

Theology on the Web.org.uk

Making Biblical Scholarship Accessible

This document was supplied for free educational purposes. Unless it is in the public domain, it may not be sold for profit or hosted on a webserver without the permission of the copyright holder.

If you find it of help to you and would like to support the ministry of Theology on the Web, please consider using the links below:



Buy me a coffee

<https://www.buymeacoffee.com/theology>



PATREON

<https://patreon.com/theologyontheweb>

PayPal

<https://paypal.me/robbradshaw>

A table of contents for *Scottish Bulletin of Evangelical Theology* can be found here:

https://biblicalstudies.org.uk/articles_sbct-01.php

Christian Democracy in Russia

RICHARD SAKWA

Christian Democracy has emerged as one of the major currents in post-communist life. This article will examine the role of Christian Democracy in Russia, placing it in the broader context of European affairs and discussing the main programmatic points and the role of the movement in Russian politics. The paper will focus on the activities of the Russian Christian Democratic Movement (RCDM), by far the largest and most influential of the numerous Christian Democratic parties and movements. Russian Christian Democracy has a distinctive approach to such issues as the reconstruction of the Russian state, democracy, nationalism and the relationship with the West, and the role of Christian politics under post-communism. However, while much of the activity is both Christian and democratic, it is by no means clear that it adds up to Christian Democracy.

Christian Democracy and Post-Communism

The Christian Democratic movement spread throughout Europe in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, partially as a response to the rise of socialist parties, but more broadly as an element in the rise of parliamentary party politics. The first formal Christian Democratic party was established in Italy in 1919, and everywhere Christian Democracy was an element in the opposition to socialism in western continental Europe. In the postwar years the Christian Democratic (DC) party in Italy and the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) in Germany dominated the politics of their respective countries. Christian Democratic parties have also been important in Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg, Austria and Switzerland, although everywhere in the 1970s there was a significant weakening of their position.

The late 1980s, however, were marked by a revival in the fortunes of Christian Democracy in the West, and this has affected developments in the East. In the European parliament in Strasbourg Christian Democratic parties grouped in the European People's Party have played the central hegemonic role on the so-called right, and in response both in France (CDS) and Holland (CDA) there are attempts to restructure politics to revive social Christian politics. Even the British Conservative party, long considered too right-wing to be associated with the Christian Democratic bloc in the European parliament, began under John Major to embrace the idea of the social market economy.¹

Christian Democratic parties have played a prominent role in the development of multi-party politics in the transition from communism. In Slovenia a strong Christian Democratic movement emerged with representation in government. In Germany the striking victory of the Eastern CDU in the elections of March 1990 in what was the German Democratic Republic sealed the fate not only of the people but of the country

as well. The Hungarian Democratic Forum (HDF) led by József Antall, who was elected its leader in 1989 and prime minister of Hungary in 1990, espoused a type of liberal nationalism, though it placed less emphasis on social policy than most Christian Democratic parties. The HDF was accepted into the Christian Democratic International (CDI) and hosted the latter's conference in Budapest in 1990.

The Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) was particularly strong in Slovakia, coming top of the poll in the local elections in the republic in November 1990, with 27.4 per cent of the vote.² The KDH leader Ján Čarnogurský, a lawyer by profession and Catholic by faith, later became prime minister of Slovakia and pursued 'social market' policies. His plans for a fairly restrictive abortion law led to accusations of social illiberalism, but for him the victory over communism did not put an end to the need to overcome the moral crisis of western secular liberalism.³ His view that the church could become the foundation of new forms of social solidarity made the Slovak experience particularly applicable to Russian conditions.

The only surprising thing was the weakness of the explicitly Christian Democratic movement in Poland, although the influence of Christian Democratic ideas on the evolution of Solidarity and its successor parties is obvious. Sections of Solidarity, moreover, were interested in developments in Russian Christian Democratic thinking and saw opportunities for their application at home. Christian Democracy was as fractured as the rest of the political spectrum, and by mid-1991 there were some 40 Christian Democratic groups in Poland.⁴

Perhaps even more surprising is the rise of Christian Democracy in Russia. Christian Democracy tends to be associated with Roman Catholic traditions in general, and the social philosophy of the church developed in the late 19th century in particular. In 1891 Pope Leo XIII issued the landmark encyclical *Rerum novarum*, in which the church discussed the main social problems of a nascent industrial society: labour problems and conditions, fair wages, rights to property and human dignity. The encyclical thus sought to establish a new role for the church by developing a distinctive social philosophy that criticised the excessively materialist tradition of socialism while being careful not to capitulate into uncritical adulation of liberalism. The tradition of *Rerum novarum* exercised a profound influence not only on the inner development of the church, finally freeing itself of the reactionary heritage of visions of the central role of the medieval papacy in an agrarian society, but also on Western European politics in the form of Christian Democratic parties and the philosophy of the social market economy.⁵

The French philosopher Jacques Maritain developed the notion of 'personalism', the idea that individuals develop themselves only by realising their responsibility before others and in particular before their family and society. As Fogarty puts it,

Personalism, as distinct from individualism, is held by Christian Democrats to imply a certain 'solidarist' conception of the individual's responsibility to and for the society around him, and, following from this, a 'federalist' or 'pluralist' ideal of the structure of society and the processes which go on within it.⁶

Personalism has become a central component of Christian Democracy. A second key notion is indeed that of the 'social market economy', developed by the Protestant member of the CDU, Ludwig Erhard.

It is this distinctive social philosophy, based on the moral worth of the individual in a spiritual relationship with the realities of modern society, that makes Christian Democracy attractive in Russia. Its rejection of socialism is obviously alluring in post-

communist conditions, but at the same time its criticism of liberal amorality allows Russian post-communist political society to maintain a distance from modern western liberal democracy while developing its own distinctive social and political philosophy within the broader context of European democratic politics. The Christian Democratic tradition allows discussion of the ethical content of social progress in Russia to avoid some of the banalities of the old stark contrast between Westernising and Slavophile models of development. The reintegration of Russia into the modern capitalist world economy is accompanied by an ethical debate drawing on both western and, above all, Russian Orthodox traditions of social and political community.⁷

The distinguishing characteristic of post-communist Russia is its conscious return to spiritual values and to the religious bases of human community that have long been decried in the mass consciousness of the West. As Patrick Michel points out, religion under communism 'succeeded in placing itself in a threefold "active vector" of disalienation (at individual level), detotalisation (at the level of society) and desovietisation (at national level).'⁸

Whether the renewed religious impulse is only a reaction to the enforced atheism of the communist era, or whether it marks a new phase in European civilisation as a whole in which the West learns from the anguish of the East, only time will tell.

The Emergence of Christian Democratic Parties

Christian Democracy is not part of Russian Orthodox or Russian political traditions. There was no explicitly Christian party before the revolution, though there was a small Christian Democratic caucus in the State Duma and a small group from 1905 in the Constitutional Democratic (Kadet) party. In the conditions of the time, it could be argued, there was no need for an overtly Christian party since the whole society was permeated by Orthodoxy. A Christian Democratic party was, however, established in March 1917,⁹ thus predating the Italian DC, but it made almost no impact on political life.

At various times in recent years there have been some five Russian parties that have claimed to be Christian Democratic. The first to emerge was the Christian Democratic Union of Russia (CDU), established at a constituent conference on 4–7 August 1989. Some 80 representatives from various informal Christian organisations from several towns attended. The conference had been convened on the initiative of the human rights activist and prisoner of conscience Aleksandr I. Ogorodnikov, who had been in labour camp from 1978 to 1987. The conference established a Coordinating Committee to manage the affairs of the party and the broader Christian movement, and Ogorodnikov was elected to the chair. At the same time, it launched a newspaper, *Vestnik khristianskoi demokratii* (*Bulletin of Christian Democracy*).

The 'Basic Principles of the CDU of Russia', its 'Appeal to Christians of Russia' and its 'Declaration', adopted by the founding conference, were all similar to those adopted later by the RCDM, espousing the development of a Christian politics. The documents were modified later, with the draft programme only being discussed at the party's 8th conference in June 1990,¹⁰ and adopted at the 9th conference in November 1990.

A second conference in December 1989 was a much larger affair, with some 300 delegates from throughout Russia as well as guests from other republics and further afield, including Solidarity and the CDI. The conference decided to fight the spring 1990 parliamentary and local soviet elections. They won three seats to the St

Petersburg (Leningrad) soviet, one in Tsaritsyn (Volgograd) and one in Kerch'.

However, in the midst of the elections the party split. A group accused Ogorodnikov of financial improprieties and of a tendency to dominate the party and to use party property as his own. By September 1991 CDU membership was down to about 300 in eight organisations, including Moscow, Tsaritsyn, Krasnoyarsk and St Petersburg. Ogorodnikov failed three times to be elected to any soviet, and his party was not accepted into the Democratic Russia bloc. The CDU was dogged by Ogorodnikov's personalistic leadership style, financial scandals and schisms.¹¹

The organisation survived as a marginal presence in Moscow and St Petersburg municipal politics, but in general concentrated less on politics and more on social activities, including public feeding programmes, educational work and the distribution of aid. The original CDU has tended to be much overrated in the West and its main achievement has been to make Christian Democratic ideas known in Russia.

The split from the CDU was led by Aleksandr Chuyev, who went on to establish a Russian Christian Democratic Party at a conference in Moscow on 12 May 1990. Ninety-two delegates attended from 10 towns, representing some 1500 members. The Statute declared the party's aim as 'uniting citizens of Russia who desire its spiritual, political and economic regeneration and the creation in Russia of a legal state, based on the principles of Christian Democracy.'¹² They published a paper called *Khristianskaya politika*.¹³ Chuyev became a member of the council of Democratic Russia.

In December 1990 the CDU organisations in St Petersburg, Moscow and Tsaritsyn, the Russian Union of Young Christian Democrats and the Christian-Social Union announced their complete break with Ogorodnikov's organisation and the creation of a United Christian Democratic Union of Russia.

The Moscow CDU was a small organisation, with at most a hundred members by mid-1991. It was led by Viktor Rott, the editor of the journal *Khristianin*, together with E. B. Chernyavsky and A. M. Basin. The Tsaritsyn organisation, led by Fr Dmitri Nesterov, a member of the Volgograd regional soviet, was rather larger, with some 200 members by mid-1991. The Russian Union of Young Christian Democrats had a membership of some 30 scattered in four towns. It was led by D. Antsyferov. The Christian-Social Union, led by V. Kisel', was established in April 1990 and had some 20 members, most of whom could be found at Moscow State University. The St Petersburg CDU emerged out of the group *Chelovek* (Human Being) in Leningrad State University in 1987. By mid-1991 it had some 100 members led jointly by Vitali Savitsky, I. Baryl'nik and I. Potapov.

The Birth of the RCDM

The Russian Christian Democratic Movement (RCDM) emerged from a rich seam of 'informal' and often persecuted social activities. These included cooperatives, Sunday schools, the Russian Young Christian Movement, the Independent Association for the Revival of Church Art, the '*Kovcheg*' Theatre, libraries of Christian literature and much else besides. The RCDM's immediate progenitor was the group associated with the literary and philosophical '*tolsty*' ('thick' or 'heavyweight') religious journal *Vybor* (*Choice*), established by Viktor Aksyuchits¹⁴ and Gleb Anishchenko and edited by the latter. Its first issue came out as early as July 1987 and it was soon recognised as the most serious and thoughtful of all the post-*samizdat* 'informal' publications. Another source was those associated with the

activities of Fr Gleb Yakunin and in particular the group 'The Church and Perestroika'.

A preliminary meeting on 26 March 1990 brought together a broad section of democratic and nationalist Christian movements, including some 200 delegates from 50 towns. Aksyuchits argued that the time had come to establish a broadly based Christian and democratic organisation that could act as a real alternative to the CPSU. Fr Gleb Yakunin called on the CDU to join the new movement, and insisted that 'we must be able to compromise to achieve unity'.¹⁵ The meeting called for the final preparation of the statutes and the programme within the next two weeks; these were documents that had clearly been in preparation for several months.

The founding conference of the Russian Christian Democratic Movement took place in Moscow a fortnight later, on 8–9 April 1990. The conference was attended by some 300 delegates from 16 cities in Russia, the Baltic states, the Caucasus and Ukraine. Guests attended from 23 Soviet cities; Archbishop Vasili (Rodzianko) of the Autocephalous Orthodox Church of America was also present. The meeting as usual had to run the gauntlet of KGB and Communist Party obstructionism before it could go ahead in the Krasnaya Presnya House of Culture.

An executive body called the Duma (the name of the pre-revolutionary Russian parliament), consisting of 15 members, was elected, and included the three MPs elected to the Russian parliament in March 1990: Viktor Aksyuchits, Fr Vyacheslav Polosin and Fr Gleb Yakunin.¹⁶ The first session of the Duma on 9 April elected a political council (soviet) to manage current affairs in the party headed by Viktor Aksyuchits, with Gleb Anishchenko and Fr Vyacheslav Polosin as co-chairmen of the RCDM. Soon afterward two deputies of the Moscow Soviet were coopted onto the Duma with consultative (non-voting) status: Valeri Borshchev, a member of the presidium of the Moscow Soviet and chair of its commission on freedom of conscience; and Pavel Zhukov, chair of the soviet's economic commission. Further changes were made to the Duma at the RCDM's second conference in October 1990,¹⁷ and in early 1991 Fr Mark Smirnov, a well-known Christian journalist, joined the Duma with consultative status.¹⁸

There was some controversy over the membership of Vladimir Karpets in the Duma, with two delegates in particular objecting to his patriotic and monarchist views. Anishchenko, presiding over the session, insisted that all views should be represented. Karpets argued that the movement ought to appeal not only to the democratic constituency but also to the broader one comprising monarchist and solidarist movements. He argued that the movement should drop the word 'democratic' and call itself simply the 'Russian Christian Movement'. Its aim should be to convene an all-Russian *zemsky sobor* ('national council' or 'assembly of the land', in effect a parliament) which, organised as it would be on a non-party and inclusive basis, alone had the right to decide the future of Russia. Karpets, perhaps prophetically, pointed out that the development of party politics and parliamentarianism on its own could not prevent the emergence of dictatorship, as had happened after February 1917 in Russia and in Weimar Germany.¹⁹

The three main speakers at the conference were Aksyuchits, Fr Vyacheslav Polosin and Aleksandr Kazakov. The conference adopted three key documents, a 'Declaration', the 'Statutes' (*Ustav*) of the movement and, most importantly, the 'Fundamental Theses' (*Osnovnye polozeniya*) or programme.

In his address Aksyuchits argued that 'Life itself forced the creation of a Christian Democratic party in Russia.'²⁰ The RCDM was both a party and a movement, with the Christian Democratic parliamentary party the core of the movement. The aim of

the party was to change the state system to overcome the legacy of communist rule. Aksyuchits admitted that the objection could be raised that Christian Democracy was not an organic feature of Russian development, there having been no such party before 1917. However, he insisted that the absence of a party based on Christian and democratic ideals was part of the reason for the 'catastrophe of 1917'. Only after the revolution did Russian thought turn to the works of S. Frank, I. Il'in, N. Lossky, P. Novgorodtsev, B. Vysheslavtsev, S. Bulgakov, N. Berdyayev, G. Fedotov and P. Struve, who both then and now provided the intellectual framework for understanding and overcoming the Bolshevik disaster.²¹

It is important to lay emphasis on the works of these thinkers, most of whom contributed to the epoch-making collection *Vekhi (Signposts)* in 1909, warning of the dangers of utopian revolutionism. Instead of revolution they urged liberal politics tempered by Christian social values. Their works provide a rich philosophical basis for Christian Democratic politics in Russia, made none the worse for the distinctively Russian approach to the problems of morality and community.²²

Fr Vyacheslav Polosin defended the role of Christian politics, arguing that it was not a struggle for power but an attempt to preserve society from lawlessness and anarchy. The involvement of Christians in politics was a specific form of social philanthropy with the aim of achieving a harmonious social system.²³

Kazakov analysed the political situation, arguing that 'real politics' was being born but that it was marred by a conflation of the red and black hundreds in the form of 'national Bolshevism', where the extreme right and left met on a common terrain of chauvinism and intolerance. The challenge for Russia, he insisted, was to overcome the tradition of radical politics and to create a genuine conservative centrist party. Although it is a compromised term, the idea of patriotism was crucial, but only in the context of the absolutes of Christian faith.²⁴ His appeal that the RCDM should issue a special denunciation of *Pamyat'* was rejected by the conference.²⁵

Programme and Philosophy of the RCDM

Despite the fracturing of Russian Christian Democracy into a number of movements, they are nevertheless broadly united in terms of programmatic aims. There are close similarities between the various declarations and programmes, and thus here we will concentrate on those of the RCDM.

The 'Declaration' adopted by the founding conference of the RCDM outlined the key philosophical tenets of the movement. It condemned the 'falsely ascetic approach to secular activity', the 'pharisaical renunciation of politics', insisting that 'the tragedy of Russia and of Russian Orthodoxy shows us quite plainly that if we are now going to turn away from the world and wash our hands of it like Pilate, we are going to suffer an even more terrible tragedy, and it will be our fault.' The declaration outlined a special type of Christian politics, aiming to remake the world in the image of Christian ideals but in the form of laws and institutions. Since the 'Kingdom of God is not of this world', Christian politicians are at an advantage since 'they are free from the temptations of any kind of utopianism'.

The declaration condemned communism's teleological politics that took no account of the individual, and insisted that Christian politics was 'not a subjectively interpreted monopolistic ideal of a society to be built on earth' but a pluralistic view involving 'the defence and reinforcing of everyone's freedom to preach and realise his own ideal without infringing the freedom of others.' The RCDM espoused 'creative democracy' based on a concept of freedom that encompassed self-limitation and a

sense of justice. The declaration insisted on the philosophical role of private property as an extension of human activity and spirituality. The declaration ended with a defence of 'enlightened' patriotism, condemning aggressive chauvinism and insisting that only through patriotism towards one's own people could the achievements of other peoples be understood. 'Enlightened patriotism' was defined as 'the acceptance of personal responsibility for one's history, for one's culture, for the environment where one was raised, for one's spiritual heritage.'²⁶

The basic argument was for a religious-patriotic renaissance of the individual, society and the nation. The three key principles of the RCDM were the priority of Christian spirituality, enlightened patriotism and resolute rejection of communist ideology.²⁷ All of the RCDM's statements were imbued with the view that the recreation of a civil society was the basis for any effective political and religious activity. In so far as civil society is the central principle of liberal politics, so too the RCDM accepted that the religious and national rebirth of Russia was meaningless without the structuring of politics in liberal democratic terms. However, an ambiguity emerges in that the RCDM accepted that while liberalism was a necessary condition for the rebirth of Russia, it was not a sufficient one to ensure its spiritual development.

The ideas of the Declaration were developed in the 'Fundamental Principles of the Political Programme of the RCDM', in effect its programme. The preamble was followed by nine sections dealing with: 1, the political structure of the state; 2, basic human rights; 3, religion and freedom of conscience; 4, the economy; 5, ecology; 6, social policies; 7, the nationalities question; 8, science and culture; 9, education.²⁸

All politicised Christian groupings developed a strong line in anticommunist rhetoric. The RCDM, however, developed this into a broad philosophical analysis of the communist 'God-building' temptation of the 20th century. Aksyuchits argued that Leninism was 'a dialectical combination of extreme atheism with a specific type of religiosity',²⁹ and it was on the devastated terrain of this godless religion that the rebirth of Russia and Christianity, and indeed of all theistic religions, had to take place. A special type of moral and spiritual rebirth was required to overcome it, and this was reflected in the preamble. Details of the programme can be seen in the Documentary Appendix, but here we will examine some of the key points of RCDM thinking.

State Building

The RCDM took a distinctive line on the development of the Russian state. As Anishchenko pointed out, 'Russians, surprisingly enough, simply do not have a state. On the one hand, the RSFSR is not Russia, and on the other, it is not a state of Russians.'³⁰

The central principle of RCDM thinking in the programme was to avoid 'predetermining' the future shape of the Russian state system. It stated: 'The RCDM believes that only a national council (*zemsky sobor*) is competent to decide what form of government Russia should have.' The RCDM called for the convocation of a Constituent Assembly to take up the task of the old assembly disrupted after one session by the Bolsheviks on 5 (18) January 1918.³¹ Up to that time the RCDM adopted the position of 'not predetermining' the question; everything before its convocation would count as a transitional period in which the presidential form of governance would be most suitable. This was to be accompanied by the classical liberal democratic separation of powers.

This point has been the most controversial and the subject of much misunder-

standing, leading some to suggest that the refusal to predetermine the desired form of government was a subterfuge to conceal perhaps less than democratic intentions. Such a view was rebutted in the RCDM's declaration of 18 August 1991, which insisted that each form of state reflects the given stage of social development, and this had to be decided by the people at the time.³²

This period was to be accompanied by a process of 'creatively building a civil society based on autonomous associations of free citizens'.³³ In his campaign publicity for the March 1990 elections, Aksyuchits called for full autonomy of local government. The way forward, he insisted, was the complete autonomy of civil society, which could regenerate its own development and that of an organic state.³⁴ Moreover, the RCDM was unambiguous in its view that Russia's laws should be compatible with international norms of legality and human rights.

Religion

The programme considered that 'the natural relationship of state to church in today's conditions is one of benevolent neutrality', in a state based on law. In particular, the RCDM called for the abolition of the Councils for Religious Affairs, whose baleful tutelage since Khrushchev's time had in certain respects been even more invidious than Stalin's brutal repression.³⁵ Much of what had been sought in April 1990 had been fulfilled by the autumn, although the struggle continued against attempts by the communist authorities to achieve by covert means what they had previously done openly.³⁶

Economy

The RCDM called for the deideologisation and the decentralisation of the economy, with the transition from a planned to a social market economy based on private property. It accepted all types of property but at the same time called for 'resolute antimonopoly legislation'. The old party corporatist structures had to be dismantled, and the economic role of the state diminished. The market economy could not be introduced by the state but arises naturally out of private interests.³⁸ Thus the RCDM marked itself off from the Slavophile tradition, which had rejected western civilisation as a model for Russian development and had cherished the social values of the people as expressed through the commune.

There was much discussion among Christian Democrats about how West Germany had recovered after the Second World War, and about the role of the state in economic recovery and development.³⁹ One of the advisers to the RCDM on economic affairs was the well-known economist Larisa Piyasheva, who advocated rapid privatisation and condemned the economic strategy of Yegor Gaidar from 2 January 1992, whereby prices were freed before monopolies had been broken up and the economy privatised.⁴⁰

Social Policy

There was little to choose between the social policies of the Christian Democrats and those of the social democrats. To a degree, the social democratic politicians who had broken away from the Communist Party were even more neoliberal than the Christian

Democrats, willing to let market forces rip through society while doing their allegedly beneficent work. The RCDM, in keeping with its views on community, was more concerned about the social costs of restructuring the economy. It was in favour of a developed welfare system, but realised that this could function only if supported by an effective economy.

Ecology

The RCDM shared the view of all shades of Russian nationalists that communist power had been not only a spiritual and political disaster, but that 'the senseless and criminal economic policies of the communist system' had brought Russia to 'the brink of an ecological catastrophe'.⁴¹ The RCDM argued that scientific and technological approaches were limited, and that larger issues of moral and social ecology had to play a part in post-communist development.⁴²

National Question

The programme condemned all forms of national chauvinism, supported 'the right to national autonomy' of 'all nationalities in the Russian state' and asserted that 'nations wishing to secede from the metropolis should be granted the opportunity to do so'. This was balanced, however, by the view that 'the process of secession must not degenerate into a senseless and irresponsible proliferation of splinter-states', and that 'any act of secession must be accomplished only by means of a plebiscite of the *whole population* of the territory in question'.⁴³

While the RCDM supported the 'deimperialisation' of 'that ideocratic monster, the USSR', it did not support its dissolution.⁴⁴ In June 1990 Aksyuchits argued that 'all Republics which want to break away from the USSR should be allowed to do so', but added, 'they are escaping from the communist regime, not from Russia, as people often think.' He insisted that 'the Soviet empire is not a Russian empire, it is an ideological empire'.⁴⁵ Anishchenko insisted that all the nations of the USSR had suffered under the old regime. The main task was to unite against 'communist tyranny'. 'If someone wants to leave the USSR, this cannot be prevented. But I am convinced that for many republics this would be a disastrous, and, in many cases, a senseless act.'⁴⁶

Russia had always acted as the protector of Armenia, and everywhere borders were arbitrary. Anishchenko noted problems with the Crimea, 'given' to Ukraine by Khrushchev in 1954.⁴⁷ The RCDM supported the attempts by the Orenburg Cossacks to conduct a referendum on the fate of parts of their territory now in Kazakhstan.⁴⁸ The RCDM approach to the border question was similar to that which determined the Polish-German border in Upper Silesia in 1920-21. Plebiscites were held in each disputed district, and the results were binding. There was some ambiguity, however, over the role of the national plebiscites on disputed territories.⁴⁹

While it was broadly accepted that a Russia within its Soviet borders was clearly a historical nonsense, liberals and others insisted that it made political sense to work with them. Other states with equally valid territorial claims had begun their post-communist history with resolute statements that the existing borders, however unjust, would have to remain. In particular Poland renounced any claims that it might have had to its historical territories in Ukraine, Western Belorussia and the Vilnius region of Lithuania.

Foreign Policy

The RCDM called for 'genuine peace and good neighbourliness; the end of any form of assistance to terroristic and totalitarian regimes'. This was the line that triumphed in Russian foreign policy after August 1991, and was thus in marked contrast to the compromises of Gorbachev's 'new political thinking'. Above all, the RCDM stood for the 'consistent application of international agreements in the sphere of human rights, for freedom of speech and the press, meetings, demonstrations and movement, for the inviolability of the individual, freedom of conscience and belief'.⁵⁰ All Russian Christian Democratic parties favoured the reintegration of Russia into the world economy and society, rejecting all traces of the degenerate messianism that had remained in Soviet foreign policy until August 1991.

History

A distinctive philosophy of history permeated the thinking of the RCDM. All Russian Christian Democratic parties have avoided the trap, common in the early years of Christian Democracy in Western Europe, of romanticising the past in some form of Christian Feudalism, forever returning to the past as a model for the future. For the Orthodox, of course, including the Russian Orthodox, the medieval papacy is not their past, and thus their present will always differ from that of Western Europe.

One of the central features of the thinking of the RCDM reflects the common concern of Russian conservatives that the thread of Russian history was broken by Peter the Great's reforms. Autonomous Russian cultural and social development had been bureaucratised, stifling the vital organic energies of economic and political development. A second-rate form of development had been imposed that was neither authentically Russian nor effectively western.⁵¹ The RCDM stands four-square behind the Marquis de Custine's judgement of Peter the Great, if not his judgement of Russia as a whole: 'A sovereign [Peter] . . . did more evil in the world by this single attack on the prerogatives of the priest and the religious liberty of mankind than he did good in Russia by all his qualities as a warrior and an administrator, or by his genius for industry.'⁵²

Under post-communism not only structures but also ideologies are at stake. Of central importance is a party's relation to history, and here the RCDM is in a uniquely advantageous position. It is able to restructure the historical experience by appealing to suppressed and often forgotten traditions. Viktor Aksyuchits, for example, has stressed the need to regenerate Orthodox values in Russia by rethinking the Orthodox tradition. He locates the historical causes of the Russian disaster of the 20th century even further back than Peter the Great's assault on the church or the schism between the followers of Avvakum's traditionalists (the Old Believers) and the reformers in the 17th century: he locates it in a split in the 15th century. The 'Non-possessor' school of Nil Sorsky stressed what Aksyuchits calls traditional Russian spirituality, 'inner activity' and the concentration on spiritual self-perfection. They were defeated by the 'Possessor' school of Joseph of Volokolamsk, concerned with restructuring earthly life and hence requiring material wealth, the support of the state and cruel discipline. This was the tradition utilised by Ivan the Terrible and later tsars.⁵³

The central point was that Russian history contained diverse political and religious traditions, whereas the tendency of analyses focusing on political culture has been to reduce them to simplistic and simplified notions of inherent authoritarianism. Under communism the struggle over the past focused largely on the history of the communist regime itself, whereas under post-communism historical controversy has now

extended to rethinking the whole history of the nation. And just as under communism, the struggle for the past is a struggle to control the present.

Development of the RCDM

The party Statutes envisaged the RCDM as an umbrella for old and new organisations. It stated that the RCDM was 'a socio-political organisation (party) that unites supporters of radical reforms in all spheres of life in this country, on the basis of Christian moral norms.'⁵⁴ Membership could be either individual (over 16) or collective. The movement brought together various '*samizdat*' bodies, Christian clubs and charitable organisations. According to Aksyuchits, 'the movement that already existed was formalised'.⁵⁵ The RCDM was the fifth party to register in Russia, doing so in mid-1990. (By September 1991 there were 13 registered parties in Russia.⁵⁶)

The party appealed to the past and the West, but above all sought to root its legitimacy and claims to power in the present and in Russia. The appeal met with a response in society, and by October 1990, a mere six months after its establishment, the RCDM achieved fourth place in public opinion ratings.⁵⁷

The relationship between the party and the movement reflected an attempt at a division of labour. Not all the members of the movement were necessarily members of the party, and vice versa. The party was not subordinate to the Duma but operated in accordance with the movement's Declaration, Programme and Statutes and was directed by the political council. The movement concerned itself with philanthropy and religious study, Sunday schools and such like, whereas the the party concerned itself with political activity in parliament and elsewhere.⁵⁸

The Statute permitted a fairly loose structure, and regional organisations of the RCDM were largely autonomous and free to chose their own internal structures.⁵⁹ They were, moreover, encouraged to enter into local alliances with constructive forces, excluding extreme leftist or rightist groups.⁶⁰ The party tried to organise itself on the principles of *sobornost'* (conciliarity) and solidarity.

The material base of the RCDM was assured by some of Aksyuchits' business ventures. These included the contract with Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn to print, in association with the publishers *Sovetsky pisatel'*, one million copies of the *Gulag Archipelago*. As well as being involved in publishing cooperatives, Aksyuchits had been one of the central figures in the 'scientific-technological' cooperative '*Perspektiva*', the host body for the Moscow Bureau of Information Exchange (M-BIO), led by Aleksandr Igrunov and Sergei Mitrokhin. Aksyuchits was also a member of the board of the Soviet–Panamanian joint enterprise 'PYuIK'.

The RCDM published a paper *Put'* (*Path*) that acted more as a forum for discussion and thinking than as a newspaper.⁶¹ It was briefly edited by Aleksandr Kazakov in September and October 1990 before Gleb Anishchenko took over. He remained the editor of *Vybor*. The RCDM also published five regional papers in Perm', Nizhni Novgorod, Orel, St Petersburg and Kiev.

The dynamics of post-communist recruitment to political parties and the relationship of individuals to politics appears to conform to the emerging 'post-modern' pattern in Western Europe. No longer is it sufficient to identify a social basis to party support. Analysis has to include a range of subjective factors and attitudinal criteria that cut across traditional class approaches and reflect the fractured and kaleidoscopic social patterns of modern society. This is all the more true of post-communist societies emerging from periods of accelerated social change and revolutionary transformation.

Western Christian Democratic parties appeal to all confessions and ethnic groups. Christian Democracy, by definition, is a movement of lay people who accept personalist and pluralist principles. The German CDU, for example, is inter-confessional, and indeed appeals to many Muslim Turks. However, in Russia to date the emergence of a modern catch-all political party has been limited. The CDU recruited from all Christian denominations, including Baptists, Catholics and Protestants as well as Orthodox. The main appeal of the movement element of the RCDM was to Orthodox Christians, but it was open to all Christian faiths. The party, however, was open to anyone who supported its political principles irrespective of faith, and thus it was able to work with various Islamic groups.

The RCDM recruited not only from Russia but from the other republics as well, even though it was formally registered as a Russian rather than as an all-Union party. In December 1990 a Christian Democratic Movement of Ukraine-Rus' was established as an affiliate of the RCDM. It sought to carve out a third path between the independence-minded Rukh organisation and the old communist regime. It fought against the communists, but sought to preserve the historical unity of the East Slav people.⁶²

The RCDM hoped to capitalise on the rejection not only of communism but also of the politics of socialist and social democratic movements. As Aksyuchits put it, 'Society has become so fed up with red politics that it instinctively shrinks from pink politics.'⁶³ The social base of the RCDM is broader than the intelligentsia and students. Christian Democracy explicitly rejects a class-bound approach to politics and recruitment, as indeed do most parties under post-communism. Moreover, as noted, the social policies of Christian Democracy and the social democrats were well-nigh indistinguishable and both major currents in post-communist Russia were chasing much the same constituency.

The RCDM leadership was nevertheless well aware that its main strength lay among the liberal professions and white-collar intelligentsia. It could, however, take some comfort from the fact that two of its parliamentary deputies were workers: Yakovlev from Vorkuta and Yegorov from Tyumen'.

The natural constituency for all Christian Democratic parties lay among the Orthodox laity. In 1988, at the time of the millennium of Christianity in Russia, there were some 6893 active Orthodox parishes in the USSR (excluding Georgia). Of these, some 4000 were in Ukraine, leaving barely 3000 to serve the entire Russian Federation.⁶⁴ There are some 30 million practising communicants of the Orthodox Church,⁶⁵ a potentially large reserve of support for the RCDM. To put these statistics in perspective, an opinion poll in December 1989 found that 52 per cent of the population considered themselves non-believers, 48 per cent confessed to one or another religion, but only 7–8 per cent placed religious values in first place, and only 5 per cent were actively involved in religious life.⁶⁶ Moreover, as in the West, there is of course no reason why believers should vote automatically for any particular party.

The RCDM and the Alliance of Russian Solidarists (NTS) worked closely together. The RCDM's programme was remarkably similar to that of the NTS, and indeed the NTS called itself a Christian Democratic party.⁶⁷ The concept of solidarism was a fusion of Eastern Orthodox thinking, with its tradition of *sobornost'*, and the individualism of western liberalism. The general tendency was for the NTS to fade away as its historical purpose, and funding, were undercut by the collapse of communism. Such leading figures as Boris Miller argued for an end to conspiratorial politics and a shift to open work in Russia. His views were rejected, and he failed to be reelected to the NTS council in Frankfurt in 1991 and joined the RCDM. The NTS

had no more than a few small groups in Russia, although they were highly influential in certain sections of the labour movement, notably among the Vorkuta miners.

There were no major ideological differences between the RCDM's programme and those of the groups in the United Christian Democratic Union of Russia. Some of the groups that had left Ogorodnikov's CDU joined the RCDM as 'collective members', retaining their own identity within the new movement. These included the Christian Democratic Union group established by Vitali Savitsky in St Petersburg; in 1991 Savitsky was elected co-chair, with Igor' Potapov, of the regional RCDM organisation. Other groups included the one led by Viktor Rott in Moscow,⁶⁸ and the Tsaritsyn section headed by Fr Dmitri Nesterov.

Precise figures are hard to come by, but the RCDM maintained a strong presence in the army. The women's group 'Soldiers' Mothers' entered the RCDM as a collective member. The movement also had a strong presence among the Don and Orenburg Cossacks. The precise gender, age and social profile of the party remains a matter for further study. It might be noted that no women are to be found in the leading bodies of the RCDM, or in those of most other parties for that matter. Post-communist politics, with few exceptions, appears to be a fairly solidly male preserve.

By June 1990 the RCDM had some 15,000 members.⁶⁹ By August 1990, according to Aksyuchits, the RCDM had branches in 80 cities and a significant presence in local councils.⁷⁰ By the end of the year it had 18 regional organisations and branches in 96 cities with a claimed membership of 25,000, although this was probably exaggerated. According to Anishchenko, membership just before the coup of August 1991 was 5000 in the party and 10,000 in the movement.⁷¹ Despite the split in the RCDM, discussed below, total membership by February 1992 was an alleged 28,000 in 150 branches.

These low figures for membership, in a country with a population of 148 million, were in keeping with the general trend for all post-communist parties to be small. As Valeri Borshchev pointed out, the monolithic and suffocating CPSU had to leave the scene before the new parties could flourish, but then to their horror they discovered a strong reaction against *partiinost'* in general.⁷² Only the People's Party of Free Russia, which grew out of the 'Communists for Democracy' movement led by vice-president Aleksandr Rutskoi, could boast a membership of 100,000.⁷³ None of the new non-communist parties could prove a membership of over 50,000 by early 1991, and thus in the valley of the dwarfs the RCDM proved one of the largest.

There was a certain ambiguity about the identity of the new formation, and above all whether its main purpose was to become a mass party or to concentrate on parliamentary activity. Was it to be a party or a movement, and if both, how were these two tendencies to be combined? The development of the RCDM throws much light on the development of party politics in Russia. The basic tendency was from movements to parties, but the RCDM was distinct in that it explicitly from the first tried to take on a dual identity.

The RCDM in Politics

From the very first the RCDM made no secret of the fact that it was involved in a struggle for power. In June 1990 Aksyuchits stated that 'we hope to become a ruling party in a couple of years',⁷⁴ and in April 1991 Anishchenko, perhaps in an ironic parody of Lenin, stated that 'we are raising the question of power' and that sooner or later they would be putting up their candidates for the presidency and other top posts in the country.⁷⁵

The RCDM is to a degree the heir of the Constitutional Democrat (Kadet) party of 1917, even though latter-day conservatives condemn the Kadet leader, Pavel Milyukov, for his role in undermining the monarchy in the period before the February 1917 revolution. The Kadets in 1917 considered themselves the guarantors of the territorial integrity of the Russian Empire, although they were willing to concede independence to Finland and Poland, the latter occupied by the Germans at the time.⁷⁶ The analogy with the Kadets may turn out to be more accurate than expected, with the difference that the Kadets of 1917 were swallowed up by the rise of bolshevism whereas the RCDM's distinctive social and philosophical programme today may be undermined by the onset of western liberal democratic and secular politics. Moreover, as in 1917, the division between 'nation builders' and 'empire savers' threatened to engulf the democratic movement in its entirety.

Aksyuchits and his associates played an active part in the creation in October 1989 of the Democratic Russia bloc, which fought the parliamentary and local elections of 4 and 18 March 1990. The RCDM registered a series of stunning victories, despite official attempts to undermine the campaigns of its candidates. Far more than any other Christian Democratic party, and most other parties of whatever hue, the RCDM was in a position to make its mark in politics. It had at first six deputies in the Russian parliament, including Yakunin and Aksyuchits, but by the end of the year had established a centre-right parliamentary group called 'Russian Union' (*Rossiiskiy soyuz*). The RCDM also had a number of deputies in the Moscow and other local soviets.

In parliament they supported Yel'tsin. Despite this, Aksyuchits was nominated by representatives of coal miners from Vorkuta to stand against Yel'tsin for the chairmanship of the Russian parliament. The intention was to exploit the opportunity for a national platform and then stand down. His speech on 27 May 1990 once again stressed the need for the spiritual rebirth of society and the regeneration of Russia. He stressed that enlightened patriotism excluded chauvinism and hatred for others. He insisted that without an understanding of the past, the future would be closed to them. Seventy years of revolution had exiled Russia to the backwoods of civilisation. The ideological dogmatism of the authorities kept the country in a state of crisis, marked by an undeclared general strike.⁷⁷ In the event Yel'tsin was elected chair of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet in May 1990, a victory confirmed by his election to the presidency of Russia in June 1991.

Fr Vyacheslav Polosin achieved the establishment of a 'committee on freedom of conscience, creeds, charities and philanthropy' in the Russian parliament, of which he became chair. He was instrumental in the abolition of the malignant Council for Religious Affairs. The committee was also at the centre of drafting the new 'Law on Freedom of Conscience' for Russia. The original draft of June 1990 of the USSR law had been extremely conservative.⁷⁸ The much more liberal Russian law forced considerable amendments to the all-union law as adopted on 1 October 1990.⁷⁹ Thus Fr Vyacheslav and other RCDM members on the committee (Aksyuchits, Fr Gleb Yakunin and V. Kryuchkov) were able to undo some 70 years of anti-religious legislation in a matter of months. The committee was also able to make Christmas and Easter into public holidays.⁸⁰

With the onset of multi-party politics from spring 1990 the question arose as to the formalisation of Democratic Russia. At its official founding congress in October 1990 the tensions *within* the democratic camp began to emerge. The RCDM considered Democratic Russia a coalition designed to overcome the monopoly of the CPSU, and insisted that such words as 'progressive' and 'radical' should be excluded from the

aims of the movement on the grounds that these terms were compromised and ambiguous. The RCDM defined the aims of Democratic Russia in the latter's statutes as 'the coordination of electoral campaigns and parliamentary activity, the application of efforts to create a civil society'.⁸¹ Thus the RCDM rejected the idea of a 'superparty' and insisted on the autonomy of the constituent elements of the bloc, giving them full scope to pursue their individual platforms.

Russian politics has evolved in two stages since the onset of the era of multi-party politics. In the first stage there was a fairly straightforward four-fold taxonomy. There was a reactionary camp, bringing together the chauvinists of the right and left, *Pamyat*, Stalinists and neo-communists on a platform of Soviet patriotism or National Bolshevism. The second group comprised neo-conservatives, including the nascent Christian Democratic parties, the Constitutional Democrats and some smaller parties. The third bloc was the largest, comprising social democratic groupings, mostly consisting of former communists like Anatoli Sobchak, Gavriil Popov, Yuri Afanas'yev, and then Eduard Shevardnadze and Aleksandr Yakovlev. The fourth group was made up of the dwindling band of reform communists around Gorbachev.

The second phase of multi-party politics followed the collapse of the CPSU after August 1991. In the absence of a common enemy, the picture was now much more complicated. Shorn of its alliance with the party *nomenklatura*, the reactionary camp was now a possible ally of the neo-conservative centre in defence of a broad concept of the Russian nation. They were opposed by what the RCDM was wont to call the 'left radicals' or the 'liberal communists' in the ascendant after the coup.

Politics became more polarised as the debate intensified over whether Russia was a core nation or a broader type of empire-state. Should Russian nationalists be satisfied with the establishment of a nation-state within the arbitrary borders of the RSFSR, or should they demand a broader 'empire' cleansed of communism and encompassing the traditional Russian lands of 'White Russia' (now the Republic of Belarus), 'Little Russia' (Ukraine) and South Siberia (Northern Kazakhstan)?

In his presidential speech on 27 May 1990 Aksyuchits had argued that the nationalities would escape from the communist regime but not from Russia. Once a democratic regime was established in Russia, in Moscow, then all the problems could be solved.⁸² When asked in August 1990 about his attitude towards the various separatist movements in the Baltics and elsewhere, Aksyuchits asserted 'we support them'.⁸³ He hoped, however, that not only the three Slav republics but the others too would see that their best future lay with Russia. This view appeared to be confirmed by Gorbachev's referendum of 17 March 1991, which indicated a majority for a 'renewed union of sovereign republics'. The tendentiousness of the question, however, and the circumstances attending the vote gave it little legitimacy. The RCDM had urged its members to abstain from voting in the union referendum,⁸⁴ and only warily appealed to such a compromised act by a discredited regime to argue for the unity of the old state. In the event, Aksyuchits's views on the viability of the union proved to be hopelessly optimistic, and it was on the rock of nationality politics that the party broke.

As far as Aksyuchits was concerned, the 'left radicals' dominant in Democratic Russia would play only a transitional role. The RCDM would support them as long as they contributed to the dismantling of communist power but not when they began to see separation and democracy as synonymous.⁸⁵ The time of reckoning came much sooner than most parties expected.

At the Democratic Russia congress in October 1990 the RCDM had insisted on the right to join other coalitions, and this it did when on 19 April 1991 it entered a centre-

right electoral and political bloc called People's Accord (*Narodnoye soglasiye*). The RCDM allied itself with the Democratic Party of Russia (DPR), led by USSR and RSFSR people's deputy Nikolai Travkin, and the People's Freedom Party (Constitutional Democrats) led by Mikhail Astaf'yev. Travkin's party had some 20,000 members,⁸⁶ whereas Astaf'yev's party claimed 6000 but had no more than a few hundred at most. Travkin was a charismatic and dynamic leader arousing strong loyalty among his supporters but bitter loathing among his enemies, many of whom could be found in Democratic Russia. Polls nevertheless placed him second only in popularity to Yel'tsin.⁸⁷ He employed his eloquence in defence of the rights of Russians living in the non-Russian republics.

The founding declaration of the group on 19 April insisted that a 'third path' had to be found between the CPSU monopoly, on the one hand, and 'left radical spontaneous destruction' on the other. The third path was the new 'constructive democratic' bloc based on the defence of individual rights and 'the renunciation of left and right radicalism and all forms of political extremism'. They insisted that the struggle against the communist regime 'should not take the form of a struggle against the state as such, since only a strong democratic state is a guarantee of the rights and freedoms of the individual.' They called for the maintenance of the territorial integrity of the RSFSR, and the development of a new voluntary union for the USSR as a whole.⁸⁸ The document, signed by N. I. Travkin, V. V. Aksyuchits and M. G. Astaf'yev, committed the parties to fighting elections together (through the already existing *Rossiisky soyuz* bloc), joint political initiatives, coordinating parliamentary work and activity in Democratic Russia, and developing a joint programme. The question of who would be their joint candidate in a presidential election was left open.

People's Accord took on the role of a classical conservative grouping, and indeed began to evolve into a party, with joint declarations and a consultative council. As part of Democratic Russia it played a key role in the opposition to the communist regime: and after the coup in August 1991 it began to define itself in opposition to the emerging left-liberal consensus. The left radicals, revealing at times an inability to move beyond bolshevik ways of thinking, began to equate opposition to themselves as opposition to democracy itself. In practice, the emergence of an opposition signalled a healthy development in multi-party politics. Sooner or later Democratic Russia, like Solidarity in Poland, would have to break up along ideological and political lines of cleavage.

The RCDM conference on 18 August 1991, which brought together some 300 delegates from 50 towns, met to approve a 'Declaration' modifying the general policy of the RCDM, and to ratify its transformation into an 'All-Russian' (*vserossiiskaya*) party, active not only in the Russian Federation but also in the other republics. This would pit the RCDM directly against the emerging Christian Democratic formations in Ukraine and Belorussia.⁸⁹

The Declaration once again insisted that the destruction of communism did not require the destruction of the old state as well, and proposed the transformation of the union into a democratic centralised state. Above all the Declaration condemned the nation-state principle ('one nation, one state'), and instead insisted that 'The source of state sovereignty should be not the ethnos, but the people, that is, the combination of all the citizens of a given state.'⁹⁰ The Declaration gave a sophisticated analysis of the development of Russian statehood, denying that it was ever, strictly speaking, an empire. It rejected a simplistic post-communist narrow nation-building endeavour and its accompanying exclusive nationalism. The document represented a major contribution to theoretical discussion. A practical consequence was that the RCDM

accepted the text of the draft Union Treaty that was to have been signed on 20 August, although it considered that it gave too much power to the republics.⁹¹

In response, Fr Gleb Yakunin resigned not only from the Duma of the RCDM but also from the movement itself. In his declaration Yakunin noted three key points of disagreement. Firstly, he condemned the participation of the RCDM in a bloc with the DPR and discussions over merging the parties to create a 'United DPR'. He denounced Travkin personally for trying to split Democratic Russia and insisted that any association with such a personality could not but discredit the RCDM. Secondly, he denounced the aim of turning the RCDM into an all-union party. Thirdly, he disapproved of RCDM support for the new Union Treaty since it had been condemned by the Coordinating Council of Democratic Russia, of which he was a member.⁹² Borshchev resigned from the RCDM as well at this time.

During the coup of 19–21 August 1991 all wings of the democratic movement united to defend the White House, even though the 'patriots' knew well that the defeat of the putschists would, in the short run at least, lead to the victory of the 'left radicals' and the accelerated dissolution of the country. Aksyuchits, Anishchenko and many other Christian Democrats distinguished themselves by their active participation on the barricades. Aksyuchits helped establish a radio station in the White House, and helped to convince a key unit of the Taman'sky division to turn its tanks round to defend the building.⁹³

The split in August 1991, which saw the departure of Yakunin and Borshchev, was particularly damaging to the democratic credibility of the RCDM. Already at the founding conference of the RCDM Yakunin had argued for a broad movement. He insisted that while he was a 'Slavophile' in spiritual terms, he rejected 'social patriotic movements', the more reactionary, chauvinistic and often antisemitic nationalists.⁹⁴ Yakunin vigorously disassociated himself from what he considered the more extreme nationalists. He exaggerated, however, when he argued that the RCDM was a party of imperialists, intent on keeping the Russian empire within practically the same borders as the old USSR.⁹⁵ At the same time, to many in the West the presence of Yakunin in the ranks of the RCDM was a token of its democratic and national respectability.

The problems associated with the disintegration of a territory that had been formed over centuries could not be swept under the carpet, as some of the more enthusiastic left democrats believed. For instance, the 450 RCDM members in South Ossetia supported calls by the executive committee of the local soviet on 1 September 1991 to leave the jurisdiction of Georgia, then under the dictatorial regime of Zviad Gamsakhurdia, and join Russia.⁹⁶

As if in fulfilment of the forebodings of the RCDM, the Declaration by the 'Independent Citizen's Initiative Group' of 28 August 1991, whose signatories included Yuri Afanas'yev and Yelena Bonner, insisted that the Novo-Ogarevo '9 plus 1' process attempting to achieve a new union treaty was doomed, and that the state that was called the Russian Empire and then the USSR was dead. All that remained, they insisted, was to manage the disintegration and to hope that the successor republics would be democratic and observe the human rights of all their citizens. Russia could make no claims on property or territory against the other republics, the signatories claiming that this would infringe resolutions of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). This was a misreading of the CSCE process, which was not intended to inhibit change but to manage it in a peaceful and democratic way. They declared that Russia was 'single and divisible', and should have a highly decentralised federal system with a bicameral parliament with representatives

from regional territories (*krai*) and national republics.⁹⁷

In response the RCDM mobilised some of the major figures of the Russian cultural scene. In an 'Appeal to the Russian Intelligentsia' of 5 September they condemned the left radical depiction of Russia's historical and cultural traditions as inherently aggressive and threatening to its neighbours. The intelligentsia had once led Russia into communism, and now, by humiliating Russia's national feelings, was preparing the way for fascism.⁹⁸ At the same time, the RCDM in a letter to Yel'tsin supported the announcement by the latter's press secretary, Pavel Voshchanov, on 26 August that the secession of territories could lead to disaster and that the issue of borders would in one way or another have to be raised.⁹⁹

The second congress of the Democratic Russia movement on 10–11 November 1991, attended by 1180 delegates, brought some of the tensions out into the open. Once Democratic Russia had fulfilled its main purpose, the destruction of the communist regime, it was not clear what role such a cumbersome body could fulfil. The RCDM argued against attempts to turn it into a 'superparty', uniting opposed trends in one body. This would only inhibit the emergence of genuine multi-party politics and give unwarranted powers to its leadership. Instead, the RCDM's political council and Aksyuchits argued that it should remain a coalition of separate forces, with its leadership made up of representatives from the various political parties and movements, excluding cultural and other groups. Membership should be collective through parties, rather than directly as individuals. The Coordinating Council should function as a genuine coalition of representatives of registered parties, each having veto powers, and act mainly as an information exchange. Another option put forward by the RCDM was to abolish the Moscow centre of Democratic Russia altogether and retain only its regional organisations.¹⁰⁰

However, what the Christian Democrats called the 'left radical' leadership of Democratic Russia tried to turn the movement into 'the representative of society' in dialogue with the government.¹⁰¹ This approach demonstrated the tragedy of Democratic Russia. It had come close to becoming the ruling body after the coup, but since it was not clear whether it was a party or a movement it had not and could not become the 'ruling party'. In any case, the presidential institutional structure of post-communist politics meant that parties in Russia would not and could not enjoy the fruits of office in the same way that parties in Western European parliamentary systems do. Yel'tsin kept his distance from Democratic Russia.

In an atmosphere of bitter recriminations and crude barracking by the 'left radical' leadership, some 100 (other reports suggest 200–250) delegates of People's Accord walked out of the congress on the second day, congratulating the majority on 'the victory of bolshevism'. With the collapse of the communist regime a split was almost inevitable, and the only surprise was that it had taken so long. The immediate issue was Yel'tsin's decree of 8 November 1991 imposing a state of emergency on Checheno-Ingushetia, but Democratic Russia had long been torn between those in favour of 'one indivisible Russia' and those ready, if not willing, to see Russia split up.¹⁰² Already the RCDM had argued for a renewed Union, whereas Democratic Russia had been much more wary of a renewed 'centre'. The RCDM resolutely rejected the view that the pressures which had seen the Union dissolve should be allowed free rein in the Russian Federation itself. However, the attempt to use force in Checheno-Ingushetia marked a significant threshold in post-communist Russian politics.

The 300,000-strong Democratic Russia movement continued to pledge its support to Yel'tsin's government, though its representatives urged that he coordinate his

policies with them. At a press conference following the congress, the co-chairman of Democratic Russia, Yuri Afanas'ev, condemned Yel'tsin's government for taking the 'Russian imperial line' of a future 'Russian superpower'.¹⁰³

Although in numerical terms the split barely affected Democratic Russia, in political terms the damage was much greater. The remaining parties in Democratic Russia could only hope that some of its prestige would rub off on them, but without People's Accord, Democratic Russia degenerated into a faction-ridden Ottomanised movement, a party without a programme, dominated by unrepresentative leaders who tended to make policy themselves without reference to the broader movement.

After leaving Democratic Russia, People's Accord also pledged its support for Yel'tsin but began to move closer to the position of the vice-president Aleksandr Rutskoi and his People's Party of Free Russia. All the shards of the former Communist Party, except the orthodox Communist Initiative, were willing to support President Yel'tsin's policy of establishing a powerful state with inviolable borders around an indivisible Russia.¹⁰⁴

The regrouping of political forces, expected immediately after the fall of the old regime in August 1991, was now taking place. The key issue was the creation of a strong single Russia, and on this the resolutely anti-communist RCDM began to find common cause with former communist parties and individuals. Rutskoi in particular fought against the 'sovereignisation' trend in Russia, and had urged the imposition of the state of emergency in Checheno-Ingushetia. The fact that he had been humiliated by the overwhelming vote of parliament on 11 November (177 against four with 15 abstentions) to annul the decree did not appear to make much difference. A new patriotic bloc began to emerge.

A regrouping of forces also took place within Christian Democracy. Many regional organisations had refused to follow the RCDM and DPR leadership out of the congress of Democratic Russia on 11 November 1991. Some of the largest had already warned Aksyuchits that they would remain in Democratic Russia in the event of a split.¹⁰⁵ Only the Tsaritsyn regional organisation of the CDU headed by Fr Dmitri Nesterov followed Aksyuchits, while Savitsky's group in St Petersburg split away from the RCDM.

It is not clear why the regional organisations did not follow Aksyuchits, but it would be simplistic to assume that the regions were more 'democratic' and less 'imperialistic' than the centre. A more practical reason was the structure of post-communist local politics, with Democratic Russia in effect the ruling power in the provinces, controlling the media and political life. Up to August 1991 the combined forces of the RCDM and Democratic Russia had proved a very effective opposition to the decaying communist authorities in the localities. During the coup they mobilised the population against the plotters.¹⁰⁶

After the 'August revolution' Democratic Russia in effect became the sole source of political authority in many areas. This stifling pre-political state of affairs mimicked the situation as it was under the communists. Access to power and privileges was restricted to a new 'democratic' elite. If in November 1991 the regionals had followed Aksyuchits out of Democratic Russia this would have meant going into opposition and losing their influential status. On any issue other than 'empire' versus 'nation' this would no doubt have been a healthy phenomenon, stimulating the development of multi-party politics in the localities.

As far as the regions were concerned, the priority was the rebuilding of a devastated economy and society rather than the precise shape of the Russian state. There was a strong sentiment in favour of the unity of democratic ranks in the face of an

extraordinarily difficult situation. But perhaps above all, it appears that in the provinces Christian Democracy had become the fundamental ideology of Democratic Russia. To have quit Democratic Russia would have meant going into opposition to themselves.

On 25–26 January 1992 in St Petersburg a conference took place of the CDU and RCDM regional organisations that had remained in Democratic Russia. Yakunin, co-chair of Democratic Russia, took part, as well as Borshchev. A dramatic realignment was taking place in Russian Christian Democracy, now focused on St Petersburg and stripped of the more ‘imperialist’ tendencies. The conference condemned ‘part of the leadership of the RCDM who call for the re-creation by any means, including the threat of military force, of a single state in the framework of the old USSR.’ They condemned in particular the new bloc that was emerging ‘with the imperial national-communist forces under the guise of creating a patriotic movement’. For them patriotism meant the spiritual and economic regeneration of Russia based on the free personality.¹⁰⁷ The conference established a Russian Christian Democratic Union co-chaired by Yakunin, Valeri Borshchev and Vitali Savitsky. They planned to hold a congress in Moscow in May 1992.

Meanwhile, the ‘patriotic’ forces were also regrouping. In an appeal of 5 December 1991 Aksyuchits, Anishchenko and I. V. Konstantinov, a deputy of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, noted the paradoxical turn whereby the ‘communist internationalists had turned into “defenders” of the homeland, the state and patriotism, whereas at the same time “Democratic Russia” shamefully runs away from patriotic ideals.’ The appeal called for all supporters of ‘enlightened patriotism’ to unite, excluding all nationalist extremists. The state’s task was to defend all Russians, including those who ‘against their will found themselves outside their territory’. The appeal called for funds to be set aside to assist their repatriation. The ‘arbitrary Lenin–Stalin borders would be questioned one way or another’, and therefore it was better to do it through negotiations and plebiscites in the disputed territories rather than through violent means, as in the Caucasus and Yugoslavia. The new coalition of ‘democratic-statists’ (*gosudarstvenniki*) and ‘democratic-patriots’ would become a powerful force in the land for beneficial transformations.¹⁰⁸

The new patriotic movement emerged at a conference on 8–9 February 1992. Their fears were fanned by the fact that by early 1992 some 235,000 Russians had for one reason or another left their homes in other republics to face a bleak and uncertain future in Russia.

A new patriotic front emerged called the Russian National Union, which included former communists like Sergei Baburin and elements of the party headed by Aleksandr Rutskoi, the People’s Party of Free Russia. Together they made up the largest single bloc in the Russian Supreme Soviet.

Christian Democracy and the Russian Orthodox Church

The Russian Christian Democratic parties emerged against the background of the politicisation of believers trying to influence the course of political developments in Russia. The emergence of an independent Christian movement was part of the emergence of the independent movement as a whole, as the rivulets of dissent broadened into a torrent of independent political activity.

In addition to the emergence of overtly religious parties, there is at the same time a growing non-party religious movement. This is divided into a number of strands, only some of which are described below. The first is concerned with philanthropic and

charitable work, like the group *Miloserdiye*. A second strand concentrates on internal religious regeneration, such as the Moscow Catholic Club. A third strand comprises numerous Christian youth movements. For many years the Russian Student Christian Movement, founded in Czechoslovakia in 1923, had kept the flag of young Orthodoxy aloft in the West, and now assisted the development of the movement in Russia.¹⁰⁹ A fourth strand is concerned with publishing, like the 'Protestant' publishing house which brings out a very profitable monthly newspaper of the same name. By 1990 this paper had reached a circulation of 100,000. (There were of course numerous Russian Orthodox church publications, including the *Zhurnal Moskovskoi Patriarkhii*.¹¹⁰)

The fifth and associated strand is part of the general mushrooming of news agencies. Alongside the likes of Interfax and Postfactum, the four main Christian news agencies are small, yet they are growing and vigorously active. In December 1990 the Christian Information Agency (*Khristianskoye informatsionnoye agentstvo*, KhIAG) was formed out of a number of Christian social organisations. It brings out the weekly *Christian News* (*Khristianskiye novosti*), edited by a former member of the RCDM Duma, Evgeni Polyakov, with information from throughout the former Soviet Union. The 'Informational Religious Agency "Raduga"' (IRAR) brought out a solid weekly called *Vestnik IRAR*, with contacts from throughout the former USSR. The Patriarchate was associated with a third Christian informational body in the form of a journal called *Radonezh*. The fourth was a Catholic information agency called *Istina i zhizn'* ('Truth and Life').

The RCDM supported the principle of the separation of the church and state, and called on the Soviet state to fulfil its own declarations on this question; Article 124 of the 1977 Constitution, for example. The 'Appeal to the Russian Intelligentsia' of 5 September 1991 argued that the struggle for the separation of church and state had long been fought not only by the atheistic intelligentsia but also by religious bodies before the revolution, trying to free Orthodox Christianity from captivity by the state.

How serious was the danger that the revival of Orthodoxy could be used by chauvinistic nationalists for narrow political ends, including threats to the secular nature of Russian society? Could the revival of Orthodoxy threaten the rights of Muslims, Jews and others?

The RCDM appeal insisted that the healthy influence of Orthodoxy in political life could not be portrayed as an attempt to impose a new servitude to replace the collapsed communist regime. There was no reason, Christian Democrats insisted, why an Orthodox country should have an Orthodox state. Their aim was 'a free church in a free state'.¹¹¹ Indeed, given Soviet circumstances, those struggling for religious freedom found themselves in the vanguard of the struggle for democracy. Individuals who had suffered many long years in the struggle for religious freedom and human rights were more likely to make better democrats than former communist functionaries and academics who suddenly discovered the virtues of democracy in the comfort of their offices some three years into *perestroika*.

Under conditions of post-communism traditional values and conservative policies can actually take on a modernising function in that they help to overcome reactionary leftist prejudices against the market and private property that prevent economic development.¹¹² However, this sort of conservative modernising impulse is liable to imbue society with a new set of values that may inhibit modern all-round capitalist development. The RCDM, for example, has a clear concept of an alternative modernity that tries to overcome the historical problem of communist mismodernisation while not succumbing to the amorality of liberal western 'end of history' modernity.

Conservative modernity may also challenge the secular traditions of communist society in the social sphere. The problem in Russia over this issue is nothing like as acute as it is in Poland. Russian Orthodoxy does not share Catholicism's social policies as regards abortion and divorce, and thus some of the conflicts of Polish post-communism may be avoided in Russia.

Whereas the Christian Democratic parties in Italy and Germany are based on the respective church (in Germany on more than one church), in Russia the evolution of Christian Democracy has taken a rather different path. The relationship between the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) and political parties is much more ambivalent. Ogorodnikov's CDU took an uncompromising line towards the Moscow Patriarchate, whereas the breakaway group led by Aleksandr Chuyev, the Russian Christian Democratic Party, was prepared to work with the new Patriarch, Aleksii.

Yakunin was one of the most vigorous scourges of the official church, accusing it of passivity in the face of the tragedy of 1917, for which it was, in the material sense, partially responsible.¹¹³ The tension between what Jane Ellis calls 'hierarchs' and 'dissidents' in the church¹¹⁴ was reflected in the RCDM itself, and was no doubt one of the factors separating Yakunin from his colleagues.

In contrast to Yakunin and the CDU, the RCDM as a whole tried to work with the ROC and redeem it from its long history of 'Sergianism'—compromise with the Soviet state and subservience to the communist authorities.¹¹⁵ Polosin stressed that the RCDM had no intention of splitting the church or of directing any activity against it, but at the same time insisted that the RCDM would maintain its independence from the church. As he stressed on several occasions, the All-Russian Church Council (*pomestny sobor*) of 1917–18 had permitted clergy and laity to participate in politics; not, however, in the name of the church, but as individuals.¹¹⁶ At the preparatory conference of the RCDM on 26 March 1990 he had noted the corruption within the official church and the fact that, through the so-called Peace Fund, it had supported the war in Afghanistan.¹¹⁷

Despite the compromised past of the Russian Orthodox Church, the RCDM in particular looked upon it as the repository of national traditions during the years of oppression under the 'bolshevik yoke', a period which the RCDM compared to that under the 'Mongol–Tartar yoke' between 1240 and 1380. Not only for the smaller nationalities, but for Russia as well, the church acted as an integrating factor as far as certain sections of society were concerned. As Bociurkiw points out, 'In the absence of other autonomous ethnic institutions, a national Church becomes a haven for national traditions and culture: it legitimizes the struggle for their preservation and, at least implicitly, for national liberation, and assumes the role of spokesman for the national interest.'¹¹⁸

In the West the social thinking of Christian Democratic parties developed in a fruitful interaction with the social philosophy of the Roman Catholic and other churches. In Russia, however, it was the religious philosophers like Berdyayev, Struve and Frank who provided the inspiration for the post-communist Russian Christian Democrats.

The ROC, however, was not totally immune to the condition of the working class and social issues before the revolution of 1917 and had generated an embryonic social theology. It was a priest, Fr Georgi Gapon, who led the workers into the massacre of Bloody Sunday in January 1905. Individual priests and bishops did take social initiatives, including involvement in trade unions and welfare activities, and of course sustained the numerous philanthropic and charitable foundations that were such a marked feature of pre-revolutionary Russian life.¹¹⁹

The history of the church under the communists was not solely one of acquiescence. The brave resistance of Patriarch Tikhon in the early years was followed by Metropolitan Sergi's complicity, but this did not preclude individual clerics making brave stands for human and religious rights.¹²⁰ In the post-Stalinist period the priority was human rather than social rights, and thus the political theory of contemporary Christian movements is more developed than their social philosophy. Russian Christian Democracy thus has a distinct and long tradition on which it can draw and is by no means operating in an intellectual or historical vacuum.

One factor that unites the RCDM and the ROC is that both have 'imperial' elements. The ROC exercised jurisdiction not only over Russia proper in its Soviet boundaries, but also in Ukraine, Belorussia and the other republics. The ROC expanded with the tsarist state to encompass the whole area in the form of an 'imperial' church.¹²¹ The disintegration of the USSR was accompanied by the loss to the Moscow Patriarchate of numerous parishes. In Ukraine and Belorussia there was a struggle to establish autocephalous churches, while at the same time churches belonging to the Uniates in Western Ukraine were detaching themselves. The RCDM was critical of the church's subservience to the communist state, but found in it an ally in the struggle for the unity of the East Slavs.

The ROC has not endorsed the RCDM or any other Christian Democratic party (perhaps suspecting them of acting as unwitting agents for the Catholicisation of Russia); its policy thus differs from that of the Vatican in its overt support for the DC party in the first post-war Italian elections. It is not clear what effect the RCDM or any of the other Christian Democratic parties have had on the internal life of the ROC but in the long run such influence cannot be anything but beneficial.

Christian Democracy, Liberalism and the West

The church in Russia faced much the same problems as the Roman Catholic Church in Poland. The leading theologian of Solidarity, Józef Tischner, argued that 'there is much truth in the assertion that, after the confrontation of Christianity with communism, Christianity now faces the confrontation with liberalism.'¹²³ Of course, the church had played a very different role in Russia from that in Poland, where it had acted as a forceful spiritual bastion against the internal communisation of the individual. In Poland, the danger was that the church would lose some of the moral authority that it had gained in the struggle against communism; in Russia, the organised church had yet to gain that authority.

One other major difference from the situation in Poland is worth stressing. Whereas in Poland communism was perceived to have come from the semi-Asiatic barbaric East in the form of Soviet tanks and occupation forces, in Russia communism was perceived to have been a particularly horrible manifestation of western rationalism and Enlightenment thinking. Meanwhile, some of the Pope's extreme formulations on the failings of the West, its materialism, secularism and consumerism, have been tempered by the arguments of Cardinal Basil Hume and others. They have argued that too great an emphasis on the spiritual values associated with the East might undermine the democracy, pluralism and tolerance typical of the West and desperately required in the East.¹²⁴ A debate between western materialism and ecumenism and eastern spirituality, then, lies at the core of debates over the identity of Christian Democracy in Russia.

The thinking of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn profoundly affected the development of Christian Democracy in Russia, and in particular the thinking of the RCDM. In 1990

he had outlined his plans for 'rebuilding Russia', which while permeated by a profound democratism of spirit nevertheless alarmed some. In particular, he had insisted that the Slavic heartlands of Russia, Belorussia, Ukraine and North Kazakhstan should remain together—although not by force.¹²⁵ His views on liberalism and the West are well known: he rejects the West's 'rationalistic humanism' and its pursuit of happiness at the expense of justice and moral truths.

At the founding conference of the RCDM Yakunin insisted that in politics and economics he was a strong 'Westerniser', but in spirit a Slavophile. This was a division, in one way or another, that afflicted many individuals and in a sense the movement as a whole.

Christian Politics, Democracy and *Sobornost*'

The phenomenon of post-communism is marked by distinct and often contradictory tendencies. The aspiration to democracy is accompanied by an ambivalence towards rationality and a search for new meta-truths to replace the shattered bearings of the old society. In this context, religious life is an act of both psychic and social reintegration. Society is uniquely open to revealed truth, and at the same prey to charlatanism and unscrupulous operators.¹²⁶ The phenomenon of the 'practising non-believer' emerges, in contrast to the prevalence of the 'non-practising believer' in the West.¹²⁷

The experience of communism demonstrates that it is very dangerous to consider politics a separate sphere. The RCDM insisted that if Christians did not get involved in politics, then politics would concern itself with Christians. However, the problem with post-communism in Russia, in marked contrast to the situation in Eastern Europe, was that traditional Russian over-politicisation of daily life reached yet a new peak. As the Decembrist Mikhail Lunin had noted, 'In Russia you can't even say "hello" without politics.' Anishchenko argued that Christians had always been deeply involved in politics in Russia, although this did not necessarily have to take the form of parties in the past or, indeed, in the future.¹²⁸

There is a question over the level of secularism that the RCDM thinks proper for a political order. The church, for them, cannot restrict itself to the private management of its affairs and those of its parishes, but should suffuse its spirituality not only into society but into the political system as well. It was not always clear, however, whether the new Christian Democratic parties sought to establish a Christian society, or a society imbued with Christian values, which is not quite the same thing. The first suggests the priority of institutionalising belief in law, whereas the second makes more concessions to the need for autonomous institutions which Christian values can influence but not necessarily dominate. The commitment to transcendent values can sometimes lead to an underestimation of the need for democratic processes and social pluralism on earth, a problem that Christian Democracy in Western Europe has not fully resolved.

Sobornost' is one of the key values of all the Christian Democratic parties. It refers to the conciliar nature of the church whereby both the excesses of episcopal authority associated with the Roman Catholic Church and the opposite trap of extreme individualism typified by Protestant churches can be avoided. In Orthodox thinking *sobornost*' suggests a search for unity based on love and freedom that does not involve giving up one's principles. Hence in a religious gathering there is an attempt to reach consensus rather than the imposition of a majority vote.

In the absence of effective multi-party politics the Russian parliament at times

appeared to work on the basis of a search for consensus rather than conflict, and was thus truer to the tradition of *sobornost'* than to that of pluralistic liberal politics. Yakunin tried to apply the idea to the development of democracy in Russia, arguing that democracy was a secular form of *sobornost'*. The problem could not be solved so easily, since *sobornost'* is often contrasted with parliamentary democracy and western democracy in general. It is often described as something different in principle, as a limitation on democracy arising out of church traditions. A church council (*pomestny sobor*) might well be attended by elected lay delegates, but there was a structural imbalance since the bishops would always outweigh the clergy, and so on down to the humble worshipper. Historically, *sobornost'* has to a degree excluded free and equal citizenship. The mere presence of hierarchs presupposes hierarchy.

In a round-table chaired by Michael E. Urban, Vyacheslav Igrunov, the director of what was the Moscow Bureau of Information Exchange (M-BIO), funded at one stage by Aksyuchits, argued that the RCDM, despite its formal commitment to democracy, was in fact an undemocratic body. He argued that the RCDM, in contrast to some of the other new parties, did reflect 'mass consciousness', but he went on to suggest that 'it selects only a fragment and excludes the liberal current entirely'. He even went so far as to suggest that the Programme was 'not orientated towards any democratic principles at all', since it refused to predetermine the future structure of the Russian state. Another participant, Sergei Mitrokhin, countered by suggesting that this could be seen as a token of the democratic credentials of the party, 'since it does not seek to predetermine the fate of Russia but is willing to abide by the results of the democratic process. And, moreover, it is in favour of a legal order.' The view that the RCDM would 'develop into a real political party' was not challenged.¹²⁹

The debate over just how democratic the RCDM is continues. It should be stressed that the RCDM sees democracy not only as an aim but also as a method. The movement was well aware that the attempt to build democracy on a devastated social terrain was a dangerous project, and hence argued the need for the development of civil society, on which a stable state could be built. Their programme, reminiscent of John Stuart Mill, stressed the need for 'education in creative democracy', with the development of a legal consciousness, respect for freedom and the broad development of a democratic culture and a culture of democracy.

Václav Havel has asserted one of the concerns that was central to the RCDM, the moral contamination of society: 'All of us have become accustomed to the totalitarian system, accepted it as an unalterable fact and therefore kept it running. . . None of us is merely a victim of it, because all of us helped to create it together.' As he put it earlier, the 'line of conflict' did not run between the people and the state, but rather through each individual person.¹³⁰ In a paraphrase of Michel Foucault's maxim that power passes through subjects as much as through rulers, the RCDM contends that guilt runs through the individual as much as between individuals. The RCDM has called for a 'moral revolution' to overcome the communist rebellion against God, for repentance rather than retribution.

The RCDM and Christian Democracy

The RCDM has an ambivalent relationship with Christian Democracy as a theory, and with the Christian Democratic International as an organisation. While there is little doubt that the RCDM is a Christian and a democratic party, the CDI sometimes doubted whether it was a genuine Christian Democratic party.

The RCDM has officially applied for membership of the Christian Democratic

International but so far its application has been shelved. The CDI is an organisation based in Brussels with a membership of parties from 58 countries. Each member of the CDI has autonomy for its domestic and foreign policies, with the CDI Secretariat in Brussels acting as a broad unifying structure, distributing information and publicity, coordinating initiatives and, in certain cases, providing material assistance.

Ogorodnikov's Christian Democratic Union was the first of the Russian Christian Democratic parties to apply for and receive probational membership, and indeed substantial material support, at the CDI congress in Guatemala in September 1990. The speed of the CDU's acceptance was justified by the need to give it 'moral support and physical protection', the threat of physical persecution not yet having been entirely lifted in the Soviet Union.

The CDI has had reservations in embracing the RCDM for two main reasons. The first is the question mark about its democratic credentials and the perception that it might be prey to the theocratic heresy and the anti-rationalist Russian authoritarian mysticism allegedly inherent in Orthodoxy. On the other hand, the 19th-century proto-Christian Democratic movements like *Zentrum* in Germany and the *Partito Popolare Italiano* equally placed more stress on the *Christian* rather than the *democratic* component of Christian Democracy than did their latter-day counterparts, and this appears to be a stage that the Russian movement is now repeating.

The second point focuses on disagreements over the disintegration of the USSR. The CDI Secretary-General, André Louis, raised some of these issues in his address to the RCDM conference on 18 August 1991. He argued that the old Union was dead, and insisted that the RCDM build its programme 'not conceived in terms of the past, but on the contrary on a creative approach focused on the future'. The unity of the republics, as the experience of the European Community had demonstrated, could not be forced but had to be based on a long process of voluntary association. Moreover, he warned against excessive centralism and in effect made a plea for subsidiarity, one of the concepts that Catholic social thinking had contributed to the development of the European Community, urging that 'political responsibility should always be exercised, as completely as possible, as close as possible to the people'.¹³¹

In certain respects the RCDM does not conform to the Christian Democratic tradition. It is arguably not a Christian Democratic party at all but a traditional conservative party, more akin to the British Conservatives than the continental tradition. The RCDM tried to combine traditional values with what they called the contemporary achievements of world civilisation, the classical European conservative combination. The party also passed the test of modern conservatism in claiming that the powers of the state should not be much more than those of the 'nightwatchman'. In practice, however, conservatives rely heavily on an interventionist state. Libertarian conservatism, with its minimal role for the state, is clearly impracticable in post-communist conditions, and the RCDM realised this before the 'left radical' anti-statists. Above all, the party lacked a developed concept of federalism, as well as having failed to take on board the notion of subsidiarity. It was fully committed, however, if not in so many words, to the classical Christian Democratic notions of personalism and pluralism. While it may depart from European traditions in many respects, the RCDM also has much in common with the Christian Democratic tradition. Above all, there are clear similarities in the social Christian element of the thinking of both sides.

It is not clear whether Christian Democracy is compatible with the Eastern Orthodox tradition. Christian Democracy has not traditionally been associated with countries where Orthodoxy predominates and has made little impact in Romania or

Bulgaria. There is thus a historical gulf in understanding to be bridged between the new-born Russian Christian Democracy and the traditional form that has developed in Western Europe. As Karpets suggested at the founding conference of the RCDM in April 1990, there is no overwhelming reason why Christian politics had to take the form of Christian Democratic politics.

Christian Democracy in the West is not a static force, and it has in any case never operated on the basis of a rigorously worked-out theory. In the domestic policies of each country it is faced by new challenges, such as the decline of religious belief and the salience of ethical issues focusing, for example, on the role of the family, abortion and genetic engineering. The hegemony of Christian Democracy in Germany and Italy in the post-war years was no doubt buttressed by the divisions engendered by the Cold War. Only residual traces of Christian Democratic theory could be found in the practical policies of certain Christian Democratic ruling parties. Now instead of relying on the external enemy of Marxist regimes, the movement is faced by the challenge of internal renewal and the examination of its own policies. For too long Christian Democrats were complacent accomplices of comfortable ruling elites, allowing the radical elements of their own social policy to stagnate while wallowing in the narrow certainties of the Cold War. Now it is time for the CDI itself to look to the post-Cold War agenda of social justice on a global scale.

Conclusion

Andranik Migranyan argued that 'the Russian national movement is still embryonic and remains on the periphery of socio-political life in Russia.' In contrast to the situation in Eastern Europe and some of the other former Soviet republics, the anticommunist struggle in Russia mobilised more around general democratic principles than national revival. However, Migranyan argued that the democratic potential of the country was very low, whereas the potential of a national movement was enormous.¹³² This is not the place to enter into polemic with Migranyan on the democratic potential of the country, but there is no doubt about the paradoxical, though in certain respects understandable, growth of the national movement *after* the fall of communism.

The RCDM was convinced that Russia was called to a great destiny, but Russia's tragedy is that it is not sure wherein its greatness lies. In the 20th century it suffered the greatest devastation a nation can know, and on top of everything else was accused of enslaving others. The tragedy of Russia again is that its limits, physical and spiritual, are not known. Even England, with secure borders, has not yet made final peace with its neighbours Wales, Scotland and Ireland, and tiny Belgium is being torn apart by ethnicised nationalism.

The RCDM is at present grasping the unique opportunity to combine nationalism and democracy in a way that could strengthen both. However irrational nationalism might appear, in certain forms it is an expression of the urge to freedom, and the RCDM has insisted that individual development can best take place in the framework of a broader national community. Christian Democracy in Russia, and in particular the RCDM, is bound up with the redefinition not only of the past in general but also of the Russian national idea in the present. At the same time, it is committed to a democracy that reflects some of the truncated traditions of Russian social development. The RCDM is heir to a long tradition of Russian political and religious philosophy, but redefines it for modern purposes. As the RCDM's patriotism became perhaps less 'enlightened', it tended to become more of a Christian 'national' party and less a Christian Democratic one.

The decline of the appeal of most forms of socialist legitimation suggests that Christian Democracy can be expected to play an important part in the creative task of post-communist development. Christian Democratic parties have developed with extraordinary rapidity since 1989. According to André Louis, Christian Democracy's success can be explained by the fact that it 'realises the striving for morality'.¹³³

It is not clear at the moment that any of the existing Russian Christian Democratic parties is sufficiently within the tradition to take on the mantle of Christian Democracy. However, Christian Democracy, like democracy itself, will have to change and adapt to the challenges of the post-communist world, and in particular the specific features of Russian tradition and development.

The RCDM has emerged as one of the central protagonists on the post-communist Russian political scene. It has tried to steer its own path between, on the one hand, the decayed communist regime and its dangerous illusions and, on the other, what was perceived as the national nihilism of the left radical westernising democrats. The RCDM sought to base itself on a democratic and patriotic politics.

The RCDM and its allies have already been able substantially to affect policy as a Christian interest group, notably in the adoption of the liberal Law on Freedom of Conscience in October 1990. It has, moreover, substantially penetrated state agencies and local government, and has played a central part in the development of post-communist political processes. Above all, Christian Democracy has assisted the expansion of the public sphere and the development of the independent associations of civil society. At the same time the development of the egotism of civil society has been tempered by the notion of *sobornost'*, which has expanded from the sphere of church life to encompass the aspirations to community in the broader social sphere.

Christian Democratic parties suffer from problems similar to those facing all the new parties in Russia, and in particular the focus on the leader and the weakness of internal organisational and ideological discipline. Russian Christian Democracy has suffered the fate of many of the new parties: the tendency to splinter. The RCDM has suffered from devastating splits, and has along the way lost key figures. It is still not clear whether it will be able to forge an effective campaigning party appealing to a broad electorate but there is no doubt that it will play a central role in the development of post-communist Russian democratic politics.

Notes and References

I would like to thank John Anderson (St Andrews), Anthony de Meeus (Brussels), Vladimir Moss (Guildford) and Philip Walters (Oxford) for their help in the preparation of this article. They bear no responsibility for the views presented here.

¹ The literature on Christian Democracy includes M. P. Fogarty, *Christian Democracy in Western Europe, 1820–1953* (London, 1957); R. Irving, *The Christian Democrat Parties of Western Europe* (London, 1987); J. M. Mayeur, *Des Partis catholiques à la démocratie chrétienne* (Paris, 1980); H. Portelli and T. Jansen (eds), *La Démocratie chrétienne: force internationale* (Paris, 1986); J. Whyte, *Catholics in Western Democracies* (London, 1981).

² Judy Batt, *East Central Europe: From Reform to Transferation* (London, 1991), p. 129.

³ *Independent*, 9 December 1991.

⁴ Khristianskoye informatsionnoye agentstvo (KhIAG), *Khristianskiye novosti*, no. 22 (19 May 1991), p. 22.

⁵ *Rerum novarum* was followed by a number of other encyclicals, broadening the church's social philosophy into new areas, such as world peace, human rights, decolonisation and development, and environmental issues, and at the same time deepening its earlier analysis of the role of work in modern society and reasserting the primacy of the individual against

the blind laws of the market. The encyclicals included: *Quadragesimo anno* (1931), *Mater et magistra* (1961), *Pacem in terris* (1963), *Gaudium et spes* (1965), *Populorum progressio* (1967), *Octogesimo adveniens* (1971), *Laborem exercens* (1981), *Sollicitudo rei socialis* (1988) and, on the centenary of the original encyclical, *Centesimus annus* (1991). For a discussion of the significance of *Rerum novarum* in its centennial year, see *Objectif Europe*, L'Office Catholique d'Information et d'Initiative pour l'Europe (OCIPE), nos 13–14 (1991).

⁶ Fogarty, *Christian Democracy in Western Europe*, p. 5.

⁷ There is a strong parallel here with Pope John Paul's vision of a revived Christendom that, while avoiding dreams of medieval temporal power, could challenge the domination of secular humanism in Western Europe and could provide a beacon of hope in Eastern Europe, filling the spiritual vacuum that is the legacy of communism. The movement for the 'second evangelisation' of Europe was boosted by the first Synod of some 80 European bishops, which met in Rome in November 1991 to discuss, by implication at least, the extension of the boundaries of the Counter-Reformation to the East. Since the declaration on his first papal visit to Poland in June 1979 of 'the spiritual unity' of Europe the communist regimes had fallen and the political unity of the continent had been established. Now the Pope tried to imbue the unification of Europe with a spiritual content. As can be imagined, the Russian Orthodox Patriarch, Aleksii II, did not take kindly to renewed Catholic proselytism in Russia, Belorussia and Ukraine. The Pope's appointment of a new Roman Catholic Archbishop in Moscow, Tadeusz Kondrusiewicz, did not go down too well either. For an attempt to define the issues dividing Catholicism and Orthodoxy in Russia today, see *Moscow News*, (2–9 February 1992), p. 7.

⁸ Patrick Michel, *Politics and Religion in Eastern Europe: Catholicism in Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia* (Cambridge, 1991), p. 1.

⁹ *Khristianskiye partii i samodeyatel'nyye ob'yedineniya: sbornik materialov i dokumentov* (Moscow, 1990), p. 63.

¹⁰ *Khristianskiye partii i samodeyatel'nyye ob'yedineniya*, pp. 49–60.

¹¹ It would appear that such scandals derive less from any improper behaviour by Ogorodnikov than from lack of care when dealing with the very large sums that began to arrive from the West. The split in CDU ranks in spring 1990 arose from the lack of accounts concerning the disbursement of half a million dollars. As one of Ogorodnikov's friends stated. 'I've known Sasha for twenty years. Could anyone really accuse him of dishonesty? I don't think that he knows what colour money is, and he has never had a decent pair of trousers', Anatoli Levitin-Krasnov, *Kommersant*, no. 17 (1990).

¹² *Noveishiye politicheskiye partii i techeniya v SSSR: dokumenty i materialy*, general editor B. F. Slavin (Moscow, 1991), pp. 525–6.

¹³ *Khristianskaya politika* was in fact the old *Vestnik khristianskoi demokratii* from issue no. 14.

¹⁴ Viktor Vladimirovich Aksyuchits was born into a peasant family in Western Belorussia on 29 August 1949. The family moved to Riga in 1953 and from 1965 to 1969 he studied at the Riga Marine College. From 1969 to 1972 he served with the Soviet Navy. In 1972 he entered Moscow State University through the worker's faculty and studied philosophy, graduating in 1978. His main interest was early 20th-century Russian religious philosophy. He was a member of the CPSU from 1971 to 1979, but left convinced that the party was leading the country to catastrophe. He was not permitted to continue in academic life, so took up the life of the *shabashnik*, an itinerant building site worker. He worked with brigades of *shabashniki* in the collective and state farms of Siberia, Kazakhstan, the Caucasus, the Far East and Central Russia, and thus had a good opportunity to witness at first hand the devastation of Russia. An interview on Aksyuchits' life was published in *Put'*, 2 (December 1990), p. 5.

¹⁵ *The Bell*, Newsletter of the Association for a Free Russia (May 1990), p. 6.

¹⁶ The initial 15 members of the RCDM Duma were as follows: Viktor Aksyuchits (Moscow); Gleb Anishchenko (Moscow, joint editor, with Aksyuchits, of the journal *Vybor*); Artem

Artemov (Moscow, general manager of Duma affairs); Boris Bychevsky (Moscow, icon painter, chair of the Independent Association for the Revival of Church Art); Aleksei Chubisov (Tver', church activist); Oleg Denisenko (Moscow, chair of the Russian Young Christian Movement); Vladimir Karpets (Moscow, Christian writer and historian); Aleksandr Kazakov (Riga, Christian writer and one of the editors of the Latvian Russian-language paper *Atmoda*, first editor of RCDM newspaper *Put'*); Oleg Kostenko (Odessa, Christian social activist); Fr Vyacheslav Polosin (Moscow); Evgeni Polyakov (Moscow, historian and editor of RCDM-affiliated *Vestnik khristianskogo informatsionnogo tsentra*); Vitali Savitsky (leader of the St Petersburg group of the Christian Democratic Union, which had broken away from the CDU led by Alexander Ogorodnikov); Valeri Senderov (Moscow, human rights activist and writer, one of the representatives of the Alliance of Russian Solidarists (NTS) in Moscow); Anatoli Sutko (Obninsk, leader of the Kaluga group of RCDM); Fr Gleb Yakunin (Moscow). *Rossiiskoye khristianskoye demokraticeskoye dvizheniye: sbornik materialov* (Moscow, 1990), p. 5; Vladimir Sadovnikov, *Vestnik khristianskogo informatsionnogo tsentra*, no. 29 (10 April 1990); *Keston News Service*, no. 349 (3 May 1990), p. 3.

¹⁷ For details, see *Put'*, no. 1 (1990), p. 2.

¹⁸ Fr Mark Smirnov was the joint editor, with D. E. Furman, of *Na puti k svobode sovesti* (*The Road to Freedom of Conscience*) (Moscow, 1989), one of the milestones of *perestroika's* reevaluation of the role of religion in society.

¹⁹ *Vestnik khristianskogo informatsionnogo tsentra*, 29 (10 April 1990), pp. 3–4. For Karpets' thinking see 'The Idea of Russia or "the Russian Idea"', condemning Messianic versions of 'the Russian idea', *Put'*, no. 1/4 (January 1991), p. 7.

²⁰ *RKhDD: sbornik materialov*, p. 7. Key documents from this collection are published in full as an appendix to this article.

²¹ *ibid.*, p. 8.

²² The volume *Vekhi: sbornik statei o russkoi intelligentsii* (*Signposts: Articles on the Russian Intelligentsia*), (Moscow, 1909) contained articles by N. A. Berdyayev, S. N. Bulgakov, M. O. Gershenzon, A. S. Izgoyev, B. A. Kistyakovskiy, P. B. Struve and S. L. Frank. In 1918 a follow-up volume called *Iz glubiny: sbornik statei o russkoi revolyutsii* (*From the Depths: Articles on the Russian Revolution*), republished in Moscow in 1991, contained articles by some of the earlier contributors on the meaning of the catastrophe of the Russian revolution. A third volume with deliberate reference to the earlier ones was *Iz pod glyb* (*From Under the Rubble*), (London 1975), with articles by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, Mikhail Agursky, Igor' Shafarevich and others analysing the evils that had befallen Russia. In a deliberate reference to the tradition, Aksyuchits and his associates had established a publishing arm called 'Iz glubin'. For an analysis of the significance of *Vekhi* see Christopher Read, *Religion, Revolution and the Russian Intelligentsia, 1900–1912* (London, 1979).

²³ *RKhDD: sbornik materialov*, pp. 13–17.

²⁴ *RKhDD: sbornik materialov*, pp. 17–21.

²⁵ *Vestnik khristianskogo informatsionnogo tsentra*, 29 (10 April 1990), p. 3.

²⁶ *RKhDD: sbornik materialov*, pp. 21–35, at p. 34.

²⁷ *Moscow News*, no. 21 (3–10 June 1991), p. 6.

²⁸ *RKhDD: sbornik materialov*, pp. 38–40.

²⁹ *Put'*, no. 6/9 (1991), p. 14.

³⁰ *Stoliisa*, no. 13 (19), (April 1991), p. 18.

³¹ *Put'*, no. 2/5 (March 1991), p. 1 of addendum.

³² 'RKhDD– deklaratsiya po tekushchemu momentu' (18 August 1991), pp. 11–12.

³³ *RKhDD: sbornik materialov*, pp. 38–40.

³⁴ 'The renewal of Russia', mimeo, p. 3.

³⁵ On the development and role of the national CRA, see John Anderson, 'The Council for Religious Affairs and the shaping of Soviet religious policy', *Soviet Studies*, vol. 43, no. 4 (1991), pp. 689–710.

- ³⁶ Gleb Anishchenko, 'Sovet umer—da zdravstvuyet sovet', *Put'*, no. 3/6 (April 1991), p. 4.
- ³⁷ *RKhDD: sbornik materialov*, p. 44.
- ³⁸ *Moscow News*, no. 21 (3–10 June 1990), p. 6.
- ³⁹ For a reprint of a discussion of the ideas of Ludwig Erhard, see *Put'*, 5/8 (1991), p. 13.
- ⁴⁰ *Moscow News*, no. 5 (2–9 February 1992), pp. 8–9.
- ⁴¹ *RKhDD: sbornik materialov*, p. 45.
- ⁴² M. P. Krylov, *Put'* (October 1990), p. 6.
- ⁴³ *RKhDD: sbornik materialov*, pp. 48–50.
- ⁴⁴ RCDM Declaration 'Ot kommunisticheskoi imperii k novomu gosudarstvu', *Put'*, no. 2/5 (March 1991). See also V. Aksyuchits' 'Natsional'noye i ideologicheskoye', *Put'*, no. 1/4 (January 1991), p. 2. For a concise exposition of the view that the territory of the USSR, and not the RSFSR, was the successor to tsarist Russia, see Alexander Tsipko, *Put'* no. 2/5 (March 1991), p. 4.
- ⁴⁵ *Moscow News*, no. 21 (3–10 June 1990), p. 6.
- ⁴⁶ *Stolitsa*, no. 13 (19), (April 1991), p. 18.
- ⁴⁷ Russians made up 70 per cent of the population of the Crimea, 24 per cent were Ukrainians, and 6 per cent others, including a small proportion of Crimean Tatars: *Put'* no. 2/5 (March 1991), p. 2. See also 'The Crimea in February 1954', *Moscow News*, no. 6 (9–16 February 1992), p. 9.
- ⁴⁸ *Stolitsa*, no. 13 (19), (April 1991), p. 18.
- ⁴⁹ In November 1991 Aksyuchits called for plebiscites in disputed territories, but did not mention a national referendum. *Nezavisimaya gazeta* (14 November 1991), p. 2.
- ⁵⁰ *Put'* (October 1990), p. 2.
- ⁵¹ For a historical summary of this view, see V. O. Klyuchevsky, *Istoricheskiye portrety* (Moscow, 1990), p. 253.
- ⁵² Marquis de Custine, *Letters from Russia*, translated and edited by Robin Buss (Harmondsworth, 1991), p. 58.
- ⁵³ Victor Aksyuchits, interviewed in *20th Century and Peace*, in *Khristianskaya demokratiya: Bulletin of the Christian Democratic International on Eastern Europe*, 13 (May–June 1991), pp. 17–28, at pp. 19–20.
- ⁵⁴ *RKhDD: sbornik materialov*, p. 52.
- ⁵⁵ *Moscow News*, no. 21 (3–10 June 1990), p. 6.
- ⁵⁶ Yel'tsin on television, 7 September 1991.
- ⁵⁷ *Put'*, no. 1 (1990), p. 2.
- ⁵⁸ Polosin interviewed in *Nauka i religiya*, no. 9 (1990), pp. 30–1.
- ⁵⁹ *RKhDD: sbornik materialov*, p. 53.
- ⁶⁰ *Put'*, no. 1 (1990), p. 2.
- ⁶¹ The choice of the name *Put'* was a deliberate reference to the paper by the same name published by Berdyayev in Paris in the 1920s.
- ⁶² *Put'*, no. 3/6 (April 1991), p. 3.
- ⁶³ *Forbes Magazine* (20 August 1990) p. 38; a view expressed in his opening address to the founding conference of the RCDM on 9 April 1990, *RKhDD: sbornik materialov*, p. 9.
- ⁶⁴ *Religion in Communist Lands*, vol. 17, no. 2 (Summer 1989), p. 155; John B. Dunlop, 'The Russian Orthodox Church and nationalism after 1988', *Religion in Communist Lands*, vol. 18, no. 4 (Winter 1990), p. 295.
- ⁶⁵ *RCDA—Religion in Communist Dominated Areas*, vol. 27, no. 4 (Fall 1988), p. 10.
- ⁶⁶ *Moscow News*, no. 11 (18 March 1990), p. 11.
- ⁶⁷ The latest version of the NTS programme was adopted in November 1987: *Put' k budushchei Rossii* (Frankfurt), translated by George Miller as *An Alternative to Gorbachev: the Way to a Future Russia* (London, 1990).
- ⁶⁸ Viktor Rott was the editor of the journal *Khristianin*, published by the 'Protestant' organisation, who issued a paper by that name. Relations between Protestant organisations and Orthodox ones appeared closer than those between the latter and Roman Catholic bodies.

- ⁶⁹ *Moscow News*, no. 21 (3–10 June 1990), p. 6.
- ⁷⁰ *Forbes Magazine* (20 August 1990), p. 38.
- ⁷¹ Interview, 8 September 1991; see also *Stolitsa*, no. 13 (19). (April 1991), p. 16.
- ⁷² Interview, 10 September 1991.
- ⁷³ *Moscow News*, no. 4 (26 January to 2 February 1992), p. 8.
- ⁷⁴ *Moscow News*, no. 21 (3–10 June 1990), p. 6.
- ⁷⁵ *Stolitsa*, no. 13 (19), (April 1991), p. 18.
- ⁷⁶ Edward Acton, *Rethinking the Russian Revolution* (London, 1990), p. 145.
- ⁷⁷ *RKhDD: sbornik materialov*, pp. 58–66.
- ⁷⁸ *Izvestiya* (5 June 1990); *Pravda* (6 June 1990); for analysis, see *Report on the USSR*, vol. 2, no. 39 (28 September 1990), pp. 13–14.
- ⁷⁹ *Izvestiya* (9 October 1990); *Pravda* (9 October 1990).
- ⁸⁰ *Stolitsa*, no. 13 (19), (April 1991), p. 9.
- ⁸¹ *Put'*, no. 1 (1990), p. 2.
- ⁸² *RKhDD: sbornik materialov*, p. 65.
- ⁸³ *Forbes Magazine* (20 August 1990), p. 38.
- ⁸⁴ *Put'*, no. 2/5 (March 1991), p. 2.
- ⁸⁵ Aksyuchits interview, 10 September 1991.
- ⁸⁶ *Moscow News*, no. 46 (17–24 November 1991), p. 3; in September 1991 Anishchenko claimed that the DPR had 35,000 members, and in February 1992 the DPR allegedly had 50,000 members. *Moscow News*, no. 4 (26 January to 2 February 1992), p. 8.
- ⁸⁷ Some aspersions have been cast on his role in the first days of the coup. Apparently his failure to appear during the defence of the White House was caused by his wife refusing to let him out of the apartment. Thus history fails to be made, and an appointment with destiny is missed.
- ⁸⁸ 'Deklaratsiya Konstruktivno-demokraticeskogo bloka "Narodnoye soglasiye"', *Khristianskiye novosti*, no. 18 (21 April 1991), pp. 10–12. For a reasoned analysis condemning the left radicals in Democratic Russia for their support for the disintegration of Russia on the grounds, among others, that the Lenin–Stalin borders were drawn quite arbitrarily, see V. Aksyuchits. 'Demokraty v stalinskikh granitsakh', *Put'*, no. 5/8 (1991), pp. 2, 4. For a defence of the RCDM line that the comparison with the break-up of the Western European empires was a false one, and that the priority was to get rid of the communist regime so that free peoples could decide on the new state formation, see Vladimir Tinakov, 'Osobodit' ili razdelit'', *Put'*, no. 5/8 (1991), p. 4; see also Artem Artemov's condemnation of the idea of a commonwealth of sovereign states in the same issue, p. 5.
- ⁸⁹ *Put'*, special issue (19 August 1991); 'Deklaratsiya po tekushchemu momentu', mimeo (18 August 1991). For the development of Christian Democratic movements in Belorussia, see *Khristianskaya demokratiya*, no. 14 (July–August 1991), pp. 7–11; no. 15 (September–October 1991), pp. 8–13; and in Ukraine, *ibid.*, no. 14 (July–August 1991), pp. 4–6. Even though the RCDM had originally envisaged itself as a party operating in the RSFSR alone, groups and individuals associated with the RCDM soon sprang up in the other republics. It should be noted that British mainland parties do not organise in Northern Ireland, despite several attempts to do so.
- ⁹⁰ 'Deklaratsiya', p. 9.
- ⁹¹ *Pravda* (19 August 1991), p. 1; *Khristianskaya demokratiya*, no. 14 (July–August 1991), p. 11.
- ⁹² *Khristianskiye novosti*, no. 40 (1 September 1991), p. 11.
- ⁹³ *Put'*, special issue (19 August 1991); and *Put'*, no. 7/10 (1991), pp. 1–4.
- ⁹⁴ *Khristianskaya demokratiya*, no. 7 (May–June 1990), p. 4; John Anderson, mimeo, p. 4.
- ⁹⁵ Interview in *Izvestiya*, cited in *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, no. 14 (November 1991), p. 2.
- ⁹⁶ 'Appeal of the emergency session of the Soviet of People's Deputies of South Ossetia to President B. N. Yel'tsin', 1 September 1991, mimeo: RCDM press release (mid-September 1991), mimeo.

- ⁹⁷ 'Zayavleniye gruppy "Nezavisimaya grazhdanskaya initsiativa"', 28 August 1991, signed by Yu. N. Afanas'yev, L. M. Batkin, V. S. Bibler, Ye. G. Bonner, Yu. G. Burtin, V. V. Ivanov and Lev M. Timofeyev.
- ⁹⁸ 'K rossiiskoi intelligentsii' (5 September 1991). The signatories included V. Aksyuchits, G. Anishchenko, V. Borisov, S. Zalygin, I. Zolotussky, I. Konstantinov, Yu. Kublanovsky, D. Likhachev and V. Nepomnyashchy.
- ⁹⁹ Letter to President B. N. Yel'tsin from V. Aksyuchits, mimeo.
- ¹⁰⁰ 'Obrashcheniye delegatsii RKhDD khuchastnikam s'yezda dvizheniya "Demokrati-cheskaya Rossiya"', mimeo; *Russkaya mysl'*, no. 3904 (15 November 1991), p. 6. Aksyuchits' detailed analysis of the conference is in *Nezavisimaya gazeta* (14 November 1991), p. 2.
- ¹⁰¹ L. M. Batkin, member of the Coordinating Council of Democratic Russia, *Russkaya mysl'*, no. 3904 (15 November 1991), p. 6.
- ¹⁰² In 10 out of 16 autonomous republics in the Russian Federation Russians were in a minority, and in one, Yakutia, Russians comprised 50.3 per cent of the population. Thus there was certainly a potential for Russia to split up devastatingly. See Artem Artemov, *Put'*, no. 5/8 (1991), p. 5.
- ¹⁰³ *Russkaya mysl'*, no. 3904 (15 November 1991), p. 6.
- ¹⁰⁴ *Moscow News*, no. 46 (17–24 November 1991), p.3.
- ¹⁰⁵ *Russkaya mysl'*, no. 3904 (15 November 1991), p.6.
- ¹⁰⁶ See, for example, events in Borisoglebovsk, *Khristianskiye novosti*, no. 41 (8 September 1991), pp. 7–8.
- ¹⁰⁷ 'Ostorozhno–natsional-kommunizm!', mimeo (26 January 1992).
- ¹⁰⁸ 'K narodnomu soglasiyu', mimeo (5 December 1991).
- ¹⁰⁹ *Put'*, no. 2/5 (March 1991), p. 7.
- ¹¹⁰ Some of the broad range of the Christian press is reviewed by Oleg Mramornov in *Put'*, no. 6/9 (1991), p. 15.
- ¹¹¹ *Put'* (October 1990), p. 2.
- ¹¹² For a comparable argument, see Melanie Tatur, 'Catholicism and modernisation in Poland', *The Journal of Communist Studies*, vol. 7, no. 3 (September 1991), pp. 335–49.
- ¹¹³ *Vestnik KhIA*, no. 29 (87), (10 April 1990), p. 4.
- ¹¹⁴ Jane Ellis, 'Hierarchs and dissidents: conflict over the future of the Russian Orthodox Church', *Religion in Communist Lands*, vol. 18 no. 4 (Winter 1990), pp. 307–18.
- ¹¹⁵ A discussion of 'Sergianism' is in *Put'*, no. 2 (December 1990), p. 6. On KGB penetration of the Holy Synod, see *Moscow News*, no. 6 (9–16 February 1992), p. 16.
- ¹¹⁶ *RKhDD: sbornik materialov*, p. 14.
- ¹¹⁷ *The Bell* (May 1990), p. 6.
- ¹¹⁸ Bohdan Bociurkiw, 'Nationalities and Soviet religious policies', in Lubomyr Hajda and Mark Beissinger (eds), *The Nationalities Factor in Soviet Politics and Society* (Oxford, 1990), p. 152; see also T. B. Dunn, *Religion and Nationalism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union* (London, 1987) and Nicolai N. Petro (ed.), *Christianity and Russian Culture in Soviet Society* (Boulder, CO., 1990).
- ¹¹⁹ John Anderson, mimeo, p. 14; see early chapters of J. W. Cunningham, *A Vanquished Hope: the Movement for Church Reform in Russia 1905–1906* (New York, 1981); and G. Simon, *Church, State and Opposition in the USSR* (London, 1974).
- ¹²⁰ Plenty of examples can be found in: Gerald Buss, *The Bear's Hug: Religious Belief and the Soviet State* (London, 1987); Jane Ellis, *The Russian Orthodox Church: a Contemporary History* (Beckenham, 1986); Dmitry Pospelovsky, *The Russian Church under the Soviet Regime, 1917–1982*, 2 vols (Crestwood, NY, 1984); Dmitry Pospelovsky, *Soviet Studies on the Church and the Believer's Response to Atheism* (Crestwood, NY, 1988); Pedro Ramet, *Cross and Commissar: the Politics of Religion in Eastern Europe and the USSR* (Bloomington, IN, 1987).
- ¹²¹ Bociurkiw, 'Nationalities and Soviet religious policies', p. 152.
- ¹²² For details, see Dunlop, 'The Russian Orthodox Church and nationalism after 1988', pp.

294–9; also Jane Ellis, 'Hierarchs and dissidents', pp. 316–17.

¹²³ *Tydognik Powszechny* (7 April 1990), cited by Timothy Garton Ash, 'Poland after Solidarity', *New York Review of Books* (13 June 1991), p. 51.

¹²⁴ *Guardian* (29 November 1991).

¹²⁵ Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, 'Kak nam obustroit' Rossiyu?', *Komsomolskaya pravda* (18 September 1990); *Literaturnaya gazeta* (19 September 1990); *Rebuilding Russia: Reflections and Tentative Proposals* (London, 1991).

¹²⁶ Russia has been swept by various faith healers, sightings of UFOs and all sorts of other phenomena that might indicate a society suffering a profound psychological trauma. This is not to suggest that faith-healers like Kashpirovsky, Kasyan, Chumak and Davitashvili, revered by millions in Russia today, are false prophets, or that the extraordinary psychic phenomena recorded in Russia in latter days are all hoaxes. For a positive view, see *Moscow News*, no. 4 (26 January to 2 February 1992), p. 14.

¹²⁷ Michel, *Politics and Religion*, p. 5.

¹²⁸ Gleb Anishchenko, *Stolitsa*, 13 (19) (April 1991), p. 16.

¹²⁹ 'The Soviet multi-party system: a Moscow roundtable', conducted by Michael E. Urban, *Russia and the World*, no. 18 (October 1990), pp. 1–6, at p. 3.

¹³⁰ Timothy Garton Ash, *New York Review of Books*, 15 February 1990) p. 18.

¹³¹ *Khristianskaya demokratiya*, no. 14 (July–August 1991), p. 13. Later letters by André Louis to Aksyuchits stressed the need to develop policy from existing circumstances, that there was no practical alternative to the independence of the union republics, and that this has been accepted by a large proportion of the Russian population in these republics.

¹³² *Nezavisimaya gazeta* (14 November 1991), p. 5.

¹³³ *Khristianskiye novosti*, no. 22 (19 May 1991), p. 20.