

which Paul desired for the Colossian Christians, a constituent which was to be diffused through all the others. Thankfulness should mingle with all our thoughts and feelings, like the fragrance of some penetrating perfume through the common scentless air. It should embrace all events. It should be an operating motion in all actions. We should be clear-sighted and believing enough to be thankful for pain and disappointment and loss. That gratitude will add the crowning consecration to service and knowledge and endurance. It will touch our spirits to the finest of all issues, for it will lead to glad self-surrender, and make of our whole life a sacrifice of praise. "I beseech you, brethren, by the mercies of God, that ye present your bodies a living sacrifice." Our lives will then exhale in fragrance and shoot up in flashing tongues of ruddy light and beauty, when kindled into a flame of gratitude by the glow of Christ's great love. Let us lay our poor selves on that altar, as sacrifices of thanksgiving; for with such sacrifices God is well-pleased.

A. MACLAREN.

CANON MOZLEY.

CANON MOZLEY was one of the most interesting and significant figures of the second generation of Tractarians; if not the deepest or the strongest, he was among the subtlest theologians of his day. He touched nothing that he did not in some measure disentangle; he could not or rather he would not follow any clue to the end. He had no ambition, intellectual, or other; he was content with a firm standing ground and a clear view; he did not wish to get on. If his character had a fault it was an instinctive severity to others who did wish to form systems and pursue careers. He pities a Bishop of Chichester for

a success which only meant a necessity of being elaborately civil to people for whom he could not care. The success of Bishop Wilberforce was above such pity, but while it was in the making it was hardly judged. Out of some score of notices only two can be called kindly. Mozley admitted his "go" on a platform, and found him less artificial than he expected in society; but he hinted that a bishopric would soon be necessary to his health, which was likely to be worn out in the effort to face both ways and please both parties. In the same spirit we are told that a famous sermon "was considered by the masters and fellows likely to be very useful to the undergraduates."

There are a few good stories in the letters collected by his sister: how Dr. Pusey in a sermon on Luxury dropped his voice and addressed the heads of houses, and hoped the undergraduates would not hear; how the venerable president of Magdalen snubbed a fellow of that college who had drawn a rash university reformer into a challenge, and then put him in the Vice Chancellor's court; how Newman affected to dislike giving away his books; how Henry of Exeter looked very gruesome, and the Duke of Wellington very fit to be a bishop. But as a whole the letters are not so piquant as the "Reminiscences of Oriel." Their interest is ethical rather than historical. We learn less of the author's time than of the temper in which he watched it. One striking point is the attitude of good-humoured critical reserve to every leader but Newman. Mozley was a follower of Newman, not of the movement. When Newman went where he could not follow, Mozley drew back and let the movement, what was left of it, go its own way, not without a touch of the resentment which Newman had felt to the Anglican divines.

His own life was uneventful. He was the son of the well-known publisher. He was bullied at school by his master. At 13 he stood for a scholarship at Corpus,

being coached with some precocious solemnity by his elder brother, the author of the "Reminiscences"; at 17 he entered Oriel; at 21 (in 1834) he was placed in the third class — apparently because he was slow over a second piece of Latin Prose (second papers are never set now except in case of a doubtful pass). He had to wait six years for a fellowship; his connexion with Newman stood in his way, though Pusey's influence helped him at Magdalen at last. His election put an end to a curious experiment in the endowment of research. Newman and Pusey had taken a house where mature students of theology were to work under their direction; Mozley was the last who consented to profit by their compromising patronage. He was not idle the while. He helped to edit Froude's Remains; he worked on the "Library of the Fathers" and the *British Critic*. In 1844 the *British Critic* came to an end, and he became editor of the *Christian Remembrancer*. In 1854 he published his "Augustinian Doctrine of Predestination," soon followed by a volume on "Baptismal Regeneration," to justify the Gorham judgment; before publishing it he retired from the editorship of the *Christian Remembrancer*. In 1856 he accepted the living of Old Shoreham and married; in 1862 he published a Review of the Baptismal Controversy; in 1865 he delivered the Bampton Lectures; in 1869 he was appointed Canon of Worcester; in 1871 he returned to Oxford as Regius Professor of Divinity; in 1878 he died of a second seizure—the first had come in 1875.

In the Bampton Lectures and his later works Mozley addressed the public which remembered Newman and awaited an answer to "Essays and Reviews." A literary epicure may think that he was at his best and freshest in the earlier works, on subjects interesting to the narrower public of the *Christian Remembrancer*. That public was

very delicate and very *borné*; there was more out-of-the-way reading than now, and it was not *de rigueur* to have read the book of the day.¹ The reign of Charles I. was just then the central period of history. Mozley devoted three essays to it. Those on Strafford and Laud, whom he privately thought "a great but twisty character," are full of a romantic sympathy which does not distort the outlines. *Mutatis mutandis* he anticipates Mr. Gardiner's estimate of Strafford, he admires Laud for his homeliness and his large-heartedness, which made him the confessor of Buckingham as well as the patron of Little Gidding. Both Laud and Strafford attracted him because they failed. Carlyle's apotheosis of Cromwell and Stanley's glorification of Arnold provoked him to irony. He finds the real kingship of Cromwell a little grotesque by the hereditary kingship of Charles; where Carlyle sees all manner of heroism and simplicity, he sees a strong aspirant self-will that creates a humility in the very process of self-exaltation floating triumphant on "a large, powerful, muddy stream of supernaturalism." Arnold was too happy for him as well as too irreverent, too lacking in intellectual sympathy for opponents. The criticism on him is not ungenerous yet the well-known sermon preached at Lancing is something like a palinode. The essays on Luther and Blanco White are masterly, the last is the least unsympathetic. Luther was too boisterous, too animal, too worldly wise for Mozley. If he could not deny his greatness, he could

¹ Mozley writes in 1851, "I am reading Mill's Logic, *i.e.* judiciously, those parts I can understand. I am much impressed with the immense quantity of thought which he has put together, though one rather misses that very high sort of acuteness which one has in Hume and Pascal. He seems to get at his philosophy by patience and accuracy more than by genius, though one would not say he had more of the latter. And I cannot help suspecting that he made considerable blunders by some defect here, for patience and accuracy cannot do everything, and will make mistakes for want of genius, as genius will make mistakes for want of them; but I am talking prematurely." That is perfect criticism, but what college tutor now could leave a book like Mill nine years unread—true, he need not have read Hume and Pascal first.

point out how much of Lutheranism is due to the idiosyncrasies of a monk without vocation. He was less repelled by the consuming fire of candid conscientious questioning in which Blanco White's convictions gradually burnt down to a *Caput Mortuum* of pure resignation to an Unknown God.

The manner of the essays does not equal the matter; there is too much of the indirectness and perplexity of a new writer feeling his way. The defect takes another form in more substantial works; something essential is always left out, something only half relevant comes in instead.

All through Newman's Essay on Development we are face to face with the question, Is the Visible Church, the Church of the Fathers, a failure? Mozley's reply shows that he half saw this question, for he hints that failure may be slow; but he never faces it. He writes for a public that admitted the claims of the "Undivided Church" of the fifth century. He does not dispute them, yet he does not grapple with the enormous presumption that Rome is the heir to those claims if the objection from doctrinal innovations can be met. Instead, he shows that an argument thrown off at red-heat is not always scientifically exact. The idea of corruption by exaggeration is omitted—he analyses it in Newman's own best manner; he dilates on peril of idolatry because the secondary worship of Rome has a far-away resemblance to the primary worship of Canaan. He makes points like these: the Russian saints will quite bear comparison with the Irish, so the "Note of Sanctity" is not confined to Rome; St. Athanasius and even St. Cyril would have been shocked at the thought that there must be some being as glorious as the Arian Christ; Bellarmine would have shrunk from defending definitions which went beyond "*Quod semper quod ubique quod ab omnibus.*" But a writer who could still defend

Bull against Petavius had not much right to be scandalized even by a system which once rested on the False Decretals.

The books on Predestination and Baptism are connected by a touch of the same unconscious sophistry. Predestination and Regeneration both imply Sanctification. Predestinarians are not heretics, yet they cannot hold that all baptised persons are regenerate, for they are not all elect. As a matter of fact St. Augustine did hold this—perhaps a little against the grain—of all who did not receive baptism unworthily: they were really sanctified by the grace of baptism for the time, whether the grace of perseverance was vouchsafed them or no. But whatever we think of the connexion, the separate discussions are excellent. Few predestinarians have much sense of mystery; but it was only as a “mystery,” or rather as “one aspect of mysterious truth,” that Mozley thought Predestination tolerable. He was one of those who would rather be wrong with Butler than right with Whately: he clung obstinately to the unscriptural sense of mystery, as something which the more we think of it the less we understand—as if the “revelation” of “mysteries” were intended to confound the human understanding, not to enlighten it beyond its natural capacity. A “mystery” like “Original Sin” was not to be investigated or accounted for, at most it might be referred to when Predestination was called unjust. The right course was to recognise both Free Will and Predestination without trying to reconcile them—in a word, to imitate the apparent inconsistency of Scripture¹—since we can only attain to an obscure apprehension of truth, and cannot

¹ Throughout “Scripture” is personified; although there too different authors, by the same Spirit, set forth different aspects of truth, each of which is separately clear. Perhaps private believers are rather presumptuous when they try to see *both* with St. Paul and St. James. A more modest and helpful course might be for each to abide by those aspects of truth and those inspired teachers that each finds edifying, leaving others without dispute to other guidance.

combine the glimpses we have of it. If so, we can draw no inferences from them either positive or negative, and this anticipates Mansel's condemnation of "dogmatism" and "rationalism." Mozley was more cautious than Mansel. He would not admit that because God's perfections were imperfectly known they differed in kind from human virtues; he saw, too, that religious knowledge would seem vague and unreal compared with natural, if what he thought its limits were generally recognised. He was content that most men should think they know more than can be known; the "dogmatism" of Jonathan Edwards and the "rationalism" of Jeremy Taylor were less evils than the "scepticism" of David Hume—which for most minds was the alternative. Still, if the limits of knowledge could be safely recognised, he thought that knowledge would grow. Whenever "learned ignorance" seems to be the highest knowledge, we are told in vain¹ by some wise man that it is the condition of all future progress. The real condition of progress at such times is a new departure, not an exhaustive criticism of the tedious mass of confused scholasticism into which theology and philosophy sink so easily. The leaders of a new departure often put off the old learning if they have it, as David put off Saul's armour; they go their way and take their chance of reviving opinions rightly or wrongly exploded long ago. Till the new departure is ready there is a place for those who can trace out some of the tangled lines of thought. If we do not know what to think of Predestination, it is well to know what a predestinarian like Aquinas could do to tone it down in detail and all but put it out of sight. It is true that he seems to have accepted the doctrine without needing it, except perhaps as a corollary from that of the First Cause. More zealous predestinarians have needed the doctrine for

¹ The history of psychology from Locke to Mill may be an exception, yet positive psychology seemed barren till associated with physiology and sociology.

more pressing reasons: St. Paul to justify the calling of the Gentiles and the temporary rejection of Israel; St. Augustine to explain to himself why his own experience of prevailing grace was not universal, and to vindicate that experience against the shallowest and best-intentioned of heresiarchs; Luther and Calvin to complete the comfort which their doctrine of Justification promised to believers. There have been few disinterested predestinarians till the New England Calvinists found the question "am I elect?" even more tormenting than the question "have I saving faith?"

Indeed we are all biassed more or less. Mozley analyses the character of the typical Calvinist and the typical Arminian in one of his choicest digressions; perhaps *he* is a little biassed by his pre-occupation with responsibility; he says little of the tendency of great men of action to some form of fatalism; he does not ask—is the hypothesis of free will suggested by the fact of indecision? Nor does he follow up St. Augustine's fruitful thought¹ that by grace the will regains the freedom lost by sin, which led to St. Anselm's definition of freedom as the capacity of the will to choose good for its own sake.

A graver defect is, that in discussing two "mysterious" subjects he only applies his common sense to one. He argues that if baptised children grow up without any signs of a new nature they never were regenerate in baptism. He dissects the scholastic theory of "infused habits" of faith, hope, charity, and other supernatural virtues which produce no acts, with ironical respect; he notices that some are *born* with a disposition to virtue, ay, and to holiness; he even points out that baptism was primarily intended for adults, only secondarily for infants, and that the patristic

¹ The point is mentioned as if it were parallel to St. Paul saying that the servants of righteousness are free from sin—as the servants of sin are free from righteousness.

account of its effects rested on what adults experienced—witnessed in one another. Then why keep to the “high *priori* road” in treating of Predestination and Grace? Why put Predestination first? it is preposterous in discussing St. Augustine? Again, did not Pelagius appeal to a more familiar experience than St. Augustine? More people feel themselves choosing and striving than feel themselves guided and helped. Do we not all seem to know some who are good because they must and others who are good because they will? This translates itself well enough into Overall and Baxter’s doctrine of Predestination, that constraining love is given to the elect and sufficient grace to all. Such a theory may be inadequate to St. Paul’s teaching in the Epistle to the Romans; but if we cannot trust common sense against the *prima facie* meaning of texts on Predestination, how are we to trust it against the *prima facie* meaning of texts on Baptism? However when Mozley applied common sense he did so on a theory which satisfied him.

Mozley leaves the question unasked, not quite unanswered. Very excellent things are spoken of the City of God and of the least of such as go in and out at her gates—all by way of supposition. Christians as such are to be taken by themselves and others as regenerate,¹ elect, a royal priesthood, saints; if they are not, the loss is theirs. That is his answer to the demand for an Ideal Church. He refuses to lower the ideal to the standard of the practical; he refuses to insist on machinery or to be content with it; he bids us be satisfied with possibilities and prospects, or choose between lowering our conception of the gift and limiting the recipients. Does this sound unreal and heartless? Few things in Newman are finer than Mozley’s

¹ Mozley has some very telling references to more than one Protestant Catechism, where Catechumens are made to assert their own election just as the Baptismal Service asserts the regeneration of all infants.

chapter on the Law of Supposition, by which institutions, relations, classes and nations are and must be idealized.

As the individual believer was to rejoice on the supposition that he was regenerate and elect, he was to obey Church authority on the supposition that Church rulers were led by the Spirit. One who began by believing both suppositions would come by acting on them to find reason for both; in this way a man might be surer that the Church was led by the Spirit than that he was. How far was the Church led? Mozley held with Jewell that the Church of England at least received nothing on the authority of the Fathers but what was embodied in her own formulas; the religion of Anglicans was a safe way of salvation, because they imposed nothing but what was clearly taught in Scripture and the Fathers; while Roman Catholics taught much which did not seem to be in Scripture, and Anabaptists were always finding much in Scripture which was not in the Fathers. If the Fathers seemed to teach much that the Church of England did not, Mozley maintained that she did teach all that the Fathers could be proved to have taught from the beginning. About the Trinity and the Incarnation and the necessity of Grace, Scripture and antiquity were clear; about everything else there was room for "schools" of opinion resting on "aspects" of truth. Such a view is made to fit the accidents of an historical position; it is easier to defend than to embrace. It will make few converts; but Mozley held that conversion is not the object of controversy, as Newman holds that controversy is not the instrument of conversion.

The main thesis¹ of the Bampton Lectures has the same quality of being perplexingly defensible. The absolute uni-

¹ It is a little confused by a doubtful identification of "Special Providences" with inconspicuous miracles. Miracles are events without known second causes; most "Special Providences" depend upon the unexplained coincidence of two or more trains of second causes, each separately clear.

formity of nature it seems is not a rational conclusion, though it is a premiss of every rational inference. It really has no ground beyond the all but invincible impression which our experience makes on our imagination. To assert human freedom, a spiritual order, a personal God, is at once an act of faith and of reason—of faith because it needs an effort to take us beyond the range of ideas which custom has made familiar—of reason because there are solid and appropriate grounds for each assertion.

Mozley recoiled from Baden Powell's theory of a spiritual and a natural order, each known on its own evidence, each removed from contact and collision with the other, so that a miracle like any other "dogmatic fact," if admitted at all, would be rather a trial than an aid to faith. Hence he put the argument for the necessity of miracles to any conceivable revelation in the extremest form. No character, no insight, no moral or spiritual ascendancy, will warrant a claim to superhuman knowledge or dignity without the unmistakable display of superhuman power. In spite of texts like "the secret of the Lord is with them that fear Him," "whosoever will do His will shall know of the doctrine," which point to a belief that piety surely recognises whatever truth can be imparted to sanctity—in spite of the paradox that when God did tempt Abraham, the father of the faithful had to be assured by signs and wonders that the temptation came from on high—there are advantages in the argument that the natural man is entitled to ask those who offer information beyond his own reach about a spiritual order, for credentials which he can appreciate. For as he commonly needs to be assured that there is a spiritual order at all, there is a presumption in favour of interruptions of the order of nature. This presumption serves to reinforce the analogy between Divine and human freedom on which Mozley relies. Otherwise it might be asked why, if our freedom interrupts the order

of nature in which it subsists, the Freedom of God, in whom the order of nature is established, should interrupt it too? It might be argued that to make general rules which generally work well and can be set aside on occasion—like Bank Charter Acts—is very well for earthly rulers who are not omnipotent or omniscient.

One wishes that Mozley had grappled with the ultimate question: Are the natural and spiritual order really continuous and one; is the natural order sustained through the spiritual. If so, our knowledge of the two may still be discontinuous and disparate, just as our knowledge of our own minds and bodies is. Materialists and spiritualists agree at last that what we cannot combine without confusion is really one. "The reasonable soul and flesh is one man," whether Plato was right or wrong in saying that mind is older and more of a first principle than body. From this point of view a miracle might be provisionally defined as an event in the natural order with no known antecedent except in the spiritual order.

But after discrediting Baden Powell's theory of the natural order as a closed circle, self-complete and self-contained, Mozley continued to apply it. Neither the authority of Butler nor the tempting illustration offered by Babbage, could seduce him to close with the hypothesis of "unknown law." Even apart from the confused notion of a "higher law" to which we might reduce the known laws of nature and the unknown law of miracles—"the discovery" of the latter "amounted to supposition of a new order of nature." "A law of nature in the scientific sense has reference to our experience alone." A miracle must be contrary to the order of nature as we know it, in which it is impossible to calculate upon miracles.

It is also impossible to calculate upon the appearance of a new comet; it is imaginable that we might come to understand a new miracle as we understand a new comet—

as a fresh instance of the action of a well marked group of powers imperfectly known. We can know nothing perfectly till we can compare many observations made at our leisure under known conditions. Again, cures are wrought by faith—in God or in imposing remedies. We do not know how either are wrought; but the comparison makes both less perplexing, more credible. Our carnal mind is relieved to think that a physical effect follows on a physical process, though we do not know it, and do know the spiritual power of the gifted saint or favoured believer which starts the process. So, too, we may compare the stigmata with the case of the lady whose own ankle was marked by a blow she expected to see fall on a child. Once more the stories of saints rising from the ground in prayer,—of Buddhists and witches flying through space—of the “levitation of mediums,” all hang together; if one of the four stood alone it might be *mere* fancy, *mere* trickery, it takes more to get rid of the four. “Mediums” are tricky, saints are not; witches are half starved, “mediums” are not. We want an explanation which will fit all the cases; while if one class of cases were authenticated, we should believe in all.

No comparison of possible observations helps us to guess *how* miracles happen; if we must look for a “law” of miracles at all, it must be a law not of the “how” but of the “when”—at what periods, within what circles, are contemporary miracles taken seriously by men of sense and character. An enquiry of this kind is perhaps a preliminary to an examination of the testimony to any group of miracles. Otherwise we may be met by an assertion that “the general stream of miraculous pretension” (which certainly must be treated as a whole) runs fullest in ages of ignorance and excitement, that it is precisely when testimony is most worthless that miracles are attested best. Mozley certainly refuted the sophistry, that if miracles

can be proved by evidence they need immeasurably more evidence than other facts. As certainly he over-rated Paley's argument that the testimony of the first witnesses of the Resurrection must be true, because it cost them dear. Did not the poor saints of Jerusalem receive an hundred-fold in this present time, when the abundance of the Gentiles flowed in upon them? Had any who went up with the Master to the last Passover the choice of going back to be as others who counted the cost in time and let the Christ go by? The only choice His followers had was to sit down with spoiled lives, or to cleave at all hazards to the greatest of memories, the greatest of hopes. By Pentecost their choice was made.

The University Sermons, like the Bampton Lectures, are convincing if we will keep to the questions the preacher asks. For instance, in a sermon on the Atonement, Mozley sets forth the power and the glory of the cross; he proves ingeniously that the objects of self-sacrificing love are, and ought to be more favourably regarded for the sake of that love; the question which since the days of St. Anselm has been a stumbling block in the way of all theories of the Atonement, "can a sinner be rightly forgiven simply on his own repentance and amendment?" is left unanswered and unasked. In the sermon on the Vatican Council, the obvious comments on the text, "My kingdom is not of this world," are balanced by splendid pictures of Hildebrand's ethical indignation against the tainted origin of secular rule, and of the Papacy preparing for the downfall of the temporal power by a final statement of all its claims; yet the sermon is one-sided after all. Theocracy can always appeal to the text, "the kingdoms of this world are become the kingdoms of our God and of His Christ," is the Church to allow them to apostatize at pleasure? Hildebrand only bore the same witness in the Holy Roman empire as "sweet Samuel Rutherford" bore afterwards

For Zion's King and Zion's laws,
And Scotland's covenanted cause.

Comtists are treated with the same ineffectual candour as Vaticanists. Mozley refutes their claims to be more "altruistic" than Christians without resenting it, but he insists that subjective immortality is only a new name for posthumous fame. "Vivre dans autrui" means more than this. As the Spirit strives or even reigns in those whose eyes are holden that they know Him not, so the spirit of ancient worthies may live on in those who never heard their names.

The argument that beauty is only recognised by reason is happier; but the strength of the sermons lies rather in psychology than in dialectic. For instance, the difficulty of conversion is illustrated by a commentary on Aristotle's saying, that no one would care for anything that could be gained by becoming some one else, and the reversal of human judgment is explained by the way in which, as a man deteriorates or improves, old good or evil habits shrink into a mere shell or coating over the true character that has been growing unseen. There is equal insight in a sermon on Unspoken Judgment. The preacher dwells on the difficulty and the duty of maintaining an estimate of others, which it is equally culpable to abandon and to express. It is a true and subtle distinction, that those who live among equals find life a probation, while those who live for inferiors make it a mission. The famous sermon on the Pharisees is perhaps as remarkable for its limits as for its power. Pharisaism was no doubt a new invention in evil, but the Pharisees are not made intelligible as a concrete historical phenomenon; we get no explanation of how the Talmud comes to repeat the charges of the Gospel, no explanation even of the spontaneous homage of a respectable neutral character like Josephus.

In fact, Mozley had very little sense for the externals of

history, though he was profoundly interested in it; he was something like a geologist who should set himself to trace the secular action of chemical changes in the crust of the earth, without any clear apprehension of the mechanical action of denudation and deposition. The whole book on the ruling ideas of early ages is worthy of its title. The writer sees ideas, and hardly anything else; all the difficulties of the Old Testament are explained by the fact that Israel had an idea of solidarity which we have not and had not an idea of individual right which we have. Is the latter idea the higher? Mozley does not ask. He even discusses the justice of killing all the Canaanites, though the Pentateuch clearly implies that most of them were to be driven out. He assumes on the whole that the order to wage a war of extermination was congenial. It is clear both from the precepts in Deuteronomy and the history in Judges, that it was not; the instinct of Israel was to let the eye pity and the hand spare. Mozley condemned the instinct so far as he recognised it, and argued that it is better for an age to act up to its own standard than to anticipate the temper of another. He does not notice that Saul was condemned by the mouth of David's prophets for his attempt to apply the legislation of Deuteronomy within the Promised Land, while his reluctance to apply that legislation beyond it incurred the sentence of Samuel, in whose days there was peace between Israel and the Amorites. The fundamental thought of the book is itself unconvincing. Revelation is given to re-create and to transfigure those to whom it comes. To say that one precept or another was given for the hardness of men's hearts, is not to say that a revelation as a whole must be adapted to and limited by the state of the recipients; if it makes them capable of one truth they could not attain, one virtue they could not practise of themselves, it may make them capable of any. How can it be said that Jael could not comprehend that

treachery to a guest, if he were an enemy of God's people, was a sin, when in the *Iliad* and the *Avesta* we find truthfulness magnified by heathen without the law? Nor does it really meet the difficulty of the Old Testament that Christianity grew out of it. Christianity is clearly the culmination of the mighty movement of prophecy from Amos to Ezekiel and Jeremy; but this movement appears at first not so much a continuation of what has gone before, as a reaction from it, and the appearance has to be explained before the argument will hold. Besides, the heart of the difficulty lies elsewhere. Comparing the Pentateuch with other ancient codes no one would think it is overpraised in Deuteronomy, but comparing the Chosen People with other ancient nations, one feels that the Lawgiver was right again. The Law found Israel unlovely, and left him so. At the very best in the days of the Maccabees, when Israel had put away idols, and the Law was not yet made of none effect by men's traditions, the Syrians prevailed whenever they put forth their strength, the Greeks beat Persia fairly. The fact is that since the Renaissance the judgment and the conscience of the natural man approves of and delights in pagan antiquity, taking it at its best, as a man like Plutarch approved of it and delighted in it; the only important difference being that our standard of sexual morality happily is still nearly as strict as that of the ancient Germans, and in one particular stricter, while taking Hebrew antiquity as a whole, from Isaac to Akiba, the natural judgment and conscience never get beyond unwilling respect. To get beyond respect to sympathy we must cast culture, civilisation, liberty behind us, with the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eye, and the pride of life. It is a serious difficulty; it hardly lightens it that the Desire of All Nations grew up in Israel—as a root out of a dry ground.

G. A. SIMCOX.