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TWO NEW TESTAMENT WORDS DENOTING LIFE :

ζωή AND ψυχή.

IN a former Article in the EXPOSITOR¹ an endeavour was made to throw light upon the New Testament relations of ψυχή and πνεῦμα, *soul* and *spirit*. But ψυχή, through its sense of *life*, has relations also with ζωή; and, considering that the English language, like the Latin, supplies, in this region, only one representative for both, it may be worth while to elucidate with some care the radical distinction between them, and trace its effect where the words may at first sight seem to be used indiscriminately.

Both ψυχή and ζωή are sometimes roughly defined to be the *living principle*. Tittmann calls ζωή, *vita quâ vivimus* : and ψυχή, *vis animalis quâ vivimus*. Webster makes ψυχή the "living principle which animates the body"; and the only distinction he appears to draw between the two words is based on the contrast between this life and the life to come. Archbishop Trench treats of ζωή and βίος, but leaves ζωή and ψυχή untouched.

A fundamental difference between these synonyms is at once suggested by the use of ψυχή as *soul*, and not unfrequently as *a living being, an individual life*, or, in common phrase, *a life*. Ζωή can never denote *a living being*, in the body or out of the body, though it may of course denote the life of that being. Thus Adam could become a ψυχή ζώσα,² but he could not become a ζωή; in fact it was the πνοή ζωής that made him a ψυχή. We could scarcely substitute ζώας for ψυχὰς in the expression, "Men that have hazarded their *lives* for the name of the Lord Jesus Christ;"³ though ζώην for the life of both Paul and Barnabas would have done very well, just as the singular is found in the phrase, "What is your life (ἡ ζωὴ ὑμῶν)?"⁴

¹ Vol. XII. (First Series), *A New Testament Antithesis*.

² Gen. ii. 7.

³ Acts xv. 26.

⁴ James iv. 14.

not in quite the same sense however as that of the singular $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ when used of several persons; for instance, where Joab rebukes king David for having shamed the faces of all his servants "which this day have saved thy life ($\psi\upsilon\chi\eta\acute{\nu}$), and the life ($\psi\upsilon\chi\eta\acute{\nu}$, that is, the individual life of each) of thy sons and of thy daughters."¹ Nor could $\zeta\omega\eta$ take the place of $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ where the latter is applied to a beast,—“beast for beast,”² literally “life for life” in the individual sense; though $\zeta\omega\eta$ is constantly attributed to animals as well as to men,—for example, where the flood is said to have destroyed “all flesh, wherein is the breath of life ($\zeta\omega\eta\varsigma$).” In a word, $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ is the *individualised life*, confined to the particular creature, and it is this sense that affords the common footing for the renderings *life* and *soul*, which sometimes really overlap one another: $\zeta\omega\eta$, on the other hand, is the *general stock of life*, so to say, of which the $\zeta\omega\eta$ of each is a share;³ hence $\zeta\omega\eta$ is the word in Acts xvii. 25, “seeing he himself giveth to all *life* and breath and all things.” A happy illustration of this distinction occurs in Abigail’s speech to David:⁴ “The $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ of my lord shall be bound up in the bundle of $\zeta\omega\eta$ with the Lord thy God; but the $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ of thine enemies (each and all of them) shall he sling out, as out of the middle of a sling.” And again, in Psalm lxxv. 9, LXX., “God . . . which hath brought my $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ into $\zeta\omega\eta$.” Hence $\zeta\omega\eta$ $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta\varsigma$, “the life of an individual life,” is a possible phrase,⁵ but not $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ $\zeta\omega\eta\varsigma$ except as a Hebraism for $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ $\zeta\omega\sigma\alpha$.

This distinction is not undermined even in those passages where the words are used synonymously. In Psalm xxvi. 9, “Gather not my soul with sinners, nor my life with bloody men,” the Septuagint has $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ in the first clause, and its

¹ 2 Sam. xix. 5.

² Lev. xxiv. 18.

³ Hesy chius gives as one of his definitions of $\zeta\omega\eta$, η $\pi\rho\delta\varsigma$ $\tau\delta$ $\xi\eta\nu$ $\chi\omicron\rho\eta\eta\gamma\iota\alpha$, “the supply for the purpose of living.”

⁴ 1 Sam. xxv. 29.

⁵ Compare 2 Sam. xi. 11, according to one reading.

true sense is shewn by the parallelism of ζωή in the second ; but the ψυχῆ is the individual life and ζωή is limited by the possessive. The same may be said of Psalm lxxxviii. 3, " My ψυχῆ is full of troubles, and my ζωή draweth nigh unto Sheol ;" and of Psalm xxxiv. 12, " What man is he that desireth life (θέλων ζωήν, life generally) and loveth (ἀγαπῶν) many days," as compared with Proverbs xv. 32 (LXX.), " He that observeth reproof loveth his life (ἀγαπᾷ ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ) ; or, better still, with John xii. 25, " He that loveth his life (φιλῶν τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ) loseth it ;" the latter clause of which verse, " He that hateth his life (μισῶν τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ) in this world shall keep it unto life (ζωήν) eternal," may likewise be compared with Ecclesiastes ii. 17, " Therefore I hated life (ἐμίσησα τὴν ζωήν, life generally, as a state for myself), because the work that is wrought under the sun was grievous unto me." In all these passages the distinction may, without fancifulness, be consistently discerned.

A better instance of the contrast between ζωή and ψυχῆ could hardly be found than in the parable of the Good Shepherd. " The thief cometh not but that he may steal, and kill, and destroy ; I came that they might have life (ζωήν) and might have it more abundantly." ¹ The primary meaning of ζωή here, in the framework of the parable, is ordinary life as opposed to ordinary death, and this life not individualised ; but in verses that follow,—vv. 11, 15, 17,—the individual life of the Good Shepherd is denoted by ψυχῆ : " The good shepherd layeth down his life (τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ) for the sheep ;" " I lay down my life (τὴν ψυχὴν μου) for the sheep ;" " I lay down my life (τὴν ψυχὴν μου) that I may take it again." This " it" stands of course for τὴν ψυχὴν ; accordingly we may observe in passing that the contrast here between ζωή and ψυχῆ is not a contrast of heavenly and earthly life, but of substance and individual-

¹ John x. 10.

isation. The idea of individuality is strong in Leviticus xvii. 11, 14, "The life ($\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$) of all flesh is in the blood," where nothing more appears to be meant, physically and literally, than that, when the blood goes from the individual, the individual life goes with it, and the blood is consequently made a "conventional hieroglyphic" for the life,¹ an idea that we find expressed in Aristophanes under the same use of $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$, when Strepsiades, in the *Clouds* (line 712), cries out that the vermin are "draining his life" ($\tau\eta\nu\ \psi\upsilon\chi\eta\nu\ \epsilon\kappa\pi\acute{\iota}\nu\omicron\upsilon\sigma\iota\nu$). It is noticeable that in verses 10-15 of the above chapter in Leviticus, $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ is used indifferently, now for the individual life, now for the living individual ("The life of the flesh is in the blood;" "No soul (or life) of you shall eat blood"), the sense of individuality being the common ground. Nor does Philo ignore the difference between $\zeta\omega\eta$ and $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ when, in allegorising a similar passage,² he speaks of an $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\alpha\iota\mu\omicron\varsigma\ \zeta\omega\eta$ and, further on, of an $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\alpha\iota\mu\omicron\varsigma\ \psi\upsilon\chi\eta$: the former, $\eta\ \acute{\epsilon}\nu\alpha\iota\mu\omicron\varsigma\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \alpha\iota\sigma\theta\eta\tau\eta\ \zeta\omega\eta$, "the life depending on blood and cognizable by the senses," is a life of which we may be *companions* ($\acute{\epsilon}\tau\alpha\iota\rho\omicron\iota$), and so be assailed by that disposition which is deft at dispersing piety; the latter, $\eta\ \acute{\epsilon}\nu\alpha\iota\mu\omicron\varsigma\ \psi\upsilon\chi\eta$, "the *individual* life depending on blood," the life in which "the help of the Lord" has not been born.³

It seems clear therefore that, in sacred literature, $\zeta\omega\eta$ is the abstract general word, $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ the particular and concrete; and that while $\zeta\omega\eta$ may be appropriated and particularised, $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ cannot be dispersed and generalised, so as to be life in the abstract or in distribution.

This distinction may very well have its roots in the earliest known usage of the two words. Homer's only sense of $\zeta\omega\eta$

¹ That the blood was literally the seat and substratum of the soul was the opinion of Critias.

² Genesis ix. 4, "Flesh with the life thereof, which is the blood thereof."

³ Philo, *Quis rerum divinarum heres sit*, chap. xii.

(and he uses it but twice) is not *life*, but *sustenance*,—something external to the individual and appropriated in part by him. Ζωὴ ἄσπετος is the “boundless store” which the troop of Penelope’s wooers in the palace of the absent Odysseus had not yet utterly consumed:¹ and ζωὴ πολλή was the “abundant store” of the piratical Eubeithes which Odysseus had once protected against the wrathful Ithacans when they sought to swallow it up,² (καταφαγείην). This sense, though a rare one, is found also in Herodotus³ and Aristotle; in Ecclesiasticus iv. 1, “My son, defraud not the poor of his living (τὴν ζωὴν)”; probably in Proverbs xxiii. 3, “Be not desirous of his dainties; for they are deceitful meat”—LXX. (ἐδέσματα) ἔχεται ζωῆς ψεύδους, “they lay hold on the victual of a lie,” (Vulgate, *in quo est panis mendacii*); and apparently in Proverbs xxvii. 27, where the Hebrew equivalent for “Thou shalt have goat’s milk for thy food” is strangely different from the Septuagint, which reads, ἔχεις ῥήσεις ἰσχυρὰς εἰς τὴν ζωὴν σου,—“Thou hast *strong sayings* for thy sustenance”; and this though the context is obviously material. Ψυχὴ, on the contrary, in Homer is the *breath* in or proceeding from the person, and hence the *personal life*; conceived also as a real substance, a life principle that can leave the body through the mouth or through a wound; and hence the soul as opposed to the body.⁴ The quasi-external sense of ζωὴ was not lost in its post-Homeric development, and the personal force of ψυχὴ remained undiminished. The idea of individuality and concreteness in Nestor’s phrase, when he speaks of pirates as men who “put their lives in doubt,” ψυχὰς παρθέμενοι,⁵ is found, for example (if indeed it be necessary to quote instances), in Herodotus when Demaratus tells how the Greeks “adorn their heads when they are about to risk their life,”

¹ Odyssey xiv. 96.² xvi. 429.³ Cf. ii. 177; viii. 105.⁴ Compare the article already referred to, *EXPOSITOR*, vol. xii.⁵ Homer Odyssey, iii. 75.

κινδυνεύειν τῇ ψυχῇ;¹ a thought which Polybius expresses² by κινδυνεύειν τῷ βίῳ, when describing how Theodotus the Ætolian had stood in danger of being assassinated by the favourites of Ptolemy his master; but ψυχῇ is the more personal word. Again, in Thucydides (i. 136), Themistocles, as a suppliant at the hearth of Admetus, the king of the Molossi, makes τὸ σῶμα σώζεσθαι, "bodily safety," the exact equivalent of σωτηρία τῆς ψυχῆς, "security of life," the individual life being referred to in both expressions. Plato indeed has a ψυχῇ κόσμου, a "soul of the world"; the human soul, however, is not a part of this world-soul, but only made after its likeness; so that the ψυχῇ κόσμου is not as it were a common stock from which each man draws. Aristotle, again, makes ζωῇ not the life as individualised, but the principle of life,³ and defines it to be ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς, that is, what conducts to actuality or realisation all the powers of the ψυχῇ; and likewise (that we may bring to bear the other sense of ἐνέργεια) what is itself the realization or actuality of the powers of the ψυχῇ. To put this conception in other words, ζωῇ is a name for the means by which the ψυχῇ is developed, and also for the state to which the ψυχῇ by development attains. He includes ζωῇ in the chain of the universe, a chain with potentiality (or power not in exercise) at one end, and actuality at the other; the potentiality (δύναμις) having no value or existence except when viewed in its work of development, in exercise and in achievement (ἀνάγεται εἰς τὴν ἐνέργειαν); and ζωῇ, as a δύναμις, operates in ψυχῇ as its sphere, effecting perception in animals, and thought in human beings.⁴ Thus ζωῇ is the constitution of the ψυχῇ, without which it could not be or act as a ψυχῇ. Nor does Plato contradict this function of ζωῇ when he speaks of the ψυχῇ as "bringing ζωῇ,"⁵ for he is here dealing with the body as lifeless without the

¹ Herodotus, vii. 209.² v. 61.³ Nicomachean Ethics, i. 7. 12.⁴ Compare Ethics, ix. 9.⁵ Phædo, 105 D. Cratylus, 399 E.

ψυχή; neither is Aristotle inconsistent with himself when he calls ψυχή the ἀρχὴ ζωῆς, "the principle of life," that by which we live and perceive and think;¹ for he also is referring to life as individualised in the ψυχή and manifested in the body.

The atmosphere of this radical distinction floats also about the verbal compounds; take, for example, ἀψυχος, "without a (personal) life"; ἔμψυχος "endowed with a life"; λιποψυχεῖν "to leave one's life behind"; ψυχομαχεῖν "to fight for dear life"; and many others might be quoted which have a similar reference to the individuality. On the other hand, compounds of ζωή, like ζωογονεῖν, ζωοποιεῖν, may all have ψυχή for their object; as, for instance, in Luke xvii. 33, "whosoever shall lose his life (ψυχήν) shall save it alive (ζωογονήσει)."

It is in consequence of the individual inner property of ψυχή that the word, variously translated, can connote appetite, emotion, personal energy or force of character. Such phrases as "Thy soul (ψυχή) longeth to eat flesh" (Deut. xii. 20), "Soul (ψυχή), . . . take thine ease, eat, drink and be merry" (Luke xii. 19), "Whatsoever ye do, work heartily (ἐκ ψυχῆς)," have their classical parallels. Socrates, in his panegyric on Nicocles, uses the expression τῇ ψυχῇ ποιῆσαι, "to do with all the heart," and he speaks elsewhere of the power of men to tame the ψυχὰς of wild beasts. Cambyses, according to Herodotus (iii. 14), made trial of the ψυχή of Psammenitus by imposing slave work upon his daughter. Xenophon tells of Agesilaus² that whenever he engaged in battle he brought away clear proofs of having fought bravely (Xenophon refers to wounds in front), "so that men could test his spirit (αὐτοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν δοκιμάζειν) not by hearsay but by seeing for themselves." So also Polybius (ii. 20, 7), ἔμμενον ταῖς ψυχαῖς, "They (the Insubres)

¹ *De Anima*, ii. 2. 12.

² *Agesilaus*, vi. 4.

stood their ground spiritedly" (with their spirits), though they were being mowed down by the Romans. Plutarch likewise¹ speaks of τὸ χαῖρον τῆς ψυχῆς, "the part of the ψυχῆ that is touched by joy." Then there is μεγαλοψυχία, the grand virtue of the philosophers, which Aristotle defines² to be "a depth and greatness of the ψυχῆ," that is, as we should say, of the character.³ But as ζωὴ is that by which the ψυχῆ lives, we cannot be surprised that ζωὴ should be preferred when *activity* is to be expressed. Hence the adjective ζωτικὸς goes a step beyond ψυχικός. The latter signifies "belonging to life," and, in the New Testament, "belonging to the life of this world;" but ζωτικὸς is *lively*, with life in full health and vigour; and Galen could accordingly denominate a high-spirited or passionate temperament a ζωτικὴ ψυχῆ; while Plato had already made similar use of the word when, in the discussion on the Republic (610 E.), Glaucon declared that injustice "endowed its possessor with peculiar vitality (τὸν ἔχοντα καὶ μαλὰ ζωτικὸν παρέχουσαν), and sleeplessness as well as vitality." The verb ζάω, too, seems to take the highest place, a place higher than βίωω, as describing the life worth living. Dion Cassius relates how Similis was promoted by Trajan to the command of the Guards, but, finding the post a weariness, resigned it seven years before his death to retire into private life; and then Dion gives us his epitaph: Σίμιλις μὲν ἐνταῦθα κέεται, βίους μὲν ἔτη τόσα, ζήσας δὲ ἔτη ἑπτὰ. "Here lies Similis, having lived so many years, but having (really) lived seven years." Menander also appears to have made use of the two words for a similar paradox, if a fragment from the Πλόκιον be rightly completed with the aid of Seneca who quotes it:

¹ *Morals*, 705 A.

² *De Virtutibus*, v.

³ So even of character in its weakness. Agesilaus, we are told, rejoiced in his superiority over the Persian king, who shrunk from heat and cold δι' ἀσθένειαν ψυχῆς. (*Xenoph. Ages.* ix.)

“It is but a small part of life (*βίος*) wherein we (really) live (*ζῶμεν*).” There is no corresponding verbal form of *ψυχή*, signifying *to live*, though a transitive form *ψυχόω* is found with the meaning, “I endow with life,” a verb applied by Philo to the rod of Moses (*ῥαβδὸς ψυχωθείσα*).¹ Pythagoras, again, calls God the “mind and life-principle (*ψύχωσις*) of all beings;”² Gregory Nazianzen similarly speaks of Him as the “life-principle (*ψύχωσις*) of living things (*ζωῶν*);” and Theophylact (Ep. i.) has the passage, “Us, who were dead through a polluted life (*βίῳ*), thou by thy writings hast quickened (*ἐψυχώσας*) to virtue.” But, notwithstanding exceptional cases, *ζωή* and its derivatives are the natural and usual words for life in its activity and fulness; and hence we can readily understand how the New Testament writers preferred to express by *ζωή* the life that was “the light of men;” and, by *ζωοποιῶν* (not *ψυχοποιῶν*) *πνεῦμα*, the active, new-creating agency, the “second man,” Christ, in contradistinction to the passively receptive *ψυχή* *ζῶσα*, the “first man, Adam.”³ It is the *πνεῦμα* or *πνοή* *ζωῆς* that constitutes the individual *ψυχή*,⁴ whether of the lower or of the higher nature, of animals or of men; and this *πνεῦμα* is represented as coming from God, “in whom we live (*ζῶμεν*),” through the Word who is “the life.” Consequently, in Biblical Greek, *ζωή* is more nearly related to *πνεῦμα* than to *ψυχή*; and while God is called *πνεῦμα*, and, in the “Word,” is called *ζωή*, He is never called *ψυχή*. And just as *πνεῦμα* in the New Testament is frequently the *ψυχή* glorified, so also is *ζωή* the glorified condition of the *ψυχή*. It is that to which the *ψυχή* may rise: “Whosoever shall lose his life (*ψυχήν*) shall save it alive (*ζωογονήσει*);”⁵ for it is

¹ Philo, *Life of Moses*, i. 14.

² Pythag. in Clement of Alexandria, 62.

³ 1 Cor. xv. 45.

⁴ Gen. ii. 7.

⁵ Luke xvii. 33. Compare 1 Cor. v. 5, “That the *πνεῦμα* may be saved in the day of the Lord Jesus.”

the "life of God" from which the *ψυχὴ* that lives in sin is estranged ("alienated from the life of God—*τῆς ζωῆς τοῦ Θεοῦ*—because of the ignorance that is in them"),¹ that life which has its beginning even in this mortal state, ("so far as I now live—*ζῶ*—in the flesh, I live—*ζῶ*—in faith"),² and of which, through Christ, all-restored *ψυχαί* shall in due time fully partake: "For ye died, and your life (*ζωή*) is hid with Christ in God. When Christ who is our life (*ζωή*) shall be manifested, then shall ye also with him be manifested in glory."

This sense of the "higher life" reminds us of another distinction between the two words. The abstract quasi-detached sphere in which *ζωή* moves, makes it (what the concrete appropriated *ψυχὴ* is not) the fit expression for life in regard to its manner and duration. The second part of Hesychius' definition of *ζωή* already referred to is *χρόνος τοῦ εἶναι*, "the time, the duration of being." Thus we can speak of *ἀκατάλυτος ζωή*, "endless life,"³ but not of *ἀκατάλυτος ψυχὴ*, in the same sense, though of course an *immortal soul* could enjoy that life. Equally restricted, no doubt, would be the usage with the adjective *αἰώνιος*; at any rate, while *ζωή αἰώνιος* frequently occurs, *αἰώνιος ψυχὴ* is nowhere found; and in the apparently correlative expression *αἰώνιον πνεῦμα* of Hebrews ix. 14 ("who through eternal spirit offered himself without spot to God"),—where *πνεῦμα* is not the personal Holy Spirit but a quality of our Lord's nature,—the close relationship of *πνεῦμα* and *ζωή* before noticed should be kept in mind. Again, the phrases *ἔτη ζωῆς*, *ἡμέραι ζωῆς*, are common enough in the Septuagint; and, at Proverbs iii. 2, *ἔτη ζωῆς* is put parallel with *μῆκος βίου*, "length of life"; but *ἔτη, ἡμέραι ψυχῆς* as *years or days of life* would be a solecism, as also would be the substitution of *ψυχὴ* for *ζωή* in the passage, "Thou in thy life

¹ Eph. iv. 18.² Gal. ii. 20.³ Hebrews vii. 16.

time (ζωή) didst receive in full thy good things";¹ or of ψυχῆς for τοῦ ζῆν in Hebrews ii. 15, διὰ παντὸς τοῦ ζῆν ἔνοχοι ἦσαν δουλείας, "were all their life-time subject to bondage." Neither, on the side of *manner*, can we speak of μακαρία ψυχή, "a happy life," though the same expression might stand for a "happy soul"; such combinations, on the other hand, as μακαρία ζωή are common enough, as where Plato, for instance,² is recalling the life of the golden age; and in both the Old and the New Testament ζωή is found alone to denote life with all its blessings.³ Under *manner, conduct* is naturally classified; and here the ζωή of sacred literature is particularly strong: to it has been transferred the ethical idea that so often attached itself to the classical βίος. But, if I understand Archbishop Trench rightly, I am inclined to question his accuracy when he denies to the ζωή of classical Greek any inherent ethical sense. If it be used, as at times it is, like βίος, for life as to its manner, and not merely for life in opposition to death, then we cannot but expect to find ζωή, occasionally at any rate, with an ethical colour. And that such a usage was recognized in the best age of Greek, is clear from Plato's *Republic*, 521 A: where Socrates, in speaking of the eagerness for power, is made to say: "If you can invent for the destined rulers a life (βίον) better than ruling, you may possibly realize a well-governed city: for only in such a city will the rulers be those who are really rich, not in gold, but in a wise and virtuous life (ζωῆς ἀγαθῆς τε καὶ ἔμφορος) which is the wealth essential to a happy man."⁴ Here, and in Plato's frequent conjunction of the verb ζῆν with the adverbs εὖ, καλῶς and the like, we have surely a foretaste of the ζωή καὶ εὐσέβεια, the "life and godliness," of 2 Peter i. 3; the ὄντως ζωή, the "life

¹ Luke xvi. 25.² *Laws*, 713 c.³ Cf. Psalm xxxvi. 8, 9; Rom. viii. 6, and especially Ecclesiastes ix. 9, where the A.V. "live joyfully" is, in the Septuagint ἰδέ ζωήν, "see life," a literal translation of the Hebrew.⁴ Davies and Vaughan's translation of the passage.

indeed," of 1 Timothy vi. 19; and the ζῶντες ὄντως, the "truly living," of Philo (*Quis rerum*, xi.), those who are not dead to the ψυχῆς βίος, that is, the ethical life of the inward man, as contrasted with the life among the "shows of things." And, whether or not an ethical sense be granted to the classical ζωή, this ὄντως ζωή attracts us strongly to the belief that the exalted use of the word—first found in the Scriptures, because, as Archbishop Trench says, the Scriptures first made death the consequence of sin, and therefore life the consequence of holiness,—has a legitimate basis in the Aristotelian conception of ζωή as an ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς, an internal developing energy producing inward and outward results, itself both the means of attainment and the condition attained. According to Aristotle, God is the ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ,¹ "the principle of transition in the soul"; He is the "eternal prius of all development," and "all things else seek to become like Him." His mode of activity—an activity not leading in his case to development—is absolute thought, and this ἐνέργεια constitutes ζωή in the highest and most blessed sense: "so that to God belong life (ζωή) and perpetual and unending eternity."² And elsewhere he says³: "The ἐνέργεια of God is immortality (ἀθανασία), and this is unending life (ζωή)." Life therefore is, with Aristotle, to be found, in its fulness, only in God; and all things else "seek God, if haply they might feel after him and find him."⁴ In Him is the ὄντως ζωή (to apply a Pauline phrase once more to Aristotle's thought); this "life" is to Him—the most perfect of beings—blessedness, and the blessedness Aristotle calls an ἐνέργεια. But Aristotle also defines ζωή to be an ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς, so is it therefore the name for the means and condition of that full and harmonious realization of the soul's powers which is Divine perfection and blessedness.

¹ *Eth. Eudem.* vii. 14.

³ *De Cælo*, ii. 3.

² *Metaph.* xii. 7.

⁴ *Acts* xvii. 27.

The perfection which Aristotle views as "absolute thought," is viewed in the Scriptures as absolute moral goodness: "Every one that hath this hope set on him purifieth himself even as he is pure;"¹ "Master, what good thing shall I do, that I may have eternal life? And he said unto him, Why askest thou me concerning that which is good? One there is who is good; but if thou wouldest enter into life keep the commandments."² And the condition of "eternal life" is to "know" this absolutely good Being,³ this knowledge being by no possibility theoretical only, but effective for practical issues: "We shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is."⁴ To this end (*τὸ δὲ τέλος ζωῆν αἰώνιον*, Rom. vi. 22), the *ζωή*, the life of God, which is already in principle the possession of the believer, develops the personal life, the real personality, the inward man: "So then death worketh (*ἐνεργεῖται*) in us, but life (*ζωή*) in you."⁵ This life is, in Aristotle's language, *ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετήν*, "an energy of the soul in accordance with moral excellence," resulting first in the "performance of the peculiar work which belongs to man as man;"⁶ secondly, in a complementary *εὐδαιμονία*, *τὸ εὖ ζῆν*, *happiness, well-living*; and, finally, in that highest form of *εὐδαιμονία* which proceeds from absolute knowledge. But this knowledge in the Gospel is far more deeply and distinctly ethical than the knowledge in Aristotle;⁷ for it is a knowledge not of absolute thought, but of the Absolute Good, and includes the necessary moral effects upon those who know Him, the blessedness which comes from knowing and being like "the blessed God" (*ὁ μακάριος Θεός*, 1 Tim. i. 11). Nevertheless the ideas of *ζωή* in Aristotle and in the Bible have this

¹ 1 John iii. 3.² Matt. xix. 16-18.³ John xvii. 3.⁴ 1 John iii. 2.⁵ 2 Cor. iv. 12.⁶ Compare *Eth. Nic.*, i. 6; x. 7.⁷ In Aristotle the exercise of the moral virtues yields a satisfaction of an inferior kind.

common ground, that ζωή in its true sense is the actuality of the ψυχή, the perfect realization of the personality, in an acquired likeness to God.

A similar development of the ψυχή accords with the ideas of Philo. Amid much that is wildly allegorical and un-Biblically material, he contends for a true ζωή and a true ψυχή. The latter he calls¹ the "soul of the soul," or as we might say, "the innermost man," or the "better nature." The ζωή that man lives is real or unreal according as this "dominant part"—the part not "dependent" on flesh and blood but "breathed into man by God from above"—rules or is ruled. For, says he, "there are three kinds of life; the first, to God; the second, to the creature; the third, on the borders of both, being compounded of the two. Now the life to God has not descended to us nor has it come to the necessities of the body. And the life with respect to the creature has neither ascended in any wise to heaven nor has it sought to ascend; but it lurks in unapproachable recesses, and rejoices in a life which is no life (τῷ ἀβιώτῳ βίῳ). And the mingled kind is that which has often ascended, being led thither by the better part, and looks into divine things, and is divinely inspired; but yet often turns back, dragged the contrary way by the worse part." And again, there are times when "the portion of the better life (ἡ τῆς κρείττονος ζωῆς μοῖρα) outweighs the whole." Who does not see here a picture of the development of the ψυχή in its onward progress—first, in the life to the flesh—then in the life of struggle, the flesh lusting against the spirit and the spirit against the flesh—lastly, in the life to God in heaven, the "crown of victory" which comes to "self-denial and a life of seeking after knowledge," those "elder children of wisdom?"²

This is the development, the transition (κίνησις, as Aristotle would phrase it) to which Jesus refers when He

¹ *Quis heres*, chap. xi.

² See Philo, *Quis rerum*, ix.

counsels the "loss" of the *ψυχή* in order that it may be found or "saved alive" (*ζωογονεῖν*), Luke xvii. 33); and the "hatred" of the *ψυχή* in order that it may be "kept" unto the *ζωὴ αἰώνιος* (John xii. 25). *Πνεῦμα* is indeed preferred to *ψυχή*, as we have said before, to describe the organisation of the renewed life, both in this world¹ and in the world to come;² nevertheless *ψυχή* is the individual life all the while,³ yet so glorified by the abnegation of self—or, to use Philo's phrases again, by the spoiling of the "life to the creature" (*πρὸς γενέσιν*), the march through the "border-life" (*μεθόριον*), and the "crown of victory" (cf. *Μωϋσῆς . . . στεφανώσας*) at the last—that the *ψυχή*, living now ideally or completely "to God" (*πρὸς Θεόν*), is known by another name, *πνεῦμα*, a name that does not recall the *σάρξ*, the "body of humiliation," the fetters of the earthly organism. But *ζωή* remains in use still, and stands for the new life as it stood for the old; for *ζωή* has no dyslogistic sense, and has only found means of realizing itself in the *ψυχή* by the process through which the individual life has passed; it has reached that which *ζωή* ought to be, "the life indeed," the harmonious activity of all the powers according to the nature that was primarily in the image of God. The *ζωή* even of Christ realized itself, as *our* life, by the death through which the *ψυχή* passed and in and through which it was "saved." That *locus classicus* of the Old Testament idea of sacrifice, Leviticus xvii. 11, has something to say here: "For the life (*ψυχή*) of the flesh is in the blood; and I have given it to you upon the altar to make an atonement for your lives; for the blood atones for the life." The death of the animal sacrificed had been the substitute for the death which the sinner freely accepted as the penalty of his sin;

¹ 1 Cor. vi. 17. "He that is joined unto the Lord is one spirit."

² Heb. xii. 23. "The spirits of just men made perfect."

³ John x. 17. "I lay down my *ψυχή* that I may take it again."

and by a "conventional hieroglyphic" the warm life-blood of the victim, as it were the $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ saved in death and through death, stood for the redeemed $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ of the sinner. This blood was straightway taken into the Holy Place and sprinkled upon the horns of the altar; in other words, the $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ of the sinner, which had been yielded up to death in the sacrifice, was now brought into loving communion with a reconciled God and into immediate contact with the power ("the horns") which could make reconciliation complete in sanctification. In the same way, the *blood* of Jesus,—his $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$, according to the Old Testament Levitical idea,—no mere concrete symbol of an abstract $\theta\acute{\alpha}\nu\alpha\tau\omicron\varsigma$, was not the *death* by which sinners are reconciled to God who no longer imputes their trespasses unto them;¹ but the *life*, the $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$, which was presented through eternal spirit (that is, after his resurrection) to God, and by which sinners are "cleansed to serve the living God."² But here again $\zeta\omega\eta$ is the word, and not $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$, to express vigorously and clearly the idea of activity and communication by Christ to others beyond Himself: "For if, while we were enemies, we were reconciled to God through the death of his Son; much more, having been reconciled, we shall be saved in his life ($\acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \tau\eta\ \zeta\omega\eta\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon$),"³ that is, in Christ's life as it pervades and envelops our life and transforms it. Yet Christ has not merely abstract $\zeta\omega\eta$; He has an individual $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ now as much as ever He had.

The words of Jesus in Matthew xvi. 25, 26, and the parallel passages, may be called "the parable of the $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ ": "Whosoever would save his life ($\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$) shall lose it: and whosoever shall lose his life for my sake shall find it. For what shall a man be profited, if he shall gain the whole world, and forfeit his life? or what shall a man give in

¹ 2 Cor. v. 19.

² Heb. ix. 14. See a note on this subject by Professor Milligan in his Croall Lecture, "The Resurrection of the Lord," page 263.

³ Rom. v. 10.

exchange for his life?" The Revisers have carried the rendering *life* all the way through the passage, instead of translating $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ sometimes by *life* and sometimes by *soul*; and correctly, as it seems to us; for it is the literal life which is the basis and the context of the teaching. There are two kinds of $\zeta\omega\eta$ even in this world, as the Son of Sirach had taught long before: "Weep for the dead, for he hath lost the light; and weep for the fool, for he wanteth understanding: make little weeping for the dead, for he is at rest; *but the life ($\zeta\omega\eta$) of the fool is worse than death.* Seven days do men mourn for him that is dead; but *for a fool and an ungodly man all the days of his life ($\zeta\omega\eta$).*" So also, even in this world, are there two kinds of $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$: and these two kinds of personal life Jesus seeks to present vividly to his disciples, striving to goad their thought by antithesis and paradox; in the way so common with Him, blending together the earthly and the heavenly, and passing on from the one to the other without being careful to mark a transition between worlds which, before his penetrating gaze, were but as shadow and substance; for

"Meadow, grove, and stream,
And earth, and every common sight
To Him did seem
Apparelled in celestial light."

Jesus is using the literal loss and gain of literal life, with the consequences thereof, as a parable by which to indicate what the loss and gain of the real life, the self, really are. "Will you not," He seems to say, "by giving up your personal life in its lower form—the *self* which alone, to the lower nature, makes life worth living—find a personal life that is really worth living, an $\delta\upsilon\tau\omega\varsigma \zeta\omega\eta$ which is, to each person, an $\delta\upsilon\tau\omega\varsigma \psi\upsilon\chi\eta$?" The life that is "worse than death" must be surrendered: to this we must die in order that we may truly live. We find a key to the interpretation in the parallel passage of John: "Except a grain

of wheat fall into the ground and die, it abideth by itself alone ; but if it die, it beareth much fruit. He that loveth his life (*ψυχή*) loseth it ; and he that hateth his life in this world shall keep it unto life (*ζωή*) eternal."¹ The *ψυχή* (the individual life) that individualises itself so completely as to live to itself, "abideth alone," in that state of isolation from God and from man which is and will be death ; but that which "dies," which sinks the evil natural individuality in "living to God," and therefore to fellow-man, "beareth much fruit" ; life in its fullest activity for itself and for other lives.² If then our Lord used literal death merely as a veil for the deeper truth, it was not his aim, in these passages at any rate, to teach that the loss of existence in this world for his sake secures existence in the next ; any more than He teaches elsewhere that the cutting off of the right hand in this world for his sake secures the whole body in the next.³ The loss of the literal life for Christ's sake is only the occasional incarnation of the spiritual ideal. In the death of Christ Himself we learn the meaning of love, and that expression of Christ's love must be the rule of our life. "Every deed of love," says Haupt, "is a laying down of the *ψυχή*, a denying of the *ἐγώ* as a personality for the sake of a brother."⁴ Only by this daily abnegation of self, a surer test and discipline than even the literal death which is its symbol, can the *ψυχή* become a glorified *ψυχή*, and be "supplied" for ever⁵ with the *ζωή* of God.

JOHN MASSIE.

¹ John xii. 24, 25.

² 2 Cor. iv. 12: "Death worketh in us" (witness the outward symbol of the inward death) "but life in you." ³ Matt. v. 30.

⁴ Note on 1 John iii. 16: "Hereby know we love, because he laid down his life (*ψυχή*) for us : and we ought to lay down our lives for the brethren"—an argument from which John at once infers the duty of generosity.

⁵ Compare the definition of *ζωή* already quoted from Hesychius: *ἡ πρὸς τὸ ζῆν χορηγία ἢ χροῖος τοῦ εἶναι*; also Philippians i. 19, "I know that this shall turn to my salvation through your supplication and the supply (*ἐπιχορηγία*) of the spirit of Jesus Christ."