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## ABOUT THIS JOURNAL

**FAITH AND THOUGHT**, the continuation of the **JOURNAL OF THE TRANSACTIONS OF THE VICTORIA INSTITUTE OR PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY OF GREAT BRITAIN**, has been published regularly since the formation of the Society in 1865. The title was changed in 1958 (Vol. 90). **FAITH AND THOUGHT** is now published three times a year, price per issue £1.50 (post free) and is available from the Society's Address, 130 Wood Street, Cheapside, London, EC2V 6DN. The price of recent back issues (when available) up to the end of vol. 100 is 80p (post free).

**FAITH AND THOUGHT** is issued free to **FELLOWS, MEMBERS AND ASSOCIATES** of the Victoria Institute. Applications for membership should be accompanied by a remittance which will be returned in the event of non-election. (Subscriptions are: **FELLOWS**, £7.00; **MEMBERS**, £5.00; **ASSOCIATES**, full-time students, below the age of 25 years, full-time or retired clergy or other Christian workers on small incomes, £1.50; **LIBRARY SUBSCRIBERS**, £5.00. **FELLOWS** must be Christians and must be nominated by a **FELLOW**.) Subscriptions which may be paid by covenant are accepted by Inland Revenue Authorities as 'an allowable expense against income tax for ministers of religion, teachers of RI, etc. For further details, covenant forms, etc, apply to the Society. The Constitution and Aims of the Society were last published in **FAITH AND THOUGHT**, vol. 98, No. 1.

### EDITORIAL ADDRESS

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A Journal devoted to the study of the inter-relation of the  
Christian Revelation and modern research

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## AGM

The Annual General Meeting of the Institute was held at Chelsea College, London, S.W.3., on Saturday, 20th. May 1978. The President, who was about to leave for an extended visit to Australia, had sent his apologies for absence and, in the absence of the Vice-Presidents, the Chairman of the Council presided at the meeting.

The Minutes of the previous AGM, which had been published in *FAITH & THOUGHT*, Vol. 104, No. 2, were taken as read, and adopted.

On the nomination of Council, the President and Vice-Presidents were re-elected for a further term of office.

Dr. R.E.D. Clark, Mr. Gordon E. Barnes, and Mr. Paul Helm, retiring members of Council, were re-elected for a further period of service.

It was reported that Dr. Michael Collis had accepted cooption to the Council; but, as the Council had been unable to give the statutory notice to the AGM, his appointment would have to be ratified at next year's AGM.

The Chairman paid tribute to Mr. Francis Stunt, whose death had been announced during the past year, and who had served the Institute so valuably as Treasurer. His wide guidance of the Society's financial affairs and his generous support of the Institute's work from charitable trust funds had enabled the Institute to survive a period of grave financial difficulty. No suitable successor had yet been found; but the Assistant Secretary would continue to administer the finances.

The Secretary to Council presented the Annual Accounts and Auditor's Report for the year ended 30th. September 1977, which were adopted *nem. con.* Members were reminded that, as the Accounts are no longer published in the Journal, they could obtain a copy by applying to the Assistant Secretary.

Messrs. Metcalfe, Blake, and Co. were re-appointed as Auditors.

The Chairman of Council presented a brief report summarized below.

#### CHAIRMAN'S REPORT

The Chairman firstly drew attention to the saving in the production costs of the Journal during a period of marked inflation and expressed the Institute's gratitude to the Editor for the economies he had been able to achieve without any reduction in the quality of the Journal. These economies had helped to reduce the excess of expenditure over income for the year to £99, a figure lower than for many years. He pointed out, however, that the income recorded in the Accounts included some donations, which would not necessarily be repeated in future years. So the Institute still had some way to go before its regular income met the costs of its present level of activities - without any future expansion. The only satisfactory solution to the problem was to recruit more members. The level of recruiting during the year under review had been disappointingly low: sixteen members had joined, but the Institute had lost fifteen by death or resignation. The Chairman again appealed, as in previous years, to members to do all they

could to recruit friends and colleagues.

The Chairman reported that Council was considering the possibility of launching an appeal to establish a fund to be used primarily to meet editorial expenses and eventually to provide a research grant to assist the academic wishing to work in an area relevant to the Institute's interests. It was envisaged that the research worker might combine his research activities with editorship of the Journal. Members would be informed of the finalized plans, and invited to assist in publicizing the appeal.

In recent years it had become difficult to convene a quorum for meetings of Council, because several members live far from London. Although such members could seldom attend meetings, they could still make a useful contribution to the work of Council by means of correspondence. Council would not therefore wish to lose such members or, in future, be inhibited from nominating a suitable person for membership just because his home is at a distance. It is therefore considering increasing its size in the hope that more members could attend meetings. Such a change would require an amendment to the Constitution. It may be, therefore, that the time had come to review the Constitution to see whether, in the light of changing circumstances, other amendments were desirable. For example, the AGM had become a poorly attended formality. Should it therefore take some other form? Is it still desirable that it be normally held on the Saturday immediately preceding Queen Victoria's birthday? The Chairman invited members to examine the Constitution and inform Council of their opinions. They would find the Constitution, as last amended in 1967, printed in *FAITH & THOUGHT*, Vol. 98, No. 1, 1970.

Lastly, as on some previous occasions, the Chairman appealed for greater participation by members in the affairs of the Society. Apart from recruiting already emphasized, nominations for Council and Editorial Committee would always be appreciated by Council; and indeed any suggestions that might enhance the value of the Institute's work.

#### Symposium

The AGM was followed by a Symposium on Sexual Ethics at which four papers were presented.

Peter E. Cousins M.A.,  
 "BIBLICAL TEACHING"  
 (Editorial Director - Paternoster Press)

O.R. Johnston M.A., Dip.Ed., Dip.Th.,  
 "HISTORIAL DEVELOPMENTS"  
 (Director - Nationwide Festival of Light)

John Honey M.Sc., M.Ed.,  
 "SEX EDUCATION AND COUNSELLING"  
 (Lecturer - King's College London)

Gerald Hughes B.D.,  
 "PASTORAL CARE"  
 (Director of Religious Studies - Rugby School)

The first of these papers is printed in this issue.

## Editorial

Mr R.D. Doidge of Brookside, 219 Mottram Road, Stalybridge, Cheshire, SK15 2QX, writes "If any member living within 35 miles of my home is interested in discussions of creational and biblical interest I would welcome an opportunity for contact."

## News & Views

### WINNABLE WAR

Three summers ago Kenneth Brecher, the anthropologist, appeared in Malcolm Muggeridge's BBC2 "Stop to Think" programme (14 Aug. 1976). He described how, full of Western pride, he went to live with a small isolated tribe (I think it was in Brazil) who accepted him graciously. The wonderful thing about these people, he said, is that they are completely self sufficient. Before his two year stay was ended they had utterly shattered his earlier belief that

Europeans are superior to natives by reason of their wonderful know-how.

The natives pointed to aeroplanes in the sky and asked how they are made. In factories, Breacher said, yet it was all talk, talk, talk: he did not know how to make one. They watched him scribbling on paper, a stuff unknown to them before, and realised that it might prove useful. "What does one make it from?" they asked. "From wood" he replied. "Here is wood in plenty" they said, pointing to the trees, "Please make us some". But he did not even know how to start! These native people know how to get literally everything they need from nature: they pity the poor ignorant Westerner who has no idea how to provide for his needs.

How right they are! How many of us, using raw materials of nature only, could make shoes and clothes, or the simplest shack to live in, or find food to eat, or recognise plants of medicinal value? Remember — no cheating! Cloth, needles, nails, screws, hammers, saws and the paraphernalia of the DIY shops, do not grow on trees. With civilisation our independence withers away: our dependence on others becomes absolute. A very few in Western society have been trying to learn the art of self-sufficiency, but for the bulk of us this would be impossible, not only because of ignorance but because of lack of space.

The decline in self-sufficiency has a close bearing on what is now being said about future war.

Dr Frank Barnaby, Director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, has written on "The Danger of Winnable Wars" (*New Scientist*, 9 June 1977, p. 578) He quotes from the physicist C.F. von Weizsäcker (*The Relevance of Science and World Issues*, 1977) who says that "with continuing technical progress... it is highly probably that there will be an atomic war before the end of this century" — a view shared by an increasing number of scientists. It will not come about, as President Kennedy feared, through madness or accident but because a breakthrough in weaponry will, for the first time, make war winnable. Von Weizsäcker thinks that which ever side first develops such a weapon will have little choice but to use it preemptively. He sees little hope that disarmament will prove feasible, or that the arms race will be stopped in time. But when once there has been a pre-emptive and effective strike, world government will be achieved. "I am terrified of having to admit that it is increasingly probable that the creation of a world

government will come about only as the result of an atomic world war."

New weaponry which would make a knock out blow effective may be of a defensive variety, for offensive weapons are already powerful enough. Anti-satellite devices, space-based lasers and charged particle beams capable of destroying ballistic missiles, or anti-submarine devices might effect a breakthrough which would be extremely destabilising. A war might be over in a few hours rather than years. Industrial societies are now 'softer' than they were thirty years ago and less able to take the intense suffering and trauma resulting from the destruction of medical and municipal services. Finally Barnaby reflects that if a world government did come about as a result of an atomic war, "then is it not likely that it would be an utterly repressive one?" With self-sufficiency gone, the psychological pressure to conform with evil in high places will be all but irresistible.

It is fascinating to watch such ideas develop at the purely secular level - they have been common place to many Christians for many years. The earthquake of Rev: 6 may well be an atomic war and it precedes the world wide kingdom of the Beast. "Who is able to make war with him?"

### MARXISM IN UNIVERSITIES

The infiltration into Universities and polytechnics of Marxists dedicated to indoctrinating students and overthrowing liberal values in academic life received some publicity at the end of last year (articles in *The Times* 14, 15 Nov. 1977 and later letters). This development of the 60s was almost confined to the rapidly increasing teaching of sociology. Prior to 1960 the subject was taught in only five universities and only one department was of any size: today it is taught in every British university except St Andrews.

*The Times* cited the opinions of many academics, the general feeling being that the one-sidedness of Marxism makes it ill fitted as a serious intellectual discipline. In the sociological faculties teaching and text books assume that the ills of our society are due to its capitalism, all study of crime, poverty and repression in communist societies being ignored. The influence of the Marxists according to Dr A.H. Halsey of Nuffield College, Oxford, was such that "it was certainly very difficult to get an academic job at

many universities if you had views on the right. Left-wing views were automatically correlated with intelligence".

Some of the worst cases of undue influence being exerted by the extreme left are connected with the polytechnics. Bullying and intimidation have occurred even among staffs in London polytechnics. "A young member of staff came out of a departmental meeting shaking like a leaf after being subjected to intense pressure to falsify her marks in order to pass left-wing students in an examination that they had clearly failed on academic grounds. The head of the department concerned, she says, openly admitted that he was not interested in academic standards." Sometimes even the study of religion from a sociological point of view has been drastically curtailed but allowed to figure prominently in a course on deviance! Teaching in medicine, social work and education is affected. Professor David Martin of the London School of Economics writes "within the whole education system there is a steady drip of indoctrination. It moved from universities and polytechnics to teacher training colleges and through to schools and children. Its message is that society is a sham, and that everything worth while is middle class bilge. If you create that feeling in society, you unnerve people and allow dogma to triumph."

An inevitable rejoinder (18 Nov.) by teachers at the Open University against these "McCarthyite techniques of smear and innuendo" followed. It was claimed that Marxist studies had contributed significantly to teaching and research in British universities

In a later letter (24 Nov.) C.K. Grant of the Department of Philosophy, Durham University, pointed out that Marxism cannot be regarded as just another social-political theory, to be studied by students alongside the rest. Rather, it is a programme of action with the aim of overturning by force the liberal tradition of our democracy. In addition, all the chief Marxist theorists hold that truth is a bourgeois delusion. But if there is no objective truth, what are academics supposed to be teaching? The intemperate reaction of the left to the *Times* report, written by Professor Gould, suggests that the charges are not ill founded.

#### PARAPSYCHOLOGY

Joseph Hanlon has long been considered the archcritic of

parapsychologists. In earlier years he ruthlessly attacked Soal's work on ESP, long held to be some of the most convincing evidence for parapsychological phenomena ever published. More recently he exposed, or attempted to expose, Uri Geller the spoon bender. He is still extremely sceptical about the movement of objects by mental power and Christopher Evans is equally sceptical.

Brian Inglis, (*New Scientist* 22 Sept. 1977, p. 753) draws attention to the difficulties of proving anything in this field when scepticism is so strong. Sceptics like Hanlon, we are told, appear "concerned more with detecting possible loopholes for magic tricks, than with the phenomena themselves". But what if Hanlon and Evans were to think up some foolproof test, satisfactory to themselves, and positive results were obtained? Well... there would always remain one possible flaw. Who would there be to prove that the experimenters themselves were not hand in glove with the possessor of psychic powers? Obviously the experimenters themselves would have to be watched to check that no hanky panky was afoot; and the watchers themselves would need to be watched and these also in turn... Experimenters and those experimented on would need to be "onion-coated with observers, monitors and assessors". But, adds Brian Inglis, "A sceptic to whom I showed the piece was unimpressed. With so many people concerned, he pointed out (the reference was to Puthoff and Targ's work on Uri Geller where the precaution of onion coated boservers was actually taken), it must have been easy to fudge the results. You can't win..."

All the same, so far as Hanlon is concerned, it seems that at long last the penny is beginning to drop. After again emphasising his scepticism about psychokinetics, he says in parenthesis "Nevertheless, I do now expect that some form of telepathy will eventually receive scientific validation" (*New Scientist*, 22 Sept. 1977, 753). This, notwithstanding some newly discovered evidence of data manipulation in a small number of the Soal-Goldney experiments (*Proc. Soc. Psy. Res.* 1974, 56, 41-131; 1978, 56, 236-281).

In an interesting book (*Learning to Use Extrasensory Perception*, Univ. of Chicago P. 1976, 170 pp) Charles T. Tart draws attention to the fact that "in practically all learning situations a subject receives almost immediate feedback as to whether he was correct". With most subjects extrasensory perception (ESP) dies off with time and this leads the author to wonder if the fall off could be stopped by immediately telling the percipient whether he has done

his "thought reading" correctly.

However, if someone is seeking, by ESP, to identify the cards which I successively hold in my hand, a good many of his guesses will be correct — purely by chance — about one in ten if there are ten possible kinds of card. This successful chance guessing is equivalent to "noise" in a circuit and it is argued that if the ratio of genuine ESP/noise is low feedback will be of little help, and therefore genuine ESP will probably die away slowly. But above a certain critical "talent threshold", feedback ought to make genuine learning possible. However the threshold will not be constant, being dependent on motivation among other factors. Experiments with Dana Redington showed that with good subjects the usual decline was stopped by feedback.

Tart has an interesting passage on repeatability. Thus far repeatability in ESP is statistical only. He compares the situation to that of the study of electricity in the pre-Faraday era. The electrical discharge of the lightning flash was spectacular, unpredictable, soon over and difficult to study. At the other extreme there was the rubbing of amber which often caused it to attract light objects, such as feathers, though the effect often failed for unknown causes (humidity of the air etc). In ESP there are spectacular spontaneous happenings, comparable with lightning. Statistically the very weak effect of amber electricity was significant, just as in ESP (card guessing) today. Not until a breakthrough (the discovery of the electric battery which would provide electricity to order) was real repeatability achieved and the way prepared for advance in the science of electricity. Today ESP is in the pre-battery stage.

#### LATCHKEY AND SPOON BENDING

The astonishing feats of latchkey and spoon bending by Uri Geller, seen by millions on TV a year or two ago, caused much speculation at the time and initiated much research. A magician (Ronald Markham *alias* "Romark") demonstrated on TV (in January 1974) that it is quite possible to bend keys by sleight of hand, but as always in such cases it is impossible to prove that this is how Geller did it. Furthermore, some magicians seem to have completely convinced that Geller's doings cannot possibly be explained by the magician's art. Arthur Zorka of the Society of American Magicians, for instance, states flatly that "there is no known way... that any

method of trickery could have been used..." (Quoted, G.L. Playfair, Letter, *Times* 19 Jan. 1978.)

The publicity afforded to Geller brought to public notice the fact that a great number of individuals possess similar powers. Professor John Taylor, a physicist at King's College, London, contacted a number of boys, ages 7 to 11, who could bend metal by thought. He recorded that three bends, in over a hundred, were performed in sealed tubes. David Frost interviewed Matthew Manning (TV on 16 Oct. 1964) who could bend metal and in whose presence especially when he was a boy at school, violet poltergeistic activity took place.

Extremely interesting research is now being published by Professor J.B. Hasted, of the Department of Physics, Birkbeck College, in the University of London. Much of this is concerned with the powers of a 17-year old boy, Nicholas Williams and it affords some of the most convincing evidence for the reality of physical psychical phenomena we have read (*Jour. Soc Psy Res.* 1976, 48, 365; 1977, 49, 583 with more to follow).

Hollow latch keys were specially made for this work. In their interiors standard strain gauges were mounted non-centrally. Electrical connections to the gauges were made with flexible screened leads and these led to amplifiers and chart recorders. Before sessions took place the keys were hung up in various positions by their leads in Nicholas William's home, and during sessions he sat on a chair at a table and amused himself with his favourite hobby of building model aircraft. He was asked to try to bend the latch keys which (in addition to amplifiers and recorders) were always positioned well out of his reach. It was agreed with his parents that, during sessions, they would not enter the lounge where Nicholas worked. Hasted himself watched carefully to check that there was no hocus pocus — often he sat on the stairs of the house from which, with the kitchen door open, he had a good view of the boy. He gives detail diagrams of the lay out.

Recorders were run for over 20 hours when Nicholas was absent. The slight deviations from straight lines corresponded to a 'noise' level of 0.5 millivolt. If a man-made fibre carpet was electrostatically charged by rubbing and then touched against a key, a larger deflection (up to 12 mv) was observed, but even this did not reach the higher signal levels (50 mV or more) obtained during experiments.

Any slight reversible bending of a key actuated the strain gauges inside it and was automatically recorded. Permanent bending did not often occur, though sometimes it did and occasionally a key would snap in two.

Nicholas had very little conscious control of the bendings though it did increase to some extent with practice. Usually the bendings took the form of violent oscillations. In later experiments two or even three keys were hung separately, well out of Nicholas's reach and well separated from one another. Often (on rather more than half the occasions) the key bendings occurred with exact synchronicity in time. Even if Nicholas had been able to handle the keys, which he showed no desire to do, he could not have handled and bent more than one at a time: certainly he could not have made them bend rapidly in unison. "The signals can therefore be regarded with confidence as due to paranormal metal-bending pulses produced in the presence of the subject." The latch keys were never touched during the experiments. In one session video recordings were made in synchronism with the chart record.

As he explained in a TV interview earlier this year, Hasted, trained as a physicist, is extremely surprised by his findings, for they prove the existence of forces outside what is known to science. He construes his job as one of investigating the facts rather than of suggesting theories. He thinks, however, that an oscillating "surface of action" must exist "over which paranormal bending forces are potentially exerted on solid specimens placed in that surface." The surface appears to oscillate, to be flexible and in the experiments described it may be as much as 10 metres broad. When two sensors (strain gauges) happen to lie in this field together, both oscillate in unison. The surface moves up or down at speeds which may be very low, but may rise to 100 cm/sec. There is no suggestion that the surface originates with Nicholas and is transmitted spherically outwards like a wave front, for were this the case it would reach the nearest sensor first and this often did not happen.

Bending of latchkeys was not stopped by screening, either by metals or non-metals. When a key was hung in a large brass vase the oscillations became much more violent and the key snapped in two. It is evident that electro-magnetic forces are not involved. Oddly enough synchronicity was destroyed by screening and the bendings did not take place when the screening was complete, as in a closed sealed vessel. (Other workers have observed effects under these conditions as we have noted.)

When strips of metal were used they were often folded or twisted (remarkable photographs are reproduced). The forces involved were often enormous. Professionally bonded test pieces of aluminium alloy were obtained from Ciba Geigy and presented to Nicholas and to other boys with similar 'powers'. Often the resin bonds fractured suddenly and the test pieces were bent. But sometimes there was no sign of bending; the test pieces being simply pulled apart. The forces required to do this were of the order of half a ton weight or more and "such forces would not be produced physically by normal means" in the absence of machinery. These breaks were not observed directly: they took place in Nicholas's house where no sign of machinery could be found!

There is of course no *direct* relationship between these experiments and Christian belief, but the indirect connection is important. If we can prove that events quite outside what physical laws allow do in fact take place in the presence of a few endowed people, it hardly makes sense to be too critical of christian miracles. Furthermore the fact that these 'psychic' forces manifest in presence of human beings only, not of sheep, dogs, cats or monkeys, points to a difference 'in kind' between men and animals.

### CONQUEST OF CANAAN

In a recent booklet (*Early Israelite Warfare and the Conquest of Canaan*, Oxford Centre for Postgraduate Hebrew Studies, 45 Giles', Oxford, 1978, £0.57 post free) Abraham Malamat asks what degree of historicity is to be ascribed to the biblical tradition of the conquest of Palestine in the 13th century BC. Are these stories true or are they inventions of story tellers and redactors of a later age?

The problem arises because the extra-biblical Near East sources make no mention of the events, though at the time they may of course have caused no more than a ripple on the international scene.

In reconstructing history as recorded in the Bible we need to remember that the overwhelming sense that God was with His people led to the writing of accounts which telescope lengthy involved campaigns "creating in retrospect a historical account of artificial simplicity". Yet the historian, looking back, must wonder how a horde of semi-nomads emerging from the desert fringe was able,

quite quickly, to conquer an array of fortified cities and well trained forces, including fleet chariotry". How could it have happened? In part the cause is to be found in the lack of a Canaanite national consciousness: the scores of city-states rarely came to one another's aid. No one aided the people of Jericho or of Ai when Joshua attacked, nor were the fords of Jordan protected. But, excluding divine help, the major factor was undoubtedly the application of a new concept in military science, that of the "indirect approach" (Liddell-Hart). Though the references are brief, it is clear from the Bible that the Israelites used the techniques of this approach in a way which was a veritable pinnacle in military history. In later years, after the Monarchy had been established, they fell back on conventional ways of warfare, but in this earlier period feints, detours, ambushes, diversions, and night attacks were employed. "By stratagems you shall wage war, and victory (shall come) through much planning"(Prov. 24:6); "For want of stratagems an army falls, victory (comes) through much planning" (Prov. 11:14).

The battle stories collected in the OT incorporate a wide variety of stratagems, unique for the ancient Near East. Not till more than a millenium later (excluding the Far East, e.g. Sun Tse) were military ruses studied and collected in book form, and these were based on Greek and Roman wars (Frontinus, *Stratagemata*, late 1st Cent. AD with over 500 stratagems and Polyaeus, *Stratagemata*, late 2nd Cent. AD with 950 examples). These collections mention a number of methods adopted by ancient generals which closely resemble the ruses described in the Bible. "These parallels are of considerable importance in bolstering the credibility of the biblical examples", says Malamet.

In the Bible there are no outright successful assaults on enemy cities. Joshua used the psychological device of marching round Jericho for six days (Josh. 6) to lower the enemy's morale and make him relax his vigilance. Frontinus gives several similar examples, e.g. that of a Roman general who repeatedly marched his troops round a well-fortified Italian city till the vigilance of the defenders waned, when he stormed the walls.

Another tactic involved was the decoymont of city-defenders into the open by simulated flight after which ambushers attacked the cities (Josh. 7-8; Jud. 20:18-44). The boldness of this battle plan lay in the seeming repetition of direct attack just after it had led to defeat. In later years Himilco, of Carthage, conquered Agrigentum in the same way.

Likewise Fulvius repeatedly attacked the Cimbrians and repeatedly retreated till, in false confidence, they left their city defenseless and open to attack by ambush.

Of Joshua it is often recorded that he attacked suddenly and unexpectedly — secrecy and speed were his weapons. He could move an army by night (Josh. 10:9) and attack in the early morning from such a position that the rising sun was in the eyes of the enemy ("Sun, stand thou still upon Gibeon" implies this). The Romans of later days used the same tactic. A brilliantly executed night manoeuvre is recorded of Gideon (Jud. 7).

Today Israeli commanders are inspired by the ancient tactics as were Allenby, Wavell and Wingate in British military circles. It is difficult to believe that legends could inspire in such a way.

This valuable booklet, to which Rev. A.C. Adcock has kindly drawn our attention, embodies material derived from earlier well-documented studies ("Conquest of Canaan..." in *Encyclopaedia Judaica Yearbook 1975/6* 166-182 and *The Conduct of Israelite Warfare in the Biblical Period*, in *Acta, International Conference of Military History*, Tehran, 1976, Bucharest 1978, 115-123).

## DETERMINISM AND LIGHTNING

Mathematical equations expressing physical laws often give the impression that nature is deterministic, at least so far as macroscopic events are concerned. This point of view was strongly expressed by Peter Kapitza in his address to the Royal Society in 1976. Religion and science, he said, parted company when the laws of science were first laid down. "The law of causality is taken to state that a given cause leads to a unique effect. Thus a scientifically posed problem has only one solution just as there is only one multiplication table, and so true scientific generalizations are necessarily objective." (*Proc. Roy. Soc.* 1977, 357A, 1-14)

In the very next paper attention is drawn to the extraordinary variations which occur in the lightning flash — perhaps the most impressive of all reasonably common terrestrial phenomenon. No two lightning flashes are alike and even the velocities of the leader strokes, which are stepped, vary by a factor of twenty (usually within the range of 10-120 cm per microsecond). (T.E. Alibone and D. Dring, *Proc. Roy. Soc.* 1977, 357A, 15). As for the

bewilderingly different patterns which the lightning forms in the air, the suggestion has been made that cosmic rays are the cause (*New Scientist*, 12 Jan, 1978, p.88). When a high energy particle enters the upper atmosphere it sends down a shower of thousands of less energetic particles which ionise the air and perhaps act as the trigger for the lightning flash. This makes possible the rapid build-up of charge in the cloud base. A cosmic-ray shower can provide "a series of stepping stones for a major lightning discharge. The lightning leader would jump from one secondary cosmic ray track to the next, following a stepped and tortuous path to ground, to be followed by return discharges." In short, a man killed by lightning may owe his death to a single atomic particle. It would be impossible, at this level, to show "that a given cause leads to a unique event".

#### SHROUD AND AHMADIS

A great deal has appeared in the press recently on the shroud of Turin and scientific tests have been mentioned — though the authorities still, as before, refuse to permit carbon dating of the cloth, fearing, perhaps, *kaput* to a first class publicity stunt. It is difficult to understand why some Christians take seriously the claim that it is the shroud in which Christ's body was wrapped for burial. St John makes it quite plain that our Lord's head was wrapped in cloth separately from his body ("... saw the linen cloths lying, and the napkin, which had been on his head, not lying with the linen cloths but rolled up in a place by itself" Jn. 20:6-7). The Turin shroud is in one piece. There are curious and unexplained features about it but it is difficult to think that it is connected in any way with Christ. If it dates from the early years of our era, we must remember that crucifixion was a common enough death. After one such crucifixion friends may have removed a body for burial elsewhere.

Interestingly enough ill-considered Christian concern with the shroud has provided the Ahmadis (the Moslem sect which claims that Jesus went to Kashmir after His crucifixion) with a useful new argument. It runs like this — "that if Jesus was wrapped in it [the shroud] on being taken down from the cross, his circulatory system was still functioning. Having a heart capable of pumping out blood from his wounds and staining the shroud would indicate that he was, in modern clinical terms 'alive'. This chink in Christian armour is exactly what Moslems of the Ahmadiyya movement,

and others who accept that the tomb [in Srinagar] is genuine, have been waiting for years to hear." (4 June, 1978, *Telegraph Sunday Magazine*.) This 85-year old sect, which now numbers 10 m, holds that Jesus recovered after the crucifixion and travelled to Kashmir where the tomb of Jesus the prophet may still be seen today. The sect is wealthy and has long had a mosque in England. It was founded by Hasrat Mirza Ahmad (1835-1908) and is now led by his descendant, Hafiz Mirza Nasir Ahmad. The Government of Pakistan declares it to be a non-Muslim sect and members are barred from making the pilgrimage to Mecca. They claim Ahmad as a prophet, but orthodox Muslims say that Mohammed was the last of the prophets. (Cutting sent by B.T.H. Weller).

#### LIFE ON MARS?

In a recent paper *Icarus* (1978, 34, 666-674) Harold P. Klein discusses the three kinds of experiments performed in the miniature laboratories carried by the two Viking landers.

The rather surprising results obtained, quite unlike any obtained with earth or moon soils, suggested at first that a low form of life was present. Thus, when radioactively labelled nutrient was added to the soil, the gas liberated ( $\text{CO}_2$  or possibly  $\text{CO}$ ) was radioactive. However, the rate of gas evolution was far more rapid than expected, especially in view of the fact that no organic material is present in the soil (down to the level of a few parts per million). If living organic matter is present at or below this level it is considered doubtful if a "biological system could be sustained over long periods of time". After a careful survey of the evidence, including the apparent photosynthesis in some of the tests, Klein concludes: "To summarise the current status of our interpretations, *all* the data taken together would seem to point towards nonbiological explanations for *all* of the observed reactions in the Viking experiments."

The various results obtained point to the presence of three oxidising agents, hydrogen peroxide, inorganic peroxide or superperoxide of some kind (or kinds), both of which are readily destroyed, and a very slow but less destructable oxidising agent (possibly a form of ferric oxide).

## CHIMPANZEES

Dr Jane Goodall, who has now spent 18 years studying chimpanzees in Tanzania, recently gave the first L.S.B. Leakey Memorial Lecture at the Natural History Museum in London (reported, *Times*, 16 Jan., 1978). She said that all the chimps living in a community recognise each other and all have their own habits and mannerisms. Thus one mother, called FLO, is highly solicitous for her offspring during their childhood (which lasts 14 years). The same care is shown by her daughter FIJI who imitates many of her mannerisms and protects her younger brother. Is this a family tradition? Another mother, named PASSION is abrupt and sometimes violent with infants. One of them she killed and shared it as food with her family: her daughter, too, behaves in a similar way. In 1970 gangs of males from one community started to attack individuals in a neighbouring community and several brutal deaths resulted - a type of encounter uncommon in animals who rarely cause one another serious injury despite threats and blustering.

There are, of course, close parallels to all this in human society, but although the higher primates can be taught a language by man, it still seems to be unnatural to them: the natural use of language distinguishes mankind from animals.

A recent study of six deaf children showed that they invented a language of their own, a sequence of signs (largely pointing) being used which were built into sentences. Chimpanzees do not do this. (*Science*, 197, 401)

## PLANET FORMATION

The attractive theory of the formation of the solar system, commonly associated with the name of Sir James Jeans, was abandoned when it was shown that hot stellar matter in space would not have condensed in the filament formed by two stars which were supposed to have suffered a near collision. The great angular momentum of Jupiter was another cause of difficulty. So an accretion theory of the origin of planets came to be widely accepted, though there has never been any certainty.

For many years past Professor Michael Woolfson has been considering possible modifications of the Jeans theory which might serve to remove the difficulties. In 1960 (*Nature*, 187, 47) and again four years later (*Proc. Roy. Soc.* 1964, 282A, 485), he argued that the Jeans theory was quite feasible after all. If the second star which approached our sun was a diffuse protostar, with fairly cool exterior, the cigar of matter pulled out between the two stars would have been derived from this second star, not from our sun, in which case it would have been relatively cool and the difficulty of condensation would not arise. More recently Woolfson has been in the news again (*New Scientist*, 3 Nov. 1977) in connection with his lecture to the Royal Astronomical Society (see *Mon. Not.RAS*, 180, 243) which commemorated the centenary of the birth of Jeans. A computer film simulation of the near encounter was shown. Calculation shows that the filament would form and break up into planets as envisaged in the earlier theory. Star encounters are rare and if planets are so formed they are presumably rare also.

Returning to the accretion theory, most stars are binary and the complexities of motion of a planet influenced by two suns are such that an earth-like planet on which life could develop seems unlikely. However, R.S. Harrington (*New Scientist*, 13 Oct. 1977 p. 84) argues that there is a wide variety of configurations in which planets may follow stable orbits in the presence of two suns. T.A. Heppenheimer (10 Nov. p 376) replied that planets cannot form by accretion in the first place unless the two suns are far removed from one another (say 50 AU), and that accretion will be stopped if one of them is as small, even, as Jupiter. Very few binary stars are so far separated and the difficulty of supposing that earth-like planets are at all common remains. (1 AU = sun-earth distance)

### FALLEN FROM HEAVEN

On 20 Sept. 1977 "a huge star suddenly flashed out of a dark sky, sending shafts of light impulses to earth" (curious language!) over the city of Petrozavodsk in Karelia. It spread over the city like a giant jelly fish "sending out numerous thin light rays like a downpour of rain". After ten or twelve minutes the jelly fish turned into a bright red circle and moved away. Much the same phenomenon was observed at Leningrad. The director of the meteorological observatory at Petrozavodsk was emphatic that none of the workers there had ever seen the like before. "It remains

an enigma what caused this" he said. Later, however, according to Tass, Russian astronomers said that the mysterious balls of fire were probably satellites or rocket stages burning up as they entered the earth's atmosphere. The opinion expressed was that sputniks sometimes explode on re-entry and that the bits and pieces remain in the atmosphere for quite a long time, (still burning brightly?). (*Times*, 13 Oct. 1977) Do such prophecies as Mt. 24:29 ("the stars shall fall from heaven") refer to events of this kind? The super-powers are said to be developing hunter-killer satellites which will destroy enemy satellites. Several thousand man-made satellites and parts of satellites now orbit the earth.

On 8 March, 1976, a shower of stone meteorites hit the earth in NE China, the heaviest weighing 1770 kg., which is a world record. The original object hit the atmosphere at about 12 km/sec and broke into fragments which fell over an area of 500 km<sup>2</sup>, the shower lasting 37 secs. The hundred or so meteorites collected were being examined in China. (*New Scientist*, 6 May, 1976, p. 290). We are reminded of the biblical story of how when the kings of the Amorites were fleeing from Joshua "the Lord threw down great stones from heaven upon them as far as Azekah, and they died; there were more who died because of the hailstones than the men of Israel killed with the sword" (Josh. 10:11). It is not clear why the word for hail is used at the end of the verse, but the long day following suggests a meteoric phenomenon which illuminated the night sky. As the locality in which the stones fell is clearly stated, it would seem that some of them may well be there to this day, but as far as we know no one has looked for them. It would not be difficult now-a-days to distinguish meteoritic from ordinary stones.

## PURITANISM AND SCIENCE

Charles Webster's *The Great Instauration; Science, Medicine and Reform, 1625-1660* (Duckworth, 1976, xvi + 630 pp, £14.) is a work of great erudition which has not previously been mentioned in this JOURNAL. The book takes its title from Francis Bacon's *Instauratio Magna* which became overwhelmingly important in Puritan philosophy after Bacon's death in 1626. The basic idea, based mainly on the books of Genesis and Daniel, was that man, as a result of the Fall, had lost his God-given mastery of nature, but that, by working flat-out to discover how nature operates,

he now had an opportunity to stand once again where Adam had stood. This would bring about the Great Instauration, the time of the restitution of all things, the goal of the ages, and with it would come the second advent and the commencement of the millenium when man's dominion over nature would extend even to the stars.

Thus millenarianism made Puritans confident of the ability of the human intellect to master science. It encouraged both a confident exploratory approach to nature and a scepticism of generally held ancient and medieval ideas inherited from the past.

An important point about Puritan philosophy, and one which greatly encouraged the growth of knowledge, is that it was God-centred rather than man-centred. Since discovery comes only by the grace of God, it is the Christian's duty to spread knowledge to the utmost of his ability. Puritans taught that trade secrets, proprietary recipes and the like, were positively wrong — God's grace is bestowed freely and man cannot hug God's gifts as if they are his alone. This attitude was unique to Puritans: early scientists of the period who were little influenced by the Puritan tradition (eg. Evelyn and Petty) never wholly accepted it. It underlaid the Patents system which ensured that knowledge of know-how would not be lost to posterity.

Earlier historians of science found in Puritanism the main incentive for early 17th century science. In recent years this view has been questioned on the ground that many of those in earlier lists of Fellows of the RS had no Puritan affiliations. But many of these Fellows, attracted only by idle curiosity, rarely attended meetings: the torch of science was ignited and kept burning by a few only and in this group the Puritan and biblical incentive was uppermost. By 1660 when the political and religious influence of Puritanism was destroyed, the foundations had been well laid.

Belief in the impending millenium led Puritans to redouble their educational efforts so that the ground might be prepared for the Great Instauration. To this end Comenius was invited to England on the eve of the Civil War. Under Puritan influence new Professorial Chairs were founded in the Universities.

In medicine the influence of Paracelsus was strong among Puritans. Galenic medicine was complex and treatment difficult and expensive. Paracelsus had eschewed wealth, had gained his knowledge from the lore of simple folk (he despised that of

sophisticated authorities), had introduced minerals into medicine and made medicine inexpensive and available to the poor. The medical use of minerals encouraged the development of chemistry: in this field Puritans were also greatly influenced by the writings of Glauber: Boyle was inspired by Glauber and also von Helmont in his early days. Much attention was also given to agriculture: attempts were even made to cultivate mulberry as food for silk worms.

This book is fully documented and well indexed, it is likely to remain a standard text on the period for a long time to come.

#### SHORT NOTES

*Mysticism.* Books on mysticism seem to be in fashion (see Reviews, p 134). One of the most interesting we have seen is Eve Baker's *The Mystical Journey: A Western Alternative* (Wildwood House, London, 1977, 121 pp.). Its argument is that a deep spiritual hunger is encouraging oriental mysticism in the West, but that we do not need to look far to realise that Christianity, too, has a mystical tradition, every bit as satisfying as anything to be found in the East. By way of illustration, Buddhists tell monks to fix their minds on a senseless problem, the *Koan* (see this JOURNAL 101, 273) but the 14th century *Cloud of Unknowing* urges you to fix one word — such as *God* or *Love* — on your heart: "It will be your shield and spear in peace and war alike... with this one word you will suppress all thought under the cloud of forgetting..." A similar practice is the constant repetition of the Jesus prayer ("Lord Jesus have mercy upon me, a sinner") which is to be repeated over and over again so as to synchronise with breathing. This, according to the monks, is what is meant by "prayer without ceasing". St. Ignatius of Loyala even managed to synchronise the entire Lord's prayer with breathing. (Compare NT, "when you pray use not vain repetitions, as the heathen do, for they think that they shall be heard for their much speaking" Mt. 6:7).

*Dishonesty and Grants.* In the USA there is increasing concern about dishonesty in applying for research grants. A good scientist will sometimes need to change the direction of his work mid-stream, yet in applying for a grant he will need to state clearly what he intends to do: it will be made clear to him that

he will be paid to carry out the work proposed.

With hum drum work, particularly in technology, no difficulty arises. In many research projects it is fairly easy to see what needs doing and even how long the work is likely to take. But a creative scientist cannot always see the path ahead and he is tempted to be dishonest, in fact it may happen that he cannot survive unless he *is* dishonest. For example he may apply for a grant to do work which he has already done or will have been done by the time the grant comes through (*Science* 1974, 185, 399).

L van Valen, Professor of Biology at Chicago, considers the situation so bad that he writes, "The norm in our science remains dishonesty, because it is made necessary for the survival of creative research" (*Nature* 261, 2). In his own experience he speaks of having had to follow less worth while work within the terms of his grant, rather than lines which he believed would have been more fruitful.

*Star of Bethlehem.* The interesting article in *Nature* (1976, 264, 513-7 see this JOURNAL 104, 19) was followed by a number of letters, with a reply by D.W. Hughes the original author (268, 520). A number of interesting points are mentioned. For example Jesus was born before Herod died (Mt. 2:1) but Quirinius was not governor in Syria (Lk. 2:2) till AD 6-9. Enrolments were apparently made every 14 years and E. Hulse suggests that we should follow F.F. Bruce in translating the passage in Luke: "This enrolment was before that made when Quirinius was governor of Syria" which would give BC 6-9 for the date of our Lord's birth. In his reply Hughes quotes an interesting Jewish tradition to the effect that a star would appear two years before the birth of the Messiah, which throws light on Herod's command that all children less than two years old should be killed. However there is so much of interest on these pages that the original should be consulted.

*Supernova of AD 1006.* An article in *Monthly Notices of the Royal Astronomical Society* (F.F. Stephenson et al, 1977, 180, 567-584) contains translations of all the known records of the supernova which appeared in May AD 1006, the most brilliant that has appeared in historic times. It reached a magnitude of -9.5 at maximum, about a quarter of the brilliance of the moon, and was visible for several years. According to one record "because the zodiacal sign Scorpio is a bad omen for the Islamic religion" many bitter wars were fought as a result of its appearance and there

were many calamities. It must certainly have encouraged the idea that the end of the world had come, but there appear to be few Christian records.

*Cashing in on the manna machine.* Rodney Dale and George Sassoon, who made the extraordinary suggestion that manna in the wilderness was manufactured by a high technology machine called "The Ancient of Days" (see this JOURNAL, 103, 66), have now expanded their idea in book form (*The Manna Machine*, Duckworth, 1978). The machine, they claim, was left behind by an extra-terrestrial visitor. They are excited because Cutty Sark whisky have offered a million pounds for the first proof that extra-terrestrial beings visited the earth in ancient times. "I rang Cutty Sark and confirmed with them that part of the manna machine would qualify" says Dale (*Cambridge Evening News*, 21 June). So now they are hoping to mount an expedition to find the machine which, they say, was hidden on high ground called Mount Nebo thirty miles east of Jerusalem at the time of the Babylonian conquest. If the nuclear fuel is still there, he says, it should be detectable from a light aircraft.

*Population - India.* A sample enumeration indicates that India's population is increasing by 13 million a year. The forced sterilisation programme of recent years made virtually no impact on the population increase. In one year of Janata rule the number of sterilizations performed had dropped from 4 million to one million in 1977-8. (*Times*, 11 July, 1978).

*Poisoning the Wells of Language.* After quoting from Paul van Buren, John Knox, J.A.T. Robinson and Thomas Boslooper (who says that "the virgin birth of Jesus ought to be maintained and believed in the twentieth century as it was in the first and second... the absence of the virgin birth in the contemporary Christian World Mission is unthinkable" but it needs to be reinterpreted to mean "that God acted in history and that monogamous marriage is civilization's most important institution" (*The Virgin Birth* 1962, SCM Press). Dr E.L. Mascall comments:- "To play fast and loose with the accepted meanings of words in this way seems to me to be quite outrageous. It is poisoning the wells of language and makes intelligible communication between human beings virtually impossible... Its prevalence in modern theological writing testifies to two things" (1) that supernaturalistic language is needed to distinguish alleged Christian belief from atheistic secularism, (2) that "traditional Christian belief has a nostalgic

character even for those who no longer hold it" (from *Nature and Supernature*, 1976, Darton Longman and Todd, p. 43).

*Laetrile*. (See this JOURNAL, 103, 130.) Though previously thought to be harmless, this alleged cure for cancer appears to be quite dangerous. A number of deaths due to taking it are reported from America. *Pharmaceutical Journal*, 10 Sept. 1977, p. 222).

*Time*. As Augustine of Hippo pointed out long years ago, time is an exceedingly confusing concept. In a recent paper G.J. Whitrow writes "On the Impossibility of an Infinite Past" (*Brit. Jour. Phil. Science*, 1978, 29, 39-45), drawing attention in particular to the scientific results relating to Big Bang cosmology. Karl Popper (same issue, p. 47) replies: "In the absence of any 'natural' unit of time, and even more of any guarantee that in the distant past there existed events comparable to those events we now use to define units of time, we may well wonder whether there is an ontological difference corresponding to the difference between a time co-ordinate reaching into an infinite past and a time co-ordinate with a beginning." We are reminded here of temperature scales. On the Kelvin scale, temperature starts with a zero around minus 273C, but it would be possible to define the 'zero' as minus infinity if, say, a measure of energy expended in reaching low temperatures by some agreed method was taken as a measure of temperature. In Christian theology God is believed to have existed for ever and ever backwards in time but following Popper it would obviously be extremely difficult to define the precise meaning of such language.

*The Beauty of Nature*. Dirac's thought "is dominated by his belief in the beauty and symmetry of nature. This is expressed in his dictum that it is more important for the equations of a theory to be beautiful than to agree with experiment. He is sure that an ugly equation cannot be true. Of course in the end a theory must agree with experiment, but the point he makes is that we should not be put off by apparent disagreements with experiments, and if we keep our equations beautiful we stand a better chance of final success than if we alter them in an ugly way to agree with every experimental result." (Review by Peter Hodgson of P.A.M. Dirac's *Directions in Physics*, Wiley, 1978, £9.20; *New Scientist*, 20 July, p.206). This belief of one of the founders of quantum mechanics is (1) very similar to the attitude of the Christian towards life, all things working together for good to those who love God, and (2) it is sensible to argue that if nature is beautiful in this way, the Mind that made it is beautiful too.

*UFO Conspiracy.* *The Times* (19 Mar. 1978) recently carried a long article on "The UFO Conspiracy" by Ian Ridpath, author of *Messages from the Stars* (Fontana, PB, 1978). The UFO conspiracy, according to Ridpath, is largely the work of the UFOlogists themselves. Too often important facts have been suppressed. In Socorro in New Mexico, for instance, in February 1964 a flying saucer was seen to land in the desert and take off with a roar of blue flame. The mayor and banker owned the site and with a cigar lighter and shovel made appropriate marks on the ground. After the publication of the story in the *Sun* the little town received very welcome publicity, with tourists spending their money. In 1975 a woodcutter named Walton disappeared in Arizona and his five mates claimed to have seen him taken aboard a flying saucer. But the team was behind hand with its work and their contract contained a penalty clause in case it was not finished on time. The 'abduction' appears to have been a staged "act of God" to avoid financial penalty — but the UFOlogists hushed this up! There are two sides, we are told, to even the best of UFO stories!

*Exorcism.* In our last issue (104, 221) John Richards warned against bulldozer tactics in casting out demons. Soon after the press publicised the case of the 23-year old theology student Anneliese Michel of Klingenberg, Bavaria, who died of starvation and exhaustion after being subjected to 9½ months of exorcism practices, on the advice of a Jesuit expert. The Bishop of Würzburg ordered two RC priests to drive six devils out of the girl with the result that AM became totally demented. In a subsequent trial both parents and priests were found guilty of negligent homicide, but the priests only were fined. (*Times* 20, 22 Ap. 1978)

*Steady State Universe.* Further evidence against the steady state theory of the universe has appeared. According to the steady state theory the universe, considered in large portions at a time, is everywhere in space and time the same. Studies of quasars, the most distant objects known, show that their distribution is very far from uniform. (*Atrophysical Jour.* 1978, 220, p11; *New Scientist*, 9 Mar. 1978, p. 655)

*Roman Catholic Sectarianism.* It is interesting to note that some RCs appear to be quite as sectarian as some Protestants. RCs in Glasgow were warned by their Archbishop (the Most Reverend Thomas Winning) that if the priest in charge of the Tridentine church, recently established there, joined couples in wedlock the marriages would be invalid. The priest's hearings of

confession would also be null and void. But Father Fuchy was not at all put out. Immediately afterwards he celebrated the Tridentine Mass with a congregation of 70 present and publicly announced that the Archbishop was in error. "With very few exceptions", he said, the church hierarchy is "showing disloyalty to Christ... It is trying to destroy the church of their fathers, the church which has nourished them." (*Times* 22 May 1978)

In Spain a schismatic RC Spanish sect has crowned a new Pope (Pope Gregory XVII) in Seville to rival the Pope in Rome. Pope Gregory now threatens priests with excommunication from the Carmelite Order of the Holy Face (of which he is founder) if they celebrate in any language other than Latin (*Times* 16 Aug. 1978).

*Influenza from Space.* The suggestion of Fred Hoyle and Professor Chandra Wickramasinghe to the effect that influenza viruses originate in comets has led them to query the theory of person-to-person transmission of "red influenza". They applied for a research grant from the Science Research Council to continue their investigations along these lines, but the request was turned down. They have accordingly written to the Prime Minister complaining that the scientific establishment is obstructing their researches because they are challenging the orthodox theory of the evolution of life on earth (*Times*, 14 Ap. 1978).

*Priestley.* J.G. McEvoy has an interesting, scholarly and comprehensive article in the journal *Ambix* (1978, 25 (1) 1-55 to be followed by two further articles in the July and November issues) on Joseph Priestley (1733-1804). Priestley's theology, which motivated his science, is discussed in great detail. Priestley called himself a determinist and believed that a causal chain of events starting at the creation has continued to the present day. Nevertheless the properties of matter are not inherent in it but given by God, who can take them away if and when He pleases. Priestley held that in the last resort God cannot be regarded as wholly immaterial for if so He would be "cut off from all communication with and all action and influence upon his own creation".

*Height of Man.* Load-bearing in the back is taken by the intervertebral discs which are made of a resilient sponge-like material. Upright posture during the day results in water being squeezed out of the discs: at night it is reabsorbed and by morning a man's height has increased by a third of an inch. Astronauts, returning from weightless conditions, have been known to find themselves two inches taller! (Cf. Mt 6:27!)

*Roman Catacombs.* There were 60,000 Jews in Rome around 150 AD at which date they purchased catacombs from pagan owners. Only 2-3% of the recorded inscriptions are in Hebrew, most (80%) being in Greek and some in Latin. First names are mostly mythological, not biblical, and in the richer Jewish tombs are adorned with figures which violate the decalogue. Jews in Rome hope that the Jewish catacombs will be returned to them: at present they are looked after by the Vatican. (*Times* 16 Mar, 1978)

*Boring and Bad.* Commenting on the widely held assumption that "boring" and "bad" are to be equated, Angela Kingston, a mathematics teacher, wisely remarks, "The real corruption perpetrated by the media... is the notion that everyone is entitled as of right to be entertained all the time". (*Letters, New Scientist*, 9 June, 1977, p. 608). Perhaps the decline of religion, like the decline of mathematics in schools (see many press comments in newspapers for early March 1978) is chiefly due to the undoubted fact that worship is not entertaining.

*Education.* Higher education, regrettably looked upon as a passport to a high standard of living, is increasingly tending to be self-defeating. A university degree is "fast becoming a ticket to nowhere" (*Information*, published by International Labour Organisation. Quoted, *Times* 16 Mar. 1978). In many Western countries degrees are conferred at a rate vastly in excess of openings available. In the third world the position is probably worse - jobless graduates in India rose tenfold between 1966 and 1971. In communist countries university intakes are limited by the requirements of the state, a situation which must be agonizingly frustrating to those who are rejected because they are not good enough Marxists.

As Christians we need to emphasize that students should study, not to put themselves in front of a job-seeking queue, but out of a deep love of knowledge, and the increased opportunity which it affords to help others to find and love our Lord.

*Somerset Maughan.* Robin Maughan, a nephew of Somerset M. who was a vigorous critic of Christianity see for example, *The Pathetic Fallacy* (i.e. Christianity!) - reports an interview with his uncle (*Sunday Times, Weekly Review*, 16 Ap. 1978). SM is reported to have said "My success means nothing to me. All I can think of now are my mistakes. I can think of nothing else but my foolishness. I've made mistakes all along the line. And the



REGINALD LUHMAN

## MORALITY AND RELIGION

This paper, recently given at a philosophy seminar at London University, discusses the possible relationships between religion and morals. It is concluded that the only possible relationship is one of overlap.

From time to time one hears appeals for more effective religious teaching to stem the tide of immorality. Such appeals assume not only a close connection between morality and religion but argue that they are inextricably joined. Such a view, I believe, rests on a confusion. Attempts have been made to define religion in terms of a list of necessary features that go to make up a 'family resemblance' which will encompass all religions. However, for the purpose of this essay I shall be content with describing religion as a belief in a transcendent being who evokes awe in his worshippers who in turn respond by performing certain acts which together constitute worship. Indeed, even this description could be objected to on the grounds that certain religions, like philosophical Buddhism, seem to dispense with the transcendent altogether. We must further note that religious utterances have a performative function. Thus in saying 'God is our Father' the believer is doing more than stating a fact (if such it is); he is expressing his trust in God. This can be brought out by asking what would it mean for a believer to say, 'God is our Father, but I don't trust Him'. By moral reasoning I mean seeing events and states of affairs in terms of obligation. What ought to be done in specific instances being justified in terms of fundamental moral principles like justice, freedom and respect for persons. How one decides what principle to follow when fundamental principles clash or whether there is any sense in talking about the objective existence of the transcendent outside a religious 'language game' lies outside the scope of this essay.

There are at least three possible ways in which religion and morality could be connected. (1) Religion is a form of morality, (2) Morality is a form of religion, (3) Morality and religion are autonomous disciplines which nevertheless overlap. I shall argue that only the third possibility is defensible.

An example of the first position is found in Professor Braithwaite's Eddington Memorial Lecture where he claims, "the primary use of religious assertions is to announce allegiance to a set of moral principles". Thus he argues that the man giving allegiance to Christianity is showing his intention to follow an agapeistic way of life. The doctrinal contents of religions are regarded as 'stories' which may or may not be believed, but which function as a psychological support for following the religion, He writes, "It is an empirical psychological fact that many people find it easier to resolve upon and carry through a course of action which is contrary to their natural inclinations if this policy is associated in their minds with certain stories". For him the different religions differ only in the 'stories' that they entertain.<sup>1</sup>

Besides the criticism that Braithwaite fails to take account of aspects in the various religions which go beyond morality, he also fails to note the different roles played by religious and moral language. This is clearly brought out by a consideration of the concept of duty as seen in terms of religion and morality.

Moral duties can be various and differ one from another. Furthermore one duty may be more obligatory than another. With religion, duty to God is all of one piece. The believer does not ask whether one religious duty is more important than another, but whether or not it is God's will. With one's duty to one's fellow it is always possible to define the duty and there is often a cut-off point where one can say 'I have done my duty'. However with one's duty to God this is never possible. Because the believer makes certain claims about the nature of God his religious duty must be qualitatively different from his moral duty. We feel a moral duty because we see someone in need and feel we ought to respond to that need, but God does not need anything from us. This must be so, otherwise, as Kierkegaard observed, "It would be a highly embarrassing thing to be a creator, if the result was that the creator came to depend on the creature". Similarly failure in our moral duties often leads to injury to other people. Even failure to keep one's promise can cause distress. However it is difficult to understand how failure to do God's will can

injure God. The person who suffers is the one who fails to do God's will and many religions teach a way of reconciliation. For the believer this can mean starting again as if nothing had happened. Such an eventuality is often not available to the person who injures another by failing in his moral duty. The offender can be forgiven, but the clock cannot be put back. Of course this does not imply that the same duty cannot be both a moral and a religious duty. The fundamental difference is that duties seen as moral duties are context-dependent (some duties taking precedence over others) but religious duties are absolute; God's commands cannot become of secondary importance without being abandoned altogether.

If religion cannot be subsumed under morality, could it not be that morality is a species of religion? Many have certainly thought so. It has been argued that morality has its objectivity in the revealed will of God who, at least in some religions, is regarded as all-powerful and all-knowing.

This possibility must be rejected for two reasons. First, if such knowledge is revealed we have to be certain that the revelation comes from God and from no other source. This is made more difficult when it is realized that we cannot even prove the existence of God let alone the validity of His purported revelation. More crucial, however, is the problem of why we should assume that what God commands should necessarily be good. Even if it is possible to know that God exists and is both omnipotent and omniscient it does not logically follow that He must be good. In fact the phenomena of religion seem to militate against such a view. We find many instances in religion where immoral practices have been performed ostensibly as the result of divine revelation. Human sacrifices and sexual perversions were practised in ancient pagan religions, widows were burned to death on their husbands' funeral pyres and outcasts despicably treated in Hinduism and even in Christianity the Inquisition, the Crusades and slavery have all been justified in terms of the divine will. If one seeks to counter this by arguing in terms of lack of moral insight, then one is acknowledging that morality is prior to religion. The problem is clearly put by Dr. A.C. Ewing<sup>3a</sup> "... the simplest and most radical way of making all ethical principles dependent on God would be to say that their validity just depended on their being decrees fixed by the will of God... the question arises why God should command any one thing rather than any other. We cannot say that he commands it because it ought to be done, for that would have to be translated into 'God commands it because

it is commanded by God'. (If however) ... the commands were only issued because it was good that they should be or because obedience to them did good, this would still make judgments about the good, at least, independent of the will of God... If what was good or bad as well as what ought to be done were fixed by God's will, then there could be no reason whatever for God willing in any particular way. His commands would become purely arbitrary, and while the idea of God as issuing arbitrary commands has sometimes been welcomed as a tribute to his omnipotence, omnipotence without goodness is surely an idea of no religious value whatever, and the idea of God would be deprived of all ethical content. For to say that God was good would be just to say he was God: he would be good by definition whatever he should do. Since there was no ethical reason for his commands, God might in that case just as well command us to cheat, torture and murder and then it would really be our duty to act like this". In other words to make ethical principles dependent on God either issues in a tautology (what ought to be done is what God commands, therefore what God commands is what ought to be done) or reduces morality to a form of obedience. The confusion is created by mistaking a metaphysical for an epistemological question. It may be that morality is rooted in God's existence and nature. "But even if it is so rooted, it does not follow that a knowledge of God's existence and nature is necessary to our knowledge of moral (or any other) rules and principles. The epistemological question of the basis of our knowledge of such principles is another matter, and in each case that basis must always be appropriate to the kind of knowledge that is being pursued".<sup>4</sup>

Another consequence would follow from identifying religion with morality. This is that it would be impossible for a non-religious person to be moral. This is surely not the case. Atheists and agnostics know the difference between right and wrong and few would want to maintain that the person who rejects religion is thereby justified in doing as he pleases. Such a position is untenable, at least to biblical Christianity which argues that no one can be excused from obeying the moral law by arguing that they do not know God because God's laws "are written on their hearts, accusing or excusing them" (Rom. 2:14-15).

Of course it could always be argued that religious belief is universal and that atheists really believe in God 'at the bottom of their hearts'. The problem here is to determine what can then be meant by belief in God. If one acts morally by the unbeknown help of God then the significance of religious concern becomes

irrelevant and there will be no way of identifying the divine help outside of the moral life itself.

There is a final line of approach which can be pursued by those who maintain that morality is inextricably linked with religion. It is that a believer must hold that all things, including the laws of ethics, must ultimately depend on God, otherwise God would be limited. This rests on a confusion of the laws of ethics with existing entities. Thus Ewing rightly observes "... we must not confuse laws with existent entities, and when we realize this we can see that we might hold that God created the whole universe without holding that He created the laws of ethics (or of logic for that matter). These laws are just the sort of thing that could not from the nature of the case be created at all... Could they be valid if God did not exist? Well, if God created the whole cosmos, or it is eternally dependent on him, nothing could exist at all without God and therefore without God there would be no being in existence to whom the laws of ethics could apply... But that is not to say that they are made by God as laws and do not follow from their inherent content. Thus it is surely wicked deliberately to inflict pain unnecessarily because of the nature of pain, and not primarily because God decreed that it should be so. On the contrary, if God forbids it, it is because of the inherent nature of the act, from which its wrongness already necessarily follows".<sup>3b</sup>

It is one thing to deny the identity of religion and morality, but another to maintain they are completely separate. Of course it may be that particular religions have taught moral principles that prove unpopular or incline believers towards a life separate from society. Thus Rousseau claimed that Christianity made people into bad soldiers who showed little concern for their rights and political privileges. Some aspects of religion, such as the doctrine of original sin in its extreme form, lead to a position where moral action is denied to all but recipients of the grace of God. Nevertheless, this doctrine, rightly understood, only emphasizes the dilemma faced by the weakness of the will recognized by theologians and moralists alike that is summarised by St. Paul as "the good that I would I cannot, but the evil that I would not that I do". In fact most, if not all, religions have a moral dimension, but of course not all adherents to the religion faithfully follow its moral precepts. Where we find a developed religion we find that morality takes on a deeper meaning in the light of the religious beliefs. Thus in Christianity a belief in a God who is morally perfect transforms the believer's whole

view of life. In Professor Peter's words, "This is tantamount to saying that a religious person is one who has developed a deeper dimension in his consciousness, which transforms his more mundane experiences".<sup>5a</sup> In the teaching of Jesus the concept of fraternity is extended beyond race and nation to include the alien and the enemy and thus because the Christian believes in the Fatherhood of God it follows that in Christ there can 'be neither black nor white, rich nor poor, bond nor free because we are all one in Jesus Christ'.

If it is maintained that there is little in the Bible about society and that the emphasis is on the individual, when the answer would be that by the individual application or moral principles social reforms come about. Thus there is no outright condemnation or slavery in the New Testament, but it was the principle explicit in Paul's letter to Philemon that he should receive his runaway slave back "no longer as a slave but as a beloved brother" that led ultimately to the abolition of slavery. The way religion transforms ethical concern is seen in the Christian concept of love which is not only selfless and a shared experience uniting the worshipping community but has its source in the love of God who sent his Son to die for the unlovely and undeserving. In this way also Christianity is able to respond to the problem of pain by seeing God himself involved. As Peters expresses it "... religion, by placing the fact of suffering in a cosmic context, objectifies the particular response to it that is thought appropriate ... By its personification of love it suggests a way which is open to all to face the human predicament with some kind of hope".<sup>5b</sup>

I claimed at the outset that the identification of religion and morality rests on a confusion. They are not identical but complementary. I would further maintain that, although I do not see how in teaching morality one could be also teaching religion, it seems to make good sense to say that by teaching a person to see the world in terms of God one could also point that person to moral principles that arise from such a world view.

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COLIN J. HEMER

## The Manchester Rotas-Sator Square

Dr Hemer, who has long been interested in this fascinating magic square, comments on its recent discovery in Manchester and on its probable Christian origin.

A wet afternoon at a muddy redevelopment site in the heart of Manchester hardly seems a plausible setting for an archaeological discovery of potential importance for the early history of Christianity. There are, as we shall see, tantalizing problems of interpretation which make it premature to build too much on debatable possibilities. But the find may prove to throw light on questions of far-reaching significance, and we await with the keenest interest the results of tests currently being carried out.

A worker at a rescue dig off Deansgate, Manchester, at the end of June 1978, unearthed a large sherd of coarse Roman pottery, measuring some seven inches by three and a half, caked with mud, but bearing traces of large lettering scratched on its surface. After cleaning, the word OPERA appeared clearly across the centre of the surface, and above it the word ROTAS, broken at the top but clearly enough legible. A third line was fragmentary, preserving only the upper parts of five letters which may be restored as TENET.

This peculiar sequence of letters is sufficient to permit recognition of the well-known "magic square" whose complete form reads:

R O T A S  
O P E R A  
T E N E T  
A R E P O  
S A T O R

The letters of this square read alike forwards or backwards, up or down. Apart from the sequence AREPO, the lines all read as intelligible Latin words, and the whole may at a pinch be translated as a meaningful sentence: "*Arepo* the sower (*sator*) holds (*tenet*) the wheels (*rotas*) with care (*opera*)".

The problem of interpretation of this cryptic *graffito* is itself a fascinating story extending over more than a century. The square had in fact long been known as a mediaeval Christian symbol, often used as a talisman or amulet. But its origin and significance were unknown. Then in 1868 an example was found scratched on wall-plaster from a Romano-British excavation at Cirencester. This find was long disputed and discounted as a possible mediaeval intrusion. As archaeological techniques of the day were undeveloped, the doubt persisted. In the 1920s three scholars offered independently, with minor variations, an explanation of the Christian meaning now recognised as having been attached to the square from about the 8th century. The twenty-five letters could be rearranged to make the words *Pater noster* ("Our Father") written crosswise, with the additional letters A and O, standing for "Alpha" and "Omega", "the first and the last" (cf. Rev. 1:11; 21:6), twice each:

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      P
      A
    A  T  O
      E
      R
P A T E R N O S T E R
      O
      S
    O  T  A
      E
      R
  
```

In 1931-2 four new examples of the square were found during the excavation of Dura-Europus on the Euphrates. These were of undoubtedly Roman date, of the mid third century, before the destruction of the city. Dura-Europus was an early Christian centre, and the discovery confirmed that the hypothesis of a Christian origin for the square might be carried back into the Roman period. It also corroborated the Roman provenance of the old Cirencester find, of perhaps the fourth century. The Christian view won wide acceptance, and the case seemed essentially closed.

The consensus was a brief duration. In 1936 a specimen of the square was found in a very surprising place, in the Palaestra near the amphitheatre at Pompeii. But Pompeii was overwhelmed and sealed off by volcanic ash on 24 August A.D.79. In fact there were two specimens there: a previously published scrap of *graffito* was now recognised as a fragment of another square. These finds raised grave doubts about the Christian interpretation: it was questioned whether there could have been Christians in Pompeii, and, if so, whether they could conceivably have used a kind of cryptic symbolism unparalleled until much later. And there were other complications. It was argued that the Palaestra square must be even earlier: it was associated with *graffiti* thought to antedate the earthquake of A.D.63. It is true that other evidences have been offered for the presence of Christianity in Pompeii and Herculaneum before their destruction, but these are highly dubious. Many scholars have felt that the date is impossibly early for the Christian view, and have sought other explanations.

One suggestion was that the *graffiti* were the work of later explorers of the ruins: but it was shown that the covering debris had lain undisturbed since A.D.79. Others have offered alternative theories of the origin of the square: that it was Jewish, or Mithraic, or Orphic, or connected with local Italian cult, or merely a verbal curiosity whose anagrammatic properties were accidental and without religious or other significance. There is of course no dispute that it was a Christian emblem later, that Christians adopted it if they did not originate it, presumably because they anticipated modern scholars in seeing "*Pater noster*", "*Alpha*", "*Omega*", and the cross. But the real question is that of origin: did Christians think of encoding their beliefs into this cryptic form, or did they merely take over a pre-existing device of alien origin which just happened to be singularly adaptable to their use, and, if so, when?

The very few subsequent finds have done little to clarify the elements of the problem. To date only about ten examples of the square have come to light from the Roman period, from places widely scattered round the limits of the Empire. So the Manchester discovery is of great importance, and anything we can learn of its context will be worth careful weighing. The indications are that it is actually the earliest known specimen apart from the two from Pompeii. Professor Barri Jones, Professor of Archaeology at Manchester University, who has directed the excavation, is confident in assigning it to the later second century, about  $\pm$  A.D.185, from the convergence of different lines of archaeological evidence. But the square is scratched on a sherd

of what can only have been an *amphora*, a heavy storage jar of coarse ware, probably imported from somewhere in the Mediterranean area. The *graffito* seems to have been added later, whether on the intact vessel or an already broken sherd. In any case there is no means of telling whether the square originated in Manchester, or was brought from elsewhere. The site belonged to an area of civilian settlement adjoining the Roman fort of Mamucium, but there is nothing apparent in this context which seems likely to throw specific light on the interpretation of the square. We may perhaps hope for more details than are yet available, but for all the excellence of modern techniques some uncertainties of the case are likely to prove insoluble.

It may still be debated whether the squares at Pompeii (or at Manchester) are really yet valid evidences of Christianity at all. The crucial question of the origin of the thing remains. Here I offer a personal opinion for what it is worth. I hope to publish elsewhere later the more technical reasoning on which this judgment is based. It involves a curiously intricate study in the evaluation of coincidence and of linguistic and constructional probability, complicated by the need to strike the right balance in the difficult historical questions. It is a problem to separate the original and essential from the secondary and coincidental. The complexion of the study seems to shift surprisingly under the attempt to explore the possibilities thoroughly. One factor is the peculiar limitation imposed on the construction of such a square by the word-pattern of the Latin language. Thus AREPO is there simply as a reversal of OPERA. Attempts to answer the question of *origin* by finding an esoteric meaning in it are, I think, beside the point. There is certainly a secondary tradition of the interpretation of AREPO, but only, I think, secondary. It will not help in the crucial question of origin.

It seems strongly probable, all things considered, that the inventor of the square already had the words "*Pater noster*" in mind, and was prompted by them to hit upon this very ingenious way of encoding them into a cryptic anagram. There are difficulties in the way of supposing that a square could have been composed *ex nihilo* in a form which lent itself to this particular coincidence. It may still be argued that the words "*Pater noster*" are not necessarily exclusive to Christians, but that Jews, for instance, might have used them. This may be true, but only Christians, I think, are likely to have found a fundamental and formative motif in them (Matt. 6:9; cf. Rom. 8:14 ff; Gal. 4:6 f). In fact the non-Christian views seem plausible only if the Christian may be excluded. It all comes back again to the difficulty in the

early date of Pompeii. Apart from reservations prompted by this, the Christian view would probably still command wide acceptance, even if for differing and sometimes incompatible reasons.

We cannot claim to prove that there were Christians in Pompeii, but I do not think it unlikely. According to Acts 28:14 there *were* Christians at nearby Puteoli (Pozzuoli) when Paul landed there, probably in 60. It would not be surprising if there were others at Pompeii then or a few years later. There seem to be good grounds for supposing that there was actually an earlier, swifter and more widespread expansion and development of primitive Christianity than our fragmentary sources can specify or than some scholars accept. Their scepticism is perhaps carried over in part from older assumptions and does less than justice to the evidence of the New Testament documents themselves. It is still a very surprising thing, which seems almost too good to be true, if we really have evidence in the square for a Christian presence in Pompeii. On balance I think we probably have. The square is best explained as of Christian origin, and Christianity in Pompeii is not improbable. The two aspects may be held together and even corroborate each other. The difficulties may be explained in this context: the early use of Latin by Christians, for instance, is not the problem often supposed, for Christianity was essentially a vernacular and evangelistic movement which probably began to use Latin as soon as it extended from the East into a Latin-speaking environment. It is well to be aware of the diversity of possibilities and the fragmentary character of our surviving knowledge of the first two Christian centuries. We need to recognise our limitation of perspective and to be wary of stereotyped impressions based on arguments from silence.

This brief account must inevitably omit discussion of many issues which belong to a fuller study. Such include questions of the precise status of the "Alpha" and "Omega" motifs, usually derived from the Revelation, and of the cross symbolism. The probable answers do not invalidate, and may confirm, the view taken here.

COLIN J. HEMER

PETER E. COUSINS

## THE BIBLE AND SEX

In this paper, given at the recent VI Symposium on Sexual Ethics (26 May 1978), Mr. Peter Cousins, now Editorial Director at the Paternoster Press, gives a comprehensive account of biblical teaching on sex. He shows beyond doubt that, for example, popular ideas about what Paul thought are very wide of the mark.

Any attempt to understand the Bible's teaching about sex must, of course, begin with Genesis 1 - 3. Irrespective of the date when this material reached its present form, it contains - regarded from one angle - the deepest thinking about reality of an immensely influential community; seen from a different viewpoint it represents the self-disclosure of the Creator of reality. Recent years have seen an interesting confirmation of the importance of stories about sexual origins and relationships. Even in our supposedly scientific age, *The Naked Ape*<sup>1</sup> has been denounced as sexist and has been answered by another 'myth'<sup>2</sup> of human sexual development which claims our attention not so much because of its scientific accuracy as because of its implications for the rôles of man and woman today. It is regrettable that Christians have tended in the past to concentrate so much on the supposed historical and scientific implications of Genesis 1 - 3 that they have overlooked its parabolic significance. And yet - as we shall see - the New Testament itself shows the way to interpret these stories and their relevance to attitudes and conduct.

Many people who have tried to relate Genesis 1 - 3 to similar material in other Middle Eastern cultures have found the attempt brought enhanced insight. There is a useful summary by David Payne,<sup>3</sup> and von Rad's commentary on Genesis<sup>4</sup> assumes this approach. Apart from Genesis, we shall scarcely comprehend the distinctive

nature of the Hebrew understanding of sexuality, which is at the same time far more positive and yet far more cautious than that of Israel's neighbours. The question is raised even before the sixth day and the creation of Man. For the command to 'be fruitful and multiply' (Gen 1:28), goes beyond a human attempt to give divine sanction to something that happens in any case. The divine command must be seen against the cultic backdrop in which sex was itself deified. Venus, Aphrodite, Astarte — these goddesses (or should one say this goddess?) of love and sex — were not pretty figures dreamed up to decorate valentine cards. Even a Christian poet and dramatist could write of 'Vénus toute entière à sa proie attachée'<sup>5</sup> as if the goddess were some predatory animal hunting down her victims. The Middle East saw sexuality as divine: it offered the possibility of experience that transcended reality; it could destroy as well as uplift; it encompassed the mysterious origins of new life. (We may note in passing that in this respect sexuality is no different from other aspects of the 'natural' world, all of which are deified in polytheism and all of which are demythologised in the Genesis stories.<sup>6</sup>)

When the animals are told to 'be fruitful and multiply', the narrative affirms two things. First, that sexuality is not autonomous; it forms part of the Creator's purpose and — like everything else — is subject to His will and is to function in accordance with His command. Second, that sexuality is in no way evil. All that God made was "very good"<sup>7</sup>; in fact, God invented sex. It could indeed be argued that the whole biblical attitude to sexuality is summed up in these two affirmations: that sex is good and that it is not autonomous.

The creation of Man is first mentioned in Genesis 1:27. The divine statement of intent ('Let us make Man in our own image...') is followed by an understated but unmistakable indication that Man is not complete apart from the existence of two differentiated sexes. "So God created Man in His own image, in the image of God created he him; male and female he created them." Here there is no hint at all of any primacy for the male, no suggestion that the image of God in Man is primarily masculine or that there is anything derivative about woman. Few have wished to follow Barth in his suggestion that the image of God in Man is constituted precisely by male-and-femaleness.<sup>8</sup> But it is hard to disagree with what he argues in the same context: that this word underlines the immense significance of human sex differentiation. Man and woman are structurally and functionally different, however much cultural variations or the divine imperative may modify the

manifestations of this distinction. I define myself and orientate myself in terms both of actions and of self-awareness with reference to my sexuality. Stereotyping of sexual rôles is not supported in the Bible but the narrative rules out the possibility that I may find fulfilment or a 'higher' way of serving God by achieving some sort of essentialised super-humanity that transcends - as if that were possible - the givenness of my sexuality. I am not thinking in this context primarily about homosexuality - although that too is here shown to be no part of God's purpose - but of what might be called the higher unisex which is found also among devout Christians but never in the Bible.

The statement that "it is not good that man should be alone" (Gen. 2:8) introduces the account of how God made woman from man's side. It relates naturally to Genesis 1:27 especially as it is followed by the expressed intention: "I will make him a helper fit for him". Certainly the word 'helper' might by itself imply inferiority but this is ruled out by the word translated 'fit'. Kidner paraphrases: "a help as opposite him"<sup>9</sup>, while von Rad sees the word as containing the notion of similarity as well as supplementation,<sup>4a</sup> This view is supported by the way in which the narrative underlines the isolation of man. He can name the animals that are brought to him, an activity that witnesses to his authority over them, but the episode concludes with the verdict that "there was not found a helper fit (= as opposite to) for him" (Gen. 2:20).

The account of the creation of woman emphasises the mystery of the existence of Man in two sexes; the 'deep sleep' concealed the origin of woman. But she is made of the same stuff as man, a fact from which Paul (Eph. 5:28f) later draws some very practical implications. And it is no accident that this narrative culminates in the first poetry to be found in the Bible, as the man, frustrated by his failure to find a companion among the animals, cries: "This one at last, bone from my bones, flesh from my flesh; this shall be called Woman; for from man was this taken."

In the face of this story it is remarkable how often we are told that for Hebrew thought the chief purpose of marriage is the procreation of children. On the contrary, the story says everything about companionship and nothing about children. What it does imply about marriage, however, extends on and into the New Testament. First, we note that at this first marriage it

was God Himself who gave away the bride; marriage in fact entails God's giving this man and this woman each to the other. "God himself", says von Rad, "like a father of the bride, leads the woman to the man." Here is the origin of the saying of Jesus about "what God has joined together" (Mk. 10:6-9), and of the idea that husband and wife are responsible to God for how each treats the other.

Two comments by the narrator further explicate the nature of marriage. First, it is said that marriage means that a man 'leaves his father and his mother and cleaves to his wife and they become one flesh' (Gen. 2:24). It is being literalistic to interpret the first part of the verse as referring to a hypothetical matriarchal period in Hebrew society when a man was received into his wife's family. The primary emphasis is descriptive and aetiological: here, the writer says, lies the explanation of the intensity of love which drives a man to break even the closest ties in order to be united with woman. Love, which for the Old Testament is 'strong as death' (S of S 8:6), derives this imperative strength from the fact that it unites what was originally one. Having grasped this point, we can see that the phrase, 'one flesh', which has been so tediously explicated, is primarily not a theological one, but is grounded in the language and thought of the story itself. Yet the use of the metaphor has profound implications. It entails the corollary that divorce must be more like a surgical amputation than the termination of a contract.<sup>10</sup> And it is difficult to overlook that flesh is the medium through which the whole personality communicates its varied emotions, longings, joys and fears — compare, "My whole being (lit. my heart and my flesh) cries out with joy to the living god" (Ps. 84:2).

G. von Trobisch<sup>12</sup> draws attention to the immense significance of the 'leave and cleave' pattern of marriage within the clash of cultures that he encountered in Africa. The 'leaving' passes judgment on any marriage pattern that involves the mere absorption of either partner within the extended family of the other. The 'cleaving' implies fidelity and permanence and — ultimately — monogamy. He also utilises the insistence on companionship within the new relationship as an argument against the tendency to see woman as a breeding animal and marriage as a means of increasing the family's strength. Derek Kidner<sup>9</sup> sees it as significant that leaving must precede cleaving: premarital intercourse is not the biblical pattern.

The narrator's second comment is that "the man and his wife were both naked and were not ashamed" (Gen. 2:25). At one level, this is a simple aetiological story: the narrator is preparing the way for his explanation that clothing is a consequence of sin (Gen. 3:7). At a more sophisticated level, he asserts that sexual shame too is a result of sin and in making this point he implies that nakedness within marriage is in some sense a symbol — even a recreation — of Man's original unfallen state. Man and woman are intended to live together in innocence and without shame. But it is difficult not to see a further level of meaning as one relates the comment to marriage. For the narrator is pointing out that the man and the woman were totally exposed to each other; their relationship precluded any sort of 'covering up'. It may not be too fanciful to refer to Paul's anticipation of a time when in God's presence he would 'know as I am known' (1 Cor 13:12) — a passage that deals, perhaps significantly, with love. Many married couples who find they have to work hard in order to achieve openness and transparency within marriage have come to see such a significance in this verse, which runs counter not only to 'Victorian' prudishness (a far wider phenomenon than the adjective implies) but to every attempt to establish a schizoid refuge by talk of rôle differentiation.

Genesis 1 and 2 establish marriage not as a sacrament but as one of God's creation ordinances, intended for Man everywhere and having certain characteristics which — not surprisingly — are found to some degree all over the world. All patterns of marriage evolved or devised by human societies are more or less imperfect approximations to the creation ordinance here described.<sup>13</sup>

The Fall narrative in Genesis 3 throws a great deal of light on the way in which sin has modified marriage. (Not, of course, by the introduction of sexual intercourse: *that* interpretation of eating the forbidden fruit is ruled out not only by 1:28 but also by 2:24f.) The first point to be noticed is the way in which the action of one partner affects the other. There is no hint that the man sinned by accepting the woman's initiative, for the narrative is not at this point concerned with degree and sub-ordination, but each is shown as sinning and both as a result are afraid to face God (Cf. 1 Tim. 2:14). The sequel is hostility between the man and the woman. The 'one flesh' relationship is broken as the man blames the woman (v.12) for the predicament they are in. The relationship is further damaged because the man now begins to dominate his wife and she — in spite of the suffering she endures in childbirth — to crave for him.

Kidner comments: "...control has slipped from the fully personal realm to that of instinctive urges passive and active. 'To love and to cherish' becomes 'To desire and dominate'. While even pagan marriage can rise above this, the pull of sin is always towards it".<sup>9</sup>

Thus it is not surprising that the Old Testament includes material which shows a degree of sexual exploitation. Polygamy was practised for a variety of reasons. The desire for a large family was clearly an important factor (cf Jud. 8:30; 12:8), so was love (2 Sam. 11), and - in the case of kings - political considerations (e.g. 1 Kings 3:1). The rights of the first wife are safeguarded in Exodus 21:10f. In the same context (Exod. 21:7-9), the rights of female slaves are stated and in Deuteronomy (21:10-14) a woman captured in war is placed sexually 'out of bounds' for a month, although the reasons for this are not clear. It may also be noted that the taboos connected with menstruation will have limited a man's sexual use of his wife or slaves.

However, polygamy is nowhere commended. The law of levirate marriage does not come under this heading (Deut. 25:5-10) and the cases of Jacob and Elkanah (1 Sam. 1:1-8) graphically illustrate the problems associated with polygamy. In the course of time, it was urged that the equality of treatment demanded by Exodus 21:10 ruled out the possibility of polygamy. It is in any case difficult to reconcile with the 'one flesh' and 'cleaving' concepts.

Exploitation is far removed from the idyllic picture of sexual love presented in the Song of Solomon and from the exhortation to loyalty and mutual joy in Proverbs 5:15-19. Proverbs refers more than once to the benefits of a happy marriage (12:4; 18:22; 19:14) and the portrait of the ideal wife in 31:10-31 shows a very competent lady exercising a great deal of responsibility. Interestingly, Paul echoes this (1 Tim. 5:14), expecting a woman to be mistress of her home. It may also be relevant to cite Abigail (1 Sam. 25) as a wife who knew how to manage affairs for her husband's good. The rich woman of Shunem (2 Kings 4:8ff) certainly seems to have enjoyed considerable freedom of action.

In respect of sexual activity outside marriage, the Old Testament makes clear distinctions and in one respect applies a double standard.<sup>14</sup> It is uncompromisingly hostile to every kind of sexual deviance and to adultery where a married woman is involved. The list in Leviticus 20:10-21 includes adultery with

the wife of a Hebrew (cf Deut. 5:18; 22:22); incest (cf Deut. 23:1); homosexuality between men; and bestiality (cf Exod. 22:18). Homosexuality is discussed by David Field<sup>15</sup> and by Roger Moss<sup>16</sup> (Exeter 1977), both of whom argue that the biblical prohibition, repeated by Paul (Rom. 1:27; 1 Cor. 6:9 and 1 Tim. 1:10), refers to all homosexual intercourse and cannot be restricted to prostitution or the activities of bisexuals. They see the prohibition as grounded in the creation order rather than in these apparently isolated vetoes.

The prohibition of adultery with a married woman includes intercourse with one who is betrothed since this was regarded as equivalent to marriage. The death penalty is to be enforced upon both partners though an exception is realistically made if a betrothed girl is raped in the country since she was presumed to be helpless (Deut. 22:22-27). It should however be noted that the stipulation that two witnesses must be available to give evidence (Num. 35:30; Deut. 17:6; 19:15) will have made the carrying out of the death penalty very rare. (Num. 5:11ff describes a strange ritual for use when a husband merely suspects his wife of unfaithfulness.)

It was regarded as far less serious to rape or seduce a girl who was not betrothed. In this case, the rapist must pay a bride price of fifty shekels and marry the girl with no possibility of ever divorcing her (Deut. 22:28f) and the seducer must pay the bride price and marry her provided her father gave permission (Exod. 22:16f).

Intercourse before marriage entails the possibility that a bride might be discovered not to be a virgin. The high significance attached to virginity in a bride is seen in Deuteronomy (22:13;21) where the death penalty is prescribed, although there is also a proviso that the bridegroom who makes an unfounded allegation shall be whipped and heavily fined. In addition he must keep the slandered woman as his wife with no possibility of divorce.

How can we explain these laws? Clearly there was an economic factor involved. A wife and her children were in some sense the property of the head of the family and succession rights were involved in the case of sons. The prohibition of coveting the neighbour's wife, ox and ass (Exod. 20:17; the order is different in Deut. 5:21), would not be couched in quite those terms today. (All the same, we may note in passing, it is still true

that adultery involves theft, if not of a person then of the commitment which belongs to the defrauded partner (cf 1 Thess. 4:6). But in Israel as in other cultures the severity of the law against adultery with or by a married woman owes something to the possibility this entails that a man may have to bring up another man's child who may grow up to possess the family inheritance. Similarly, the payment of compensation to the father of an unmarried girl who has been raped or seduced is not to be seen as a fine so much as restitution for an asset lost and compensation for the prospect of having to continue supporting a daughter whom no other man will marry. The same holds good in the case of the bride who is not a virgin.

Yet something more is surely involved when Nathan does what would scarcely have happened in other neighbouring societies and denounces David's sin with "Thou art the man!". It was for a different reason that the prophetic historian comments: "But the thing that David had done displeased the Lord" (2 Sam. 12:7; 11:27). Adultery breaks the covenant between Yahweh and Israel. Not only is Israel committed to keep the covenant made at Sinai which explicitly forbids this sin so that to sin thus is to sin against God (Ps. 51:4 as traditionally interpreted). David's sin against Uriah is, so to speak, a horizontal breach of the covenant with Yahweh which should govern all relationships within the covenant community.

After the exile, we find a further insight made explicit. Malachi (2:13;16) condemns divorce using an argument which applies also to adultery as a breach of "the covenant between you and the wife of your youth". This understanding of marriage as involving a covenant between man and woman has been immensely influential. It is perhaps implicit also in the story of Hosea's relationship with Gomer (Hos. 1-3).

Malachi's words go a long way towards prohibiting the double standard in sexual morality. The words which commence Job's great oath of purgation have a similar thrust. Job declares himself guiltless of adultery (Job 31:9-12) but he goes further than this; (vs. 1-4): "I have made a solemn promise never to look with lust at a girl." Taken in conjunction with the inwardness of the tenth commandment, it shows that the Old Testament contains, implicitly at least, a standard higher than many casual readers give it credit for.

In Malachi (2:16) we read: "I hate divorce, says the Lord God of Israel." Certainly it is remarkable that the Old Testament contains no law of divorce. A passage in the book of Deuteronomy (24:1-4) which at first sight seems to contain such a law, turns out on closer reading to refer to the remarriage of a couple who have been previously married, then divorced and now wish to remarry. Such a remarriage is forbidden as 'an abomination' although no reason is given. It may be that the possibility of such a remarriage is seen as threatening the stability of the second marriage, which is thus strengthened by the prohibition. Here divorce is presupposed and two assumptions are made: first, that it may occur because of some defect in the wife; second that the divorce entails the drawing up of a legal document. This procedure obviously means that the husband must take time to consider his decision. But it is impossible to gather what sort of 'defect' was regarded as a ground for divorce; the rabbis were still arguing about this in New Testament times, when the school of Shammai interpreted it as unfaithfulness while the school of Hillel understood it as anything that might displease the husband. It should be noted that the woman was free to remarry although the possibility is not envisaged that she might herself seek a divorce. The only occasion on which divorce was made obligatory was when Ezra took steps to end the mixed marriages that threatened the survival of Israel's faith (Ezra 9, 10).

We have already seen that the Old Testament attitude to sexuality is one of whole-hearted acceptance; this develops quite naturally into a rabbinic view such as the following: "R. Jacob said: 'He who has no wife lives without good, or help, or joy, or blessing, or atonement'. R. Joshua of Sikhnin (Sogane), in the name of R. Levi, added that he is also without life. R. Hiyya b. Gammada said that he is not really a complete man and some say that he diminishes the divine likeness."<sup>17</sup>

Yet as we have seen, chastity was highly valued, and there were also many taboos connected with sexuality, referred to below. One reason for this pronounced polarity was undoubtedly the sexual element in the religions of Israel's neighbours. Cult prostitution entailed legitimising fornication and adultery as well as homosexual activity. Deuteronomy (23:17, 18; cf Lev. 19:29) refers to this situation when it forbids Israelites of either sex to become temple prostitutes. It is not at all surprising that sexual imagery ('adultery', 'fornication') is so often used by the prophets to refer to Israel's apostasy from Yahwism, since almost inevitably this figurative unfaithfulness

involved literal unchastity. In any attempt to understand the biblical view of 'sexuality, we must take account not only of the positive note struck in the Genesis stories but also of the negative influence of contact with what might be called the 'demonic' aspect of sexuality.

This sense of mystery and power of sexuality may underlie some of the miscellaneous laws and taboos observed in Israel. All emissions from the sex organs rendered a person ritually unclean and although one might hypotheticate medical or quasi-medical reasons in the case of morbid discharges or menstruation, it is impossible to extend this to seminal emission. No doubt the reason for this taboo, as for the others, is lost in history, but it will certainly have inculcated either reverence for the mystery of sexuality or a feeling that sex in some way defiles or weakens a man.<sup>18</sup> If we consider circumcision we find a very significant innovation in Israel. Whereas some of her neighbours practised circumcision (Jer. 9:25, 26) as a puberty rite and the Hebrew word for a relation through marriage is derived from a root referring to circumcision,<sup>19</sup> presumably referring to circumcision as prefacing marriage, the custom has in Israel been taken out of this explicitly sexual realm and has become merely a symbol — received in infancy — of membership within the covenant community. Yet this mutilation of the male genitals, placed at the heart of the covenant relationship, will hardly have failed to affect the community's perception of sexuality.

Attempts at surgery to reverse circumcision became of importance during the later Hellenistic period, when some hellenised Jews wished to exercise naked in the gymnasium. This was in itself a break with Old Testament tradition for Israel was strongly opposed to nudity. This is a motif in the narrative of the Fall (Gen. 2:25-3:21) and exposure of the sexual parts is frequently referred to by the prophets as a sign of humiliation. (See e.g. Isa. 3:26; 47:1-3.) It is an emphatic contrast to the sexuality of her neighbours' religion when Israel prohibits the construction of an altar with steps on the grounds that this might lead to an officiating priest exposing himself (Exod. 20:26). A later requirement was that priests wear linen shorts for this explicit purpose (Exod. 28:42f). It is not surprising that there should be many other regulations affecting the priests. Physical defect would disqualify a man from offering sacrifice and among the defects is mentioned being a eunuch; but it is more significant that this condition — often associated with pagan worship — is mentioned elsewhere in isolation as disqualifying altogether from

membership of Israel (Lev. 21:16;23; Deuteronomy 23:1). We may perhaps place in the same category as freedom from physical defect the stipulation that the high priest must marry a virgin - not even a widow, although this particular restriction did not apply to the priests (Lev. 21:13f; cf. v. 7).

It is not surprising that some modern critics have been so impressed by such laws that they have categorised the Old Testament attitude to sexuality as hostile and (in a pejorative sense) puritanical. In favour of this viewpoint it is also possible to cite a substantial number of euphemisms for sexual and excretory functions.<sup>20</sup> Negative Christian attitudes to sexuality have undoubtedly been able to draw upon an Old Testament tradition. But this is a very one-sided interpretation for it overlooks the strongly positive treatment of sexuality within marriage which we have outlined. And when its cultural background is taken into account, the Old Testament is comparatively free from sexist tendencies.

In the New Testament we find the basic attitudes of the Old Testament reaffirmed and also transcended. This holds good in three broad areas: marriage, sexual purity and the status of women.

Although Jesus was unmarried, he regarded marriage highly. When he was invited to take sides in the controversy about what was meant by the term 'matter of uncleanness' justifying divorce in Deuteronomy (24:1-4), he formulated a principle of great importance. Although Moses had tolerated divorce, this was no part of God's original purpose but a concession to human imperfection or 'hardness'. Jesus bases this verdict on an appeal from Deuteronomy 24:1-4 to Genesis 1:27, which he interpreted as setting forth God's original and continuing purpose for marriage, that it should be an organic union ('one flesh') and thus in principle at least indissoluble. There seems no room for reasonable doubt that he did assume the possibility of divorce and remarriage in certain circumstances - unless we are to assume that 'Matthew' contains material which is wholly opposed to the teaching of Jesus. In the controversy about this 'Matthean exception', it has been all too easy to overlook the significance of the saying: "What God has joined together, man must not separate". This is usually interpreted as a pious commonplace affirming that all marriages are somehow 'made in heaven' and calling for a response only from lawyers in divorce courts, who are prohibited by it from dissolving marriages. In fact, Jesus

was doing as He so often did — throwing the disputed issue back at his questioners and demanding a response. The saying warns all who hear — including husbands and wives — against doing anything to harm a marriage. God's purpose is that man and wife should be one; to threaten this unity in any way is to frustrate God's will (Mark 10:1-10; Matt. 19:1-12).<sup>21</sup>

In the Epistles we find that a common ingredient in the ethical teaching is an affirmation that marriage is good and a warning against adultery and fornication (See 1 Thess. 4:3-8; Heb. 13:4; 1 Pet. 3:7). 1 Timothy (4:1-5) is of especial interest because of its explicit denial of the perverted asceticism which was later to pass as orthodoxy, regarding marriage as evil or at best an inferior state.

In 1 Corinthians (7:10) Paul refers to the teaching of Jesus and in verses 12-14 supplements it with his own, urging that marriages are not to be terminated on religious grounds. But in verse 15 he seems to permit a Christian partner who has been deserted the freedom to remarry. This stipulation is important since it seems to imply that marriage is not totally indissoluble.

Elsewhere, Paul introduces a principle which is revolutionary in its implications. It is not surprising, in view of Paul's Jewish background, that he should have disapproved of sexual abstinence within marriage, except for limited period.<sup>22</sup> But it is remarkable, in view of Paul's apparent views about the subordination of women, that he should state not only that 'a wife is not the master of her own body but her husband is' but also its corollary, that 'a husband is not master of his own body but his wife is'. This thesis of mutuality is so radical that many people in the twentieth century have not yet absorbed its implications.

But it is not so surprising when we read Ephesians 5:21-33. For here Paul takes the 'one flesh' motif and utilises it in a most remarkable and creative manner. We may distinguish two elements in his reshaping of this traditional concept, already singled out by Jesus. First, Paul applies it to the relationship between Christ and the church. The fact that he calls this a *mysterion* and that the Vulgate translated the word as *sacramentum*, has misled some Christians into regarding marriage as a sacrament. This is not the case. Marriage, unlike the gospel sacraments, is not required of, nor is it peculiar to Christians. Nor is a promise or gospel word attached to it. Nor is it dominical.

It is true that the prophetic tradition — we may cite Hosea and Jeremiah in particular — had spoken of the relationship between Yahweh and Israel in terms of the marriage covenant. But Paul goes further than this: he utilises not the concept of covenant but that of organic unity as expressed in the 'one flesh', a much closer bond. In addition, he uses the comparison not simply, as in the Old Testament, to show how God's people should behave towards Him, but to provide a pattern for relationship within marriage. The husband is to love his wife as Christ loved the church — sacrificially. The submission shown by the wife is to parallel that of the church towards Christ. There is, of course, something repugnant to many people today about a view of marriage which sees the responsibility of the wife in terms of submission. But before we take issue with Paul, it is important to note several things. First, that in the case of both submitting and loving, we are speaking of behaviour which is obligatory for all Christians: Paul begins this passage by exhorting *all* to 'submit yourselves to one another'. If we were to attempt a legalistic approach to his words, we should find ourselves pointing out that the wife is not here instructed to love her husband! It seems as if Paul is giving not so much a general set of instructions about marriage as a statement of the implications for marriage of viewing it in the light of redemption as well as creation. The second point is that not only does Paul decline to prescribe a dominating role for the husband, since he parallels submission with love rather than e.g. leadership; he also makes an all but intolerable demand by requiring that the husband's love resemble that of Christ for the church. If we bear these points in mind, we are still left with a view of marriage that conflicts with much that we take for granted in the twentieth century western world, but it is undeniably a high and demanding one and as different as could be imagined from the sexist exploitation that has too often been confused with it.

It has been suggested that there is some inconsistency between the high view of marriage in Ephesians 5:21-22 and the attitudes expressed in 1 Cor. 7:1, 8, 9 where Paul apparently regards marriage as little more than an unfortunate necessity imposed upon those who have not the gift of celibacy, as a hindrance in the work of God and a hazard in difficult times. To understand this viewpoint, we must take account of the context. Paul is dealing with questions posed by the Corinthian church and seems here to be trying to shift their attention from the detailed matters that were concerning them to broader, redemptive considerations. He is uncompromisingly opposed to asceticism:

God has given Man a sexual nature and this requires — generally speaking — an outlet. (1, 8, 9). But it must be recognised that marriage imposes demands and responsibilities which hinder total commitment to Christian service of the kind that Paul was involved in (32-35). In addition, Paul is at this time strongly convinced that the church is facing the tribulation which must precede the *parousia*, the birth-pains of the new age, and sees in this a further disincentive to marriage (26-31). Indeed, this same reasoning leads him to counsel a 'sitting loose' to all kinds of involvement in routine living (29-31). Apparently Paul's attitude changed as the *parousia* was delayed and circumstances changed. Nevertheless, his teaching here is neither inconsistent with Ephesians 5, nor is it without relevance to Christians in certain situations today.<sup>23</sup>

A similar problem is posed by the life-style and by one saying of Jesus. In spite of the positive view of marriage referred to above, we have to recognise that Jesus did not Himself marry and that in Matthew 19:12 he speaks of some people as being eunuchs for the sake of the kingdom. In one sense, there is nothing new about this, although it seems counter to the thrust of the Old Testament thought. For Jeremiah had been similarly situated. In spite of his warm and emotional personality, marriage had been out of the question for him because of his circumstances and destiny (Jer. 16:1-10). Ezekiel's situation following the death of his wife was not dissimilar; his mission also required him to ignore his natural impulse to mourn (Ezek. 24:15-27). In spite of this Old Testament precedent, the saying of Matthew 19:12 represents an important innovation. Although the Essenes, for example, practised celibacy, Judaism as a whole saw little possibility of fulfilment outside of marriage (see the rabbinic quotations above). Jesus, however, affirms that a person who is incapable of marriage may use the single life to God's glory and indicates a possibility of voluntarily choosing such a life in order to serve the kingdom. Although the word 'eunuch' refers to physical defect, the principle may also be applied to emotional conditions that preclude marriage but not the service of God. In fact, while the saying in no way prescribes or affirms the superiority of the single life, it establishes it as a valid setting in which the calling of God can be followed, and thus has important implications for Christian discipleship and for the status of the unmarried. The example of Jesus perfectly illustrates the thrust of the saying.

Another saying of Jesus which might be interpreted as hostile to marriage is Mark 12:18-27 and parallels. If, in opposing the crass literalism of much contemporary teaching about life in the resurrection, He denies that marriage will exist in the new age, does He not devalue it as a present reality? To pose the question thus is to answer it. To say that marriage has no place in the world to come neither denies its value in this world nor does it imply that the values enshrined in marriage will be lost. Paul Jewett comments:- "Exegetes have too easily inferred from Mark 12:25 that where there is no marriage there will be no male and female, because the theologians have traditionally understood the distinction between male and female in terms of marriage. There is good reason to argue, however, that it should be the other way round: marriage should be understood in terms of the male/female distinction, the latter being the more fundamental reality. If this is so, then it does not follow that a life without marriage and procreation is a life that knows no fellowship of male and female. In this respect it must be remembered that Jesus did not say that in heaven there will be no men and women, but only no marriage and giving in marriage".<sup>24</sup>

There is only one New Testament passage which, if literally interpreted, seems to imply a preference for virginity above marriage. In Rev. 14:4, the 144,000 seen with the Lamb are commended as 'virgins'. A literal interpretation would however be almost intolerable in a book which, more than any other in the New Testament, reflects Jewish attitudes and which therefore can be scarcely be interpreted as favouring asceticism. F.F. Bruce therefore suggests that by defiling themselves with women the Seer means having intercourse outside of marriage and that 'virgin' here implies purity.<sup>25</sup> L. Morris understands the word as a metaphor based on OT usage and implying spiritual faithfulness.<sup>26</sup> R.H. Charles excises the passage as secondary on the grounds that it is out of keeping with the book as a whole and that the whole section is suspect.<sup>27</sup>

If the New Testament endorses the Old Testament commendation of marriage (although providing for the possibility of a vocation to celibacy) and likewise urges the importance of chastity although not sexual abstinence within marriage, it similarly attaches great importance to sexual purity. The reasons for this insistence are not altogether different from those which we have seen to underlie the Old Testament hostility to the sexual mores current in adjacent cultures. For the New Testament writers also live in a culture which is overwhelmingly hostile to sexual purity.

So long as the setting is Jewish and Palestinian, there is little need for warnings against sexual sin. Certainly, Jesus tells the woman taken in adultery to go and sin no more but equally He can assume that the rich young ruler knows the commandments, including "Thou shalt not commit adultery" (John 8:11; Mark 10:17-19). In the world of Greece and Rome, however, the church faced a very different situation. Not only was fornication provided for in the worship of Aphrodite and in eastern cults, but for men in particular sexual promiscuity, hetero- or homosexual, was regarded as natural and in no way reprehensible. William Barclay, commenting on Ephesians 5:1-8, cites Cicero's *Pro Caelio*: "If there is any one who thinks that young men should be absolutely forbidden the love of courtesans, he is indeed extremely severe. I am not able to deny the principle that he states. But he is at variance not only with the licence of what our own age allows, but also from the customs and concessions of our ancestors. When indeed was this not done? When did anyone ever find fault with it? When was such permission denied? When was it that that which is now lawful was not lawful?"<sup>28</sup>

It is true that even paganism disapproved of certain behaviour: in 1 Corinthians 5:1 Paul says of the man who had an incestuous relationship with his step-mother that "not even the heathen would be guilty of it". But there is plenty of evidence to confirm the black picture he paints in Romans 1:24-27. It was at this point above all that the Christian ethic conflicted most obviously with that of society in general. But it was not to be tolerated in the Christian fellowship: believers were forbidden to associate with Christians who behaved thus (1 Cor. 5:9-11). Recently it has been argued that Paul was concerned to forbid only casual and promiscuous extra-marital relationships. It is obviously true that the degree of evil involved in extra-marital sex relationships may vary, and that some relationships of this kind are associated with unselfish and loving attitudes but since the creation ordinance implies a one-flesh and unconditional commitment it is hard to see how a biblically based judgment can condone such relationships without qualification.

But it would be wrong to see the New Testament church as obsessed with sexual sin. In the same context, Paul also disfellowships Christians guilty of greed, idol-worship, slander, drunkenness and theft. Nor may we interpret this concern as arising from any fear of or hostility to Man's physical nature.

Indeed, Paul's argument against fornication in 1 Corinthians 6:15-20 is based explicitly on an interpretation of the 'one-flesh' view of sexual intercourse which emphasises its psychological and spiritual implications.<sup>29</sup> At no point in the New Testament is sin located in Man's physical nature as such, witness the inclusion among 'works of the flesh' of idolatry, witchcraft and jealousy (Gal. 5:19-21).

In Matthew 5:21-48 we find Jesus Himself equally uninterested in singling out sexual sin as especially heinous. His reinterpretation of the Law condemns not only lustful thought but also murderous anger, vengeance and selectivity in kindness. Yet by focusing on the inward attitude rather than the outward action he formulated a revolutionary principle. Although there are rabbinic parallels<sup>30a</sup> this word of Jesus modified Christian thinking more profoundly than the rabbinic sayings affected Judaism. Not only did He extend the absolute demands of God into Man's innermost attitudes and character, He also in effect constituted every human being as guilty of adultery.<sup>31</sup> In respect of sexual morality, as of all other, the New Testament leaves no room for self-righteousness.

No less revolutionary was the attitude of Jesus to women.<sup>32</sup> In spite of Klausner's claim that the status of woman in Palestine at the time of Jesus was high,<sup>30b</sup> it is clear that the disciples' surprise when they found Jesus talking to a woman would be a normal reaction (John 4:27).<sup>33</sup> Jeremias points out that a woman had no right, for example to bear witness, since it was concluded from Gen. 18:15 that she was a liar. In a constantly repeated formula women were classed with Gentile slaves and children.<sup>34</sup> Even today, the Jewish Prayer Book includes a prayer, "Blessed art thou, O Lord... who hast not made me a woman." By the standards of His time, it was amazing that Jesus should have had a group of women disciples, referred to in Luke 8:1-3. Contrary to a rabbinic dictum that "If any man gives his daughter a knowledge of the Law it is as though he taught her lechery",<sup>35</sup> Jesus encouraged Mary of Bethany to listen to his teaching (Luke 10:38-42). No wonder women were 'last at the Cross and first at the Tomb'.<sup>36</sup>

In spite of the obsessively repeated suggestion that he was a woman-hater, Paul emulated Jesus in his attitude to women, as may be seen from the number of times they are mentioned by name in his letters. "He treated women as persons: we recall his commendation of Phoebe, the deacon of the church in Cencreae,

who had shown herself as helper to him as to many others (Romans 16:1f), or his appreciation of Euodias and Syntyche of Philippi who worked side by side with him in the gospel (Philippians 4:2f). The mainstream churches of Christendom, as they inch along towards a worthier appreciation of the ministry of women, have some way to go yet before they come abreast of Paul."<sup>37</sup> It was Paul who affirmed that in Christ there is neither male nor female (Gal. 3:28).

The significance of this development for sexual relationships is immense. Where the only possible relationship envisaged between men and women is an overtly sexual one, there are two possible courses of action: society either accepts a degree of promiscuity or it imposes rigid controls which limit contact between the sexes in the interests - as a rule - of safeguarding the proprietary interests of men. But by requiring an attitude of complete chastity, Jesus opened up the possibility of a new kind of relationship.<sup>34</sup> This relationship is in effect adumbrated in Mark 3:31-34. Here Jesus extends his family to include all who accept God's kingly rule, and having said here that these are his 'brother, sister...mother' he later promises that whoever leaves hom and possessions for Him will "receive a hundred times more houses, brothers, sisters, mothers, children..." (Mark 10:30). To imagine that the New Testament usage of 'brother' and 'sister' in the community derives merely from a notional and abstract development of the concept of God as Father is to misunderstand one of the most important motifs in the Christian attitude to sexuality. When Paul tells Timothy to "treat the younger men as your brothers, the older women as mothers, and the younger women as sisters, with all purity" (1 Tim. 5:1f), he is pointing the way to a new type of extended family which unites men and women, married and unmarried, in a new supportive relationship which offers the possibility of expressing maleness and femaleness without overt sexuality. It is no less relevant today than it was two thousand years ago.

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- 4 Gerhard von Rad, *Genesis*, Old Testament Library, ET London 1972, (3rd. ed.), (a) p. 42.
- 5 Racine: *Phèdre* I.3.

- 6 'Genesis 1 strips creation of this mythological character... The God of the Genesis creation story is not one of the forces of Nature, not even the supreme fertility god or Nature with a capital N. He stands over against the world as its sovereign creator...wholly other, the transcendent God' (R. Davidson, *Genesis 1-11*, Cambridge Bible Commentary, London 1973, p. 14).
- 7 Genesis 1:4, 10, 12, 18, 21, 25, and finally - with a difference - 31.
- 8 Karl Barth, *Church Dogmatics* III.1.41; III.2.45; III.4.54, 152.
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- 11 R. Davidson, *Genesis 1-11* in *The Cambridge Bible Commentary*, 1973, p.38.
- 12 G. von Trobisch, *I Married You*, IVP.
- 13 For a thought-provoking discussion of the relationship between legal marriage and the marriage bond, see Paul Ramsey, *One Flesh*, Bramcote, 1975, pp. 17f.
- 14 In Genesis 38, Judah has intercourse with a woman he believes to be a prostitute (12-18) but is incensed when his widowed daughter-in-law turns out to have behaved similarly (24).
- 15 David Field, *The Homosexual Way - A Christian Option?* Nottingham, 1976.
- 16 Roger Moss, *Christians and Homosexuality*, Exeter, 1977.
- 17 Gen. R. Bereshit. XVII 2. Cited from *A Rabbinic Anthology* C.G. Montefiore and H. Loewe, 1938.
- 18 Two passages that may be cited in this context are Psalm 51:5 and Exodus 19:15. Psalm 51:5 has sometimes been misunderstood as implying that sexual intercourse is sinful in itself. But the parallelism between *brought forth* and *conceived* makes it clear that emphasis is being placed here not upon the sexual act but rather upon the beginnings of human existence, so that the Good News Bible is right to translate 'from the time I was born / from the day of my birth'. As for Exodus 19:15 (cf verses 10, 12, 13), this is paralleled in 1 Samuel 21:1-5. Both passages can indeed be interpreted in the same way as 1 Corinthians 7:5, where sexual activity is not regarded as in any way evil, but may be abstained from when undivided attention is to be directed elsewhere and towards more directly spiritual ends. For this view, see B.S. Childs, *Exodus*, Old Testament Library, London 1974, p. 369. But the Old Testament passages at least seem likely to be influenced by the idea that seminal loss entails the expenditure of

- psychic, if not of physical force. (We may compare the nineteenth century euphemism, 'to spend'; and the neurotic segregation of athletes in training from female company.)
- 19 See H. Ringgren, *Israelite Religion* (Eng. Trans. 1966), p. 203.
- 20 See O.J. Baab in *Interpreter's Dictionary of the Bible*, Nashville, 1962 S.V. 'Sex', pp. 298f.
- 21 For a careful discussion see NIDNTT III, (Exeter, 1978) pp. 535f.
- 22 1 Cor. 7:3-5. See also vss. 36-38 which are probably addressed to couples who lived together in a celibacy which, however laudable by the standards of Greek thought with its mind-matter dualism, was perverse when judged by the 'one flesh' doctrine of Genesis 2.
- 23 F.F. Bruce, *Paul Apostle of the Free Spirit*, Exeter, 1977, p. 267, interprets this as an *argumentum ad hominem*, cf. H. Chadwick, *Jour. NT Studies* 1955 (May), pp. 261f.
- 24 Paul Jewett, *Man as Male and Female*, Grand Rapids, 1975, p. 34. See also I.H. Marshall, *The Gospel of Luke*, Exeter, 1978, p. 741.
- 25 F.F. Bruce, *A New Testament Commentary*, Glasgow, 1969, p. 654.
- 26 L. Morris, *Tyndale New Testament Commentary*, 1969.
- 27 R.H. Charles, *Internat. Crit. Commentary*, Edinburgh, 1920.
- 28 W. Barclay, *Daily Study Bible, Letters to the Galatians and Ephesians*, Edinburgh, 1954, p. 191.
- 29 It is usually assumed that sinning 'against the body' here implies that the physical body of the sinner is involved in sexual sin in a way that is unique and unlike that entailed in other forms of sin. But there may be something to be said for the interpretation suggested by John Ruef in his *Pelican New Testament Commentary* (Harmondsworth 1971): "Paul is here continuing his theme of identification with Christ through the faithful community...not only is the meaning of the sexual act perverted but the meaning of faithful membership in the body of Christ as well" (p. 48).
- 30 Joseph Klausner, *Jesus of Nazareth*, 1925, p. 385. (a) Cited on p. 385 (b) pp. 195f.
- 31 We are all "below the line," for we are all adulterers, some within legitimate marriage and others outside it. Because a man does not "dissolve his marriage" in the sense in which that term is used in civil law, he cannot, on that account, pride himself on his observance of the Seventh Commandment' (Emil Brunner, *The Divine Imperative*, Eng. Trans. London 1937, p. 353).
- 32 C.F.D. Moule (*The Phenomenon of the New Testament*, 1967, pp. 63-66) writes feelingly about this, contrasting it not only with that of contemporary Judaism, but also with that of the apostate church.

- 33 Cf. the rabbinical sayings cited by L. Morris in the New London Commentary, *Gospel of John*, 1972.
- 34 J. Jeremias, *Jerusalem in the Time of Jesus*, Eng. Trans. 1969, pp. 374-376.
- 35 *Sot.* 3:4.
- 36 Cf. Jewett, ref. 24, pp. 94-103.
- 37 Bruce, ref. 23, p. 457.



ALAN P.F. SELL

## CONSERVATIVES, LIBERALS and the GOSPEL

In this article Dr. Sell characterises liberal and conservative tendencies in theology, and shows how those on either side could, and sometimes did, reduce the Gospel. He notes the subsequent changes of attitude, but suggests that in seeking to set forth the heart of the Christian gospel we may learn from, and be warned by, the older debates.

### I

To those who have been brought up to regard the late nineteenth century as the hey-day of preaching — which, at least in some Anglican and nonconformist circles, it was — it comes as a surprise to discover that the prevailing homiletic assurance was set against a background of shifting landmarks, and of a degree of theological fluidity, the like of which had seldom if ever been known before. From the Renaissance onwards man had increasingly come to the fore. His autonomy, real or imagined, was extolled by many; to his possible achievements in scientific and other realms there seemed to be no limit. The attack upon the transcendent and the supernatural, and the rise of immanentist thought had provided soil in which modern biblical criticism could take root, and in which evolutionary thought could flourish. The concern with history and the idea of progress; the increasingly fashionable agnosticism and naturalism; the optimism of many, the pessimism of a few; the virtual demise of the old Calvinist-Arminian debate which, for all its discourtesies, had kept alive the question of the heart of the gospel — all these were factors which contributed to the nineteenth century ferment of thought. Anyone who, like Ritschl, sought to establish theological bearings could hardly avoid a measure of ambivalence, and could certainly expect fully to satisfy nobody.

Nor was it in the case of theologians as W.S. Gilbert said it was with boys and girls: that they were "either a little liberal, or else a little conservative". Theology produced no such tidy disjunctions. On the contrary, the terms "liberal" and "conservative" are so highly ambiguous that any attempt at stipulative definition is hazardous in the extreme.<sup>1</sup> We might, for example, wish to designate Ritschl a liberal; but the term requires immediate qualification, and its relativity becomes plain, as soon as we find Ritschlianism dividing, inconveniently, in a *threefold* right, left and centre manner, represented respectively by T. Haering (1848-1928), A. Harnack (1851-1930) and W. Herrmann (1846-1922). When we further consider the way in which Ritschlianism was more widely assimilated - by those, for example, who welcomed the emphasis upon God's Fatherhood as an antidote to what they understood as Calvinism's capricious deity; and by those Americans who extracted thence a theology of progress which seemed to undergird the "American dream" - it becomes clear that all manner of nuances are detectable in the Ritschlian phenomenon, and that many motives are at work.

We are not here dealing with doctrine alone. Thus, the liberal W.P. Merrill explained, "The liberal can never hope to state his views with the sharp definiteness that marks the theology of the older school. For he is dealing, or attempting to deal, with life, not with the forms it takes; with reality, not with theories about it".<sup>2</sup> (Though the Anglicans of the Churchman's Union, founded in 1898 and renamed the Modern Churchman's Union in 1928, were often more than a little intellectualist!) Lest anyone should think that by contrast *all* conservatives have ever been exclusively concerned with doctrine, we would draw attention to the political dealings of the anti-Marxist "fundamentalists of the far right".<sup>3</sup> Confusion is worse confounded by the fact that some have variously allied themselves with both conservatives *and* liberals. Thus, with reference to three Anglicans: the self-styled Liberal Catholic Charles Gore, the protestant-evangelical H.C.G. Moule, and the liberal Broad Churchman Hastings Rashdall, Dr. J.K. Mozley wrote, "On the subject of the value to be attached to the miraculous in Christianity, Gore and Moule are near to one another, as neither of them is to Rashdall; in their general view of the nature and results of the inspiration of the Bible Gore and Rashdall adopt a position which Moule would not entertain; while in regard to their conception of the Church, the ministry and the sacraments, Moule and Rashdall, in their affirmations and denials, stand over against Gore."<sup>4a</sup>

Again, there is the kind of complication represented by the fact that the liberal Dr. E.W. Barnes's definition of *evangelicalism* - "It is Christianity in its most simple and purest form, free from accretions, marvellously alive because it has escaped from the clutch of the dead hand of the past"<sup>5</sup> - would be taken by many as an excellent definition of *liberalism*! As if all this were not enough, there are the manifold qualifications required by historical time-lags, and concerning geographical origins. Fundamentalism, for example, never made the orchestrated impact upon Britain that it did upon America; nor was the millenarian impetus as great in the former nation as in the latter; and within America itself the Mennonites, the Calvinists of the Christian Reformed Church, and the Lutherans of the Missouri Synod - all theologically conservative - were not shaken by the fundamentalist-liberal convulsions of the nineteen twenties and thirties to anything like the degree that the larger of the Baptist and Presbyterian Churches were.<sup>6</sup> Our final cautionary point has already been alluded to in our reference to Dr. Barnes: we shall not be surprised to find those who claim the name "evangelical" within both of the blurred-edged tendencies ("groups" is too tidy a word) of which we speak. It remains only to add that some, during the heat of battle adopted the attitude, "A plague on both your houses!" Thus Bernard Manning declared, "It is a scandal that controversialists, degrading words like 'evangelical' and 'catholic', have given them the fustiness of party banners".<sup>7</sup> Certainly it was not lack of personal conviction which prompted Dr. A.E. Garvie to say, "I disown any party labels for myself altogether".<sup>8a</sup> But such men could usually be pigeon-holed fairly easily - at least by others. Our contention is that liberal and conservative were locked in combat over the fundamental question, "What is the heart of the Christian gospel?" Since that question is of perennial importance, their disputes, however hoary, are of more than passing interest, and may even - especially since pendulum-swings are not unknown in theology - hold warnings for their successors.

We shall first note some who were more or less conservative whilst decidedly evangelical (liberal evangelicals will engage our attention later). At once we come face to face with the disputed question, what are the characteristics of conservative evangelicalism? D.R. Davies argued that "Evangelicalism affirms that regeneration is an indispensable condition of the Christian experience of redemption and forgiveness...No redemption without second birth - this is the irreducible essence of Evangelicalism".<sup>9a</sup> In similar vein P.T. Forsyth writes, "By an evangelical theology I mean any theology which does full justice to the one creative principle of grace".<sup>10a</sup> On this definition Luther, Calvin, Edwards, Whitefield, Wesley, would be numbered among evangelicals,

though perhaps the "Pelagianising" C.G. Finney would not. On the other hand, if we take Finney as a pioneer modern revivalist, whose evangelistic methodology comes down through Billy Graham to the present day, then evangelicalism seems to be a more recent phenomenon, and Finney is its fountain head.<sup>11a</sup> Again, to the material principle of regeneration, Dr. K. Kantzer would add the formal principle of biblical authority.<sup>11b</sup> With this Dr. Gordon Clark would agree - indeed apart from the latter principle, he thinks, the Reformers could not have challenged the Romanists.<sup>12</sup> Then, in true Reformed fashion, Dr. Hesselink adds faith: "'sola scripture', 'sola gratia', and 'sola fide' ... Where these phrases are more than mere slogans, one does indeed find an evangelical faith".<sup>13a</sup> The fact that so many find it necessary to refine our understanding of "evangelical" is a clear indication of the slipperiness of the term.

It would be broadly true to say that Anglican conservative evangelicals of the period 1850-1920 would have associated themselves with the traditional Reformed view. Those episcopalian Puritans who sought to reform the Church of England from within would certainly have done so, and so, in their wake, would Newton, Toplady, Venn and Grimshaw. Among their nineteenth century successors would be found Charles Simeon and Henry Martyn. Anglican evangelicals have traditionally defended the Establishment, and have been loyal to the *Book of Common Prayer*. At their best - witness the Clapham Sect - they have shouldered their responsibilities to the less fortunate in what some latter-day historians have been too ready to pronounce a patronising, paternalistic manner. A minority of conservative evangelical Anglicans has been vociferously anti-Roman. Few summed up the stance of this party so succinctly as Bishop J.C. Ryle (1816-1900) of Liverpool. He defined evangelical religion both positively and negatively. Standing by the absolute authority of scripture, it affirms man's corruption in sin, maintains the penal substitutionary theory of the atonement, and emphasises the work of the Holy Spirit in regeneration and in the life of grace. It is not anti-intellectual; it does not undervalue the Church, the ministry, episcopacy, the Prayer Book, good order, holiness or self-denial, though it does take a ministerial rather than a magisterial and sacerdotal view of the ministry; it denies that the sacraments convey grace *ex opere operato*; and whilst it believes that episcopacy is the most desirable form of church government, it does not deny the validity of non-episcopally ordained ministries.<sup>14</sup> It is not hard to read a case against Anglo-Catholicism between some of Ryle's lines.

Conservative evangelicalism lingered in all the main nonconformist denominations of England, Wales and Scotland, and in the Church of Scotland too. The leadership of these bodies

moved increasingly towards accommodation with newer thought, both in respect of adjusting to biblical criticism, utilising the concept of evolution, heeding pressing social needs, and becoming increasingly silent on those profoundly doctrinal questions which had fuelled the older Calvinist-Arminian debates. C.H. Spurgeon was a lonely exception among the Baptists, and even he was sufficiently in accord with the predominant spirit of the age to say, "Every century sees a marked advance in the world's condition, and we shall proceed at a quicker rate when the Church wakes up to her responsibility".<sup>15a</sup> Some conservative Methodists who stood, whether they all realised it or not, in the tradition of evangelical Arminianism, found a focus for their interests in Cliff College, a training centre for home missionaries which grew out of the vision of Thomas Champness (1832-1905), and whose first Principal, Thomas Cook, was appointed in 1903.<sup>16</sup> Even so, Dr. Workman spoke for most Methodists when he said that "Methodism is rightly undisturbed by the higher criticism of the Bible".<sup>17</sup> The mention of Cliff College, noted for its class meetings, its choruses, its evangelistic treks and the like, reminds us yet again that we are dealing with ethos and not with doctrine only.

This is not in any way to minimise the importance of doctrine. Some are *confessionally* conservative and evangelical, calling themselves Reformed or Lutheran. Among the former some, saddened by the way in which some professedly confessional churches have, in their view, lapsed, have taken to themselves the term "Orthodox". In Scotland we find the small Reformed Presbyterian Church (1743) which stands in the covenanting tradition; the continuing Free Church (1843); and the Free Presbyterian Church (1893).<sup>18</sup> When the majority of the Free Church was on the point of joining with the United Presbyterians to form the United Free Church of Scotland (1900), the Free Church was congratulated on the impending union by the Assembly of the Irish Presbyterian Church. The Reverend James Hunter, however, was by no means in sympathy with his Assembly's resolution, and for many years he waged a battle in the interests of Calvinism, and against modernism. Matters came to a head when in 1927 he formally charged the Reverend J.E. Davey of the Irish Presbyterian College, Belfast, with denying *inter alia* the full inspiration of the scriptures. The Assembly found in favour of the Professor by 707 votes to 82, and Hunter felt that he could no longer remain a member of so compromised a Church. With other seceders he formed the Irish Evangelical Church, which on 26th March 1964 changed its name to the Evangelical Presbyterian Church. The Reformed Presbyterian Church of Ireland (Presbytery 1763; Synod 1811) continues in rather greater numerical strength than its Scottish Mother Church. In England Calvinistic conservatism is the continuing stance of the Strict Baptists, and of those Reformed

Baptist churches which have been increasing in numbers since the 1960s, and some of which are more overtly confessional in character.<sup>19</sup> There are conservative evangelical individuals and groups in the mainstream denominations of Britain, and from some of these such interdenominational bodies as the IVF and the Evangelical Alliance draw some of their support.

In America conservative evangelicalism has ever been well represented among the major Baptist denominations, though vociferous minorities have seldom been wanting who have lamented the encroachment of liberal thought, and the departure from old standards. On occasion secession has resulted, as witness, for example, the General Association of Regular Baptist Churches (1932) which came out of the Northern Baptist Convention, and which esteems the Baptist Confession of 1689; and the Conservative Baptist Association of America, which emerged from the same parent in 1947. However, the more consciously confessional Presbyterians have experienced the greatest strategic difficulties in their desire to be open to advancing thought on the one hand, and to prevent schism on the other. The Presbyterian Church of the U.S.A. was particularly exercised in this matter. The attempts during the 1880s and 1890s of Professor Charles A. Briggs of Union Seminary New York to acquaint his Church with the *advantages* of the higher criticism led to his suspension in 1893. The General Assembly of 1892 and 1893 had meanwhile declared that the original biblical documents were devoid of error, and the 1892 Assembly refused the request of fifteen presbyteries that the Westminster Confession be revised. In time, however, the newer thought held sway within the Church until, conservative and fundamentalist opposition notwithstanding, those who felt that their Church was entering into an unholy alliance with non-Christian thought forms seceded in 1936. The leader of this secession was J. Gresham Machen (1881-1937), a Professor at Princeton Theological Seminary. Machen stood in the line of Charles and A.A. Hodge and B.B. Warfield (whose views, incidentally, of biblical authority had been attacked by T.M. Lindsey as being scholastic rather than Reformed<sup>20</sup>), and although schism was not his intention, he and his supporters threw down the gauntlet to their Church with the establishment in 1933 of the Independent Board of Foreign Missions, and three years later the break-away Presbyterian Church of America was formed. In 1939, on the separation of Carl McIntire's more millenarian and separatist Bible Presbyterian Church, the PCA changed its name to the Orthodox Presbyterian Church.<sup>21</sup> Of the other American Presbyterian bodies we may mention two denominations which stand in the covenanter tradition: the Reformed Presbyterian Church of North America and the Reformed Presbyterian Church, Evangelical Synod. The latter is currently engaged in union conversations with the Orthodox Presbyterian Church.

We should not do justice to American conservative evangelical confessionalism were we to fail to mention such denominations as the Reformed Church in America (1628) and the Christian Reformed Church. These are of Dutch origin, the latter being formed in 1890 by the union of two secessions (1822 and 1857) from the former. To some extent the disputed issues were reflections of troubles in Holland, but the stand against Freemasonry, which those who joined the Christian Reformed Church took, was a further ingredient in the strife. Both Churches adhere to the Heidelberg Catechism, the Belgic Confession and the Canons of Dort.<sup>22</sup> To the Missouri Synod Lutherans we have already referred, and it hardly needs to be said that there are numerous other conservative evangelical groups in America, concerning some of which the casual observer may be forgiven for thinking that they are distinct from their brethren as much because of pride as because of principle.

We can no longer delay our attempt to unpack that most emotive of terms, "fundamentalist". We have waited until now in order first to make plain that there is much conservative evangelicalism to which the term "fundamentalist" in the sense often assigned to it - aggressively evangelistic, highly emotional, lacking in clear doctrinal emphasis, decisionist - does not apply at all. Nor can we content ourselves by saying that a fundamentalist is one who subscribes to the five fundamental doctrines which collectively gave their name to the movement: the verbal inspiration of the Bible; the Virgin Birth of Christ; his substitutionary atonement; his bodily resurrection; and his imminent personal return. For not only is it the case that many Roman Catholics could assent to all five; but also, many conservative evangelicals of the confessional kind, though likewise eager to endorse these fundamental doctrines, were not able to acquiesce in the individualism, the millenarianism, and the evangelistic methodology which were the hallmarks of many fundamentalists. We shall proceed cautiously, therefore, by noting three strands which, in addition to the interest in scriptural authority and regeneration, helped (to varying degrees in varying places) to make fundamentalism into what it became. These strands are revivalism, the scriptural holiness movements, and the prophetic and millenarian movements. After an introductory paragraph we shall treat each in turn.

Like its Old World counterpart the Calvinism of the New World was not immune to tensions.<sup>23</sup> There was the antinomian controversy of the 1630s associated with Mrs. Anne Hutchinson. There was the denial by William Pyncheon as early as 1650 that Christ bore the Father's wrath.<sup>24</sup> Rationalistic Arminianism began to make its impact as witness John Wise's *Vindication of New England Churches* (1717); and America was not bereft of

Arians such as Jonathan Mayhew and Thomas Barnard. In 1784 Charles Chauncy wrote on the *Salvation of all Men*, by which time the impetus in the direction of unitarian universalism had already appeared in the person of John Murray, who arrived in America in 1770, having learned his theology from James Rely in London.<sup>25</sup> The seeds were thus already sown for the split between liberalism and evangelical revivalism which was to follow the Great Awakening.<sup>26</sup> The supreme challenge laid upon Jonathan Edwards (1703-1758) was to prevent a landslide from the Calvinistic side of the ravine. He therefore staunchly upheld the view that man is morally unable to do the good, apart from regeneration by God; and that the only "freedom" natural man enjoyed was the freedom to follow a sinful course. The efforts of Edwards's disciples Joseph Bellamy (1719-90) and Samuel Hopkins (1721-1803), who were influenced by the governmental theory of the atonement and by Leibzizian theodicy, lay in the direction of a contemporary reassertion of Calvinism. In fact both Edwardean Calvinism and the Calvinism of the "Old Lights" who opposed the Great Awakening were modified to some extent by the revival. The modifications were carried further by Nathanael Emmons (1745-1840), Timothy Dwight (1752-1817) and Nathanael W. Taylor (1786-1858). Taylor maintained the equality of reason and revelation, and concerning what he took to be Edwards's faulty estimation of man's natural ability he expostulated, "it is an essential nothing".<sup>27</sup> Thus emerged the New Divinity.

Charles G. Finney (1792-1875)<sup>28</sup> was dramatically converted on 10th October 1821, and promptly became a revivalist preacher. Perhaps the best way of summarising his "offences" is to say that he was "Pelagian", latterly perfectionist, and given to non-scriptural evangelistic practices - his "new methods" which comprised appeals, the "anxious seat" and the like. As to the first, Finney, influenced by Taylor, denied that God's sovereignty extended to the physical realm. There man was free - indeed, the *a priori* intuitions of human reason are free of error.<sup>29</sup> God's omnipotence is thus limited by man's freedom. It follows that in theory every man is open to persuasion: hence the importance of preaching. There can be no such thing as moral inability. Man is under an obligation to surrender to God, and he can do it if he will. Depravity is a state of selfishness in which unconverted man *voluntarily* continues. All of which leads to a radical revision of the traditional doctrine of regeneration. By conversion now is meant a freely-chosen new direction: "The fact is, sinners, that God requires you to turn, and that what he requires of you, he cannot do for you. It must be your own voluntary act".<sup>30</sup> More strongly, he argued that conversion is not immediately by the Holy Ghost, but

by argument and persuasion.<sup>31</sup> None of this met with Dr. Warfield's approval: "It is quite clear that what Finney gives us is less a theology than a system of morals. God might be eliminated from it entirely without essentially changing its character. All virtue, all holiness, is made to consist in an ethical determination of will".<sup>32</sup> Consistent with this is Finney's view that election means God's foreknowledge of those who will be converted.<sup>33</sup>

In later years Finney admitted that many of his converts had relapsed, and he attributed this to the inadequate doctrine of sanctification which, earlier in his career, he had espoused. Now at Oberlin College, he developed his version of perfectionism, building upon his own conversion experience which, he thought, had left him free of sin.<sup>34</sup> Certainly, to some of his converts "entire sanctification" was a real possibility - in which connection Dr. Opie rightly remarked, "Ironically, his critics condemned only his Pelagianism as an awful lapse. They would have been thunderstruck had they not missed his Gnostic streak entirely".<sup>35a</sup> Finally we note those less able theologians, but considerable pragmatic revivalists, who stood in Finney's line. Pre-eminent among these was Dwight L. Moody (1837-99),<sup>36</sup> of whom the following sober, not to say caustic, assessment has recently been penned:

"'I am an Arminian up to the Cross; after the Cross, a Calvinist'. By 1875 Dwight L. Moody, the foremost revivalist of his day, could make a shambles of theological controversy with hardly a murmur of dissent. Evangelicalism, once a powerful theological movement, based on revivalism, had been shattered. In its place Moody offered an enthusiastic but comfortable moralism. The sovereign God of American religious awakenings before the Civil War had become by the Gilded Age a friendly personal counselor. Sin, once a truly awful condition, Victorian gentility translated into the social improprieties of laziness, drunkenness and poverty. Grace had been a marvellous last-minute rescue from the threat of eternal suffering and offered a vision of blessedness. Now grace provided for the pleasantries of self-confidence, comfort, and prosperity. Conversion, once the most shattering experience of man's short and harsh life, became the voter's judicious right to change his party affiliation. Moody's revivalism reached its climax not in mystical transcendence or intense piety, but in sentiment".<sup>35b</sup>

We turn now to the holiness element in conservative evangelicalism. It may be contrasted with Finney's version of man's quest of holiness in that it was more traditionally evangelical than Pelagian, and there was often much less emphasis upon the mechanics of revivalism, and more on the original, and not just on the co-operative, work of God the Holy Spirit.<sup>37</sup> In a word, this strand of thought and experience is the heir of Wesley and of those Moravian pietists and those mystics from Tauler to Law, upon whom he drew. We may observe in passing that some pietists, horrified by the more barren tracts of Protestant scholasticism, became anti-intellectualist in rather the same way that some later fundamentalists who despised "book learning" did. But our main concern is to indicate that the Wesleyan holiness tradition, the classic expression of which is Wesley's *A Plain Account of Christian Perfection* (1766) was far removed in spirit and in doctrine from the Oberlin perfectionism of later times. Wesley did not teach the possibility of sinless perfection in this life; to him such perfection was possible for man only in eternity. Moreover (and here he was at odds with the Calvinistic doctrine of perseverance) the sanctified may yet fall and perish. The concern for scriptural holiness was continued within the Salvation Army, founded by the ex-Methodist William Booth (1829-1912); it is the *raison d'être* of the American Church of the Nazarene which dates from the late nineteenth century, and of its British counterpart, the Calvary Holiness Church; it fired the preaching of the Americans W.E. Boardman and Mr. and Mrs. R. Pearsall Smith; and it is the distinctive doctrinal feature of the Keswick Convention, the first of which was held in 1875, and among whose early leaders was Evan H. Hopkins.<sup>38</sup> Some of those associated with Keswick departed from Wesleyan perfectionism in this important respect: they separated sanctification from justification, and made the former a future prospect and the object of a second blessing.

Finally, we have the growing interest in millennial matters and prophecy. This element has been brought to the fore by Dr. Ernest Sandeen in particular.<sup>39a</sup> Rejecting H.R. Niebuhr's sociological explanation of fundamentalism in terms of urban *versus* rural communities, he claims that the fundamentalist base of support was as bourgeois and urban and was that of liberalism.<sup>39b</sup> Fundamentalist leadership was, however, characterised by millenarian and prophetic inclinations. Dr. Sandeen traces this interest from Daniel Whitby, Rector of Salisbury; he mentions the impetus provided by the French Revolution, and the growing concern for the fate of the Jews - a concern represented by the teaching of Lewis Way; he analyses the split between pre- and post-millenarians, the former of whom took a more pessimistic

view of the world; and he provides an account of the dispensationalism of J.N. Darby and his Plymouth Brethren,<sup>40</sup> distinguishing this from that native American dispensationalism whose leader was William Miller: "The Millerites did not accept the restoration of the Jews to Palestine as a part of the prophetic time-table, nor were they willing to admit that biblical prophecy had any further promises to keep so far as the Jews were concerned".<sup>39c</sup> In addition to all of this there was the futurism of such groups as the Mormons and the Shakers — not to mention the power of the "American dream". Dr. Sandeen reminds us that Jonathan Edwards himself was the first post-millennial American theologian,<sup>39d</sup> and Professor Harland has remarked that "Neither the American past nor the nature of her present bewilderment and frustration can be understood without taking fully into account how this strong sense of particular calling, of 'destiny under God' has remained a constant aspect of the ideological structure of the nation".<sup>41</sup>

Among the steps on the road to orchestrated fundamentalism was the series of Niagara Bible Conferences (1883-97). From the 1890 Conference there issued James Hall Brookes's fourteen-point statement in which scriptural inerrancy and the premillennial return of Christ were affirmed. Other leaders, drawn from a variety of denominations, included Arthur T. Pierson and William J. Erdman. In 1882 the first Bible School was founded at Nyack-on-the-Hudson, and there followed Moody's Chicago Evangelistic Society (later the Moody Bible Institute) in 1886. Many other such schools sprung up, and among their most important common features were the advocacy of interdenominational evangelism and the abhorrence of liberalism in theology. Then, between 1910 and 1915 was published that series of pamphlets to which we have already referred, whose collective title was "The Fundamentals". Sponsored by the layman Lyman Stewart, the series was enhanced by the contributions of such distinguished scholars as B.B. Warfield and James Orr. Advanced critical views were countered (though Orr, to the disquiet of some, gave a qualified welcome to theistic evolution as not necessarily undermining the faith); bodies such as the Mormons and the Christian Scientists were opposed; and the basic orthodox doctrines, and in particular the five fundamentals, were upheld. At the World's Bible Conference in Philadelphia in 1919, among whose leaders were R.A. Torrey and W.B. Riley, attention was focussed upon the fundamentals, and an attempt was made to place the apocalyptic element in perspective. There followed the stormy decade of fundamentalist *versus* liberal controversy. Trouble had been brewing for some years, but in May 1922 Harry Emerson Fosdick, the liberal Baptist, preached his celebrated sermon, "Shall the

Fundamentalists win?" In the following year the New York Presbytery of the Presbyterian Church U.S.A. — that body which only thirty-one years before had rejected C.A. Briggs's position on scriptural interpretation — caused offence to conservatives with its Auburn Affirmation. Elsewhere the issues which were to come to a head in the Scopes trial were being canvassed, and for all these reasons and others the question of biblical authority came to the fore once again. We can therefore understand why Dr. James Packer characterised fundamentalism thus: "What Scripture says, God says. This equation was the formative principle of fundamentalism, as it has been of all evangelicalism in history".<sup>42</sup> On the other hand, in view of the varied assortment of available doctrinal options — revivalist, perfectionist, millenarian, holiness, prophetic — and more recently pentecostal — we can see why some have regarded fundamentalism as a distinctively modern phenomenon.<sup>43</sup> We can also understand why such a Reformed conservative evangelical as Dr. Machen disliked the term. To him it suggested a narrow, novel, sometimes anti-intellectualist and over-emotional movement, which was based upon an inadequate range of doctrine, and which frequently sat loosely to churchly allegiance.<sup>44</sup> Fundamentalism was an amalgum of old and new, and among its most acute latter-day critics have been some of the neo-evangelicals.<sup>45</sup>

## II

We turn now from the confused and confusing situation in conservative evangelical quarters, to the equally confused and confusing liberal-modernist scene. One way of highlighting the issues is to consider P.T. Forsyth's claim to be modern, but not liberal; and then to show how very different was his modernism from Catholic and other varieties of that plant. Of Forsyth it has been said that "He was liberal in his intellectual address and technique, and liberal, surely, in his repudiation of any authoritarianism that would coerce the judgment and conscience. But he was conservative of the Faith. And, for him, the Faith meant a theology only because it meant a gospel, *the* Gospel. If he appeared to be a Biblicist — a term which he would not have accepted — it was because he saw that Gospel and Bible were joined together and were not to be put asunder".<sup>46</sup> This is well said, but it should not allow us to overlook Forsyth's mistrust of the theological labels which some were all too keen to use. He was anxious to maintain that "the word which is employed to express the adjustments native to a positive Gospel is not 'liberal' but 'modern'. A modern theology is one thing, theological liberalism is another".<sup>10b</sup> This understanding of liberalism seems at first sight to be in line with that of the

Anglican Modernist H.D.A. Major, who said that "the Modernist claims with conviction and humility that he more truly has his rightful home in the Church of Christ than has his Traditionalist brother, whose rightful home is really the Synagogue".<sup>47a</sup> It further reminds us of Dr. Vidler's distinction between liberality, which signifies openness, freedom of enquiry and the like, and liberalism, which in theology means a body of nineteenth century doctrines and critical stances of a negative kind.<sup>15b</sup> But when Dr. Major defines modernism as "the claim of the modern mind to determine what is true, right and beautiful in the light of its own experience, even though its conclusions be in contradiction to those of tradition",<sup>47b</sup> he is defining what Forsyth shunned as liberalism:

"by liberalism I mean the theology that begins with some rational canon of life or nature to which Christianity has to be cut down or enlarged (as the case may be); while by a modern positivity I mean a theology that begins with God's gift of a super-logical revelation in Christ's historic person and cross, whose object was not to adjust a contradiction but to resolve a crisis and save a situation of the human soul. For positive theology Christ is the object of faith; for liberal He is but its first and greatest subject, the agent of a faith directed elsewhere than on Him. It is really an infinite difference. For only one side can be true".<sup>10c</sup>

Again, Forsyth's modernism not only differed from Major's; both were in some respects poles apart from the contemporary Catholic Modernism.<sup>48</sup> Whilst Major distinguished between the English Modernists and the Liberal Protestants in that the former placed greater emphasis upon the Church and the concept of development than the latter — who, like Harnack, sought to locate the essence of Christianity by *going back* to a pre-Pauline gospel<sup>47c</sup> — the Modernists stood sufficiently consciously in the Broad Church tradition not to accept Rome as the last churchly word. Many elements went into the making of Roman Catholic Modernism — or, as Pius X said in more evaluative terms, modernism was "a compendium of heresies". In fact, as Loisy, one of its leading exponents, declared, Modernism was the concern of "a quite limited number of persons, who share the desire to adapt the Catholic religion to the intellectual, moral, and social needs of the present time".<sup>49</sup> The Modernists sought institutional and societal reform, but they put forward no commonly agreed or intellectually coherent policies, though it might be said that their general adoption of a critical stance towards the Bible

was an important common thread uniting them. It remains only to advert to the immanentist thrust of Catholic modernist thought — yet another feature which differentiates them from Forsythian modernism. This emerges clearly in such a work as Loisy's *The Gospel and the Church* (1902), his rejoinder to Harnack's *What is Christianity?* (1900). Loisy opposed the manner in which Harnack minimised the eschatological, and maintained that the gospel cannot be understood apart from the concept of development. That is, it is not static, but dynamic. Thus the gospel cannot be considered properly in the absence of a consideration of what it has become in the life and experience of the Church, and in relation to the Church's eschatological goal. The immanentist thrust is clearly evident too in the philosophy of L. Laberthonnière who, notwithstanding the encyclical *Aeterni Patris* (1899), which advocated a Thomistic basis for Christian philosophising, and turned against Aristotelian staticism in favour of a neo-Kantian theory of knowledge, and a version of post-Hegelian dynamism. Other Modernists, such as M. Blondel, were influenced by pragmatism, and began to develop a philosophy of action which would make Christianity much more a matter of practice than of theory. Manifestly the Catholic Modernists were going a fair distance farther than the Anglican Liberal Catholic Gore in revising the content of the Christian message and not its shape only. It is also clear that in its basic immanentist thrust the New Theology of R.J. Campbell had more in common with Catholic Modernism than with Liberal Protestantism. It remains only to add that some Catholic Modernists, because of their immanentism and their adoption of advanced critical views, sat somewhat loosely to biblical history. Such would take encouragement from George Tyrrell's definition of a Modernist as being "a churchman, of any sort, who believes in the possibility of a synthesis between the essential truth of his religion and the essential truth of modernity".<sup>50a</sup>

Thus far we have Forsyth, modern (yet conservative!) in spirit — or, as Dr. Vidler might say, manifesting liberality if not espousing liberalism. We have English Modernists who valued the Church whilst endorsing the critical principle and occasionally becoming unnecessarily sceptical as a result. We have the Catholic Modernists who imbibed the spirit of the age and modified the Christian Modernists who imbibed the spirit of the age and modified the Christian message to some extent.<sup>51</sup> And we have Gore, a Liberal Catholic if not in all respects a liberal man. We must face up to the fact which has already become plain, namely, that the terms "liberal" and "modernist" are sometimes used interchangeably; and we must then consider those who added "evangelical" to the former label.<sup>15c</sup>

It goes without saying that the line of theological liberals is a long one; Origen, Erasmus, Socinus, the rationalistic Arminians, the Latitudinarians — all these and others are to be found in that succession. We recall, for example, Mr. Thomas's remarks on Philip Doddridge: "If we define a liberal in theology in terms of advanced ideas...Doddridge was no liberal...But if, more properly, we define a liberal in terms of an undogmatic temper of mind, then Doddridge was one of the most liberal Dissenters of the early eighteenth century".<sup>52</sup> Modern liberalism, however, derives largely from Kant's epistemology percolated *via* Schleiermacher or Hegel in varying proportions: it flowers in an age in which old securities are being challenged by immanentist-evolutionary thought, and by the new historico-critical methodology; and it takes advantage of the demise of the old theological debate, highlighted by Calvinist *versus* Arminian which, however inadequately at times, had kept the central issues of the gospel before men's minds. Nowhere did the liberal stream flow more strongly than in America.

Two types of dissatisfaction with the New England theology had come to be expressed. On the one hand there was the protest of William Ellery Channing against Congregationalism's Calvinism which, he felt, both degraded God by overlooking his Fatherliness, and debased man by its doctrine of total inability. In the wake of Channing there came the Emersonian transcendentalists, the increasing universalist thrust, overt unitarianism,<sup>53</sup> and humanitarianism. On the other hand, there was that development of thought represented and inspired by Horace Bushnell (1802-76) whose emphasis on the personal, rather than the moral and governmental, in respect of the God-man relation gave relief to many. The influence upon Bushnell of Coleridge, Maurice and F.W. Robertson was clear. In addition to their personalistic immanentism Bushnell and those theologians who followed him — Theodore C. Munger, Washington Gladden and others, together with the great pulpit voices of the New Theology, Henry Ward Beecher and Phillips Brooks — maintained the progressive nature of revelation and, consistently with scientifically-inspired optimism, the "American dream", and the societal implications of Ritschlianism, sought to subdue the earth for God. Hence the Social Gospel, whose pre-eminent advocate was the Baptist Walter Rauschenbusch (1861-1918).<sup>54</sup> God was near to man; and man was under an obligation to be about God's business in the world — and that not only as an individual, but as a member of societies and corporations of all kinds. The Kingdom was realisable on earth, and sin comprised those remediable injustices and inequalities which stained society. The following words of Gladden capture something of the spirit of the men of the Social Gospel school:

"The idea of the immanence of God; the idea that God's method of creation is the method of evolution; the idea that nature in all its deepest meanings is supernatural; the idea of the constant presence of God in our lives; the idea of the universal divine Fatherhood and of the universal human Brotherhood, with all that they imply - these are ideas which are here to stay.... [God] is in the whole world...but he is also over it all...He is working in us, but...his working in us never overbears our choices...He is helping us all he can without undermining manhood; no more....*He is leading Humanity into the green pastures and beside the still waters.* That is the meaning of history".<sup>55</sup>

However inadequate the theology of these liberals may now seem to be, it would be indefensible to overlook their genuine evangelistic passion. Nowhere is this more clearly affirmed than by Rauschenbusch, writing from hospital: "My life has been physically very lonely, and often beset by the consciousness of conservative antagonism. I have been upheld by the comforts of God...It has been my deepest satisfaction to get evidence now and then that I have been able to help men to a new spiritual birth. I have always regarded by public work as a form of evangelism, which called for a deeper repentance and a new experience of God's salvation".<sup>56</sup>

By contrast, some of the writings of the harbingers of Dutch liberalism seem arid in the extreme, whilst some of the English authors seem relatively bloodless. As to the former, W.M. Horton has drawn attention to two rather distinct generations of modernists in Holland. The older men included Opzoomer of Utrecht, an empiricist in the Schleiermacherian sense; Scholten of Leiden, an Hegelian monist; and the Mennonite Hoekstra of Amsterdam, a Neo-Kantian. These were succeeded by the ethical modernists, led by Opzoomer's pupil Allard Pierson. He concluded that the concepts of sovereignty and fatherhood could not both consistently be applied to God. Whilst the philosophers paved the way for ethical humanism, the more extreme biblical critics such as Loman and van Manen joined Pierson in affirming that Christianity was "Idea" only, and that neither Jesus nor Paul ever existed.<sup>57</sup> In the light of such dilutions the Calvinistic revival led by Abraham Kuyper (1837-1920) is not hard to understand. Kuyper's testimony was as follows:

"There is no doubt..that Christianity is imperilled by great and serious dangers. Two life systems are wrestling with one another, in mortal combat. Modernism is bound to build a world of its own from

the data of the natural man, and to construct man himself from the data of nature; while, on the other hand, all those who reverently bend the knee to Christ and worship Him as the Son of the living God, and God himself, are bent upon saving the 'Christian Heritage'. This is the struggle in Europe, this is the struggle in America, and this also, is the struggle for principles in which my own country is engaged, and in which I myself have been spending all my energy for nearly forty years".<sup>58</sup>

Returning to England we find that, as in America, one variety of Christian liberalism issued in modern Unitarianism. If we may attempt a one-sentence summary of a fascinating story, it is this: English Unitarianism is the product of a confluence of Establishment and Dissenting Arminianism and Arianism which made out its liberal theological case on the basis of a conservative use of scriptural proof texts; that it later, not least under the influence of Channing, adopted a less coldly rationalistic approach to worship whilst becoming ever more rationalist and less biblicist in defence of its distinctive emphases; and that from time to time it attracted to itself individuals and groups of other original persuasions.

The Anglican type was Theophilus Lindsey (1723-78) who became so zealous in his justification of his newly-claimed name "Unitarian" that some thought he must be a "methodist"! On the failure of the Feathers Tavern petition, presented to Parliament in 1772, and designed to relax the subscription laws which were enjoined upon Anglican incumbents, Lindsey left the Church of England.<sup>59</sup> The term "unitarian" had been used since 1682 to describe all who held to the unipersonality of the Godhead, but from 1774 it became the name of a distinct sect, and Lindsey's liturgy was designed in such a way that God the Father alone was worshipped. On 17th April 1774 Essex Street Chapel, London, was opened, the service on that day being attended by Benjamin Franklin and Joseph Priestley (1733-1804) — the latter being the type of the Dissenters to whom we referred. Dr. Gordon informs us that Priestley was an Arminian by 1751, an Arian by 1754; that by 1768 he had accepted Lardner's view of the simple humanity of Christ; and that in 1784 — much to Lindsey's surprise — he rejected the doctrine of the Virgin Birth.<sup>60a</sup> In his works, *History of the Corruptions of Christianity* (1782) and *History of Early Opinions concerning Jesus* (1786) he argued that the early Christians were unitarians, and that the orthodox worship of Christ was blasphemous. Meanwhile there had begun a protracted controversy with Archdeacon Samuel Horsley (1733-1805) whose general attitude to both rationalists and methodists may be

gauged from the following passage from his primary charge to the Diocese of St. David's (1790). He there declared that if more sound doctrine were preached "our churches would be thronged; while the moralising Unitarian would be left to read his dull weekly lecture to the walls of his deserted conventicle, and the field-preacher would bellow unregarded to the wilderness".<sup>61</sup>

Unitarians began to take tentative organisational steps - tentative not least because their doctrinal position was illegal. A Bible commentary which advocated their views was published by the Society for Promoting Knowledge of the Scriptures (1783), but it was Thomas Belsham (1750-1829) who did more than any other to weld unitarians into a denomination. He left the Independents in 1788 and was the main inspiration of the Unitarian Society for the Promotion of Christian Knowledge and the Practice of Virtue by the Distribution of Books (1791). An *Improved Version of the New Testament* (1808) was published; two erstwhile Baptists, Richard Wright and David Eaton, were converted to unitarianism and began home missionary preaching; and in 1806 the Unitarian Fund for Promoting Unitarianism by means of Popular Preaching was established. Joseph Cooke (1775-1811) adopted unitarianism and was expelled from the Wesleyan ministry in 1806, whereupon he became the leader of Lancashire's Methodist Unitarians.<sup>62</sup> Later, in 1841, Joseph Barker (1806-1875) was expelled from the Methodist New Connexion, and the two hundred Christian Brethren congregations which he founded on an unsectarian basis eventually attached themselves to the Unitarian movement.<sup>60b</sup> Meanwhile Scotland's first Unitarian building had been erected in Glasgow in 1811; on 21st July 1813 the Unitarians had been accorded civil rights, and in 1819 the Unitarian Association had been founded to safeguard them; the British and Foreign Unitarian Association came into being in 1825; the Irish Non-Subscribing Presbyterians constituted themselves a separate body holding unitarian doctrine in 1830; and there had been a number of legal battles over the tenure by Unitarians of (generally) erstwhile orthodox property.<sup>63</sup> Among such battles was that at Wolverhampton. There were financial wrangles too. In 1705 Lady Hewley had founded a Trust for the maintenance of "poor and godly" ministers serving north of the Trent. Resources from this being denied to Unitarians, Robert Hibbert (1770-1849) founded the Antitrinitarian Fund (subsequently the Hibbert Trust) in 1847.

The rise of modern biblical criticism, the spirituality of Channing, and the anti-supernaturalism of Theodore Parker (1810-60) influenced English Unitarians in a new direction. In this regard the undoubted leader was James Martineau (1805-1900). Whereas Priestley and Lindsey had upheld the evidential value of the biblical miracles, for example, Martineau's followers took

miracles less seriously, whilst not denying the supernatural. They sought a reasonable faith, not unduly reliant upon proof texts, but also a warm piety. Arianism was held in increasingly less favour; Jesus was exemplar only; and Romantic intuitionism came to the fore.<sup>64</sup>

Among other English harbingers of modern theological liberalism we may note the Hegelian Congregationalist J. Baldwin Brown (1820-84), who challenged the penal substitutionary theory of the atonement in the interest of the concept of the divine Fatherhood; and John H. Godwin (1809-99) whose Congregational Lecture on *Christian Faith* (1858) gave publicity to the view that trust in Christ rather than belief in doctrines was of the essence of Christianity, and should issue in sincere discipleship. Godwin's distinction between the Jesus of History and the Christ of faith was later to be taken up by the Congregational minister Robert Roberts, whose *Hibbert Journal* article, "Jesus or Christ? An Appeal for Consistency" led to a controversy, and to the publication of the symposium *Jesus or Christ?* (1909) to which seventeen writers of all shades of opinion contributed. Some further "advanced" views were expressed by J. Allanson Picton (1832-1910) at the Leicester Conference of 1877. Religious fellowship should not, he thought, be determined by doctrinal or historical opinions — a view from which the Congregational Union dissociated itself in the following year. Meanwhile the term "Broad Churchman" was replacing "Latitudinarian" within the Church of England. It "has been attributed either to Arthur Hugh Clough or to W.J. Conybeare, who used it in his article on 'Church Parties' in the *Edinburgh Review*, for October, 1853. By the eighteen seventies the term 'Liberal Churchman' or 'Liberal Clergyman' was becoming common".<sup>65</sup> We should not suppose, however, that there were no differences between older Broad Churchman and later Anglican Modernist. Dr. Major has listed three ways in which their emphases differed; the Broad Churchmen were more Erastian, more inclined to a humanitarian utilitarianism, and "flaccid and unhistorical" in regard to doctrine and exegesis.<sup>47d</sup> Dr. A.M. Ramsey, in commenting upon the liberalism of Rashdall, which was content with a symbolic incarnation and an exemplarist atonement, indicates something of the breadth of Anglican liberal modernism as he compares Rashdall with Gore and Inge. It was a favourite theme of Rashdall's "that the orthodoxy of teachers such as Gore presented the doctrine of the Trinity in a manner more tritheistic than S. Augustine or S. Thomas Aquinas would countenance. On the other hand, he was apart from Inge, and nearer to Gore, in a distrust of mysticism and a dislike of the appeal to religious experience".<sup>66a</sup> Dr. Stephenson has summed up the things the English Modernists fought for during what he calls their "great period" thus:

"They fought, above all, for a supernatural, but non-miraculous, Christianity — or, rather, a Christianity where miracles were not *contra naturam*. They fought for a degree Christology, i.e. they believed that all men were sons of God but Christ pre-eminently so. This led them to the dangerous corollary that not simply Christ, but man, was consubstantial with the Father. They held strongly to the doctrine of the Incarnation but they were unwilling to insist that the Incarnation necessarily involved the Virgin Birth or the physical Resurrection".<sup>67a</sup>

The main thrust of Liberal Protestantism at large was provided by the more or less left wing disciples of Ritschl. Supreme among these was Harnack. There can be no doubt that in removing what he regarded as Pauline and Hellenistic accretions from the simple gospel he emphasised the ideas of the Fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man. It is, however, an oft-committed error to suppose that this slogan (for that is what it became) exhausts his teaching. He was equally in earnest in propounding his view of the Kingdom of God, with all that that entailed concerning the commandment of love. Further, as J.K. Mozley pointed out, he did recognise "the mystery inherent in the Person of Christ" but he "refused to accept the historic account of the Person of Christ as given in the doctrines of His divinity and incarnation. His deep reverence for Jesus as the supreme Teacher and the Revealer of God did not lead him to the acceptance of the Pauline and Johannine Christology and to the affirmations of the Nicene Creed".<sup>4b</sup> To none was Harnack's position more unsatisfactory than to the Catholic Modernists. We have already mentioned Loisy's reply; but Tyrrell's words were no less severe: "The Christ that Harnack sees, looking back through nineteen centuries of Catholic darkness, is only the reflection of a Liberal Protestant face, seen at the bottom of a deep well".<sup>50b</sup> But to many the power of the Harnackian Jesus was considerable, and a prominent British exposition of this type is that of the Baptist T.R. Glover: *The Jesus of History* (1917).

Many theological liberals would have agreed with the American Leighton Parks that "Modernism is not a body of doctrine. It is a state of mind. It is an attempt to 'justify the ways of God to man', that is, to man in the twentieth century".<sup>68a</sup> Not the least of the liberal-conservative frictions arose because of the difficulty the latter had in persuading the former not only that their position was wrong, but that it was dogmatic! But — yet another qualification! — not all liberals were professedly undogmatic. Some were anxious that the term "evangelical" should be added to their designation, and to these we finally turn.

Dr. Storr provides us with a definition of Liberal Evangelicalism with which many of his contemporaries would have agreed: "Liberal Evangelicalism emphasises the primacy of spirit and idea, and is always on the watch lest any outward embodiment of organisation, or rule or order, should usurp the place which rightfully belongs to what is inward".<sup>69a</sup> He proceeds to show that Liberal Evangelicalism is "suspicious of all cut and dried schemes of doctrine";<sup>69b</sup> that it upholds belief in the progressive revelation of truth; and that it is heir to Schleiermacher in its conviction that "the dogma should grow out of the experience, and, if necessary, be modified as the experience developed".<sup>69c</sup> Storr does not wish to imply, however, that liberal evangelicals do not know where they stand, and have no positive gospel; so he begs some important questions in affirming that "Liberal Evangelicalism finds its ultimate ground of authority in the Mind and Spirit of Christ".<sup>69d</sup> The liberal Congregationalist C.J. Cadoux was a little more specific in averring that the use of the labels 'liberal' or 'modernist' "presupposes belief in the existence, sovereignty, and goodness of God, in the Lordship and Saviourhood of Jesus Christ, and in the reality and power of the Christian Gospel of Salvation".<sup>70a</sup> The use of the terminology of orthodoxy did little to reassure some, and when Fosdick declared that *he* was a Liberal Evangelical — and not one of the unthinkingly optimistic kind either — the conservatives were appalled, and the Unitarians pressed him to shun hypocrisy and come over.<sup>71a</sup>

We have attempted to chart troubled waters. The legacy of the nineteenth century to theology was confusion — though in fairness we must confess that that confusion was not entirely the fault of the nineteenth century. The roots of the theological predicament of the early twentieth century go a long way down the centuries. The nineteenth century is the period during which the cumulative effect of older tendencies and newer methodologies is felt with tremendous force. The legacy of that century is the question "What *is* the heart of the gospel, and how may we best express it?" It might be said that every age has to face that question; and that is true. But we have to face it in a post-Christendom period. Our situation is in certain important respects more like that of Justin Martyr, Irenaeus, Clement and Tertullian, than it is like that of Augustine, Aquinas, Luther or Calvin — all of whom could easily make the assumptions of Christendom. It thus transpires that prominent among the questions freshly to be addressed is the methodological question, Jerusalem or Athens?

## III

It is our conviction that notwithstanding changing times, circumstances and modes of expression, God's holy love does not change; the prime needs of man concerning sin and salvation do not change; the fundamental gospel message does not change; and the ways in which that message may be distorted display an almost monotonous likeness through the ages. Notable amongst these ways are the several varieties of Pelagianism, with which so much of the churchly debate on the God-man relation has been concerned; and the long-standing tendency towards unhistorical mysticisms coupled often with a blurring of the Creator-creature distinction, to which their philosophical commerce has led some Christians. Both tendencies posit understandings of the nature and relations of God and man which ill accord with the basic thrust of the gospel. We may therefore say that although the particulars of the modern conservative-liberal debate — the modern understanding of history and criticism, evolutionary-immanentist thought, and so on — were new, the main issues in the debate were venerable indeed. We shall attempt to isolate some of these perennial themes as they emerge in the debates of the early twentieth century. We shall show that the hands of neither conservative nor liberal are entirely clean when it comes to distorting the gospel (nor are those of self-appointed adjudicators, no doubt!); and we shall end by drawing a moral which is none the less important for being couched in general terms.

We return first to the liberals — and at once we enter a caveat. We have been at some pains to point out that between those liberals who advocated at this-worldly "get up and go" version of Christianity which took its cue from the historical Jesus *qua* exemplar, and such philosophical immanentists as T.H. Green, who sought to safeguard Christianity from historical relativities and criticism, there is a great gulf fixed. Hence any list of liberal distortions (and likewise of conservative distortions) will be generalised. So, for that matter, will be any account of liberal and conservative virtues.

It can hardly be denied that some liberal critics of the Bible adopted an unduly sceptical attitude towards the scriptural texts. Strauss eventually concluded that the only honest thing to do was to deny that he was a Christian. Many, however, anxious to love God with all their minds and to exercise responsible stewardship over their personal resources, applied themselves reverently and with the best possible motives to be sacred text:

"They...read the Bible, not merely for personal edification, like many of the older men, who put more gospel into the Book of Leviticus and the Book of Judges than some people now-a-days can find in the Epistle to the Romans; not merely for the purpose of collecting fresh materials to use for the conversion of sinners; but to discover what the Bible really meant. And that was surely admirable. The gentle - the violent - pressure which used to be put on reluctant texts by theologians and preachers of all creeds to *make* them *say* the right thing or to *prevent* them from saying the wrong, was as bad as the gentle or violent pressure put on obstinate heretics by the Inquisition with precisely the same object".<sup>72a</sup>

In the course of their work such men received as new light the deliverances of the anthropologists, psychologists and students of comparative religion - more often than not being inspired by the thought that if they were indeed handling *God's* Word, no scientific advance could undermine it, but that if it became clear that they had been bound to superstitions, the sooner they discarded them the better. In their theologising they eagerly took a leaf out of Plato's book and determined to follow the argument wherever it might lead. Further, they were especially concerned to ensure that it was a *moral* God with whom they had to do. Not for them the God of caprice; not for them the God who required the murder of his Son before he could be induced to forgive (truth to tell some of them thus parodied all but the most brazen of conservatives in making their points). Again, since God's revelation was couched in moral terms, those who responded to it must be moral too. Erskine of Linlathen was among those who early emphasised this point: "The reasonableness of a religion seems to me to consist in there being a direct and natural connection between a believing of the doctrines which it inculcates, and a being formed by these to the character which it recommends. If the belief of the doctrines has no tendency to train a disciple in a more exact and more willing discharge of its moral obligations, there is evidently a very strong probability against the truth of that religion".<sup>73</sup> This ethical emphasis was later taken up with other than individual reference, and the idea that the Church could sit up prophetically by whilst unjust social structures were allowed to exploit the masses (however much private beneficence there may have been), was severely and rightly trounced by the men of the Social Gospel school.

Yet the very zeal with which some of these ideas were pursued led to imbalance; and the liberal C.J. Cadoux had to agree that

there were individual modernists and groups of modernists (however unrepresentative they were) against whom the charges which he lists could justifiably be levelled;

"Modernism today unduly exalts man, and teaches him to deify himself, to emancipate himself from God's authority, and to believe that he is completely self-sufficient: it therefore largely ignores the problem of sin and evil, and has an unwarranted confidence in the certainty of human progress. It is accused also of rejecting the authority and witness of the Bible, dishonestly misdating its documents, denying the Lordship, Divinity, and saving power of Jesus, denying the Incarnation and Resurrection, having no place for sacrifice, and in general abandoning the Christian Gospel. It is branded as individualistic, intellectualistic, rationalistic, humanistic, and optimistic in the wrong senses, subjective and anarchic, proud, foolish, poisonous, and even Satanic. It is held responsible for the decline of the churches, and having been weighed in the balance and found wanting, may be pronounced dead".<sup>70b</sup>

We shall provide evidence to show that some liberals, in their desire to reduce the burden of belief, did threaten the gospel; that they were encouraged in this direction by an optimism in man inspired by evolutionary-immanentist thought of various hues; and we shall cite the Social Gospel school as bearing clear marks of those attenuations of the gospel which concern us, whilst recognising their genuine and major challenge to Christian ethical theory. While we note their inadequate diagnosis and prescription, we shall not fail to applaud their proper moral concern for man in society..

Few liberals assailed the doctrinal undergrowth as zestfully as the Dutch. Professor Bavinck of Kampen lamented thus:

"It is a slow process of dissolution that meets our view. It began with setting aside the Confession. Scripture alone was to be heard. Next, Scripture also is dismissed, and the Person of Christ is fallen back on. Of this Person, however, first His Divinity, next His pre-existence, finally His sinlessness, are surrendered, and nothing remains but a pious man, a religious genius, revealing to us the love of God. But even the existence and love of God are not able to withstand criticism. Thus the moral element in man becomes the last basis from which the battle against Materialism is

conducted. But this basis will appear to be as unstable and unreliable as the others".<sup>74</sup>

Undeterred by such warnings, some preachers joined the liberal theologians in their quest of a naturalistically-honed Ockham's razor. Frank Lenwood, pastor of a busy Leeds Congregational church sought a principled approach to a situation in which a quiet revolution was taking place — "so quiet that most of the congregations do not notice the alteration, and go on repeating the hackneyed arguments in a vain attempt to satisfy the restless younger minds".<sup>75a</sup> Lenwood was convinced that "until we clear away the condemned building, we shall never get room for the new architecture which we plainly require."<sup>75b</sup>

For most liberals the new architecture was most desperately sought in relation to the doctrines of God, sin and atonement, and many thought they had found it. Thus, the Unitarian Dr. S.H. Mellone declared, "We have now affirmed our faith in the essential humanity of God and the native divine spark in the spirit of man [no novel idea this!]. The idea of the one now helps to say what we mean when we try to define the other".<sup>76</sup> Contemporaneously, across the Atlantic, Leighton Parks was rejoicing in the passage "from the thought of the Sovereignty of God to the Fatherhood of God. As a dogma, that has always been accepted; as a living truth, it is the discovery of the nineteenth century".<sup>68b</sup> In the thought of Dr. A.E. Garvie we see the old struggling with the new in such a way as to raise a serious question concerning God's sovereignty:

"We now all believe in the universal Fatherhood of God, the love which wills not the death of any sinner, but wills that all should be saved, if they themselves will. But we must beware of treating that truth as though it were a doctrine of natural theology, a matter of course, a truism, a commonplace. It is revealed and realised in Jesus Christ, His redemption of man from sin, and His reconciliation of man to God. Men are not by nature the children, but only the creatures of God... What destiny will and can Divine love appoint for man? The doctrine of eternal punishment in its crude form is impossible for any enlightened Christian conscience. To assert that all will be saved is to ignore the possibility of the persistence of sin and unbelief in some men, and the impossibility of God saving any but by moral and religious means. For persistent defiance of grace there can be only Divine judgment. If we are to believe in God's Fatherhood we shall

believe that He will do all He can do as love, as holy love, to save all men; but should any refuse salavation, such penalty will fall on them as love, holy love, appoints".<sup>8b</sup>

Qualifications notwithstanding, how far is this last sentence from the view of some liberals and, oddly enough, of some fundamentalist evangelists, to the effect that "God will save you if you let him?" What does that imply concerning God's sovereignty? The danger is that we pass from saying that God is, strictly, pitiful, to saying that he is pitiable — because he would save, but cannot.

No doubt there were ways of speaking of God which made him appear to be an arbitrary tyrant, but in reacting against such views many liberals verged upon the sentimental, and, unlike Garvie, overlooked the *holiness* of God's love. As a chastened modernist put it, modernism's "doctrine of God has not been big enough".<sup>77a</sup> In similar vein the authors of a report on "American Congregational Theology" noted that "The substitution of the New Testament doctrine of God as Love, in place of the Old Testament idea of Sovereignty [an inaccurate dichotomy this] ...has been made 'an occasion of the flesh' on the part of those whose only idea of love is that of a weak, indulgent, sentimentalism, instead of the most searching and sincere of all passions, compassionate but never compromising, sacrificial but severe".<sup>78</sup> In H.R. Niebuhr's classic phrase, "A God without wrath brought men without sin into a Kingdom without judgment through the ministrations of a Christ without a cross".<sup>79</sup> The positive point was finely put by Robert Mackintosh: "God's love is the radiance of His righteousness; God's justice is the sternness of His love".<sup>80</sup>

In the absence of the note of holiness much liberal theology devalued the doctrine of the atonement. Undeniably there had been immoral representations of that doctrine which deserved demolition, but in many quarters the pendulum swung so far that there was resumed in modern dress the Bernard *versus* Abelard dispute. If God loves all men; if he is Father of all; if all men are his children [a term which some liberals took to mean "sons", thereby overlooking the fact that in the New Testament sonship comes by adoption]; then God will so desire fellowship with men as to provide an exemplar Christ who will show men how to live; and this he has done. On this view sin is something less than radical; man is something more than unable; the atonement is an example given rather than a price paid. In fact the doctrine of sin which some liberals espoused

was as atomistic as that of Pelagius. It well accorded with the contemporary anthropocentric subjectivism which some learned from such psychologists as J.B. Pratt, for whom the crucial matter was not the restoration of a right relationship with God, but "the achievement of a new self" which it is the *individual's* task to create.<sup>81</sup> One of the most surprising features of some liberal theology is that for all its emphasis upon the pressing need to secure social justice and to ameliorate conditions in society at large, it entertained for the most part the most individualistic understanding of sin and atonement. The individual had only to imitate Christ, and all would be well.<sup>82</sup> (Not indeed that all liberals were thus at fault: Charles Gore for one neither exalted man nor minimised the importance of sin. We speak of general tendencies only).

The temptation unduly to exalt man's competence to live aright is of long standing. We find it not only in the more formal context of "Pelagian"- "Augustinian" debate, but also in such a one as the provocative Daniel Whitby (1638-1726) who was persuaded that man's natural ability to improve was such that his progress in this regard would continue until the millenium dawned. But it was the evolutionary-immanentist strain of nineteenth century thought which really launched latter-day optimism in man. The hellenistically inclined followed F.D. Maurice in holding that the Incarnation testifies to the fact that man is already redeemed;<sup>83</sup> J.R. Illingworth regarded the Incarnation as the "guiding star" of every phase of progress;<sup>86b</sup> and whilst few went as far as Bender of Bonn in holding that "Not God but man is the central element in faith; man is the sun round which circles the world of religious thought",<sup>84a</sup> popular lyricists did not lag far behind:

"I am the master of my fate  
I am the captain of my soul"

sang W.E. Henley in his *Invictus*; whilst Swinburne eulogised, "Glory to Man in the highest! for Man is the master of things". In some quarters pulpit banality was rife, so that Mandel Creighton, writing of Dean Stanley's sermons, said, "There was a certain amount of moral enthusiasm, to the intent that it was desirable to be good rather than bad; but I had previously gathered that from other sources".<sup>85</sup> But the tide could not be held back. To Walter Rauschenbusch the "swiftness of evolution" in America *proved* "the immense latent perfectibility in human nature";<sup>86</sup> Albert Peel reassured his fellow English Congregationalists that any dismay occasioned by the higher criticism should be offset by confidence in the progress of the

human race — he said that as late as 1923;<sup>87</sup> and Rhondda Williams stood the seventeenth century John Robinson on his head when he averred "there is still more light and truth to break forth through the souls of men".<sup>88a</sup>

Many of the tendencies we have noted found their natural home in Social Gospel theory. Not indeed that such theory was the inevitable consequence of liberalism in theology. On the contrary, although there were echoes of Social Gospel thinking in, for example, Anglican Modernism ("The ideal ever before the Church must be that of efficient service for the bringing in of the Kingdom of God"<sup>89</sup>), Dr. A.M.G. Stephenson, himself a Modern Churchman, had to admit that "Some of them were uninterested in social problems".<sup>67b</sup> The Social Gospel was, however, of considerable importance. It administered a much needed jolt to an American religiosity which had preached the moral values whilst ignoring the unjust social structures which threatened those very values. It stood, moreover, in the tradition of the Pilgrim Fathers, of whom it was said that "they applied the principles of the Gospel to elevate society, to regulate education, to civilize humanity, to purify love, to reform the church and the state, to assert, to defend and to die for liberty, in short to mould and redeem by its all-transforming energy everything that belongs to man in his individual and social relations".<sup>90</sup> With such declarations as this the Social Gospel movement was heralded; it gathered momentum during the 1870s and 1880s and thereafter, for three decades, it was a principal constituent of America's "Age of Crusades".<sup>91</sup>

The immanentist philosophy had taught men that God needed them and was close to them; evolutionary thought had popularised the concept of progress; and undoubted scientific and technological marvels had encouraged man to exult in his prowess. Older understandings of man's nature and lot had been shown, so it was thought, to be partial, threadbare, and even repellant. The spotlight was taken off sin as an affront to God's holy love, and turned upon sin as social injustice:

"It is impossible to lead a Christian life except in a Christianized society. Yet if we accept the thought of divine immanence, sin and evil cannot be quite so bad as they seem to be. Considered from the viewpoint of the social gospel the thought that God would damn a man because of sin is offensive.

Since man is inherently good and all men are God's children, there is in modern religion no place for individual salvation...In a word, the social gospel

addresses itself to the task to make the world a decent place to live in...What was formerly spoken of as religious is of value only in so far as it serves social ends".<sup>92</sup>

Thus some came to speak of "a hell frozen over or turned to innocuous ashes";<sup>93</sup> and of the liberal doctrine "surround the individual or community with a good environment and salvation will result" the *Watchman Examiner* declared that "No greater or more insidious heresy ever issued from hell than this..."<sup>94</sup> Most Social Gospel thinkers, however, would have endorsed the Englishman John Clifford's view that the Social Order is the burden of Jesus's teaching.<sup>95</sup> Many too would have supported his plea for more social missionaries, and would have applauded his complaint that "The Church has made too much of theology".<sup>96</sup> Many, but not all. Dr. D.W. Forrest remained convinced that "ministers of the Gospel should aim first at being professional theologians rather than amateur sociologists"<sup>97</sup> — and with him we agree. So many Social Gospel men seemed to think that they could do God's work for him: "The strength of evil institutions need not dismay us. All that is needed for their removal, and for rearing upon their ashes the structures of a new world, is new thought and new feeling".<sup>88b</sup> All? But the Kingdom is God's gift, and as far as *man's* credentials as architect of it are concerned, we cannot but agree with D.R. Davies that after two World Wars "Social salvation, which was always a chimera, is now trailing the whiskers of senility".<sup>9b</sup> Many thus came to feel the inadequacy of the Social Gospel diagnosis of man's disease — and none more acutely than Reinhold Niebuhr:

"It is not moral complacency of which liberal Christianity stands convicted but moral superficiality ....What is lacking is the realization that even the best human will in the world has the corruption of sin in it....Our whole difficulty in American Protestantism is in having so long regarded Christianity as synonymous with the simple command to love God and our fellow men, that we have forgotten that the Christian religion is really a great deal more than this....the divine mercy revealed in Christ is on the one hand a power which overcomes the contradiction between what we are and what we ought to be, and on the other hand a pledge of forgiveness for this sinful element which is never completely overcome short of the culmination of history. Only such a faith can disclose the actual facts of human existence. It alone can uncover the facts because it alone has answers for the facts which are disclosed".<sup>98</sup>

In saying that immanentist thought was a powerful impetus to theological liberalism, we do not overlook the fact that some liberals so shunned philosophy as to place themselves in a positivism of experience no less constricting than the biblical positivism which they scorned. Ritschl and Harnack had no patience with Hegelianism, for example. But for all their overt hostility to the immanent Absolute, their methodological presuppositions were congenial to the general immanentist mood if only in the negative sense that they seldom employed the concept of transcendence, or invoked that of the supernatural. We would go so far as to say that most of the recoils from intellectualism that the late nineteenth century witnessed were inspired by one variety or another of immanentism. Where philosophy was shunned, what was viewed with suspicion was monism rather than immanentism, and this owing to the inadequate attention to value, experience and history which monism was held to pay. We may thus accept Forsyth's generalisation, "Liberal theology...views the course of religion as an immanent evolution accounting even for experience".<sup>10d</sup>

As we have seen, the climate of immanentist-evolutionary thought provided fertile soil for many fresh expressions of Spinoza's belief that "whatever is, is in God".<sup>99</sup> This soil was congenial both to those who wished to avoid the perils of historicity on the one hand, and the more mysterious reaches of theology in the interest of practical Christianity on the other: seldom had a philosophical stance proved to be so contradictorily adaptable. Of the more practical expressions we have already spoken. It remains to note, as a rider to our earlier discussion of immanentism, some further examples of the impact of that variety of thought upon theology itself. Immanentism enabled the philosopher Bosanquet to affirm, "We are spirits, and our life is one with that of the Spirit which is the whole and the good".<sup>100</sup> It enabled Rhondda Williams to sermonise thus: "Every new discovery brings a new world, but all such discoveries pale to insignificance before the crowning discovery that man is spirit, and that the human spirit is one with God...In every human birth a part of God...is enfleshed, incarnated".<sup>88c</sup> H.D.A. Major could point out that "The modern Churchman differs from the Chalcedonian Fathers by holding that the substances of Deity and of Humanity are *not two*, but one".<sup>101</sup> If in Jesus the liberal Congregationalist T. Wigley saw "the highest expression of the law of our evolution, an example of the true order of divine humanity",<sup>102</sup> to Lowes Dickinson the existence or non-existence of Jesus in history was immaterial.<sup>103</sup> Finally, immanentism gave a licence to many Incarnational theologians to remodel that doctrine so that even the Unitarian Martineau could declare, "The Incarnation is true, not of Christ exclusively, but of man universally and God everlastingly".<sup>104</sup>

The criticisms of the above positions are now quite familiar to us, and can simply be listed and endorsed. The first point is the ontological one. The blurring of the Creator-creature distinction which immanentism entails encourages idealism rather than religion. This is so whether we think of monism or of experienced values. In the former case we have "an infinite extension of our horizon or our self-consciousness"<sup>105a</sup> but nothing of the transcendent majesty of God. In the latter case, as Dr. Quick said of Ritschlian theology, it "can only excuse us for treating our Lord as God on the ground of his goodness: it cannot justify us in affirming that He is God on the ground of His being, unless it proceeds further to assert that all Godhead is but a quality of man".<sup>106</sup> But the most serious criticism of immanentism is that all too often it makes theologians unable or unwilling to take adequate account of God's nature and demands, and of man's nature and needs. In consequence it all too often leaves us with worthy aspirations which we are impotent to realise, with undifferentiated mysticism or humanism; or with a religion of ungrounded charity which — especially if the prevailing climate be optimistic — all too easily unwholesomely exalts man and demeans God, encourages works and sits light to grace.

In a not untypical piece of liberalism K.C. Anderson, having declared against ecclesiasticism and theological obscurantism, waxed lyrical:

"What are the reports that are coming in from all parts of the world to-day? They all tend to one announcement, they all unite their voices to preach one mighty Gospel, the essential goodness of the world and of life: that the universe is cradled in love; that it is not only a unity, but a beneficent unity; that the life of man, the child of the universe, lies embosomed in one great Life; that the essence of things is good, and the purpose and the outcome good. But what is this but a confirmation of the essential Gospel of Jesus Christ?"<sup>107</sup>

We can well imagine what P.T. Forsyth would have said in reply to that question. Indeed, he said it in an article on "The reality of grace" which immediately precedes that of Anderson in the journal in question — never were two articles more engagingly juxtaposed. He there castigated preachers who "coo over the people the balmy optimisms of a natural and unconscious Christianity which makes no call upon the will for positive belief, but delights those who are only at the aesthetic stage of life".<sup>108</sup> As he elsewhere said, "There is a liberalism whose badge is redemption *from* an Apostolic Gospel, and not *by* it".<sup>105b</sup>

B.C. Plowright came to the same rueful conclusion and confessed, what is more, that the practical benefits expected of liberalism had quite failed to materialise:

"We believed with a *naïvete* which at this distance of time has something sadly humorous about it, that we had but to recast our theological thinking and re-phrase our theological vocabulary, and hey, presto! our church doors would be crowded once more with multitudes of men and women who had been put off religion simply because its theology was old-fashioned and had been exploded by modern science. How could the modern man trained in evolutionary thought be expected to believe in the Fall, in the literal inspiration of the Bible, in the Virgin Birth, a substitutionary theory of the Atonement, and so forth? Whereupon we proceeded to rationalize religion in the conviction that that was all that the modern man needed or desired. Religion became simple commonsense, and whether we intended to do so or not, we left the modern man with the impression that it was all plain sailing, that there neither was nor could be in it either mystery or marvel or anything before which he need bow in the wonder of worship".<sup>77b</sup>

P.T. Forsyth put the tendency we have been discussing into historical perspective thus:

"The Gnosticism of the second century, the Spiritualism of the sixteenth, and the Protestant liberalism or Roman modernism of the twentieth all represent outcrops of the same pagan tendency to replace faith by insight, to make mere inspiration do the work of revelation.... The Reformers lived with the note of revelation, on a theology of facts; the Anabaptists with the note of inspiration, on a theology of consciousness...as the vice of the one was to dry into a hard orthodox severed from experience, the vice of the other was to deliquesce into a vagrant experience on whose bogs flitted the enticing firebrakes of subjective whim".<sup>109</sup>

What now of "hard orthodoxy"? We have said that there are conservative no less than liberal ways of distorting the gospel, and Forsyth has put his finger on one way in which conservatives are guilty. But before we proceed to investigate conservative distortions it will be instructive, by way of a bridge, to see how a recent writer, whose Reformed and conservative credentials are impeccable has set matters down. Professor-emeritus R.A. Finlayson enquires whether modernist belief and

evangelical faith are the same — and the fact that he enquires as recently as 1973 suggests that to some at least the issue is still a live one. Mr. Finlayson's answer is, not surprisingly, negative: modernism is "another gospel", and this for the following reasons:

"Evangelical Christian belief holds that true religion is from God in the sense that the initiative is with God...Modernism holds that...all religion...is a movement from man to God...Evangelical belief holds that man has reliable authority for his faith in the Holy Scriptures. Modernist belief holds that a man's authority for his faith must be found in his own consciousness...Evangelical faith holds that in Jesus of Nazareth God became man. Modernist belief holds that in Jesus of Nazareth man became God...For the evangelical Christian the Cross of Calvary represents an act of God for the redemption of mankind. For the modernist the Cross points the way by which man can save himself...Evangelical faith is that moral character is the permanent quality in life and that it determines our destiny after death. Modernist belief is that life after death is uncertain, but that if the human soul survives, the All-loving Universal Father will treat all His children alike".<sup>110</sup>

If we qualify Finlayson's "modernists" by "some" we can accept much of what he says. But there is nothing in the article to suggest that conservatives too can be guilty of reducing the gospel. We shall now make good that omission; and we shall discover that whilst some conservative errors are the obverse of liberal virtues, others are the peculiar contribution of the conservative mentality.

#### IV

At the outset we must observe that if anything conservatism presents more internally contradictory gospel-distorting possibilities than liberalism. We do not, therefore, have a straightforward conservative-liberal dichotomy on our hands; we shall often find conservative against conservative. Thus on the one hand there are conservatives who emphasise system, and who tend towards intellectualism in theology and legalism in morality and ecclesiology; on the other hand there are conservatives whose emphasis is upon heart rather than head, who suspect scholarship, sit loose to churchmanship, and can become antinomian. As we look at each of these very generalised

groups in turn we shall discover that each has its own way of being "Pelagian".

Some conservatives, Dr. G.H. Clark among them, set great store by the fact that Christianity is a system. Among others who have adopted this position are Professors Louis Berkhof and Cornelius Van Til. Invariably this position is associated with the doctrine of the plenary inspiration of the Bible — a doctrine which all the writers here named are anxious to distinguish from a "dictation" theory of inspiration. What they seek is the happy concord of faith and reason; what they oppose is unbiblical rationalism in all its guises. What concerns us is the fact that in the hands of some this approach can lead to a gospel-denying scholasticism: to the view that Christianity is a philosophy before it is a religion. Thus D.B. Stevick has criticised Van Til on the ground that "The God of [his] formulations (i.e. "a self-complete system of coherence") is one God; the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob is another.... no one [according to the position criticised] can understand the Gospel except through skill in using the thought-forms of Western culture. This, in turn, means that the more philosophical skill a person shows, the better Christian he is — a kind of modern Gnosticism".<sup>111a</sup> We do not find that in fact Van Til makes so aristocratic a claim as this. But an impression of undue intellectualism can all too easily be created, even if philosophical skill is not held to be the mark of the top-grade Christian. Thus Professor Young has argued that some "hyper-covenantists" such as Hermann Dooyeweerd, who have exploited certain strands of Kuyper's thought, have disparaged piety and vital religion.<sup>112</sup> It is doubtless because of similar apprehensions at this point that, having maintained that in the interests of rationality and of the objectivity of religious truth conservative Protestants uphold the authority of the divinely inspired Bible against ecclesiastical or subjectivist authority, Dr. Henry proceeded to say that "Evangelical Christianity is not, however, mainly a revealed metaphysic or systematic exposition of supernatural reality; rather, it is the personal assurance of forgiveness of sins and of divine redemption through faith in Christ's mediatorial work for sinners".<sup>113</sup> Our question is, "If Christianity is the latter, can it at all (not "mainly") be the former?" And our answer is that it cannot. The gospel implies a system, but in itself it is not a system. Systems have an educational and expository role — even if they cannot guarantee orthodoxy — but in the last resort, "It is not mere truths or doctrines, not even if they were guaranteed by a perpetual Divine miracle, that can generate

and nourish Christian life, but the personal action of the personal God, rendered possible through Christ's work and through faith in Christ".<sup>114</sup> As H.R. Mackintosh said, "Theologies from the first have perished; they wax old as doth a garment; as a vesture Time folds them up, and lays them by. Nothing save the Gospel is abiding, and its years shall not fail".<sup>84b</sup>

Now it is not simply that some conservative theologians emphasise system *per se*; it is that in practice they have to exalt one of a number of *competing* systems, all of which claim to be scripturally based. The Calvinist-Arminian debate is a classic illustration of this fact. Moreover *within* the broadly Calvinistic position there were gospel-denying possibilities. Thus, for example, some found themselves holding that since the elect alone could be saved, and since salvation was the work of God alone, there could be no general overtures, or "free offers" of the gospel. Hussey typified this position, and it survives among the Gospel Standard Baptists to this day.<sup>115</sup> It is not difficult, however, to find numerous examples to show that this is a minority view among Calvinists — indeed that one Calvinist's systematic meat is another Calvinist's systematic poison. Thus Zanchius, Calvin's younger contemporary, exhorts his readers to emulate Christ and the apostles "who all...took every opportunity of preaching to sinners and enforced their ministry with proper rebukes, invitations and exhortations as occasion required".<sup>116</sup> Again, the first chapter of the Second Helvetic Confession (1566), prepared by Heinrich Bullinger (1504-75), contains a classic statement of the duty of freely offering the gospel, and of the distinction between the preacher's external call to all hearers and the Holy Spirit's internal call to the elect. "Beloved", cried Tobias Crisp to his flock, "will you starve in a cook's shop, as they say? Is there such plenty in Christ, and will you perish for hunger?"<sup>117</sup> Robert Trail expounded the free offer in masterly fashion;<sup>118a</sup> John Mason appealed to sinners, "Come as you are; come poor, come needy, come naked...His heart is free; His arms are open; 'tis His joy and His crown to receive you";<sup>119</sup> Horatius Bonar reminded his hearers that "the Gospel is not, 'Christ died for the elect'; neither is it 'Christ died for all'. But it is 'Christ died for sinners'".<sup>120</sup> Finally, in our own time, Professor John Murray and others have defended the free offer of the gospel.<sup>121</sup>

When the contrary position is taken numerous difficulties ensue. How does the preacher know to whom to offer the gospel? What of the perils of undue introspection to which believers are liable when they have so regularly to look within to ensure that they are indeed the "sensible sinners" for whom Christ died?

Small wonder that one of the main questions at issue in the Marrow controversy was that of assurance. Thomas Boston and his colleagues contended that men had the right to know that they had a saving interest in Christ, and they set themselves to defend the free offer of the gospel, thereby becoming the harbingers of revival and missionary zeal in Scotland. Historically, the situation was complicated by a contractual, rather than a truly covenantal theory of grace, and it was against this that McLeod Campbell protested in the nineteenth century. He claimed that the doctrine of limited atonement undermined the free offer of the gospel (whereas the orthodox distinguished between the external and the internal calls<sup>122</sup>), and focussed attention not upon what Christ has done, but upon the contractual duties the sinner needs to have performed — repentance, obedience — and the inward feelings he needs to have, in order to be assured of his right to the gospel. All of which is one conservative variety of "Pelagianism": God alone elects us, but we have to fulfil certain conditions, *and keep on fulfilling them* if we would be sure of it.<sup>123</sup>

The resultant legalism has persisted in some conservative circles, and that long after the explanatory theology has been forgotten by many. As D.B. Stevick observed of fundamentalism, "There is a long heritage...of inflamed attacks on the theater, John Barleycorn, tobacco, dancing, cardplaying, and other sinful indulgences — in other words, a long heritage of fiddling while Rome burns".<sup>111b</sup> On which mentality the conservative Dr. Carnell made the proper comment:

"Fundamentalists defend the gospel, to be sure, but they sometimes act as if the gospel read, 'Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ, don't smoke, don't go to the movies, and above all don't use the Revised Standard Version — and you will be saved'. Whenever fundamentalism encourages this sort of legalism it falls within the general tradition of the Galatian Judaizers".<sup>124</sup>

Finally, preoccupation with system can foster that totalitarianism spirit which has caused so much anguish in Christian circles, and which has all too often disrupted the household of faith. It comes as no surprise to discover that one of the factors in giving a new lease of life to the old conservative-liberal disputes is the modern ecumenical movement as represented principally by the World Council of Churches, a body which sits far too loosely to the Bible and to doctrine for the liking of the more thoroughgoing conservative systematisers.<sup>125</sup>

But not all conservatives are system builders. Far from it: some of them abhor systems. Just as some liberals denigrated theology on the ground that it unnecessarily impeded social action, so some conservatives have despised "book learning", applauded the "old-time religion" which was good enough for Moses *et al*, and regarded theological seminaries as inventions of the devil designed to drive the last vestiges of faith out of erstwhile "Bible-believing" ordinands. Such are the results of a *warped* pietism — of a pietism with which Spenser and Wesley would by no means have felt at ease.<sup>126</sup> They were neither anti-intellectualist nor individualistic in the pejorative sense.

Conservative individualism shows itself in a variety of ways. It can lead to an anti-Church mentality. This may arise either because the existing churches have become so schismatic in the name of conservative confessionalism that gentler spirits cry "We are of Christ" and resign; or because the more evangelistic members, having failed to move their fellows to mission, inaugurate separated, and often inter-denominational agencies to meet the need. On occasion both motives may jointly be present. As to the former R.W. Dale rightly advised that "Evangelical Christians should remember that Individualism involves a suppression of half the duties and a surrender of half the blessedness of the Christian life. The children of God belong to 'the household of faith'".<sup>127</sup> Concerning the latter Robert Mackintosh regretted that all too often "Evangelicalism does not wish to be distracted by any wider moral outlook than the desire to save one's own soul in the first place, and, secondly, to promote the salvation of the souls of other individuals... Infant baptism is the great rock of offence to the triumphant revival [because it places the infant individual within a covenanted fellowship]".<sup>128</sup>

Next, the methodology of individualistic, broadly Arminian Christianity can carry "Pelagian" overtones no less than the exaggerated Calvinism to which we have already referred. William Cunningham detected such overtones in the Morisonianism of his day; the Finney-influenced revivalists of the later nineteenth century further popularised the questionable approach; whilst the contemporary "voice over" decisionism has, we may hope, carried the technique to its technological limit. The error amounts to the view that the individual's action in making a faith commitment is the truly decisive thing. Hence such appeals as, "Only believe..."; "God wishes to save you — will you let him?" "Why not decide for Christ now?" These all fail to state (if those who employ such slogans do not fail to believe in) the priority of God's regenerative work; they make it appear that man holds the key to his salvation; and at their worst they

present the pitiable, rather than the sovereign, God who cannot make a move without the sinner's permission. None of which is to deny that proper synergism in which God does all and man does all;<sup>129a</sup> it is only to disallow that synergism which proclaims that God does part and man does part, but that the former cannot do his part until the latter has done his. Trail rightly expostulated, "How abominable it is to Christians ears, and how much more unto Christ's, to hear a man plead thus for pardon: 'Here is my repentance; where is thy pardon? Here is my faith; where is thy justification?'"<sup>118b</sup> Toplady was nearer the mark, "Nothing in my hand I bring, Simply to Thy cross I cling".<sup>130</sup>

The emphasis upon the believer's feelings has not only encouraged anti-intellectualism in some varieties of conservatism, it has also spawned antinomianism in ethics; but although the teaching of some veered in an antinomian direction it is not easy to find practical exponents of utter licence who claimed the protection of divine grace.<sup>131a</sup> For all that, P.T. Forsyth's warning stands against any who would easily set aside law in the supposed interests of grace: "So many converted lives go wrong and relapse because their conversion has not given them a Sovereign but only a Saviour. And the Christian life is not only gratitude for blessing received, but absolute obedience to a claim that we must own as holy just and good, whether we feel it is our blessing or not".<sup>105c</sup>

Of more practical consequence has been the unfortunate inhibiting effect of conservative individualism upon Christian social ethics. Here we have the obverse of the Social Gospel. There is, of course, no necessary connection between social unconcern and theological conservatism. The Reformed tradition has had its Prime Minister Kuyper, and many of the pietists made a valiant contribution to the social welfare of their fellows: "Few movements in church history and few schools of theological conviction have been, in proportion to population, so productive of institutional inventiveness and cultural creativity as have been the Moravians, the Methodists, and their counterparts within the larger churches".<sup>132</sup> Wesley's schools, Whitefield's orphanage, the Clapham Sect, the Salvation Army, the missions of the nineteenth century, the multitude of philanthropic, sometimes quite localised, institutions - all these sought in their several ways to fulfil the Christian hope of a world reconciled to God.<sup>133</sup>

In this last phrase we have the clue to the conservative suspicion of the Social Gospel men. The conservatives could not make any easy identification of progress in the world with the

coming of the Kingdom; and many of them, since they thought in terms of an aggregate of saved souls who together would renew the world, could not challenge those diseased systems which were the cause of the symptoms against which they so zealously battled. So great had the severance of practice from Christian thought been that some concluded that Wesley and Jonathan Edwards were, as regards socio-political thought "rationalists, sons of the Enlightenment".<sup>134</sup> Dale had made a similar diagnosis sixty years earlier:

"Although [the leaders of the Evangelical movement] insisted very earnestly on the obligation of individual Christian men to live a devout and godly life, they had very little to say about the relations of the individual Christian to the general order of human society, or about the realization of the kingdom of God in all the various regions of human activity. As the Revival had no great ideal of the Church as a Divine institution, it had no great ideal of the State as a Divine institution; nor had it any great ideal of the Divine order of the world".<sup>72b</sup>

When to this was added the later individualistic thrust of revivalism and fundamentalism, the prospect of lively Christian social ethics emanating from the conservative side receded still further. Some indeed saw the need: "if [the Church] is to retain its ascendancy over the minds of men [it must] bring Christianity to bear as an applied power on the life and conditions of society...I look to the twentieth century to be an era of Christian Ethic even more than of Christian Theology".<sup>135</sup> But the renewal was a long time coming. Professor Jellema has accurately analysed three ways in which conservatives rationalised their avoidance of ethical questions: they exalted separation from the world; they over-simplified the gospel so that it had to do only with personal salvation; and they formally repeated the formulations of Christian ethics of an earlier generation, thus "evading the problems of a contemporary society by giving a series of irrelevant answers".<sup>136</sup>

To end on a more hopeful note: the year 1947 saw the publication of Carl Henry's *The Uneasy Conscience of Modern Fundamentalism*. In this book and in many since Dr. Henry has urged his fellow conservatives to develop a doctrine of redemption adequate to the needs of the whole man in all his personal and societal relations. Again, the eighteenth General Council of the World Alliance of Reformed Churches produced a paper of "The Reformed Faith and the World of Today" in which aloofness from the world was confessed, and amendment sought.<sup>131b</sup> The evangelicals who met at Lausanne in 1974 declared that

"Reconciliation with man is not reconciliation with God, nor is social action evangelism, nor is political liberation salvation. Nevertheless, it is our duty to be involved in socio-political action... For both active evangelistic and social involvement are necessary expressions not only of our doctrines of God and man... but also of our love for our neighbour and our obedience to Jesus Christ".<sup>137</sup> Would it be fair to say that thus far there has been more talk than action? Some conservatives think so, and President I.J. Hesselink diagnosed the situation as follows:

"one of the main reasons for this lack of progress, despite an awareness of the problem, is the unevangelical, i.e. unbiblical, view that social, political, and economic problems are of secondary importance and that these problems can be solved by redeemed individuals without attacking the structures of society which are unjust.

The real problem is that some 'evangelicals', like old-time liberals, have operated with a truncated Bible, despite their formal acknowledgment of its authority. They have rung the changes of John 3: 16 and Acts 16:31 - 'Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ and you shall be saved' - but they have conspicuously ignored the social significance of the Magnificat and the Beatitudes. They have reveled in passages like Isaiah 1: 18 - 'Though your sins be like scarlet, they shall be white as snow' - but have paid little heed to a major motif in the prophets as summarized in Amos 5: 24 - 'Let justice roll down like waters and righteousness like an everflowing stream'".<sup>13b</sup>

All of which is an attentuation of the gospel.

It is a chastened liberalism that now confronts us. It is fashionable to say that Barth's *Romans* (1919), appearing as it did in the wake of War, was instrumental in effecting this change in liberals. But Gore, Inge and Temple, Forsyth and Oman, were well aware of man's disease before that catastrophe overtook the nations. On the other hand some, like Peel, decided *not* to be unduly influenced by Barth, and maintained their liberal optimism until the 1930s. But that there was a change cannot be denied. Many came to feel that undue confidence in progress and in man was not something any longer to be indulged in. As well as war there were depressions, and the rise of modern totalitarianism. Who was sufficient? Theologians began to rehabilitate the concept of transcendence. Among the leading figures in this reappraisal were Reinhold Niebuhr, W.M. Horton and John C. Bennett. In 1934 Horton declared with respect to liberalism that

"Disintegration is not too strong a word. The defeat of the liberals is becoming a rout".<sup>138a</sup> A further sign of the times was Fosdick's sermon of 1935, "The Church must go beyond modernism". He here argued that modernism had failed in being unduly occupied with the intellect, in being too sentimental, in diluting the idea of God, and in seeking a too ready accommodation to the prevailing culture.<sup>138b</sup> To the same period belongs D.R. Davies's *On to Orthodoxy* (1939) the powerful testimony of a convert from liberalism.

Conservatism too has changed, and that in two main ways. Those in the tradition broadly represented by Carl Henry — the neo-evangelicals — have urged a reappraisal of older attitudes. A catalyst in this regard was Harold J. Ockenga's negative reply to his own question of 1947, "Can fundamentalism win America?"<sup>139</sup> These men are open, rather than closed; systematic rather than idiosyncratic. Others, under such leaders as Carl McIntire, have pursued the separatist path, have vehemently opposed the World Council of Churches and, it would seem, have been more than a little involved in right wing politics.<sup>140</sup> As Dr. Henry said, "By mid-century fundamentalism obviously signified a temperament as fully as a theology".<sup>71b</sup>

A further contemporary debate in conservative circles is between those who wish to maintain the doctrine of the plenary inspiration of the Bible, and those who wish to advocate the modified view that it is the biblical doctrines which are inerrant.<sup>141</sup> It cannot yet be said that conservatives have made significant contributions to ecclesiology or to sacramental theology — still less to the question of the theological response to non-Christian religions. They are, however, as we have seen, becoming more ethically conscious, and herein lies hope.

"Rabbi" Duncan may put into words the chief lesson we have learned from picking our way across the conservative-liberal theological minefield:

"Some persons preach only doctrine; that makes people all head, which is a monster. Some preach only experience; that makes the people all heart, which is a monster too. Others preach only practice; that makes people all hands and feet, which is likewise a monster. But if you preach doctrine and experience and practice, by the blessing of God, you will have head, and heart, and hands, and feet — a perfect man in Christ Jesus".<sup>129b</sup>

## NOTES

- 1 To this extent we agree with Professor Welch. But when he says, "No significant theological programme is *as such* an attempt to be liberal or conservative, to go left or right (or to stay in the center)" we pause. If by "significant" is meant "widely influential" agreement becomes easier; but such a definition strikes oddly on the ear of those who do not employ a *quasi*-quantitative criterion of significance. Certain it is that some "Old Lights" in every generation have set out to be conservative, and they have often said highly significant, if not generally accepted, things. On the other hand, kite-flying liberals who take a devilish glee in disturbing the faithful are not unknown either. They, however, are not usually significant. See Claude Welch, *Protestant Thought in the Nineteenth Century*, New Haven & London: Yale U.P. 1972, I p.20.
- 2 William P. Merrill, *Liberal Christianity*, New York 1925, p.36.
- 3 For whom see E. Jorstad, *The Politics of Doomsday*, Nashville & New York: Abingdon 1970.
- 4 J.K. Mozley, *Some Tendencies in British Theology*, 1951, (a) p.70, (b) p.29.
- 5 E.W. Barnes, "The future of the evangelical movement" in *Liberal Evangelicalism*, n.d., p.288.
- 6 Professor R.J. Mouw, to whom we are indebted for this point, further notes that in eds. David Wells and John D. Woodbridge, *The Evangelicals: What They Believe, Who They Are, Where They Are Changing*, Nashville: Abingdon 1975, "no attention is given...to the fact that the Missouri Synod Lutherans, and to a lesser degree the Christian Reformed Church, have been recently having their own 'fundamentalist-modernist' debates, fifty years later than the traumas of the more Anglo-American groups." See his review in *Calvin Theological Journal* 1976, 11, 263.
- 7 B.L. Manning, *The Making of Modern English Religion (1929)*, 1967, p.78.
- 8 A.E. Garvie, "Fifty years' retrospect," *The Congregational Quarterly* 1929, 7, (a) p.18, (b) p.22.
- 9 D.R. Davies, "The essence of Christianity," *The World Christian Digest* Nov. 1953, (a) p.41, (b) p.45. His book *On To Orthodoxy* (1939) is also very much to the point. For earlier hesitations see P.T. Forsyth, "The insufficiency of social righteousness as a moral ideal," *The Hibbert Journal* 1909, 7, 596-613

- 10 P.T. Forsyth, *Positive Preaching and the Modern Mind* (1907), 1964, (a) p.139, (b) p.142, (c) p.143, (d) p.150. The saying comes to mind, "the rationalist blows cold, the mystic hot; warm up a rationalist and you get a mystic; cool down a mystic and you get a rationalist." For this we are indebted to S.G. Craig, *Christianity Rightly So Called*, Philadelphia: Presbyterian & Reformed 1976, p.248.
- 11(a) On this point contrast the positions of John H. Gerstner and Sidney Ahlstrom in eds. Wells and Woodbridge, *op.cit.*; and see James A. Hedstrom, "A bibliography for evangelical reform," *Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society* 1976, 19, 225-238, (b) p.38.
- 12 G.H. Clark, "Evangelicalism," in *The Encyclopaedia of Christianity*, Marshallton: National Foundation for Christian Education 1972, IV p.121.
- 13 I. John Hesselink, "Toward a seminary that is Catholic, Evangelical and Reformed," *Reformed Review* 1974, 27, (a) p.107, (b) pp.108-109.
- 14 See J.C. Ryle, *Knots Untied* (1877), Cambridge: James Clarke 1977, pp.3-12. For Anglican Evangelicalism see G.R. Balleine, *A History of the Evangelical Party in the Church of England*, 1908 etc.
- 15 (a) Quoted by A.R. Vidler, *Essays in Liberality* 1957, p.13 (b) p.21. Cf. I.T. Ramsey's opening sermon in *Liberal Christianity in History*, Modern Churchmen's Union 1969. A similar plea in face of "that wholesale condemnation of liberalism in theology which is now in vogue" was earlier entered by W.B. Selbie, *Freedom in the Faith* 1944, preface. Selbie said that his work was "not an attempt to defend the liberal Protestant theology of the nineteenth century, but rather to distinguish between the liberal spirit and that particular form of its application." (c) pp.126-151. Dr. Vidler finds that whereas Gore's beliefs qualify him for the Liberal Catholic name — he accepted the principles of modern biblical criticism, he was alive to the social implications of Christianity, and he was advanced in his view of the eternal destiny of those outside the Church — his temperament was aristocratic rather than liberal, Dr. Vidler has lucid chapters on Liberal Protestantism, Roman Catholic Modernism and English Liberal Catholicism in his *20th Century Defenders of the Faith* 1965.
- 16 See Amos Cresswell, *The Story of Cliff*, Culver, Sheffield: Joyful News Bookroom 1965.
- 17 H.B. Workman, "The place of Methodism in the life and thought of the Christian Church," in eds. W.J. Townsend et al., *A New History of Methodism* 1909, I p.30.

- 18 The Free Presbyterian Church denies that the Free Church of Scotland is in truth the continuation of the 1843 Disruption Church; "That the present Free Church, which we can never allow to be the Church of the Disruption, is very much on the down-grade, can easily be proved." In evidence the writer quotes Kenneth A. MacRae of the Free Church, Stornoway, who criticised some of the younger ministers of his Church on the ground that "a robust Calvinism has given place to a colourless presentation of the doctrines of grace, which will neither satisfy a Calvinist nor offend an Arminian." See John Colquhoun, "The present position and prospects of the Reformed Church in Scotland," in *Papers Commemorating the Quarter-Centenary of the Scottish Reformation*, read to the F.P. Synod at Edinburgh, May 1960, p.66.
- 19 Since about 1960 some interesting developments towards increasing confessional consciousness have taken place amongst this sturdily independent group of churches. In 1966 they published *We Believe*, an affirmation of faith; and in 1974 there appeared *A Guide for Church Fellowship* which set down "biblical standards for the help and guidance of the local church in the ordering of its Worship, Discipline and Witness." *Grace Magazine*, the successor of *Gospel Herald* (1833-1970) and *Free Grace Record* (1920-1970) is widely read among Strict Baptists. Again, since 1960 a number of Reformed Baptist churches have been founded *de novo*, and some others have seceded from the Baptist Union. Many of these honour the Particular Baptist Confession of 1689, and *Reformation Today* circulates among them. The Gospel Standard Baptists, who stand in the line of William Gadsby, continue to maintain their distinctive witness on such matters as the gospel offer. Their medium is *The Gospel Standard* (1835-). In an editorial in this magazine (1926, 92, 5-19) the status of the G.S. churches as a distinct denomination was clearly defended. See also S.F. Paul, *Historical Sketch of the Gospel Standard Baptists* 1961; P. Toon, "English Strict Baptists," *The Baptist Quarterly* 1965, 21, 30-36. For the other Churches mentioned in this para. see J.H.S. Burleigh, *A Church History of Scotland* 1960; M. Hutchison, *The Reformed Presbyterian Church in Scotland*, Paisley 1893; W.J. Coupar, *The Reformed Presbyterian Church in Scotland. Its Congregations, Ministers and Students*, Edinburgh 1925; G.N.M. Collins, *The Heritage of Our Fathers*, Edinburgh: Knox Press 1974; ed. A. McPherson, *History of the Free Presbyterian Church of Scotland*, Publications Committee of the F.P. Church 1975; W.J. Crier, *The Origin and Witness of the Irish Evangelical Church*, Belfast n.d. but preface has 1945.

- 20 T.M. Lindsay, "The doctrine of scripture. The Reformers and the Princeton School," *The Expositor* 1895, 5th series 1, 278-293.
- 21 See E.H. Rian, *The Presbyterian Conflict*, Grand Rapids 1940; L.A. Loetscher, *The Broadening Church*, Pittsburgh 1954; N.B. Stonehouse, *J. Gresham Machen, A Biographical Memoir*, Grand Rapids, 2nd edn. 1955; *Collected Writings of John Murray*, Edinburgh: The Banner of Truth Trust 1976, I chs. XI-XV. Machen, Stonehouse and Murray all served on the faculty of Westminster Theological Seminary, as did R.D. Wilson, O.T. Allis, C. Van Til, R.B. Kuiper and E.J. Young.
- 22 See D.H. Kromminga, *The Christian Reformed Tradition*, Grand Rapids 1943; Peter Y. De Jong, *The Christian Reformed Church*, Grand Rapids 1967. For the outworking of Dutch ecclesiastical tensions in South Africa see Peter Hinchliff, *The Church in South Africa* 1968, chap. IX.
- 23 See H.F. Foster, *A Genetic History of New England Theology* 1907; G.N. Boardman, *A History of New England Theology*, New York 1899; J. Haroutunian, *Piety Versus Moralism*, New York 1932. The contention of these books that a line can be drawn from Edwards to Bushnell has been questioned by Sidney E. Mead. He holds that "the line can be drawn from Puritanism to Old Calvinism [i.e. that Calvinism which opposed the Great Awakening] to Taylorism, each the system of the dominant party of its era. It is possible, in brief, that the Edwardeanism or consistent Calvinism was never the New England Theology." See his *Nathanael William Taylor*, Chicago 1942, p.ix.
- 24 See W. Pyncheon, *The Meritorious Price of Our Redemption* 1650.
- 25 See the works on the New England Theology at n.23.
- 26 See James W. Jones, *The Shattered Synthesis*, New Haven & London 1973.
- 27 N. Taylor, *Lectures on the Moral Government of God*, New York 1859, II p.134.
- 28 For American revivalism see e.g. Bernard A. Weisberger, *They Gathered at the River*, Boston 1958; William G. McLoughlin Jr., *Modern Revivalism: Charles Grandison Finney to Billy Graham*, New York 1959; Perry Miller, *The Life of the Mind in America: From the Revolution to the Civil War*, New York 1965; George M. Marsden, *The Evangelical Mind and the New School Presbyterian Experience*, New Haven: Yale U.P. 1970. For Finney see his *Memoirs*, New York 1876. For a critique of Finney's theology see B.B. Warfield, *Perfectionism*, Philadelphia 1958. We have found the following articles illuminating on the theological issues: D.M. Lloyd-Jones, "Revival: an historical and theological

- survey," in *How Shall They Hear?* 1960, pp.38-56; Melvin L. Vulgamore, "Charles G. Finney: catalyst in the dissolution of American Calvinism," *Reformed Review* 1963-4, 17, 33-42; P.E.G. Cook, "Finney on revival" in *One Steadfast High Intent* 1966, pp.4-16; James E. Johnson, "Charles G. Finney and a theology of revivalism," *Church History* 1969, 38, 338-358; John Opie, "Finney's failure of nerve: the untimely demise of evangelical theology," *Journal of Presbyterian History* 1973, 51, 155-173; D.M. Lloyd-Jones, "Living the Christian life. 5. New developments in the eighteenth and nineteenth century teaching," in *Living the Christian Life*, London: The Westminster Conference 1974, pp.82-99.
- 29 C.G. Finney, *Systematic Theology*, London 1851, p.3.
- 30 C.G. Finney, *Sermons on Important Subjects*, New York 1836, p.28.
- 31 C.G. Finney, *Lectures on Revivals of Religion*, London 1838, p.153.
- 32 B.B. Warfield, *Perfectionism*, p.193. From the other side Finney was criticised by the Unitarians for his lurid descriptions of hell, and for his methods of evangelism. See J.E. Johnson, *art.cit.*, pp.345-346. Among Finney's defenders was George F. Wright. See his "Dr. Hodge's misrepresentation of President Finney's system of theology," *Bibliotheca Sacra* 1876, 16, 381-392.
- 33 See e.g. his sermon on "The doctrine of election".
- 34 C.G. Finney, *Memoirs*, p.23.
- 35 J. Opie, *art.cit.* (a) p.160. These critics were to be even more stunned by the counterblast to revivalism in Bushnell's *Christian Nurture* (1847). Bushnell argued that a child should grow up a Christian and never know himself to be anything other than a Christian. (b) p.155. Among Moody's contemporaries John Kennedy of Dingwall, ever loyal to Calvinism, and Robert Mackintosh, a refugee from Calvinism, criticised revivalism trenchantly. Kennedy complained that "this proud resolve to make a manageable business of conversion-work, is intolerant of any recognition of the sovereignty of God"; quoted in Ergatees, *Arminianism - Another Gospel*, Gisborne N.Z. 1965, p.11. For Mackintosh's views see his *The Insufficiency of Revivalism as a Religious System*, bound with *Essays Towards a New Theology*, Glasgow 1889. For his spiritual pilgrimage and work see A.P.F. Sell, "The life and work of Robert Mackintosh (1858-1933)," *The Journal of the United Reformed Church History Society* 1973, 1, 79-90, and *Robert Mackintosh: Theologian of Integrity*, Bern: Peter Lang 1977.
- 36 For Moody see James F. Findlay Jr., *Dwight L. Moody: American Evangelist*, Chicago 1969.

- 37 A.M. Hills criticised the Oberlin theology on the following grounds *inter alia*: it locates all sin in the attitude of the will; it confounds consecration and sanctification, making the latter a matter of growth. See his *Holiness and Power*, Manchester 1913. For the American Holiness movement see D.W. Dayton, *The American Holiness Movement: A Bibliographic Introduction*, Wilmore, Kentucky: Asbury Theological Seminary 1971.
- 38 For Booth see (Edward) H. Begbie, *Life of William Booth*, 2 vols. 1920; Richard Collier, *The General Next to God*, London: Collins Fontana 1970. For the Church of the Nazarene see T.L. Smith, *Called Unto Holiness*, Kansas City 1962. For Keswick see W.B. Sloan, *These Sixty Years*, n.d. but 1935. For a somewhat fuller treatment of the material in this para. see D.M. Lloyd-Jones, "New developments", *op.cit.* He points out that Bishop Ryle never addressed the Keswick Convention, and that his book *Holiness* was a rebuttal of Keswick teaching. Likewise Spurgeon never spoke at Keswick, and G. Campbell Morgan gave Bible readings only there. See also E.R. Sandeen, *The Roots of Fundamentalism*, Chicago: Chicago U.P. 1970, pp.178-181. D.D. Bundy's *Keswick: A Bibliographic Introduction to the Higher Life Movements*, Wilmore, Kentucky: Asbury Theological Seminary 1975, may also be used with some caution.
- 39 (a) See E.R. Sandeen, *op.cit.* He has been criticised by some, however, for attaching too much significance to these themes. Donald Bloesch, for example, has fundamentalism sired by latter-day pietism (rather than dispensationalism) out of Reformed and Lutheran scholastic orthodoxy. See his *The Evangelical Renaissance*, Hodder & Stoughton 1974. (b) p.xii. For Niebuhr's opinion see his article "Fundamentalism" in *The Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences*, New York 1937. Among many other studies of fundamentalism see Stewart G. Cole, *The History of Fundamentalism* (1931), Westport: Greenwood Press 1971; Edwin H. Rian, *The Presbyterian Conflict*, Grand Rapids 1940; Norman F. Furniss, *The Fundamentalist Controversy, 1918-1931*, New Haven 1954; Louis Gasper, *The Fundamentalist Movement*, The Hague 1964; Daniel B. Stevick, *Beyond Fundamentalism*, Richmond Va. 1964. For a recent British view see James Barr, *Fundamentalism*, SCM 1977, and for a spirited reply to this from the Reformed standpoint see the editorial, "Fundamentalism Barred" in *The Monthly Record of the Free Church of Scotland*, December 1977, pp.191-193. (c) p.52, (d) p.43, referring *inter alia* to C.G. Goen, "Jonathan Edwards, a new departure in eschatology," *Church History* 1959, 28, 25-40.

- 40 For whom see F.R. Coad, *A History of the Brethren Movement*, Exeter 1968; H.H. Rowdon, *The Origins of the Brethren, 1825-1850*, 1967.
- 41 Gordon Harland, "The American religious heritage and the tragic dimension," *Studies in Religion* 1973, 2, 279. It is interesting to observe how this aspect has influenced such people, otherwise so different, as conservative millenarians and Social Gospel liberals.
- 42 J.I. Packer in *The Word of God and Fundamentalism*, the addresses given at the Oxford Conference of Evangelical Churchmen 1960, 1961, p.115.
- 43 J. Opie Jr. writes in *The Christian Century* 1965, 82, 608-611 on "The modernity of fundamentalism." But to him its modernity lies in its rationalistic scholasticism. Carl F.H. Henry criticised Dr. Opie in *Catholic World*, June 1967, pp.145-150, and Opie responded in the same issue, pp.151-156.
- 44 For Machen's own words on the subject see C. Allyn Russell, "J. Gresham Machen, scholarly fundamentalist," *The Journal of Presbyterian History* 1973, 51, 49-50.
- 45 E.g. E.J. Carnell, *The Case for Orthodox Theology* 1961; C.F.H. Henry, *Evangelical Responsibility in Contemporary Theology* Grand Rapids 1957 chap. II. The latter claims that fundamentalism became reactionary, it unthinkingly blended Arminianism and Calvinism, it neglected thorough exegesis, it veered towards anti-denominationalism, it neglected the doctrine of the Church, it frequently identified Christianity with premillenarianism, and it overlooked the cultural mandate.
- 46 G.O. Griffith, *The Theology of P.T. Forsyth* 1948, p.15.
- 47 H.D.A. Major, *English Modernism*, Cambridge Mass. 1927. (a) p.53. Dr. Major had earlier made this point when he provided a modernist's answer to those, both within and without the Church of England, who felt that the modernists should "come clean," secede, and join the Unitarians. See his "Modern Churchmen or Unitarians?" *The Hibbert Journal* 1922, 20, 208-219. (b) p.8, (c) pp.31,32; cf. Harnack's *What is Christianity?* (1900) E.T. 1901. (d) pp.25-28.
- 48 Though at this point we can see some justice in B.M.G. Reardon's remark concerning Liberal Protestantism and Catholic Modernism: "viewed in the perspective of our age they show up as only slightly differing aspects of a unitary tendency away from traditional Christianity altogether and towards the Christianized humanism to which theology has now largely succumbed." See his "Liberal Protestantism and Roman Catholic Modernism" in *Liberal*

- Christianity in History*, p.72; cf. his *Liberalism and Tradition*, Cambridge: CUP 1975.
- 49 Quoted by B.M.G. Reardon, *art.cit.*, p.81.
- 50 G. Tyrrell, *Christianity at the Crossroads* 1909. (a) p.5, (b) p.44.
- 51 Among other works on Roman Catholic Modernism see A.R. Vidler, *The Modernist Movement in the Roman Church*, Cambridge 1934; B.M.G. Reardon, *Roman Catholic Modernism*, A. & C. Black 1970.
- 52 R. Thomas, "Philip Doddridge and liberalism in religion," in ed. G.F. Nuttall, *Philip Doddridge* 1951, p.122.
- 53 Boston was the liberal town *par excellence*. In 1804 only one out of nine Congregational churches there remained trinitarian. See Conrad Wright, *The Beginning of Unitarianism in America*, Hamden: Shoe String Press 1976, p.253.
- 54 For Beecher see L. Abbott, *Henry Ward Beecher* 1903; W.G. Beecher and G. Scoville, *Biography of Henry Ward Beecher* 1888. For Brooks see A.V.G. Allen, *Life and Letters of Phillips Brooks*, 2 vols. 1901; R.W. Albright, *Focus on Infinity: A Life of Phillips Brooks*, New York 1961. For Gladden see J.H. Dorn, *Washington Gladden: Prophet of the Social Gospel*, Ohio State U.P. 1968; R.D. Knudten, *Systematic Thought of Washington Gladden*, Atlantic Highlands N.J. 1968.
- 55 W. Gladden, *A Modern Man's Theology* 1914, pp.6-7, 14, 15.
- 56 Letter to L.C. Barnes in D.R. Sharpe, *Walter Rauschenbusch*, New York 1942, pp.434f. Cf. R.T. Handy, "Walter Rauschenbusch in historical perspective," *The Baptist Quarterly* 1964, 20, 313-321.
- 57 See W.M. Horton, *Contemporary Continental Theology* 1938, pp.174-5.
- 58 A. Kuyper, *Lectures on Calvinism*, Grand Rapids n.d., p.8.
- 59 In 1865 the law was finally amended in such a way as to require assent to the articles, rather than to *all* the articles. William Robertson (1705-1783) had resigned his Irish living in 1764, but did not continue in the ministry. For fuller accounts of the matters briefly referred to here see Alexander Gordon, *Heads of English Unitarian History* 1895; C.G. Bolam *et.al.* *The English Presbyterians* 1968; for the impact of English Unitarianism on society see R.V. Holt, *The Unitarian Contribution to Social Progress in England* 1952; for an example of the impact of Unitarians on one town - and for material unmentioned by Holt - see A.P.F. Sell, "The social and literary contribution of three Unitarian ministers in nineteenth century Walsall," *Transactions of the Unitarian Historical Society* 1973, 15, 77-97.

- 60 A. Gordon, *op.cit.* (a) pp.39-40, (b) p.49, where Gordon says that Barker "originated several congregations in the North of England." Indeed he did, but his causes were to be found as far south as the West Midlands. After adventures in radical politics Barker went to America, eventually returning to the Methodist fold. See *DNB*.
- 61 Quoted by V.F. Storr, *The Development of English Theology in the Nineteenth Century* 1913, p.41n. As he reflected on the age of rationalism H.R. Mackintosh wrote, "It is easy to imagine how on these terms the majesty and power of the Christian Gospel vanished. There is little to produce 'joy unspeakable and full of glory' in a form of Christianity which, with half a sheet of notepaper and a spare hour, the average man can construct for himself... It is by no means surprising that the clergy who proclaimed such a message frequently exhibited a keener interest in sport or agriculture than in the cure of souls." See his *Types of Modern Theology* 1937, p.15.
- 62 See H. McLachlan, *The Methodist Unitarian Movement*, Manchester 1919.
- 63 We say "generally" because it has been argued that at least one congregation, that at Kendal, was only doubtfully orthodox in the first place. See F. Nicholson and E. Axon, *The Older Nonconformity in Kendal*, Kendal 1915, chap. XXIV.
- 64 It is not without significance that Coleridge joined the Unitarians for a time, and contemplated entering their ministry.
- 65 A.M.G. Stephenson, "Liberal Anglicanism in the nineteenth century," in *Liberal Christianity in History*, p.87. Cf. J. Tulloch, *Movements of Religious Thought in Britain during the Nineteenth Century* (1885), Leicester 1971, pp. 260-261.
- 66 A.M. Ramsey, *From Gore to Temple* 1960. (a) p.67. Dr. Ramsey also points out with respect to Modernism that "Where there is an underlying philosophy it is commonly that of the identity of the natures of God and Man, and where there is an underlying assumption it is commonly that of the uniformity of nature." (P.74). With further reference to the difficulty of labelling theologians, and with reference to Dr. Inge, J.K. Mozley writes, "One who can say that he has 'a great admiration for the old Catholic philosophy of religion, of which St. Thomas Aquinas is the most learned exponent,' is at that point, which is not situated on the circumference of religious belief, as far removed from some who would claim the name of 'modernist' as he is from Karl Barth." See his *Some Tendencies in British Theology* 1951, p.57. (b) p.5.

- 67 A.M.G. Stephenson, "English Modernism," in *Liberal Christianity in History*, (a) p.148. Although, like Harnack, the English Modernists tended to minimise the miraculous, they were not generally, like some Liberal Protestants, anti-supernaturalistic. However, Gore felt that B.H. Streeter's paper on "The historic Christ" in *Foundations* (1912) and J.M. Thompson's *The Miracles of the New Testament* were so sceptical concerning miracles that they came near to undermining the Faith. (b) p.150.
- 68 L. Parks, *What is Modernism?* New York 1924. (a) p.5, (b) p.138.
- 69 V.F. Storr, *Freedom and Tradition* 1940. (a) p.159, (b) p.169, (c) p.169, (d) p.172; cf. the Anglican symposium *Liberal Evangelicalism*, n.d., pp.vi-vii.
- 70 C.J. Cadoux, *The Case for Evangelical Modernism* 1938. (a) p.10. Elsewhere Cadoux confessed, "it is doubtless true that some theological thinkers are infected with a desire resembling the political habit of which Cromwell complained: 'Nothing was in the hearts of these men except Overturn, overturn.' The temptation to abandon beliefs because they are traditional is pernicious; and modernists must, of course, resist it, if it arises." See his "A defence of Christian modernism," *The Congregational Quarterly* 1927, 5, 164-5. Albert Peel's reflections on the 1928 Assembly of the Congregational Union of England and Wales are not without interest: "It is clear that, so far as the Chair is concerned, Modernism, for the moment, has its hand on the helm. Mr. Wrigley's address...was, in itself, the best possible denial that there is any necessary or congruous connexion between a modern outlook and cold or destructive intellectualism." See his editorial in *The Congregational Quarterly* 1928, 6, 273. (b) pp.8-9.
- 71 See C.F.H. Henry, *Evangelical Responsibility in Contemporary Theology*. (a) pp.21-22. We recognise that the growth of the *Religionsgeschichtliche schule* led by Ernest Troeltsch (1865-1923) fostered the spirit of relativism among some, and we are aware of the continuing naturalism of some of the new psychologists which was, on occasion, turned against religion. But to most of those who participated in the conservative-liberal debates between, say, 1870-1930, these were not the immediate foci of attention. More crucial ingredients were immanentism, modern biblical criticism, evolutionary thought, and Ritschlianism. (b) p.45.
- 72 R.W. Dale, *The Old Evangelicalism and the New* 1889. (a) pp.25-26, (b) pp.18-19.
- 73 T. Erskine, *Remarks on the Internal Evidence for the Truth of Revealed Religion* 1820, p.59.

- 74 Quoted by James Orr, *The Christian View of God and the World*, Edinburgh 1897, p.399. From the many contemporary analyses of liberal reductionism we note C. Gore, *The New Theology and the Old Religion* 1907, and W.L. Walker, *What About The New Theology?* Edinburgh, 1907.
- 75 Frank Lenwood, *Jesus - Lord or Leader?* 1930. (a) p.21, (b) p.29.
- 76 S.H. Mellone, *Liberty and Religion* 1925, p.231.
- 77 B.C. Plowright, "The misgivings of a modernist," *The Congregational Quarterly* 1931, 9, (a) 293, (b) 290.
- 78 See *Proceedings of the International Congregational Council* 1920, p.255. A.E. Garvie was concerned lest the idea that all men were God's children should dampen missionary enthusiasm. See his *The Missionary Obligation and Modern Thought* 1914, p.34.
- 79 H. Richard Niebuhr, *The Kingdom of God in America*, Hamden 1956, p.193.
- 80 R. Mackintosh, *Essays Towards a New Theology*, p.426. See also Charles S. Braden, "How liberal Christianity conceives of salvation," *The Journal of Religion* 1937, 7, 12-29.
- 81 See J.B. Pratt, *The Religious Consciousness*, New York 1920, p.123.
- 82 Thus in his book *The Strangest Thing in the World* (1891), Charles Bullock criticised Henry Drummond's *The Greatest Thing in the World* (1890 and many edns.) for being "The Gospel with the Gospel omitted." C.H. Spurgeon opined that Bullock "has done grand service by laying bare the device of deleting the atonement with the idea of promoting the imitation of Jesus." See *Sword and Trowel* 1891, p.340.
- 83 F.D. Maurice, *Theological Essays*, Cambridge 1853, p.162.
- 84(a) Quoted by H.R. Mackintosh, *Some Aspects of Christian Belief*, n.d. but preface has 1923, p.131. (b) p.176.
- 85 Quoted by L.E. Elliott-Binns, *Religion in the Victorian Era* 1936, p.280.
- 86 W. Rauschenbusch, *Christianity and the Social Crisis*, New York 1907, p.422.
- 87 A. Peel, *The Congregational Quarterly* 1923, 1, 230.
- 88 T. Rhondda Williams, *The Working Faith of a Liberal Theologian* 1914. (a) p.xiii, our italics. Robinson, it will be recalled, believed that the fresh light and truth would break forth out of God's holy Word. (b) p.147, (c) pp.140, 142.
- 89 H.D.A. Major, *Basic Christianity*, Oxford 1944, p.57.
- 90 The second report on a Declaration of Faith submitted to the National Congregational Council of 1865.
- 91 G.G. Atkins, *Religion in our Times*, New York 1932, p.156.
- 92 Quoted by John Horsch, *Modern Religious Liberalism*, Chicago 1920, pp.127-8.

- 93 *Proceedings of the International Congregational Council* 1920, p.255.
- 94 Quoted by S.G. Cole, *History of Fundamentalism*, p.83. It was interesting to hear Baroness Wootton, now an octogenarian, confess in a radio broadcast on 11.6.1977 that whereas in her earlier days she would have subscribed to the doctrine here castigated, she now saw more point in the notion of original sin – or, at any rate, ineradicable human nastiness. Cf. R. Niebuhr, *The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness* 1945, p.10.
- 95 J. Clifford's numerous writings on this theme are listed by J. Marchant, see next note.
- 96 James Marchant, *Dr. John Clifford* 1924, p.81.
- 97 ed. J.H. Leckie, *Professor D.W. Forrest, Memoirs and Discourses* 1919, p.85.
- 98 Quoted by Gordon Harland, *The Thought of Reinhold Niebuhr*, New York 1960, pp.45-6.
- 99 B. Spinoza, *Ethica* I, p.15.
- 100 B. Bosanquet, *What Religion Is* 1920, p.25.
- 101 H.D.A. Major in *The Modern Churchman*, Sept. 1921, p.196, quoted by O.C. Quick, *Liberalism, Modernism and Tradition* 1922, p.18; italics his.
- 102 T. Wigley in *A Re-statement of Christian Thought*, reprinted from *The Christian World* 1934, p.7.
- 103 See E.M. Forster, *G. Lowes Dickinson* 1938, p.212. Cf. H.G. Wood, *Belief and Unbelief since 1850*, Cambridge 1955, pp. 72-74. The criticism of this view by the Unitarian James Drummond is revealing: to the great mass of believers "a Christianity without Christ would be something fundamentally different from that by which they have lived. He is bound up in their religious affections, and his is the quickening breath which turns into living creatures the cold forms of truth...Nor have they seen in him only Man ascending to the pinnacle of human goodness, but the grace and love of God coming down to reconcile and save an estranged and sorrowful world." See his Hibbert Lectures, *Via, Veritas, Vita* 1894, pp.291-2.
- 104 J. Martineau, *Essays, Reviews and Addresses*, London: Longmans 1891, II p.443. Into the ecclesiological implications of immanentism, and in particular into the view of the Church as being the extension of the Incarnation, we cannot now enquire.
- 105 P.T. Forsyth, *The Principle of Authority* (1913) 1952. (a) p.171, (b) p.177, (c) pp.389-390.
- 106 O.C. Quick, *Liberalism, Modernism and Tradition*, p.18.
- 107 K.C. Anderson, "Why not face the facts?" *The Hibbert Journal* 1906, 4, 860.
- 108 P.T. Forsyth, "A rallying ground for the Free Churches. The reality of grace," *The Hibbert Journal* 1906, 4, 825.

- 109 P.T. Forsyth, *Faith, Freedom and the Future* (1912) 1955, p.96.
- 110 R.A. Finlayson, "Modernist belief and evangelical faith: are they the same?" *The Monthly Record of the Free Church of Scotland* Sept. 1973, pp.142-144.
- 111 D.B. Stevick, *Beyond Fundamentalism*, Richmond Va. 1964 (a) p.173, (b) p.59.
- 112 William Young, "Historic Calvinism and Neo-Calvinism," *The Westminster Theological Journal* 1973-4, 36, 48-64 and 156-173. For clear evidence that Mr. Young's criticism could not be levelled against all earlier Dutch Calvinists see M. Eugene Osterhaven, "The experimental theology of early Dutch Calvinism," *Reformed Review* 1974, 27, 180-189.
- 113 C.F.H. Henry, "Fundamentalism," *Catholic World* June 1967, p.149.
- 114 D.W. Simon, "The present direction of theological thought in the Congregational churches of Great Britain," *Proceedings of the International Congregational Council* 1891, p.79. We do not stay to consider the ecclesiological-catholic equivalent of conservative intellectualism. It is, of course, that the gospel requires the protection of orders, sacraments, or what not. We simply side with Bernard Manning: "The grace of God...needs no legal machinery to protect it...What is it that makes the Church different from all other societies, that makes the preaching of the Word different from all other speech, that makes the sacramental rites different from all other significant acts? It is grace. Then it is not episcopacy or the lack of episcopacy." See his *Essays in Orthodox Dissent* 1953, pp.114-115.
- 115 For the Gospel Standard Baptist position see B. Honeysett, "The ill-fated articles," *Reformation Today* no.2, summer 1970, pp.23-30, reprinted under the title *How to Address Unbelievers*. The four anti-free offer articles were added to the G.S. trust deeds in 1878. See further William Wileman, "The secret history of the four 'added' articles; 32, 33, 34, 35," *The Christian's Pathway* 1921, 26, 206-210. These articles have recently been discussed by David Engelsma in his series on "Hyper-Calvinism' and the call of the gospel" which commenced in *The Standard Bearer* in April 1974. He argues that the G.S. articles are hyper-Calvinistic, but that the testimony of the Protestant Reformed Church which, led by H. Hoeksema, came out of the Christian Reformed Church in 1924, is not. On the contrary, he maintains that his Church upholds the free offer, whilst the position approved by the Christian Reformed Church in 1924 in respect of common grace threatens the doctrine of particular redemption and therefore denies

the sovereignty of grace. The C.R. Church adopted a view of common grace according to which there is "a certain favour or grace of God which He shows to His creatures in general" and this grace includes "the general offer of the gospel."

- 116 J. Zanchius, *Absolute Predestination*, Grand Rapids: Sovereign Grace Publications 1971, p.87.
- 117 T. Crisp, *Christ's Pre-eminence*, reprinted Sheffield: Zoar Publications c. 1974, pp.13-14.
- 118 R. Trail, *Works*, Edinburgh: The Banner of Truth Trust 1975 I. (a) sermon II, (b) p.31.
- 119 J. Mason, *Mason's Sayings*, reprinted Sheffield: Zoar Publications c. 1974, p.14.
- 120 H. Bonar, "God's will, man's will and free will," Wilmington: Sovereign Grace Publications 1972, p.30.
- 121 J. Murray, *Collected Writings of John Murray*, Edinburgh: The Banner of Truth Trust 1976, I chap. XVII.
- 122 See J. Calvin, *Institutes* III xxiv 8.
- 123 See further J.B. Torrance, "The contribution of McLeod Campbell to Scottish theology," *The Scottish Journal of Theology* 1973, 26, 295-311. Writing of conversion under the Puritans R. Mackintosh said that although the convert "had nothing to do with the law as the source of 'justifying righteousness,' he was bidden to use the law as the 'rule of his life.' Doctrinally and emotionally he was to live by grace; but his conduct was to be exactly the same as if he expected to be justified by works." See *The Insufficiency of Revivalism as a Religious System*, p.8. For the view that covenant theology need not become a new legalism see Donald MacLeod, "Federal theology - an oppressive legalism?" *The Banner of Truth* no.125, Feb. 1974, pp.21-28. The historian of the Brethren movement has detected a "hint of Pelagianism" in J.N. Darby's view that "unity is not seen as the result of God's work in the death of Christ, so much as a result of the Christian's conforming to that death." See F.R. Coad, *A History of the Brethren Movement*, p.33.
- 124 E.J. Carnell, *The Case for Orthodox Theology*, p.121.
- 125 Carnell and Stevick have chapters on separation. The Reformed Presbyterian Church, Evangelical Synod, has recently given detailed consideration to the matter. See *Minutes* of the 153rd General Synod, 1975 pp.59-80. Among many conservative evangelical critiques of modern ecumenism see Donald Gillies, *Unity in the Dark* 1964, and David Hedegard, *Ecumenism and the Bible* 1964.
- 126 See Donald G. Bloesch's illuminating chap. V, "The legacy of pietism" in his *The Evangelical Renaissance*.

- 127 R.W. Dale, *The Evangelical Revival 1880*, p.33.
- 128 Robert Mackintosh, *The Insufficiency of Revivalism*, pp.13, 27; cf. D.B. Stevick *op.cit.*, pp.25-26.
- 129 (a) Cf. John "Rabbi" Duncan: "There is a true and a false synergia. That God works half, and man the other half, is false; that God works all and man does all, is true." See ed. W. Knight, *Colloquia Peripatetica*, Edinburgh 1907 p.30. (b) p.167.
- 130 From the hymn "Rock of Ages, cleft for me."
- 131 (a) For a recent review of the position see M. Eugene Osterhaven, *The Spirit of the Reformed Tradition*, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans 1971, pp.132-137. (b) p.147.
- 132 John H. Yoder, *The Christian Witness to the State*, Newton, Kansas 1964, p. 85, quoted by D.G. Bloesch, *op.cit.*, p.124.
- 133 For social contributions of American conservatives see e.g. G.H. Barnes, *The Anti-Slavery Impulse 1830-1844*, New York, new edn. 1964; John R. Bodo, *The Protestant Clergy and Public Issues, 1812-1848*, Princeton 1954; C.C. Cole, *The Social Ideas of the Northern Evangelists 1826-1860*, New York 1954; Timothy L. Smith, *Revivalism and Social Reform in Mid-Nineteenth Century America*, New York 1957; Charles I. Foster, *An Errand of Mercy*, Chapel Hill 1960; Clifford S. Griffin, *Their Brothers' Keepers*, New Brunswick 1960; E. Brooks Holifield, "Thomas Smith: The social ideas of a southern evangelist," *Journal of Presbyterian History* 1973, 51, 24-39.
- 134 *Democracy and the Churches*, Philadelphia 1951, quoted by M.E. Osterhaven, *The Spirit of the Reformed Tradition*, p.153.
- 135 J. Orr, *The Progress of Dogma* n.d. but preface has 1901, p. 353.
- 136 Dirk Jellema, "Ethics," in ed. C.F.H. Henry, *Contemporary Evangelical Thought*, Grand Rapids 1968, p.111.
- 137 As expounded by John Stott, *The Lausanne Covenant*, Minneapolis: World Wide Publications 1975, pp.27-28. Cf. also articles by Elton M. Eenigenburg, Robert A. Coughenour and Hugh A. Koops in *Reformed Review* autumn 1974, 28. This issue also includes "A declaration of evangelical social concern" (1973) among whose signatories was C.F.H. Henry. For further illustrations of the changing mood see e.g. Richard J. Coleman, *Issues of Theological Warfare*, Grand Rapids: Erdmans 1972 chap. V.
- 138 (a) Quoted by W.M. Horton, *Realistic Theology*, New York & London 1934, p.2. Cf. H.P. Van Dusen, "The sickness of liberal religion," *The World Tomorrow* no.14, Aug. 1931, pp. 256-259; John C. Bennett, "After liberalism - what?" *The Christian Century* no.50, 8.xi.1933, pp.1403-6; G.G. Atkins, "Whither liberalism?" *Religion in Life* 1934, 3,

- 335-339; Wilhelm Pauck, "What is wrong with liberalism?" *The Journal of Religion* 1935, 15, 146-160; H.S. Coffin, "Can liberalism survive?" *Religion in Life* 1935, 4, 194-203. See too the 1939 series in *The Christian Century* on "How my mind has changed." For this list of references we are indebted to Dennis N. Voskuil, "The emergence of American neo-orthodoxy," *Reformed Review* 1976, 30, 35-38; and see his unpublished doctoral dissertation, *From Liberalism to Neo-Orthodoxy: The History of a Theological Transition, 1925-1935*, Harvard University 1974. For a critique of what he calls neo-liberalism see Robert Lightner, *Neo-Liberalism*, Nutley N.J.: The Craig Press 1970. We have already referred to B.C. Plowright's contemporary "Misgivings." (b) p.4n. Dr. Horton says of liberal concepts that "it must now be announced, as an accomplished fact, regrettable but duly certified, that their vital sap has departed from them", p.8.
- 139 *Christian Life*, June 1947, pp.13-15.
- 140 See Erling Jorstad, *The Politics of Doomsday*. For recent developments within conservatism see e.g. Louis Gaspar, *The Fundamentalist Movement*, The Hague 1963; Ronald H. Nash, *The New Evangelicalism*, Grand Rapids 1963; Millard Erickson, *The New Evangelical Theology* 1969; George Dollar, *A History of Fundamentalism in America*, Greenville: Bob Jones U.P. 1973; D.G. Bloesch, *op.cit.*; eds. D.F. Wells and J.D. Woodbridge, *op.cit.*
- 141 Thus, for example, in *The Battle for the Bible*, Grand Rapids: Zondervan 1976, Harold Lindsell laments that such conservatives as Daniel P. Fuller, George E. Ladd and Paul King Jewett no longer defend the inerrancy of scripture. For recent defences thereof see e.g. Clark H. Pinnock, *A Defense of Biblical Infallibility*, Philadelphia 1967, and ed. J.W. Montgomery, *God's Inerrant Word*, Minneapolis: Bethany Fellowship 1974.

JOHN BAZLINTON

## Essay Review - CULTS

Ronald Enroth's well researched and informative book on Cults is divided into two parts. The first recounts, in some detail, the story of one ex-adherent from each of the seven Cults considered: The Hare Krishna Movement, the Children of God, the Unification Church, the Divine Light Mission, the Alamo Christian Foundation, the Love Family and the Way. All the stories, which are very readable, ring true: they are both fascinating and boring, frightening and banal, but always very human.

The second part consists of a "Commentary on the Cults". It deals *inter alia* with the general theological pattern of the Cults, and describes the kinds of activity expected of converts. Finally it deals with the role of the demonic in these movements.

The chief value of the book for the British public lies in those parts which deal with the Unification Church of Sun Myung Moon of Korea. The other cults described are either peculiar to America or have lost their impetus in the UK since the late '60s and early '70s when they were first established in this country. This is largely the result of divisions, scandals and inbuilt weaknesses which affected the Children of God, Divine Light and Hare Krishna movements. Mr Moon, who may now have to set up camp outside America where opposition to his methods is gaining strength, could prove more successful in the UK. His theology, politics, and social aims together with the large financial resources at his command (he owns armament factories in Korea) makes his movement the most dangerous of these Cults. The recent enormous influx of Moon evangelists from all over the world to the UK will probably lead to many conversions. Whether his political background will be acceptable here remains to be seen.

Dr. Enroth deals sensitively with the tragedy of the broken families left by converts. The Cults seem to have one aim in common — that of replacing natural parents with spiritual ones — little or no contact with relatives being allowed once a convert has made a commitment. This fact has caused indignant parents in America to form various organizations in order to bring Governmental and other pressures to bear. Some of these organizations kidnap converts and apply forcible 'deprogramming' (or de-brain-washing') to restore normal family relationships. Dr. Enroth covers the debate this has caused in some detail. The despair of parents has to be seen to be believed and one cannot but have sympathy for the families involved.

In his discussion Dr. Enroth shows himself well aware of the dangers of deprogramming. The main questions which the Christian must ask, however, is what is to be given to the deprogrammed individual to replace the joy and excitement, the power, the sense of belonging and the exclusiveness of the Cult? Will it be something full, rich and true, or something seven times worse? Unhappily, the romantic idealism of some of these deprogramming organizations would seem to reflect the awful barrenness of much of middle America's world-wide and value system — which obviously is one of the factors involved in the rise of the Cults in the first place. One wonders if we in the UK will fare any better.

Good as it is, to the reviewer the book seems to suffer from four faults.

Firstly, I miss evidence of a study of brain-washing from a Christian angle. Had this been undertaken, the author's conclusion might well have been different. Dr. Enroth states that "... a key to understanding the success of extremist cults is the fact of their ability to destroy the will to be self-determining". The factual evidence the author gives seems to bear this out, but given a Christian view of man, is this really true? Is the will to be self-determining given up voluntarily or involuntarily? If voluntarily, can one speak of destruction?

Secondly, knowing something of the subtlety of some of the teachings of the Cults, one would have expected the author to have been more critical of the premises of his social-scientist colleagues, whose researches into the phenomenon of 'conversion' he cites. Although some of their statements seem fairly sensible

(though occasionally the obvious is dressed up in medical psephological jargon) one would hesitate to accept others as objectively factual. It is all too easy to catagorize people and thereafter imagine that their problems are understood. However, for the Christian who does not accept that man is an automaton without freewill many current sociological and psychological categorizations with their attendant conclusions have to be considered suspect until proved correct. From the biblical view, it would have been interesting to have read the author's opinions on what it is in Man's nature that, given a few proof texts (perhaps out of context at that) and a period of conditioning, can make apparently sensible and sincere people claim black is white and white is black? What sort of need is satisfied in the convert's mind? Can his 'conversion' be rationalized? Moon's followers seem honestly to believe that you and I are blinded by Satan, and eternally damned if we do not recognize Moon's Messiahship. These issues are complex and Dr. Enroth does touch on them, but deeper research is called for.

Thirdly, the author seems to overlook the fact that his concluding and deeply interesting chapter "The Influence of the Adversary" underlines the weakness of much evangelical theology.

As the author briefly points out, the emergence of the New Age Cults has to be viewed against the background of recent developments in Western thought and culture: it is not explicable in terms of just the obvious influences of psychedelic drugs and eastern mysticism. Yet that Twentieth Century malaise, the individual's loss of identity, has much deeper roots than the author seems to envisage. To quote C.K. Chesterton "When God is dead, man does not believe in nothing, he believes in anything". If we don't know who we are, we can very easily be made to feel guilty through certain pressures and therefore wide open to manipulation by others. Even the pat answers (e.g. "If you attitude was right you wouldn't have to ask about these things" or "your 'spirit' is wrong") of the pseudo-Christian Cult adherent to straight-forward questions can stump the sincere enquirer if he is not on his guard. (Alas, such answers are also sometimes heard in genuine Christian circles.)

What of the Christian Church's responsibility in this area? The polarizations within the Christian community only reflect varying opinions among non-christians. The reliance on subjective faith either based on the believism of extreme fundamentalism or the wooliness of existential liberalism can only have assisted the

winds of spurious doctrine and cultic dogma in drying up shallow faith and shattering already weakened family units.

For this reason it seems a mistake to conclude the book with a chapter dealing only with the activity of Satan the Adversary in the rise and progress of the Cults.

Bad as he is, the devil may be abused  
 Be falsely charged and causelessly accused  
 When men unwilling to be blamed alone  
 Cast off on him those sins that are their own.

Nevertheless, I am not at all disagreeing with what Dr. Enroth says: the spiritism so obviously underlying some of the Cults is very scary.

Fourthly, it is sad to note that Dr. Enroth gives so little guidance on practical and pastoral questions.

Speaking personally, I have had experience of the mentality and methods of some of the most extreme sectarians in this country. I was reared as a member of the Exclusive Brethren (who have since developed into a Cult) and have friends and acquaintances caught up in the movements described in Enroth's book. While Mr. Moon's London Unification Church HQ, is a close neighbour. It would have been very useful to have had Dr. Enroth's views on the simple matter of what one should do when approached. How does one understand the shock that the more established Cult adherents can generate by their presence, apparent assurance, devotion and total commitment, and in the case of the pseudo-Christian Cults their use of Christian evangelical terminology and their detailed knowledge of Bible texts? Does the author know what it feels like even for a moment to be suddenly caught off guard and be almost taken in by the subtlety of truth mixed with error? How does Dr. Enroth deal with the street level challenge? Does he swap verses, challenge the adherents' premises, share a cup of tea, pray with them or would he suggest that we take Gamaliel's advice? Is there anything practical we can do other than showing the Christian virtues of love and gentleness which Dr. Enroth advocates? Is righteous anger appropriate in some circumstances?

Some account of Dr. Enroth's experiences in these areas would have been more than helpful. He does, however, mention a very worthwhile organization in Berkeley, California - the Spiritual Counterfeits Project - whose literature, tapes and ideas might well

be needed in the UK to help combat the more militant groups.\*

This book should serve as a warning. Many Christians have been caught by these Cults — often through their own naivety. If Marshall McLuhan is right and we are heading into a profoundly religious age the present day Cults are just part of the dawn. Given the possibilities of instant global communication, and the loss of meaning, values and identity in our Culture, how strong is our own faith and community to meet the possible future challenge?

Many of the Cults make capital out of the outward state of the Church. Is our own house so much part of the rubble culture that we have no viable alternative to offer? Can we only blame the Adversary? However, I do not wish to seem unduly critical. There is no more informative book on the 'New Age' Cults than this, it deserves a wide sale.

John Bazlinton

#### REFERENCE

- 1 Ronald Enroth, *Youth, Brainwashing and the Extremest Cults*, 1978, Paternoster Press, 218 pp., PB, £2.40.

\*An organization called F.A.I.R. (2 Stone Buildings, Lincoln's Inn, London WC2A 3JA) under the chairmanship of Paul Rose MP has also come to my notice. Although I do not know much about its credentials its aims are: to provide information, answer request for help, provide counselling, and enlighten the public.

# Reviews

Dean Turner, *Commitment to Care*, Delvin-Adair Co,  
Old Greenwich, Conn. 06870, 1978, 416 pp., 12.50 dollars.

Controversial, original, most worthwhile and erudite, this is an interesting book, but a difficult one to review because its coverage is so wide. The author's basic theme is that love and care are clues to an understanding of the universe. They are woven into the very fabric of things. Man, himself, cannot even begin to understand anything at all unless he *cares*, unless it *matters* to him what he will learn. (I am reminded of my vain attempts to teach a student whom nobody else could teach. All became clear when the young man said quite plainly that it was my job, as his teacher, to teach him, but not his job to learn!)

Commitment to care, being basic, cannot be applied piece-meal. This is the error of the atheist who is as concerned as any Christian to apply the principle when it suits his ends, but inconsistently forgets about it when he claims that the universe just happened without care. This theme is developed in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 (Care in Atomic Action, Care in the Cosmic Order, Care in the Cell). There is much fine material here.

But it is not atheists only who destroy commitment to care: the whole gamut of the academic world must share responsibility. "Any person who is interested in an excuse to escape having to face God can find it in modern philosophy without having to look very hard" (p. 348). Philosophical theologians are some of the worst offenders. Listening to the siren voices of Aristotle and Philo instead of heeding biblical revelation, they have patronized a god (or God) "omnipotent, omniscient, immutable and absolutely self-fulfilled and happy". This god lives outside time. To him past and future are indistinguishable; consequently he knows neither need nor care. "Beyond any doubt the most crucial error in religious theory and practice today is the notion that God himself is above need." (p. 156). Furthermore, this god's supposed perfect knowledge of the future makes man's freewill delusory and his supposed omnipotence makes the problem created by evil insoluble. In fact God cannot do just anything (eg. make a two-dimensional figure which is both a circle and a square). His infinity lies in the fact that His ingenuity knows no limits.

Inevitably these views lead on to a criticism of Karl Barth for whom, as a result of the Fall, the natural order is wholly demonic and God wholly unintelligible and therefore seemingly irrational to man. How different, Turner says, is the teaching of Jesus who feels what we feel through understanding and sharing. When we do wrong "we hurt God just as surely as we hurt one another. The reason why we can hurt God is because we hurt one another. He cares and feels". (p. 157)

The truth about God, says Turner, lies in what Jesus said about Him. It is quite certain that Jesus did not teach that God is a static being without need. On the contrary, God's future, like ours, depends in part upon choices that have yet to be made (p. 162). God cannot be concerned about the future unless He has a future, unless like us He lives in time which must be as meaningful to Him as to us.

If philosophers and theologians have become irrational, so also have scientists — in fact irrationality in science is now used to bolster up irrationality in theology. Physical scientists, for instance, accepting relativity have introduced muddle-headedness into the nature of things by denying absolute motion. Psychologists argue that ethical principles are relative, man being the product of environment and heredity and nothing else, so undermining free-will. Inconsistently, they urge men to be rational, forgetting that in their closed-shop universe, duty and rationality are inconsequential seeing that they are imposed upon us by the nature of things.

Thus theology, science and philosophy have gone sadly astray but always in a direction which encourages men to forget both God and Care. The feeling that, imbued with modern ideas, academics are themselves forgetting how to care, is now so widespread, says the author that 80% of the 10,000 or so students he has questioned now "look upon most doctors and lawyers as basically avaricious philistines insensitive to the needs of their patients and clients" (p. 169).

It is evident that Dr Turner has thought long and deeply about relativity. This book contains a lengthy (80 pp. with 150 notes) chapter available also as a paper-back, on Einstein's theory. Turner believes that we may safely return to a Newtonian universe and that all the known facts bearing on relativity (slowing of clocks in motion, bending of light and the Michelson-Morley experiment) are fully explicable by the theory proposed by

Herbert E. Ives, an American physicist (Turner is the Editor of *The Ives Papers* which is being published contemporaneously with this work).

Relativity, or rather the philosophy of relativity, is a notoriously difficult subject and Dr Turner is courageous, indeed, to tackle it. Let us hope that the experts will give him a fair hearing.

The book is well, but rather unevenly, written. In the first half the author sets out his own views: the second half deals with various odds and ends taken up in chapters of uneven length and varying difficulty. Throughout the work carefully argued passages alternate with vigorous polemic. Sometimes the thread of the argument seems to get lost in detail, only to appear again quite suddenly and unexpectedly. Everywhere Turner shows himself to be fully conscious of possible criticisms of his views. Sometimes he quotes verbatim from critics who, at meetings, challenged him in no uncertain terms — their utterances being tape recorded at the time!

Turner's knowledge is extensive and there are many interesting quotations and references: for this alone the book will be valued. It is a pity that in a work of this standard of excellence the author does not refrain from an all too frequent use of rather ugly split infinitives — but that is a mere detail. Perhaps it is even allowable across the Atlantic?

REDC

George Schlesinger, *Religion and Scientific Method*,  
D. Reidel Pub. Co., Dordrecht, Holland, 1977, 240 pp.  
(Philosophical Studies Series in Philosophy, vol. 10)

It would be impossible, fairly, to summarize this highly original volume. Written with great clarity and simplicity of style and obviously the product of many years of disciplined philosophical thinking, it is intended for the philosophy student for whom it is a 'must' if he is tempted to abandon theism as a result of the arguments against religion commonly to be found in philosophical books and journals. Needless to say it is not light arm-chair reading.

Part 1 argues that the existence of evil cannot validly be used as an argument against theism, atheistic philosophers being over-simplistic in their thinking. It is shown that propositions such as 'benevolence precludes the condoning of suffering', 'personal identity depends only on memory and/or bodily continuity', 'morality consists in making other people happy' ("Better Socrates dissatisfied than the fool satisfied" — J.S. Mill) are transparently false.

Fortitude, charity, compassion and forgiveness cannot exist without suffering yet it is to be expected that a beneficent God must seek to foster them. The degree of desirability of a (moral) state, DDS, has no theoretical maximum — just as God cannot name the highest number (the devil could always add one to it!) so He cannot know the highest DDT and it is impossible to know the minimum amount of evil necessary for an indefinite increase in DDT. Therefore it is foolhardy to argue that the actual evil in the world is greater than it ought to be on the Theistic hypothesis.

As typical of the treatment given we may cite one of the author's criticisms of E.H. Madden and P.H. Hare who say, "The core of the problem of evil is not why God did not create a perfect world but why he did not create a better one." (*Evil and the Concept of God*, Springfield Ill, 1968, p. 39.) Schlesinger comments:-

The absurdity of the demand that God should have created a better world can be brought out by asking what advice Madden and Hare would have given God had he consulted them prior to the creation of the world. They would not have advised 'create the best possible world' since they admit that there is no such possible world. Would they have urged him 'create a better world'? Better than what? Better than some world he could have created instead? But that would be an empty advice since no matter what he does the resulting universe will be better than some he could have created. And surely they could not have advised him 'create a better universe than you are going to create'. It would then have to be agreed that, so far as the DDS of God's creatures is concerned, it matters not what world he creates. (P. 65)

Part 2 deals with Freewill. The freedom of will is proved by an ingenious, but logical, development of Newcomb's Problem of Choice - conceivable objections to the proof are analysed in detail and disposed of. (The basic problem is this. Two sealed boxes are put in front of you; box 1 contains 1000 dollars, box 2 either nothing or a million dollars. You want to get as much money as you can and you may choose either box 2 or both boxes. Which choice will you make? If your will is not free your choice may, in principle, be predicted. If a predictor knows beforehand that you will choose box 2, he puts a million dollars in it; if he predicts that you will be greedy and take both boxes, he leaves box 2 empty. One line of argument proves that it will be best for you to choose the first way, another the second. The contradiction can only be resolved by assuming that the predictor cannot predict reliably - that is, that the will is free. The set up is altered in various ways: the argument is necessarily involved! It is shown that if the choosing human agent is replaced by a machine the argument fails. In this sense, then, the human mind cannot be duplicated by a machine, however complex.)

Part 3, on the Confirmation of Theism contains, *inter alia* discussions on Pascal's wager, the Verification Principle, Miracles and Scientific Method. Careful attention is given to objections to Theism by such writers as Hume and Anthony Flew. The treatment is fresh and invigorating.

The author develops an argument for Theism which "belongs to the same family of arguments which has the famous Argument from Design as its member". However, he objects to the Lecomte du Nouÿ approach on the ground that "even if the emergence of the complex molecules required for life by an entirely unguided random process is very improbable, given the amount of space and time available it is virtually certain to emerge somewhere some time!" (Not, surely, if the probability of its emergence, is zero! Time is limited, as is space where life could exist.) "My argument cannot be attacked along these lines" says the author. His conclusion "that by employing the most elementary principles underlying scientific method we may construct certain aspects of the world as constituting empirical evidence confirming Theism" seems fully justified. The book will be of value to those who have become bogged down with traditional arguments.

How valuable it would be if someone were to rewrite this book in a more popular style, easily intelligible at undergraduate level!

Donald M. MacKay, *Science, Chance and Providence*,  
Oxford UP, 1978, 67 pp., £3.50

This useful little book contains Professor MacKay's three Riddell Memorial Lectures given at the University of Newcastle upon Tyne on 15, 16 and 17 March, 1977.

Lecture 1, "A Scientist in God's World", connects the decline in Christianity in the West with the decline in the popularity of science — a joint decline compensated for by rising irrationality of every kind as men search desperately to find a meaning to life. "Neither of them [Christianity or Science] deserves the ill repute and neglect that have temporarily befallen them" says MacKay and he proceeds to demonstrate their interconnectedness.

This he does by asking what must follow when people, without knowledge of science, decide to take biblical revelation seriously. The answers come out that scientific knowledge must be based on sensory experience, not logical deduction from definition, and that we must expect to discover causal laws ("Customs of the Creator") since responsible stewardship of nature is impossible without them. Moreover, since God "upholds the universe by the word of his power" (Heb. 1:2, 3) the ceaseless activity (as discovered by science) lying at the heart of natural stability is only to be expected. And so in "a sense... every natural event is a miracle", the traditional miracle being "a change of mode of the divine activity". As for the objection that causal sequences imply atheism (or perhaps deism), this argument might be used with equal cogency to argue that because, on the TV screen, the cricketer's bat strikes the ball and makes it move, therefore TV circuitry in the set may be dispensed with.

Lecture 2, "The Mythology of Chance", deals with Monod's claim that an assured result of science is that "man at last knows that he is alone in the unfeeling immensity of the universe, out of which he emerged only by chance". This assertion, says MacKay, reveals muddled thinking about the nature of *chance* which can refer to:

1. *Indeterminism* — lack of prior cause.
2. A random *process* (eg. toss a coin in such a way as not to influence the way the dice or coin falls).

3. An arrangement having *no discernible order*. (Eg. the last digits of a column of telephone numbers seem to be at random, i.e. arranged by chance, but are actually so highly ordered that not a single misprint can be tolerated.)
4. A wholly illigitimate *personification* of an imaginary causal agent. (As when chance is said to be the cause of an event. Cf. "'I see nobody on the road' said Alice. 'I only wish I had such eyes' the King remarked. 'To be able to see Nobody! And at that distance too!'" ) It is in this sense that Monod claims chance to be "the central concept of biology".

Lecture 3, "What Room for Providence", deals with some of the apparent contradictions implicit in Christian doctrine (Eg. the Trinity, "... not three gods: but one God"; a prayer may be answered but the event which proves to be the answer may have been set in motion before the request was made to God.)

It is reasonable to think that God transcends our 4-dimensional space-time. Such transcendence is within our experience — eg. the novelist creates a space-time independent of his own (Dorothy Sayers). [The space-time of dreams and visions is also independent of that of waking life.] Two-dimensional projections at right angles (as in draughtsmen's drawings) which look different are not contradictory: the Trinity may be thought of in a somewhat similar way.

But what is a contradiction? "Hold up a finger and thumb, one...behind the other, in line with your nose. Now close each eye in turn." The finger is seen to lie both to the left and to the right of the thumb — an apparent contradiction but actually an instance of complementarity. In thinking of God we must identify the standpoint for which a statement claims to be a valid projection. The prayer difficulty is illustrated by Newcomb's paradox, (See review of Schlesinger in this issue) much debated in philosophical journals, and it is shown that the question "What if you had not prayed" contains a hidden ambiguity.

Though there is so much of value in this short book, one cannot help wondering if the biblical Christianity, as presented, is not perhaps one-sided. If God upholds the universe by the word of His power, does it follow that the activity of God is to be seen in every natural event? For Elijah the Lord was not in wind, earthquake, or fire (1 Kings 19:1). Jesus speaks of the earth bringing forth of itself (Mk. 4:28). Is it not possible that

nature, though a creation of God, often acts on its own? Or that the devil, god of this world, can sometimes control natural phenomena? Is it even possible that our Lord could have regarded disease, physical as well as mental, as every bit as much the work of His Father as were His own miracles of healing — the disease and the healing merely different modes of God's activity? If so, why did Jesus heal at all? If God casts out God, how shall His kingdom stand (cf. Mt. 12:26 etc). One has a feeling that Professor MacKay, together with many other modern Christians, says what he says, or seems to say, only because he is reacting too strongly against the clockmaker God of our forefathers.

Nevertheless the book will prove very valuable, especially at the student level. But, alas, the price is much too high, it could be xeroxed for half its price. Printing is expensive today, but has hardly reached this level yet: it is a pity that so reputable a publisher as the OUP should wish to cash in on a book of this kind, especially as the high price is bound to minimise the circulation amongst those to whom it would prove most useful.

REDC

Frank Barnaby, *Global Armaments and Disarmament*,  
(Alex Wood Memorial Lecture, 1978) Fellowship of  
Reconciliation, 1978, 19 pp., £0.30.

Dr Frank Barnaby, the director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute summarises the present position with regard to peace and arms control treaties. This is a reliable document based in part on the SIPRI yearbook. "Most scientists see some sort of disaster on the horizon. Demographers warn us of how large the world's population may become, economists of increasing global poverty, ecologists of intolerable pollution, agriculturists of unprecedented food shortages, meteorologists of the possibility of widespread climatic changes, geologists of ever-increasing [use of limited] mineral and energy resources, and so on. But undoubtedly a nuclear world war is the great single threat to the human race."

Until recently a nuclear war was thought of as unwinnable. The danger of the new neutron bomb and other devices is that they may make politicians think of such a war as winnable. This may

make the early use of such weapons more likely and once nuclear weapons are used "few believe that the use of one or a few nuclear weapons of any kind will not escalate to the use of virtually all the hundred thousand or so nuclear weapons in the arsenals. To believe otherwise is to believe that nations will surrender before they have used up the bulk of their weapons. History teaches us that they will not".

Thus far prolonged efforts aimed at disarmament or armaments control have been a terrible disappointment. The treaties now in force are outlined. "The sad fact is that the pace of arms control negotiations is outstripped by the rate of innovation in military technology." Of what use, for example, is the control of the number of intercontinental ballistic missiles allowed when no limit is set to the number of warheads carried by each missile, and each side is free to deploy cruise missiles which are not ballistic but far more deadly in accuracy? More than one half of the world's physical and engineering scientists now work full time on military research and development while, after making full allowance for inflation, the money spent on war increases steadily.

REDC

R.E.D. Clark, *God Beyond Nature*, Pacific Press, California, 1978, 110 pp. 2.50 dollars

Robert Clark, as all readers of this journal know well, has an astonishing range of knowledge in matters of science and religion and is a master of lucid presentation. Here we have in a hundred short pages many of his favourite themes brought right up to date and set out for the consideration of the 'honest thinking person' There is the argument for a Beginning, the argument for Design, the problem of evil, some evolutionary fallacies - all pointing to God Beyond Nature. It is directed primarily to those interested in science who really want to know if God exists. But it is equally useful to Christians who wish to widen their knowledge and find answers to their perplexities. No one could read this book without learning things he did not know before. I was particularly intrigued by the way Dr Clark showed the need for decision in matters of belief and showed why such decision becomes more difficult if it is put off in the supposed interest of gaining fuller knowledge. This must be the best book of its kind on the market - may it get the circulation it deserves.

JOHN WENHAM

Alan Hayward, *God's Truth: Why a Scientist believes in the Bible*, Lakeland, 1976, 302 pp., PB £0.95.

Although the reviewer is not qualified to assess the detail of Dr Hayward's analysis of the various problems that the Bible raises for the scientist, he found this book a delight to read. The arguments used seem very reasonable and reflect considerable research.

The book is divided into three parts: Part 1 deals with remarkable facts about the Bible; Part 2, with popular objections raised against its claims; and Part 3 with a system of further study devised by the author for those who want to know more.

Part 1 deals with prophecy, the claims of Jesus, the crucifixion and resurrection and with Mosaic Law. It ends with a series of fascinating coincidences to be found in various Bible stories. Unfortunately the book recommended for further study - Blunt's *Undesigned Coincidences* (1847, republished by the Dawn Book Supply in 1967) is no longer available. This section is full of interesting quotations.

Part 2 starts with a skilled demolition of that prefabricated prophet and seer of our society the 'Expert'. Jesus' attitude to the OT, the problem of inspiration, modern biblical scholarship and theories of style and authorship of biblical writing are considered next, followed by unsolved problems in the Bible, apparent contradictions and some popular red herrings. And from the view point of his own discipline Hayward then discusses miracles, the Flood, Creation, Darwin and Evolution, the uniqueness of Man, Adam, problems of dating, suffering and death and 'the Real Problem' which is taken to be man's waywardness. Perhaps it is a pity that the contemporary view of 'truth' does not call forth comment, for perhaps it is this more than any other single factor which binds modern man to self-evident truth. Once the possibility of a system of 'true truth' (to use Dr Schaeffer's phrase) has been discounted, the details of traditional Christian claims though

interesting, become meaningless. The view that truth is relative is now the basic assumption of our culture and this fact may considerably limit the receptive readership of this excellent book.

"God's Truth" is to be highly recommended; not only to Christians, but to anyone who has a sympathetic ear for the Christian claim; and hopefully to anyone who is open enough to consider questioning or even realizing his or her own assumptions in the light of the possibility that there may be, a Way.

JOHN BAZLINTON

Steven T. Katz (ed), *Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis*, Sheldon Press, 1978, 264 pp., £8.95. Gordon H. Clark, *Three Types of Religious Philosophy*, (*Studies in Philosophy & Religion* 5.), Craig Press, 1973, 126 pp., PB, 3.95 dollars. Robert Way, *The Wisdom of the English Mystics*, Sheldon Press, 1978, 86 pp., PB, £1.75.

It is only after reading the first of these books that one realises how difficult it is to handle the slippery eel of mysticism. One judges from the introduction that the ten contributors were given a general outline of the field, and were free to choose their own approaches. It is never easy to review a symposium, but a list of the contributors and their titles will give some indication of the scope.

Ninian Smart, "Understanding Religious Experience"; Steven Katz, "Language, Epistemology, and Mysticism"; Carl Keller, "Mystical Literature"; Peter Moore, "Mystical Experience, Mystical Doctrine, Mystical Technique"; Donald MacKinnon, "Some Epistemological Reflections on Mystical Experience"; Frederick J. Streng, "Language and Mystical Awareness"; Robert Gimello, "Mysticism and Meditation"; Renford Bambrough, "Intuition and the Inexpressible"; Nelson Pike, "Mystic Visions as Sources of Knowledge"; George Mavrodes, "Deceptive Mystical Experience".

The titles show some of the problems thrown up by the mystic experience or, since there appear to be varieties, by the mystic experiences. Robert Gimello attempts an outline, including a feeling of oneness and of perception of some deeper truth, which has to be communicated by an inadequate language, since the actual experience goes beyond normal intellectual description (p. 178).

Gimello further points out that a mystical experience is not to be equated with meditation, although meditation may be a pathway to it. He draws on his knowledge of Buddhism and its techniques.

One notes that mysticism is not always a religious experience, although the believer may regard it as authenticating his form of belief. Indeed the form of his experience may be partly shaped by the religion to which he belongs (e.g. Ninian Smart and Carl Keller). Mysticism as such may be distinguished from Otto's *numinous* (e.g. Bambrough), which would correspond to the ordinary Christian's sense of God's presence, whereas the high point for the mystic, if he believes in God, is union with the Beloved. The reviewer believes that this differs from the sense of union that comes through the indwelling of the Holy Spirit.

Several contributors take up the problem of language. In daily life we convey meaning by adjectives drawn from other fields, e.g. A fiery temper, an acid tongue, a sweet character. The adjectives of mysticism are harder to apply if we ourselves have not had the experiences, but nonetheless we can get the feel of them, as we can with the nouns and adjectives found at the end of the Book of Revelation. Non-mystics wrestle with communication when they try to tell their dreams.

Yet when all is said and done, we still ask how far the mystic has thrown light on reality. Is Christian mysticism different in character from, say, Buddhist mysticism? Ought we to say that one is 'right' and the other 'wrong'? Ultimately Mavrodes forces the conclusion that there is no sure way even for the mystic himself to know whether the root of his experience is of God, of himself, or of the devil.

It is a pity that the rules of philosophy will not allow other types of investigation. For example, there is no reference to the interesting physical tests in USA and Britain of mystics in the deep state. Similarly the appearance of ESP during the mystic state is referred to as something that is *held* to happen (e.g. p. 183), but investigation shows that it actually does happen, together with well attested examples of levitation (see especially, Fr. Thurston's *Physical Phenomena of Mysticism* 1952). One would also have liked some consideration of the so-called Cosmic Consciousness, the only kind of mystical experience I myself have had. This comes unsought, lasts for only a very short time, but gives an instantaneous realisation of oneness with all creation and a sense that all is well.

The second book is by a philosopher who makes no secret of his Christian faith. Although he is primarily reviewing the approaches to belief in God, with helpful treatments of ancient and modern writers, mysticism is naturally included under religious experience. He examines three starting points and conclusions, rationalism, empiricism, and dogmatism, i.e. the authority of logic, sensation, and God. Since each is bound to start with a premise, he finds the authority of God to be the only satisfactory starting point, and this authority is communicated in the Bible. He defends himself against circularity of argument. His premise of God as the revealer of truth enables him to prefer the Bible to the Koran on the ground that 'faith is the gift of God'. Stated crudely like this, it might sound as though we have no philosophy at all, yet one can only say that Gordon Clark argues his case well and fends off objections.

To return to mysticism and religious experience in general, Gordon Clark agrees with the previous contributors that mysticism is not conclusive for the discovery of truth or of God (pp. 22, 72). By the end of the book it becomes clear that he is a Christian dogmatist who finds place for both empiricism and logic. When God gave him faith, this produced an empirical experience, which went beyond what he had experienced before. It also gave him an intelligible pattern. Thus he sometimes starts from one of these premises and sometimes from another.

The third book supplies some of the mystic manna, as a well chosen set of quotations, all of them brief, most of them old, but a few modern. The author, an antiquarian bookseller in Newmarket, writes a pleasant outline introduction. He follows Fr. Augustine Baker in holding that, while mystics seem to differ from one another, the difference is in words and terms, not in content.

If the reviewer may have a final word, the mystic experience probably belongs to an introverted temperament. Gordon Clark, and perhaps most of the contributors to the Katz Symposium may be extraverts, and hence find it harder to appreciate what mystics experience. For some Christians mysticism can be a helpful opening up of the inner world and provide an intensification of the normal realisation of the presence of God. One gathers that some charismatics find this. There are, of course, preparatory techniques for stilling the conscious mind, as the first book mentions. When all is said, the mystic state involves a high degree of subjectivism, so that, unless the recipient is anchored to the biblical revelation, it may bring back conclusions that

belong to our fallen nature. With which Gordon Clark would agree.

J. STAFFORD WRIGHT

Arthur F. Holmes, *Philosophy: a Christian Perspective*, IVP, 1977, 54 pp., PB, £0.50.

This excellent little book is a revised edition of an American publication designed both for Christian students who take philosophy as part of their course and for the thinking man who wonders whether the acceptance of revelation need stultify his intellectual faculties. The author, head of the Department of Philosophy at Wheaton College, calls his booklet 'An introductory essay'. As such it is simpler than Gordon Clark's book, reviewed elsewhere.

The aims of the book emerge continually. Men's minds will be won, not by philosophical argument but by the Holy Spirit through the Word of God. Yet a Christian needs to know that his world view makes sense, and he is naturally concerned to express this, where possible, in terms that are in current use. Thus Dr. Holmes lines up with Paul in 1 Cor. 2:1-7, and favours Augustine rather than Tertullian. Since man is made in the image of God, there are, in spite of the fall, common ways of thinking which Christian and non-Christians share. The author runs through some of the important thinkers, ancient and modern, to illustrate his point.

In particular the Christian knows that the Bible does not answer everything we should like to know. There is much fallow ground to be broken up by philosophers of all persuasions who are sincerely seeking truth. The Christian student is challenged to "scrutinize accepted conceptual models, their presuppositions and their implications, and develop one which can bring Christian perspectives to bear constructively in current philosophical discussion" (p. 50).

J. STAFFORD WRIGHT

G.C. Berkouwer, *The Church*, IVP, 438 pp, £6.95.

The Publishers have presented this volume as one of a number of Studies in Dogmatics by Professor Berkouwer translated into English in association with the American house of Wm. B. Eerdmans of Grand Rapids. The author is no newcomer to English readers: probably his clearest impact was made through the translation of *The Triumph of Grace in the Theology of Karl Barth* published some years ago.

At the outset of the present work the reader is aware not only that Professor Berkouwer stands firmly within the Reformed tradition but also that he is extremely well informed. This is evidenced by the objective examination which he conducts, throughout the book, of other traditions, notably Catholicism, and by the wealth of references to contemporary Catholic literature.

The work opens with a comprehensive survey of the ground to be covered in *Credo Ecclesiam*, a survey which covers both the Church's attributes (unity, catholicity, and apostolicity) and marks (holiness). The rest of the book is an expansion of this fourfold ecclesiology, definition by definition and note by note. Berkouwer admits, of course, that further study may show that other vital characteristics ought to be added to his list of four, but he argues that a distinction between attributes and marks, played a far-reaching role in historic Roman-Protestant confrontations. In these the Romanists failed to make proper distinction between attributes and marks, whilst the Protestants understood the marks (*notae*) as standards by which the Church must constantly submit to self-judgment. However, the positive call to humility in recent Catholic pronouncements and speeches recognizes shortcomings especially that of complacency, so that the Catholic Church now appears to speak less of her self-evidence and more of the possibility of her obscuring the *esse ecclesiae*.

The meaning of true catholicity is examined in the second part of the book. Professor Berkouwer spends some time in discussing the demarcation between quantitative and qualitative catholicity. This is strange language indeed! The quantitative refers to the size and wide dissemination of the church; and the qualitative primarily to the message of salvation that is preached to all. Whilst it is true that "the quantitative extension does not necessarily guarantee the truth of what is presented to the world" (p. 109) the author is possibly too sensitive about such a

distinction within the notion of catholicity. If, as Berkouwer argues, the Church's universality "is founded in God's love for the world" (p. 111) then too much emphasis upon qualitative as distinct from quantitative catholicity merely becomes academic. Moreover, if this be the case, then true catholicity is to be understood insofar as there are tests which may, indeed *must*, be applied to every congregation, and this, for some of us is just where ecumenical exercises have proved to be remarkably unsatisfactory.

On the same question of catholicity, Professor Berkouwer raises the awkward but necessary question concerning 'The Boundaries of the Church' (chap. 6). In the New Testament boundaries between those inside and those outside seem to be very clear, (cf. 2 Cor. 6:15, etc.). But put simply, "catholicity can be more widely spread than was (formerly) thinkable... and the Church can see signs of God's grace and presence in the human life that is *extra ecclesiam*" (p. 159). If this be true, then the reviewer's long held conviction with regard to 'ecclesiastical' obduracy, particularly amongst evangelicals, seems to be much strengthened. The only occasion for surprise would be that a book such as this apparently suggests that it is through incisive thinking only that this point can be reached, although it took a catholic theologian, no less than Karl Rahner, to popularize this point some time ago.

Yet boundaries there still must be. Professor Berkouwer, in discussing Apostolicity, (chap. 8) speaks of "the problematic of charisma and office", (p. 219). It offers no solution to the dichotomy between the 'dynamic' view of the Church and the institutional one to say that the charismata belong to what is extraordinary and exceptional. Unhappily, the author does not deal with the relation between charismatic activity and psychic phenomena. I have not yet heard or read anything serious on this question, nor does there appear to be any concern about the possibility that some of our charismatic friends may possibly be straying into heresy. There may be very distinct boundaries here if we stop to think. But if such a suggestion makes us feel uncomfortable, it is equally discomfoting, as Berkouwer himself points out, when the guidance of the Spirit is institutionalized as Petrine promise and papal infallibility. The author's reading of the New Testament leads him to believe that "Peter's life is not under the sign of an unbroken guarantee and continuity" (p. 264) and he has some pertinent things to say regarding the Peter-Paul confrontation of Galatians 2.

The final chapter on "Holiness and Mission" is excellent. All who are interested in missions today will discover that Professor Berkouwer is searching, at times painful, in his analysis, but consistently rational nevertheless. But nowhere is this to be regarded as a book to make us feel more comfortable than we ought to be; and in a day when not a few are becoming justifiably disillusioned with the Church and her ministers this book may well serve as a corrective against complacency.

DAVID J. ELLIS

F.F. Bruce, *Paul: Apostle of the Free Spirit*, Exeter: Paternoster Press, 1977, 491 pp., £9.60.

It is always a pleasure to welcome a new book by F.F. Bruce, and this one is no exception. It is comprehensive, well-written, and contains many helpful insights not only on Paul but on many other New Testament subjects as well.

Here we have Professor Bruce at his best, as he deals with subjects as diversified as Paul and the Historical Jesus; the date of Galatians; Paul's thoughts on the life to come (the best chapter of all); his teaching on Baptism and the Eucharist; or the various traditions about Paul's death. In addition to all this, along the way there are many interesting sidelights on other subjects of interest to the student of the New Testament. The extended accounts of the history of the various cities of Asia Minor visited by Paul give us an intriguing glimpse into the life of the Hellenistic world, while at other places we can learn about the Dead Sea Scrolls, or discover Professor Bruce's opinion on a large number of controversial historical and theological subjects in New Testament study.

Such a large work has obviously taken a number of years to complete, and the author confirms that this is so in his preface. Parts of the book, he tells us, have already appeared in print in the *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library* and elsewhere, while other sections have formed the nucleus of a lecture course on the life and teaching of Paul given to students in the University of Manchester.

Though the work is undoubtedly comprehensive, it does therefore have the appearance of being a collection of essays rather than being a closely argued piece of work from start to finish. There is of course a unity of theme, and the chapters follow through in

chronological order, Paul's work from his pre-conversion days to his death in Rome, with historical studies interspersed with discussion of various theological themes for his writings. But there is no overall argument running throughout the book, and each chapter can easily be read and understood as a self-contained unit. In a number of places this leads to a certain unevenness of treatment. Romans and Philemon, for example, are both allotted the same space (14 pages each). This is often inevitable in a lecture course, where the same time may be given to each epistle. But some readers will no doubt think that in a book on Paul's theology Romans should be worth more space than the shortest (and arguably the least theological) of Paul's letters.

On critical matters, the book adopts the conservative stance which we have come to expect from Professor Bruce. The reliability of Acts is taken for granted, and the main framework of Paul's life is extracted from that source. I was, however, a little surprised to find that the author never attempts to justify his presuppositions at this point. Of course, it may reasonably be argued that there was no need for him to do so, since he has already done this admirably and at length elsewhere. But in view of this it is all the more unexpected that he never refers to any of his earlier work on the reliability of Acts. Readers of the present book who are not acquainted with Professor Bruce's previous conclusions may be left wondering what to do with the evident contradictions between Acts and the Pauline epistles to which he does from time to time draw attention (*e.g.* on page 82, note 29). And even those who are broadly sympathetic to his approach may find their credulity stretched by the statement on page 207, that the account of Pentecost in Acts 2 "documents the detailed fulfilment of the promise of the Spirit given by Jesus in the upper room discourse of John 14-16"!

In view of the fact that the book already runs to almost 500 pages, it may seem churlish to ask for more. But there is one question which could usefully have been considered in more detail. That is the question of Paul's precise significance for the ongoing development of Christian theology. To be sure, the final chapter of the book does give a good account of the influence that Paul has had on prominent Christians of various ages — Augustine, Luther, Wesley, *et al.* But this is largely a historical survey. At the same time, the book often raises vital questions about Paul's theological importance, without every giving any sort of systematic answer to them.

For example, it is rightly pointed out that Calvin's widely accepted distinction between the law as a means of salvation and the law as a way of life for the Christian is not Pauline. But Professor Bruce goes on to add that, non-Pauline though it is, "In its own right, this doctrine may be cogently maintained as a principle of Christian theology and ethics..." (p. 192). The implication of this statement appears to be that, at least at this point, Calvin is to be preferred to Paul. The same method of argument appears in reverse on the very next page, where existentialism is compared with Pauline theology — and dismissed, apparently because it is non-Pauline (though with the *caveat* that it may be "well founded", p. 193)

At this point, one would like to ask what criteria are being employed to decide which bits of Paul are relevant to the articulation of a Christian theology, and why other sections of his teaching can be disposed of. This question is the more pressing when one of the disposable bits of Pauline teaching appears to be his distinctive understanding of the nature of Christian ethics. And its urgency is only heightened by the observation that in one instance a particular type of theology appears to be unacceptable because it is non-Pauline, whereas in another case this consideration seems to be by-passed.

These are important questions. Indeed they are perhaps the main questions that both the average Christian and the systematic theologian alike will want to ask about Paul and his theology. It has, of course, been a long-established tradition (at least in Britain) that Biblical scholarship should concern itself with the purely descriptive aspects of theology. But one cannot help feeling that New Testament scholars (and I include myself in this stricture) would be of more help to many of their readers if they recognised the importance of their work as a part of the normative theology which determines the ongoing life of the church.

I have no doubt that Professor Bruce has thought long and deeply on this aspect of his work. He will certainly have an answer to the questions I have raised here — and at least one of his readers would like to express the hope that he will be able to use some of his impending retirement to tell us what he thinks on the subject!

From the publisher's side, this book is well produced, though I did notice quite a number of misprints. The most unsatisfactory parts of the book, however, are those for which the publisher

rather than the author must be held responsible: the illustrations and the index. The text is accompanied by a number of black and white photographs, which unfortunately add very little to the book's value. They are not even printed alongside the pages to which they refer, nor are they referred to in the text itself. Most of them look as if they could have been taken fifty years ago, and none of them has any artistic merit. They could have been left out without affecting anything but the price. Similarly, the index is disappointing and of only limited value. It is, for example, odd to see 'Aberdeen' in it (because of a passing reference to a former principal of Aberdeen University), when important theological topics like Baptism, Church, Body of Christ, Flesh, Spirit, *etc.* are missing. An index of scriptural references would have been most helpful, especially in view of the useful comments on many New Testament passages that are introduced *en passant* in the course of the book's main chapters.

At £9.60 this is perhaps not the sort of book that everyone will buy (though by present standards it is not expensive for almost 500 pages). But it is a book that every serious student of Paul should read. It will repay its readers many times over in the depth of its insight into the life and work of its remarkable and fascinating subject.

JOHN W. DRANE

K.A. Kitchen, *The Bible in its World*, Paternoster, 1977, 168 pp., £2.20.

Those readers who are familiar with Kenneth Kitchen's writings will recognize in this volume the distinctive vigour and enthusiasm that one has come to expect from this provocative author. His latest book, which draws on a wide range of material, including some very recent information, from the cultures of Israel's neighbours, has two main purposes. It seeks to illustrate the enormous benefits, together with the limitations, of 'biblical archaeology', and also puts forward various alternatives to certain widely accepted theories concerning the Old Testament. The former aim is undoubtedly successful, while the latter provides much stimulus for thought though it inevitably leaves unanswered questions. Some will find Kitchen's assertiveness irritating, and complain that insufficient attention is given to other approaches to the study of the Old Testament, but one needs to recognize that this book is primarily

concerned with archaeological matters. In the present climate of questioning about the value of archaeology for biblical study, it provides a necessary and timely corrective to recent negative trends in Old Testament scholarship.

A major attraction is the first detailed account of the amazing discoveries at Ebla outside those in specialist journals. The magnificence and importance of this early Canaanite city is accurately recounted on the basis of the archaeologists' reports, and the implications for the Old Testament are discussed at length. For instance, Kitchen examines the possible linguistic consequences for biblical Hebrew (though the fact that 80% of Ebla texts are written in Sumerian is overlooked), while special attention is given to the significance of Eblaite personal names for the patriarchal period and Ebla's city administration for the statistics of Solomon's reign.

Apart from this, the main focus is fixed on three crucial Pentateuchal areas — the proto-history, the patriarchal narratives, and the treaty/covenant relationship. Each is considered in the light of important extrabiblical data, though some of the comparisons are more persuasively argued than others. The case for the reliability of the patriarchal narratives, for example, is based on a tripartite categorization of narrative in Egyptian literature into which other ancient Near Eastern narratives do not easily fit. It also passes over several questions which arise directly from the biblical material, such as supposed duplicates, variations in style, etc. On the other hand, Kitchen's precise fourfold division of the treaties strengthens the argument for a late second millennium date for the form of Israelite covenant, although the exact function of the legal material quoted needs more clarification.

Some may cavil at certain minor deficiencies, such as occasional lapses into an unnecessarily colloquial and obvious mode of expression. The arrangement is also somewhat unbalanced, though this is partially deliberate — despite the inclusion of "Bible" in the title, the whole period from Samuel onwards (including the New Testament!) is allotted only one-third of the space. These features, however, do not detract from the book's overall qualities. Indeed, the abiding impression is that of the wealth of extrabiblical material to elucidate the biblical record, and both scholars and interested laymen will be grateful for this lucid presentation:

M. J. SELMAN

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## CONTENTS

AGM, EDITORIAL	1
NEWS AND VIEWS	4
Winnable War	4
Marxism in Universities	6
Parapsychology	7
Latchkey and Spoon Bending	9
Conquest of Canaan	12
Determinism and Lightning	14
Shroud and Ahmadis	15
Life on Mars?	16
Chimpanzees	17
Planet Formation	17
Fallen from Heaven	18
Puritanism and Science	19
SHORT NOTES	
Mysticism, Dishonesty and Grants, Star of Bethlehem, Supernova of AD1006, Manna Machine, Population of India, Poisoning of Language, Laetrile, Time, Beauty of Nature, UFO Conspiracy, Exorcism, Steady State Universe, RC Sectarianism, Flu from Space, Priestley, Height of Man, Roman Catacombs, Boring and Bad, Education, Somerset Maugham, Death of Literature, Plutonium	21
ARTICLES	
Reginald Luhman, B.D., Head of Religious Education, Westcliffe High School for Boys, <i>Morality and Religion</i>	29
Colin J. Hemer, Ph.D., Lecturer in NT Studies, University of Manchester, <i>The Manchester Rotas/Sator Square</i>	36
Peter E. Cousins, Editorial Director, Paternoster Press, <i>The Bible and Sex</i>	41
Alan P. F. Sell, M.A., B.D., Ph.D., Lecturer, West Midlands College of Higher Education, Walsall. <i>Conservatives, Liberals and the Gospel</i>	62
ESSAY REVIEW	
John Bazlinton - <i>Cults</i> (R. Enroth)	119
REVIEWS	
Dean Turner, <i>Commitment to Care</i>	124
G. Schlesinger, <i>Religion and Scientific Method</i>	126
D. M. Mackay, <i>Science, Chance and Providence</i>	128
F. Burnaby, <i>Global Armaments and Disarmament</i>	131
R. E. D. Clark, <i>God beyond Nature</i> , by John Wenham	132
Alan Hayward, <i>God's Truth</i> , by John Bazlinton	133
S. T. Katz (ed) <i>Mysticism and other books</i> , by Canon J. S. Wright	134
G. C. Berkower, <i>The Church</i> , by D. J. Ellis	138
F. F. Bruce, <i>Paul: Apostle of the Free Spirit</i> , by Dr John W. Drane	140
K. A. Kitchen, <i>The Bible in its World</i> ; by Dr. M. J. Selman (OT Lecturer, Spurgeons College)	143