

outcast and the sinner. So he sits down and sulks. And the last chapter of Jonah gives us the picture of the prophet, being sheltered by a gourd which grows up to hide him from the heat, and displaying his pitying indignation over its sudden destruction by a worm.

The prophet protests that he does well to be angry over this piece of ruthless destruction: and the story finds its climax in the last words of the book: 'Thou hast had pity on the gourd, which came up in a night, and perished in a night: and should not I spare Nineveh, that great city, wherein are more than sixscore thousand persons that cannot discern between their right hand and their left hand; and also much cattle?'

The Book of Jonah is full of the impossible—many other impossible things beside the whale. But it is full of truth; its rebuke of religious jealousy and selfish particularism makes one thankful it is in the Old Testament in spite of all the silly jests for which the accessories of the story have made our religion the butt.

Jonah will serve to illustrate an important principle. The Old Testament is Eastern literature. Read it as Western history, and you will find yourself hard put to defend it: read it as an Eastern vehicle of truth, existing not for itself but for the truth it conveys; read it for yourselves, and you will find it can indeed make you wise unto salvation through faith which is in Christ Jesus.

The Idealist Reaction against Science.

BY PRINCIPAL THE REV. JAMES IVERACH, D.D., ABERDEEN.

The Idealistic Reaction against Science, by Professor Aliotta, Royal University of Padua, has been translated by Agnes McCaskill, and published by Messrs. Macmillan (12s. net). The point of view of Professor Aliotta may be best described in his own words, as given in the preface: 'The line of thought adopted by me defends the rights of the scientific method and of natural reality against the facile denials of the Neo-Hegelians. Idealism, which came into vogue in Italy after the decline of positivism, now appears to be on the wane, and the abuse of the dialectic method has resulted in such a confusion of ideas in mental science that Croce himself recently lifted his voice against these exaggerations. It is now time to return to realism, and in England, America, and Germany there are already indications of such a return, which this work of mine would fain hasten in Italy, where, if absolute idealism has attained a large measure of success, other vigorous and original currents of thought, which have disputed the victory with it, are by no means lacking.' The excellent translation by Miss McCaskill has enabled us to read this book, and has placed us on a level with the Italian reader. We are glad that the translation, so competent in every way, has appeared. For it is a notable addition to our philosophic literature. It is sure to be closely

studied, and it deserves the closest study. In view of the large place which Idealism holds in contemporary literature, and of the place which it holds in our University teaching, it is well that a treatise on the scale of the present one, and a treatise of the conspicuous learning and ability which mark the work of Professor Aliotta, should be in the hands of the British reader. It is well also that we in these islands should be made aware of the philosophic work which is being done in Italy. Thanks to Dr. Ainslie, we have become acquainted with Croce, and here we have another Italian of high merit brought within our reach. All students will welcome this notable work in its English dress.

As we read and ponder over the contents of the volume, the first thing that strikes us is the wide learning and voluminous reading of the author. Many philosophers are well read in philosophical literature, and are not well equipped in science or in literature. Many of them too are limited in their reading to one or two languages. But Professor Aliotta is as well read in the literature of science as he is in philosophy. He is also acquainted with the whole range of contemporary literature, and the works of the great contemporary writers in philosophy and science are known to him, whether they have written in Italian, in

German, in French, or in English. He has given particular attention to the works of philosophers of all schools, and, what is unusual, he has dealt in detail with the new theories of mathematics and physics. It is not often that one reads a book of so wide a range, and so precise and accurate in all that it touches. It has not been our good fortune to meet such a book since we read Merz's *History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century*. No doubt Merz is historical and expository, and Aliotta is expository and critical, but both writers are like in the wide range of their knowledge, and in the accuracy of their delineation.

After an introductory chapter in which he sets forth the reaction from intellectualism in contemporary philosophy, and describes the history of intellectualism and anti-intellectualism in philosophy, and sets forth the causes of the present reaction against intellectualism, he proceeds to his main task. It consists of two main parts: in one he discusses in detail the reaction from intellectualism in the new theories of knowledge; in the other he discusses the new theories of Mathematics; and in conclusion he gives the outlines of a spiritualistic conception of the world. We hope that some day he will enlarge this conclusion into a separate treatise, and work it out in detail.

Returning to the first part, he divides it into two sections—the first of which sketches the beginnings of the reaction from intellectualism, and the second the reaction itself in its full-blown vigour. Agnostic Positivism is the movement in which Aliotta discerns the beginning of the reaction. He deals with the Ignorabimus of Du Bois-Reymond, and with the Unknowable of Spencer. Agnosticism is the inevitable consequence of the traditional mathematical method. The following sentence is worth quoting: 'Spencer's System with its theory of the Unknowable, appealing to a belief, a feeling beyond conception, with its doctrine of the evolutionary intuition of the universe, discrediting, as it does, the traditional mathematical attitude, and putting science at the service of biological adaptationism not only pregnant with the crisis of scientific intellectualism, but unfolds the first germs of that reaction whose development we shall follow as it strives in various ways to escape from the difficult position in which agnosticism has placed it.' It is an interesting task to follow the development through the fascinating pages of Professor Aliotta. Unfortunately that is not possible in any

reasonable notice. We can only indicate certain points in this evolution. Neo-Criticism, Voluntarism, and the Primacy of Practical Reason is the title of the next chapter, and in it he deals with Lange, Helmholtz, Riehl, Wundt, and Von Hartmann. The statement of the positions taken by these and the criticism of them are admirable. But the interest grows when in the same chapter he deals with Fouillée, Paulsen, Nietzsche, Lotze, and specially with the phenomenalism of Renouvier. The criticism of these authors and of their schemes is as admirable as is the accurate knowledge of them, and the recognition of the place they fill in the history of thought. Empiro-Criticism is the next theme, and perhaps the most interesting part of it is that which deals with Hodgson and Kleinpeter. But British readers will eagerly turn to the following chapter, which deals with English Neo-Hegelianism. We have been rather proud of Hutchison Stirling, the Cairds, Green, to speak only of those who have gone before. But Stirling and the Cairds are scarcely mentioned, and the names which occur are those of Green, Bradley, and McTaggart. This chapter also we must pass by in comparative silence, for to deal with it adequately would take more space than can be granted to us. Only the reader must not neglect it, for it is important.

In the chapters on The Doctrine of Contingency and Intuitionism, on Anglo-American Pragmatism, and on the Philosophy of Values and the Historic Method, which constitute the second section, the author is in contact with living interests, and touches on the most living issues of speculative thought at the present time. Here we come into contact with names like Boutroux, Bergson, Le Roy, and Duhem, names of living worth, and names which really live in these pages. The chapter on Pragmatism deals with such names as Pierce, James, Schiller, and Dewey, the foremost protagonists of Pragmatism; full justice is done to them, and the criticism of Pragmatism is virile and convincing. In dealing with the Philosophy of Values the chief names he deals with are those of Windelband, Münsterberg, Royce (well known in Aberdeen as a former Gifford Lecturer), and Ward, another of our Gifford Lecturers. The author is forward to acknowledge the eminence of these thinkers, and the value of their contributions to human thought, but in the interests of Realism he is constrained to dissent from their conclusions

and to criticise their methods. For it is a first principle with him that each individual has an existence and a meaning of his own, and that he is not merely a something in the consciousness of another. He insists, as much as Alice in Wonderland does, that each one is real, and not merely a thing in the Red King's dream. He cannot accept any view which would make an individual to be an item in the dream of another individual. Speaking of the view of Royce, he asks, 'Is the existence of other EGOS dependent upon me? Assuredly not! Then if I think this existence may or may not be an external meaning with respect to my idea, are my friends, and those who are dearest to me, real only in so far as they satisfy my desire? or do they rather exist in themselves in the intimacy of their consciousness, an intimacy which I cannot directly penetrate? Does *this existence of theirs in themselves* differ from my thought which takes it as its object or not? The idealist, finding himself in such a strait, takes refuge in the Universal Mind, a subterfuge which avails him nothing, since, even if the immanence in God of my thought and of the other consciousness thought by me be granted, my thought will still remain something distinct from the person I think. For instance, I conceive the reality of the individual named Royce, and even supposing my concept, and the consciousness of Royce to form part of one and the same spiritual life, my idea with its internal meaning on the one hand, and the subject Royce on the other, will nevertheless remain two distinct things which cannot be fused into one unless the consciousness of the great American philosophic be annihilated.'

Passing to the second part, which is called The New Theories of Mathematics and Physics, we find chapters on Non-Euclidean Geometry, on the New Logical Elaboration of Pure Mathematics, on Energetics, the New Qualitative Physics, and on the Theory of Models. We have read it with interest, and we think that the presentation of the views is fair and accurate, and we also think that the criticism of them is cogent and convincing. Perhaps the best thing for our purpose is to give the following extract as the outcome of this part of the treatise. It is valuable in many ways, but chiefly because it enables one to see how idealistic Realism may be. 'The scientific concept is something more than a mere summary of perceptions: it is not an *abridged experience*, but an *idealized experience*, and its fruitfulness lies in its ideal

character. In respect to experience it is not an impoverishment but a raising of it to a higher power; it is experience purified and carried to its ideal limit in order that it may satisfy the demands of necessity and logical universality. All the truly rational laws and concepts of science possess this character of ideal limits, which experience can approach more and more closely in proportion as the required conditions are verified, but which neither are nor ever can be completely realized. Every scientific concept is therefore in itself an anticipation of the future: the stamp of universality imprinted on it by thought impels it to transcend past experience and foresee the future. Our thought does not rest content with merely making a more or less economical record of perceptions, but seeks its own ideal nature in these perceptions, creating concepts which correspond more and more nearly to that type of unity which is its supreme law. There is no danger of its becoming stationary or sterile, since, as we have already seen, the ideal of reason is never realized: hence the ceaseless effort of science to harmonize known laws in higher syntheses and to establish its sway more firmly over the future. The formulas of our scientific theories, although suggested by experience, always transcend it; they are not only the reflexion of the known, but also an effort to divine the unknown. Even in the most abstract theories this hypothetic element, the life of science and the fertile root of its progressive development, is never lacking. It matters little whether the hypothesis takes concrete form in images or is expressed in mathematical signs; in either case it is a system of concepts, and only excess nominalism can stop short at the external model, and attribute to it that productiveness which is rather to be found in the thought of him who constructs it and in the idea it expresses.' The quotation is long; but we felt that we could not shorten it, because it sets forth the part which, for this realist, thought plays in the scientific construction of experience. It has here a great practice, but in all its activity thought is shown to be controlled by reality.

This appears more fully in the concluding chapter, which is called Outlines of a Spiritual Conception of the World. We may not attempt to summarize what is, indeed, too condensed already to secure a more detailed exposition. It is most suggestive, and very profound, but each section of it demands more space, to do it justice, than we

can afford to give to the whole. Special attention may be called to the section on the Dialectical Dedication of the Categories, which he thinks to be illegitimate and impossible. We follow his exposition and criticism with satisfaction, but in the end, where he deals with questions which may be called

theological, we hesitate and decline to follow without further reflexion. But with regard to the treatise as a whole, its competency, its accuracy, its incisiveness, and its fruitful suggestiveness make it a book which no student can afford to neglect.

In the Study.

Virginitus Puerisque.

I.

'He liked me.'

BY THE REV. J. S. MAVER, M.A., PAISLEY.

'Among the sons of my father he liked me, to make me king over all Israel.'—I Ch 28⁴.

THIS is a homely phrase used only this once in our Bible. David, who never forgot his early days, and all through his life turned back specially to them on solemn and important occasions, tells in this passage how he was chosen to be king over Israel. Samuel had gone to his father's house, and there seven sons had passed before him, but not one of them was the chosen one. There remained the youngest, but it had not been thought worth while to call him from the fields, and yet when he was sent for it was found that he was the Lord's anointed. In some ways it is a misfortune to be the youngest. The rest of the family are long in believing that his judgment can be trusted, or his opinion worth considering. Who would have dreamed, the brothers would say, that our David would be chosen? And so David puts it in this simple and homely way, 'He liked me,' as he looks back to that day which meant so much for him.

It is a way of speaking we often use in common, familiar talk. I heard the remark made about a boy one day some years ago. He was the eldest among his brothers and sisters, and he had been sympathizing with a little sister who had fallen and got slightly hurt. He spoke in such a kindly way to her that one who observed it remarked afterwards, 'I like that boy.' I am sorry to say that, later on, when he became a medical student, he got into a bad set, began to think some foolish ways were manly, and brought grief to the heart of

his parents. But I believe that he will grow out of that, and that his native good disposition will yet come to the front. David too did some grievous things, but the likeable came to the top at last, and he became a great and good man in his later years, with a ripe and mellowed character.

What was it about David that God liked? (1) In the first place, I think we might say that there was something attractive about his outward appearance. Like Saul before him, David's appearance was one that would be likely to win for him the homage of the people as their king. Even though Samuel said, 'Man looketh on the outward appearance, but the Lord looketh on the heart,' David was certainly not lacking in appearance. We are told of him that he was 'ruddy and withal of a beautiful countenance, and goodly to look to.' That description suggests an attractive face and form, and no doubt it had its share in God's choice of him for the high position in which dignity and attractiveness of appearance would all the more readily, as in Saul's case, gain the respect and affection of the people.

We judge a good deal by outward appearance, though often enough what is within may not correspond. 'Look at this little chin of mine with the dimple in it,' says the heroine in a modern story. 'Though I had a knowledge of all things under the sun, and the wisdom to use it, and the deep loving heart of an angel, it would not stead me through life like this little chin.' Dimples may be more than dowries. And yet, after all, how little it is in the long companionship of life! In the long run we, too, look not on the outward appearance, but on the heart.

Oh sunset of the withered cheek
And of the careworn brow,
Oh sunset of the steadfast heart,
How beautiful art thou!