. The new Russian law 'Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations'[3] followed the spirit of the vetoed 1993 amendment, and essentially set up a two-tier system, distinguishing between religious 'organisations' (which have operated in Russia for at least 15 years) and religious 'groups'; the former are granted a broad range of privileges, while the latter are permitted to worship but face restrictions on their property rights, educational activities, publishing and evangelism.

While the religious freedom situation in Russia has since evolved, with the Constitutional Court and other court decisions interpreting the law somewhat less restrictively than was initially anticipated, the activity of the regions between 1993 and 1997 is very significant and has relevance even today. After all, the way in which regions dealt with the situation was an expression of the mood in Russia's regional communities over the very important issue of religious freedom. This phenomenon, moreover, must be viewed as having regional origins, and thus representing particular regional climates. As Fagan has recently argued in her survey of religious freedom in Russia, 'when decisions are made which violate believers' rights, they are largely informed by the political agendas and personal loyalties of local politicians' (Fagan, 2003). As Homer and Uzzell point out, such actions create problems not only for freedom of religion but also for federalism and the rule of law (Homer and Uzzell, 1999, pp. 284–86).

In their path-breaking analysis of regional religion laws in Russia, Homer and Uzzell document and discuss the great variation that exists in religious freedom across Russia's regions. As they persuasively argue in their study, and as has been regularly documented by the *Keston News Service* and the *Forum 18 News Service*, there is great diversity in religious freedom across Russia's regions, with some regions violating the law with their overzealous interpretations of its restrictive nature and others enforcing it only lackadaisically.

When we look at the general state of religious freedom across Russia we are immediately presented with the problem of how to measure this freedom, since there is no collection of data sufficient for the task. Not only is there no comprehensive survey on the subject, but the information on violations of religious freedom gathered by organisations such as Forum 18, Keston Institute and the Institute on Religion and Law (*Institut Religii i Prava*) is not very useful for statistical analysis because violations are relatively infrequent in relation to the country's population and the number of regions. The data gathered by Homer and Uzzell, however, while not perfectly suited to the task, can provide some genuine insight into the climate of religious freedom across Russia's regions. In the section that follows we seek to expand upon and examine statistically the data they gather in that work.[4] This will make it possible to examine how closely the level of religious freedom is related to the level of other freedoms across the regions of Russia.

Before the 1997 law on religion was passed, somewhere between 25 and 30 regions drafted or enacted their own regional laws meant to curtail religious freedom.[5] Homer and Uzzell discuss many of them in their article, but they also mention several other regions where religious freedom was restricted in other ways. On the basis of the information surveyed in Homer and Uzzell's article, we have placed all of Russia's 89 regions into one of three groups (see Appendix). Group 1 (with the score of 0) is the most restrictive.[6] Not only did the 15 regions in this group draft or enact restrictive laws on religion, but there is considerable evidence indicating an active policy of restriction of religious freedom in many of these regions.

Other regions besides those in Group 1 also drafted or enacted restrictive religion laws, but they had less effect, either because the authorities were less prone to enforce them or because they were subsequently overturned at the regional level. Yet other regions, conversely, while not enacting any law, were nevertheless somewhat restrictive in their regional religion policy; we have placed the 17 regions meeting these two sets of criteria in Group 2 (with the score of 1). Finally, Group 3 (with the score of 2) brings together the remaining 57 regions, in which there was no documentation on restrictions of religious freedom.[7]

The picture of religious freedom that emerges from this classification does not seem to follow any predictable pattern. For example, it might be assumed *a priori* that non-ethnic (that is, homogeneously Russian) regions might be more active in restricting religious

freedom than ethnic regions, as regional authorities in the predominantly Russian territories might be attempting to give the Orthodox Church, as Russia's traditional church, some legal advantages. A quick analysis, however, indicates that non-ethnic regions were no more likely to enact restrictive laws on religion than the ethnic regions, which are home to many Muslim and Buddhist ethnic groups.[8] Likewise, there is no clear geographical pattern. The variation among the regions is presumably not random, so we need to try to find out what accounts for this variation, and what its implications are. In the sections that follow we analyse other areas of freedom – the free press and the free market – in order to ascertain how the level of freedom in these areas is related to the level of religious freedom.

The Free Press

As well as religious freedom, other freedoms too are critical components of an open society and vital for the proper functioning of pluralism and democracy. One of the most important is perhaps freedom of the press. As Owens points out, commenting on the importance of a free press for civil society,

> [I]nformation is power – in this case, power that the public will use to inform itself while making choices about votes, purchases, investments, membership in organizations, participation in mass movements, support for legal challenges, and other expressions of power that can act to counterbalance the power of the state and strong economic entities. (Owens, 2002, p. 110)

In acting as a check upon the operations both of the state and of the major economic actors in society, the media function as the eyes and ears of the general public to ensure that the rules governing political and economic life are followed and to prevent any dangerous concentration of power that might threaten civil liberties. (Bovt, 2002, p. 93)

As Bovt and Zassoursky each point out, postsoviet Russian society presents numerous challenges to the media to fulfil these functions (Bovt, 2002; Zassoursky, 2004). While the Russian press enjoyed greatly increased freedom and unprecedented growth during the early years of democratic reforms, the 1990s produced an economy dominated by corruption, ineffective state institutions, a weak judicial system and the virtual independence of local authorities from any sort of control or regulation. Finally, since coming to office in 2000, Vladimir Putin has made several moves that have limited the power of the press, including eliminating privately run television stations. As Bovt concludes, 'It is clear that the media in contemporary Russian civil society is not yet in any position to articulate the concerns of society as a whole or to act to defend democratic and market reforms in any decisive way' (Bovt, 2002, p. 105).

A recent survey of media freedom in Russia, however, indicates that the media are freer in some regions than in others (Soyuz Zhurnalistov Rossii, 2000). While the media in some regions are evolving in a neosoviet paternalist or authoritarian direction, other regions have been able to develop free and market-based media. This survey, which was conducted by the Union of Journalists of Russia (Soyuz Zhurnalistov Rossi), compiled scores from three different components related to media freedom: freedom of access to information, freedom to produce information and freedom to distribute information. In measuring freedom of access to information, researchers compared the regional legal procedures for journalist accreditation with those established in federal law and assessed officials' willingness to share public information with the press. In measuring freedom to produce information, researchers examined such things as the number of restrictions on freedom of information identified in regional mass media laws, the number of instances

of discrimination against certain mass media outlets, the ratio of state officials to independent experts sitting on regional committees responsible for granting licenses to television and radio stations, the ratio between broadcast areas covered by state and private television and radio companies and the ratio between the press runs of state and private newspapers and publishers. Finally, in measuring freedom of distribution, researchers examined the presence of financial concessions for the distribution of information and the number of bureaucratic obstacles one must overcome in order to set up a newspaper kiosk in a region.

The results of this very thorough survey indicate that, just as religious freedom varies from region to region, there is also great diversity across Russia in terms of freedom of the press. But is freedom of religion related in any way to freedom of the press? Do regions that have greater press freedom also enjoy greater religious freedom? If certain regions tend to enjoy greater freedom overall, then we would suspect that religious freedom and a free press would vary together. The results of a bivariate correlation between the index of religious freedom developed above and the media freedom survey indicate that, in fact, freedom of religion and press freedom are *negatively* correlated: regions with greater media freedom tend to have less religious freedom ($r = -0.187$). While only weakly correlated, the relationship is significant at the 0.05 level ($p = 0.041$).

Having gained some insight into the relationship between religious freedom and freedom of the press, let us look at the relationship between these two freedoms and yet another nascent freedom in Russia: economic freedom.

Freedom of Exchange and Free Markets

In the wake of Stalin's collectivisation drive in the 1930s the Soviet economy became the most centrally controlled economy the world has ever seen. Not only was it in the hands of the state, it was also 'planned' by the state to an unprecedented degree. Central planning resulted in an inefficient economic system during the Soviet era and once the decision was made under Gorbachev to restructure the economy and to introduce market reforms, it left a legacy that to this day confounds the process of market development.

The privatisation of state property is one of the most necessary changes involved in Russia's transition to a market economy and it is perhaps one of the most challenging obstacles. Between 1992 and 1999 more than 140,000 state-owned enterprises were privatised, including 25,000 large enterprises employing thousands of workers (Supyan, 2001, p. 146). Given the distorted nature of the Soviet economy, the introduction of market forces was bound to lead to an uneven process of privatisation. In his early research on regional variation in privatisation, Slider found that there existed marked and significant differences in the pace of privatisation among Russia's regions (Slider, 1994, p. 367).

The privatisation of state-owned enterprises is only part of the picture of developing free markets. Since one of the main objectives of privatisation is to put the ownership and management of enterprises into the hands of individual entrepreneurs and business people, the formation of joint-stock companies can be considered perhaps the most pro-market type of enterprise restructuring. The creation of new businesses and the development of market-based trade are also necessary in order to develop free markets.[9]

Despite the sheer magnitude of the task and many setbacks, the Russian economy today has stabilised and is experiencing significant growth. In short, Russia has successfully completed the first phase of the world's most daunting economic transformation. As a western investment agency recently noted, 'competitiveness in Russian domestic indus-

Table 1. Correlations of religious freedom, media freedom and free markets

Variable	Religious freedom		Media freedom	
	r	p	r	p
Religious freedom	—	—	− 0.187	0.041
Media freedom	− 0.187	0.041	—	—
No. of enterprises privatised, 1996	− 0.157	0.083	0.481	0.000
No. of joint-stock companies formed, 1995	− 0.170	0.065	0.430	0.000
No. of small businesses, 1998	− 0.111	0.166	0.517	0.000
Retail trade, 1996[a]	− 0.123	0.128	0.367	0.000
Personal income, 1998[b]	− 0.193	0.036	0.423	0.000

Note: Cases missing data excluded. [a]Adjusted for population. [b]Adjusted for subsistence (personal income/minimum subsistence).

tries has improved, macroeconomic stability has been achieved, and a basic market environment has been created' (Ernst and Young, 2002, p. 5).

Data continue to indicate that variations in postsoviet adaptation and change not only continue to exist, but appear to follow identifiable patterns (Marsh and Warhola, 2002, pp. 243–63). While on the whole Russia has made substantial progress in developing a market economy, the process is taking place in a highly differentiated manner with some regions responding better than others. Indeed, although some regions are making significant progress and achieving positive results, others have experienced relatively little change aside from a dramatic economic decline.

Does the formation and effective functioning of free markets relate in any way to other freedoms, such as freedom of religion and media freedom? As de Tocqueville argued long ago, civil society is critical for the political, social *and* economic prosperity of communities. As Putnam has recently argued, 'where trust and social networks flourish, individuals, firms, neighborhoods, and even nations prosper' (Putnam, 2000, p. 319). Individual freedom and civil society appear to be critical for the effective functioning of markets, so we might expect to find a strong correlation between the indicators of market development and performance discussed above and our measures of religious freedom and media freedom.

The results of several statistical tests, however, indicate that the relationship is not so straightforward: regions that have made more progress in developing free markets enjoy *less* religious freedom. The number of privatised enterprises and joint-stock companies are each negatively correlated with religious freedom, although the relationship is only weakly correlated at the 0.10 level (see Table 1); and while the number of small businesses and the per capita volume of retail trade are not significantly correlated with religious freedom, the direction is again negative. Not only is there a tendency for regions that have made more progress in market development to have less religious freedom, regional economic performance is also negatively correlated with religious freedom. Personal income is negatively correlated with our religious freedom measure, albeit at moderate levels of significance. Taken together, however, these results indicate that religious freedom is not found alongside free markets.

For comparison purposes, we should also ascertain whether or not media freedom correlates with economic freedom. There is very strong evidence that regions with greater

media freedom have more market-based and better performing economies. As the results in Table 1 indicate, all the indicators of market development are very strongly correlated with media freedom, and at the highest levels of statistical significance. Personal income is just as strongly correlated. It seems that not only does media freedom promote a 'marketplace of ideas', it also promotes market development and performance.

Civil Society and Freedom in Russia

The results of this study are in many ways counterintuitive. The various areas of freedom examined here do not all vary together. A modernisation perspective predicts that a convergence of individual liberty laws should appear across all institutional domains; but this has not occurred in Russia. While media freedom and the development and performance of free markets are very strongly related to each other, both are negatively related to religious freedom. In the area of religious freedom, it is clear that many in Russian society wish to limit the religious options available in such a way as to exclude (or greatly curtail) religions seen as western in Russia (this includes not only Roman Catholicism, but all forms of Protestantism).

Research into the origins of religious liberty provides us with an indication as to why religious restrictions are returning to certain areas of Russia. Theoretical models of church-state relations predict that states with hegemonic religions will tend to exhibit higher rates of religious repression because these religions place pressure on political actors to quash their religious competitors (Gill, 2004). This hypothesis is supported by research on the religion laws of many former communist countries; specifically, findings indicate that countries with clear religious majorities tend to implement the strictest regulations on religious choice (Froese, 2004a). Our findings concerning religious regulation, therefore, may be explained by the strength of the Orthodox Church in the various regions of Russia. In other words, where the Orthodox Church is strong and active, local governments place severe restrictions on minority religions. As argued by Fagan and by Homer and Uzzell, the drive for restrictive religious policies emanates from the Orthodox Church itself, which puts pressure on state and regional leaders to pursue policies that either restrict the activity of other religious groups or provide the Orthodox Church with special privileges.[10]

The situation regarding Russia's other 'traditional religions', however, is somewhat different. While Islam and Buddhism may be 'regional hegemonic' religions in ethnic regions such as Tatarstan and Buryatia, their relations with the Orthodox Church in such territories are of a special status, as the Orthodox Church does not seek to restrict their activities while Muslim and Buddhist leaders do not seek to curtail the efforts of the Orthodox Church. As this study also suggests, these ethnic regions are no more or less likely to have restrictive religion laws than the non-ethnic regions, an interesting finding that adds a unique dimension to the literature on hegemonic religions, which has remained concerned solely with national-level policies. When it comes to regional-level policies, however, the case of Russia suggests that regions that are ethnically mixed and might try to put forward a hegemonic religion of their own, might be prevented from doing so because the national hegemonic religion is truly hegemonic, even in minority regions.

Unlike the religious market, the media and the economic market appear to have no hegemonic influence. In particular, there is no single dominant media company or economic manufacturer that has the influence or desire to demand state restrictions on its competitors. Under Soviet rule, the state had monopolistic control of both media and market domains. Since the ending of state dominance with the fall of communism, new businesses in Russia seek to limit state influence of their markets in order to flourish.

Media and business actors therefore naturally put pressure on political actors to uphold and expand economic freedoms and freedom of the press.

The opposite is true, however, in the religious market. Historically the Orthodox Church had a dominant position in tsarist Russia, enjoying state funding and the repression of its religious competitors (Ramet, 1998), including alternative forms of Orthodoxy. The Soviet state severely repressed the Orthodox Church but simultaneously mounted an atheistic campaign against all religious worldviews (Froese, 2004b). In the end, Russians emerged from communism with no strong religious identity other than their historical and national connection to the Orthodox tradition. Subsequently, the Orthodox Church has gained members and successfully argued that other religious traditions 'threatened the true traditions of Russia, and that something must be done to curb them' (Bourdeaux, 2000). Ironically, the Orthodox present their argument as an argument for freedom because they maintain that new religious groups pose a danger to the cultural independence of Russian society. In turn, the repression of religious competitors is viewed as a defence of individual freedom to worship in the Orthodox tradition. The result, as Gvosdev has argued in the pages of this journal, is a system of 'managed pluralism' in Russia, one in which Russians enjoy greater freedom but the state, although imposing no ideology or religion in particular, nevertheless takes steps to limit the number of options available (Gvosdev, 2001).

We can conclude, then, that freedom of religion is in many ways different from other forms of freedom, at least in a society in transition such as Russia. In the case of free media and free markets the issue is essentially about taking control of these areas away from the state and putting it into private hands. Religious freedom, on the other hand, is a more complex issue. While very much about a separation of church and state in the West, religious freedom is also about the tolerance of what are to many people unwelcome and unpleasant views and ideas. The situation is more complicated in Russia because political actors frequently seek advantage by promoting a Russian national identity with Orthodoxy as one of its primary components.

While our findings clearly demonstrate that different types of freedoms respond independently to various social and political influences, they also show that religious freedoms are negatively correlated with freedom of the press and the free market. The reason for this may lie in the effectiveness of local governments. Because more active governments respond more effectively to local pressures, they will simultaneously facilitate market transitions while also repressing religious freedom. In such a case, the Madisonian maxim of 'the government that governs least governs best' is turned on its head, as religious freedom in Russia's regions is protected at the cost of inefficient local government.

While religious liberty appears related to the activities of local governments, we cannot ignore growing international expectations. An ongoing struggle for freedom in Russia is inextricably linked to the country's attempt to join the free markets and political dialogue of the democratic nations of the world. It may then be influences from outside Russia which ultimately determine the question of religious freedom. As foreign democracies decry religious restrictions within Russia political actors must choose between the requests of the Moscow Patriarchate and pressure from international opinion.

When Fedotov said that 'freedom is the late, refined flower of culture', he meant that true freedom was not to be found in the state of nature, nor in what we would today call premodern societies; it is only in the age of modern democracy that freedom becomes possible. Russia shows us that the attainment of this 'refined flower', even in the age of democracy, will require a remarkable coordination of diverse social, religious, ideological and political forces.

Notes

[1] Much of the work for this article was completed while one of the authors (Christopher Marsh) was serving as a research scholar in residence at the Institute on Religion and World Affairs at Boston University. Both authors would also like to thank Peter Berger, Wallace Daniel, Nikolas Gvosdev, Anthony Gill and Lawrence Uzzell for their assistance and comments on the ideas expressed in this paper.

[2] This law is translated in *Journal of Church and State*, 33, 1991, pp. 191–201.

[3] This law is translated in *Emory International Law Review*, 12, 1998, pp. 657–80.

[4] While Homer and Uzzell did not intend their study to be converted into a quantitative indicator of religious freedom, at least one of the authors (Lawrence Uzzell) feels that this approach is valid and may generate significant findings that can complement other work being done in this area. Personal communication with Christopher Marsh, 12 May 2003.

[5] Homer and Uzzell discuss at least three different sources of this information and three different tallies. In developing the index used here, any reference to a restrictive religion law was counted.

[6] Coding was done in this manner in order to have a scale that ranges from low to high, i.e. from a low score of 0 (little religious freedom) to a high score of 2 (most religious freedom), which would result in positive correlations with the other variables examined later in the article.

[7] While coding the regions into three groups exposes some of the variation in religious freedom in Russia, it cannot accurately measure the true magnitude of this variation. Correlations with other variables, therefore, will be weak, but given the large number of cases involved, significant correlations should at least give an indication of the nature of the relationship between religious freedom and other freedoms in Russia.

[8] Results of an independent sample t-test are as follows: $t = -0.107$; $p = 0.915$; $\mu_{\text{group 1}} = 1.465$; $\mu_{\text{group 2}} = 1.483$.

[9] Data for these variables were obtained from the following sources: Regiony; Orttung, 2000.

[10] Homer and Uzzell cite the case of Kostroma, where the more restrictive religion law was passed in order to appease Orthodox clergy (1999, p. 307), while Fagan discusses a case involving the close collaboration between a local Moscow Patriarchate diocese and various state organs in a particular republic that involved the financing of a new Orthodox cathedral.

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Appendix

Region	Religious freedom estimation
Arkhangel'sk	0
Belgorod	0
Chechnya	0
Irkutsk	0
Khakasia	0
Kurgan	0
Murmansk	0
Perm'	0
Sakhalin	0
Sverdlovsk	0
Tatarstan	0
Tula	0
Tver'	0
Tyumen'	0
Udmurtia	0
Bashkortostan	1
Buryatia	1
Chuvashia	1
Dagestan	1
Kaliningrad	1
Kalmykia	1
Khabarovsk	1
Khanty-Mansi *a.o.*	1
Komi	1
Kostroma	1
Moscow City	1
Moscow *oblast'*	1
Primorsky *krai*	1
Ryazan'	1
St Petersburg	1
Tyva	1
Yaroslavl'	1
Adygeia	2
Agin-Buryat *a.o.*	2
Altai *krai*	2
Altai Republic	2
Amur	2
Astrakhan'	2
Bryansk	2
Chelyabinsk	2
Chita	2
Chukchi *a.o.*	2
Evenki *a.o.*	2
Ingushetia	2
Ivanovo	2
Jewish *a.o.*	2

Appendix *(continued)*

Region	Religious freedom estimation
Kabardino-Balkaria	2
Kaluga	2
Kamchatka	2
Karachayevo-Cherkesia	2
Karelia	2
Kemerovo	2
Kirov	2
Komi-Permyak *a.o.*	2
Koryak *a.o.*	2
Krasnodar	2
Krasnoyarsk	2
Kursk	2
Leningrad *oblast'*	2
Lipetsk	2
Magadan	2
Mari El	2
Mordovia	2
Nenets *a.o.*	2
Nizhni Novgorod	2
North Osetia	2
Novgorod	2
Novosibirsk	2
Omsk	2
Orel	2
Orenburg	2
Penza	2
Pskov	2
Rostov	2
Sakha (Yakutia)	2
Samara	2
Saratov	2
Smolensk	2
Stavropol'	2
Taimyr *a.o.*	2
Tambov	2
Tomsk	2
Ul'yanovsk	2
Ust'-Ordyn Buryat *a.o.*	2
Vladimir	2
Volgograd	2
Vologda	2
Voronezh	2
Yamal-Nenets *a.o.*	2

Note: Coding is as follows—0, most restrictive; 1, somewhat restrictive; 2, no restrictions.