

and philosophical themes, the profoundest thoughts, and even the final conclusions of the wise of all ages, and—so far as my reading extends—of all races, do resemble each other in the strangest way, and by virtue of the constitution and limits of the human mind *must* resemble each other: their quest is the same, and their conclusion the same, however various its form.

S. COX.

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A WORD STUDY IN THE NEW TESTAMENT.

PART I.

LANGUAGE, it has been said, is buried history; and he that will dig diligently through the strata which the lapse of ages has piled one above another, will discover, with surpassing interest and surprise, how much words can teach him of the gradual elevation of man. Among other relics of the past, here and there especially will some fossil word make him linger to look upon the upheaval—if one be granted the metaphor—of heathen thought, word, and work, by the religion of Jehovah and the mission of Him who came to mould the race anew. One of such fossil words is *μακάριος* ("blessed")—a stone which is in itself a sermon, the brief but eloquent story of the redemption of mankind.

For what did the word convey to the older Greeks? Derived most probably from a root implying "greatness," it appears to have been first applied to him with whom, from his superior power, outward things were free from trouble. The idea of the *outward* crops up in the poetry of Euripides. In his play of the *Bacchants* (line 909) the chorus is made to chant, "Him

call I blessed (*μακαρίζω*) whose life hath good luck day by day and all the day long." Where then was the man to whom the name could be truly given? The Greek poets—the spokesmen of the national thought and yearning—looked not for him, knowing well that they would not find him. They called men *blessed*, it is true; but their use of the word was, of necessity, relative: the blessedness of their blest men could at any time be rudely overthrown. Homer could hold Agamemnon "blest" for "being born to high estate and prosperous days,"<sup>1</sup> but not blest amid his fitful fortunes and in his tragic end. Pindar could hail Carrhotus as "blest"<sup>2</sup> for his chariot triumph in the plains of Pytho; but in the same breath he sounds the warning note that "none is, or ever shall be, without a share of troubles." Euripides can speak of Tantalus<sup>3</sup> as once "blest"—in his might as a king and in the honour paid him at the table of the gods—yet blest no longer, "ever trembling at the threatening rock towering high above his head." And the uncertainty of blessedness led the poets everywhere sorrowfully to confess that, since the living could not attain sure and perfect exemption from adversity, the dead alone could truly and safely be described as *μάκαρες* or *μακάριοι*; and that, at any rate, no mortal man had fairly earned the title till a blessed death had set its seal upon a blessed life. Maxims to this effect had been, it is believed, the inheritance of the Hellenic race from the earliest times. One of these Herodotus makes the theme of Solon's reply to Cræsus when that possessor of fabulous wealth was eager to be pronounced the happiest of men.

<sup>1</sup> Homer, *Iliad*, iii. 182.

<sup>2</sup> Pindar, *Pythian Odes*, v. 43-50.

<sup>3</sup> Euripides, *Orestes*, 4.

“Man,” the sage declared, “is altogether the sport of fortune, for the deity is jealous [of human prosperity], and delights in confusion. We must look, therefore, to the conclusion of everything, and call no man truly happy until, having constantly enjoyed the greatest number of blessings life can give, he has likewise come to a tranquil end.”<sup>1</sup> Sophocles, in the opening words of his “Maidens of Trachis,” puts the same gnome into the mouth of Dejanira:—

’Tis an old saying, told of many men,  
 “Thou canst not judge man’s life before he die,  
 Nor whether it be good or bad for him.”

And again, in “Ædipus the King,” the chorus chants this mournful song:—

Oh, race of mortal men !  
 I number you, and deem  
 That ye, although ye live,  
 Are but an empty dream.  
 What man—yea, what, knows more  
 Of happiness and peace  
 Than just the idle show  
 And then the sure decrease ?  
 Thy fate, as pattern given,  
 O Ædipus, my king !  
 Thy doom, yea, thine, I say,  
 I know of none I count as truly prospering.<sup>2</sup>

It was in the same spirit that Hesiod made mention of “the blessed spirits of men *in the abode of the dead*,” and assigned to the heroes and deified ones the *μακάρων νῆσοι* (“isles of the blest”), as a place of rest for ever.

But if the spirits of the dead were free from toil and trouble, this bliss could be even more suitably ascribed to the gods themselves. And so we need not wonder

<sup>1</sup> The substance of Herodotus i. 32.

<sup>2</sup> *Μακαρίζω*. Both these extracts are from Dr. Plumptre’s “Translation of Sophocles” (second edition).

to find Homer opposing the θεοὶ μάκαρες ("blessed gods") to the θνητοὶ ἄνθρωποι ("mortal men"),—blessed gods, with Zeus, "the king of kings, most blessed of the blest,"<sup>1</sup> living far removed from all human vexation and suffering, the envy of the Lotos-eaters, in that "most musical, most melancholy," poem of the Laureate's:—

Let us swear an oath, and keep it with an equal mind,  
 In the hollow Lotos-land to live and lie reclined  
 On the hills like gods together, careless of mankind.  
 For they lie beside their nectar, and the bolts are hurl'd  
 Far below them in the valleys, and the clouds are lightly curl'd  
 Round their golden houses, girdled with the gleaming world:  
 Where they smile in secret, looking over wasted lands,  
 Blight and famine, plague and earthquake, roaring deeps and fiery sands,  
 Clanging fights, and flaming towns, and sinking ships, and praying hands.

Such, then, was μακάριος in the common Hellenic opinion. The typical Greek regarded "blessedness" rather from the outward than from the inward point of view; the cloud of accidents hid the essence from his sight. And yet not altogether; for to the poetic and national view there was a certain religious background which served as a prophecy of deeper thought and more accurate analysis. The sphere of happiness or blessedness was, it is true, outward and earthly; but when this happiness was destroyed, what was assigned as the cause of its ruin? Presumption, it was felt, could hardly be held back from following in the wake of prosperity; and the divine order set its face against all insubordination and haughtiness of men, visiting every transgression of its laws with certain, though not always immediate, punishment. They that waxed prosperous seemed there and then to stand in slippery places, exposed by their very prosperity to the φθόνος

<sup>1</sup> Æschylus, *Suppliants*, 519 — ἀναξ ἀνάκτων, μακάρων μακάρατε.

("envy") of the jealous gods. When Amasis, King of Egypt, heard, as Herodotus tells us, of the growing power and magnificence of Polycrates, King of Samos, he sent to his relative a message which began with these words: "Thus saith Amasis to Polycrates, Sweet is it to hear of the health and wealth of a friend and ally; but I like not thy great good fortune, mindful as I am that the deity is envious. . . . For I know not that I ever heard of any man who was fortunate in all things and did not at last utterly perish."<sup>1</sup> Œdipus, after his victory over the Sphinx, rose to the throne of Thebes, and, being lifted up by his success, described himself as the man

Whom all name Œdipus the Great.<sup>2</sup>

He had likewise broken, though unwittingly, the unchangeable laws of kith and kin. Therefore did the "Envy" of the gods lie in wait for his haughtiness, and, conspiring with the Nemesis that avenged his special transgression, compassed his disastrous fall.

In a word, continued prosperity went hand in hand with natural piety. No wonder then that *εὐδαίμων* was a constant synonym for *μακάριος*. The man whom prosperity did not exalt above dependence upon the gods, and who transgressed not the "eternal sanctities" of natural law, had a "good deity" or "good genius" always attending him. This conjunction of outward prosperity with reverence of spirit and conformity to heaven's decrees, furnishes a connecting link with the idea of inwardness which usually pervaded the more analytical definitions of Greek philosophy when it discussed the conditions of happiness. Happiness, it

<sup>1</sup> Herodotus, iii. 40.

<sup>2</sup> Sophocles, *Œdipus the King*, line 7.

seemed to the philosophers, ought to dwell in some strong tower which could repel "the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune;" and the various schools sought in various ways for a shelter from the "changes and chances of this mortal life." It may be well briefly to review the conceptions of happiness held by the most conspicuous of these schools, and expounded by their founders or representatives.

Our starting point is naturally Socrates. He, as Cicero tells us,<sup>1</sup> "was the first to call philosophy down from the heavens to the earth," the first to turn it aside from the barren cosmical and physical speculation of his predecessors to an honest "inquiry concerning life and morals and things good and evil," which was involved in his primary maxim, "Know thyself." Accepting the fact that *εὐδαιμονία* ("happiness") was the highest aim of mankind, he defined it in the widest sense as not merely "luck" and "feeling," but "well-being"<sup>2</sup> generally, and made it synonymous, not with *εὐτυχία*, "good fortune," but with *εὐπραξία*, "good doing,"<sup>3</sup> asserting, moreover, that the aim was to be attained, not in outward good, but in such good as came by moral excellence. Happiness was in this way raised from the lower level of *external prosperity* to the higher level of *internal morality*. In one passage he endorses the fable once told by Prodicus of the choice of Hercules, when Virtue represented to the hero that by following her he would attain *τὴν μακαριστοτάτην εὐδαιμονίαν*, "the most blessed happiness."<sup>4</sup> And what, in his opinion, this happiness was, may be gathered

<sup>1</sup> *Tusculan Disputations*, v. 4.

<sup>2</sup> It is in this more accurate sense that "happiness" (the most available English word) is used throughout the present article.

<sup>3</sup> Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, iii. 9, 14.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.* ii. 1.

from his remark to Antipho, that the greatest pleasure came, not from success in endeavour, but from the consciousness of "growing better oneself, and making one's friends better likewise"—that *εὐδαιμονία* accordingly lay not in luxury and extravagance. "But," he adds, "to my thinking, it is divine to want nothing; and to want as little as may be is nearest to the divine: and I hold the divine to be perfection, and that to be nearest the divine is to be nearest perfection."<sup>1</sup> The latter of these passages serves as a comment upon the former. *Μακάριος* and *εὐδαίμων* (generally translated, and with fair accuracy, "blessed" and "happy" respectively), though frequently used without apparent distinction, exhibit at other times a real difference. *Εὐδαίμων* ("having a good genius"), as can be easily seen, is applicable, not to the gods, but only, properly speaking, to men: it is therefore employed, when such distinction is required, to denote such a "well-being" as is possible for mortals, while *μακάριος* describes the "blessedness" belonging peculiarly to the divine existence.<sup>2</sup> *Εὐδαιμονία* is therefore the natural word of the philosophers in dealing with ethics, and appears strictly to signify the essence without the adjuncts, while *μακάριος* implies the essence and the adjuncts too. Take, for example, the expression of Aristotle in the section last quoted. "The happy man (*εὐδαίμων*) will never become miserable, yet will not be blessed (*μακάριος*), if he fall into the misfortunes of Priam." Thus the *εὐδαιμονία* ("well-being") of mortal life may rise to *μακαριότης* ("blessedness") in proportion as the hindrances are taken away, and the internal embodies

<sup>1</sup> Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, vi. 9, 10.

<sup>2</sup> Comp. Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, i. 9, 34 (Cope's note), and *Ethics* i. 10-14 (Jelf's notes).

itself in external realization, as in the case of the gods. That "most blessed happiness," therefore, which Virtue offered to Hercules as the sure accompaniment and reward of honourable action, was synonymous with that "true happiness" which Socrates declared to consist in being "nearest the divine perfection."

But how was the *εὐδαιμονία* to be obtained? This question brings us face to face with the fundamental idea of the Socratic ethics, that virtue—practical moral excellence—was the necessary result of knowledge or theoretical insight; that, conversely, wickedness sprang solely from ignorance; and that those who could discern the honourable and the good would never prefer any other course of conduct.<sup>1</sup> Virtue, that uniform and durable quality of the soul, working the highest good, and therefore the essential condition of that happiness or well-being which was the end and aim of all that was good, beautiful, and useful—this virtue, he appears to have thought, could be taught like mathematics. We need not be surprised then that Socrates, regarding knowledge so exclusively as the only path to moral excellence, at times actually identified the one with the other, making knowledge the equivalent of virtue and of similitude to the gods.<sup>2</sup> And it will help us more exactly to appreciate the position of Socrates if we remember that he was the embodiment of a reaction, a reaction of the *Zeitgeist* which possessed the land in the days of the Sophists. They also had directed their attention to the moral nature of man, but had taken their stand, not on exact verified knowledge, but on current popular opinion. The hollowness and

<sup>1</sup> Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, iii. 9, 5. Confirmed by Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, vi. 13, and *Ethics of Eudemus*, i. 5.

<sup>2</sup> Comp. Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, iii. 9, 4, iv. 5, 11, and i. 6, 10.



utter inutility of such conventional orthodoxy, in its ignorance and assumption, Socrates scouted and exposed; and, with a vivid perception of its mischievous results, he not unnaturally took up his standpoint at the other extreme, affirming that, while in the hands of mere opinion morality and well-being were imperilled, in those of knowledge they were absolutely secure. So complete, moreover, was his power of self-control, that he appears to have had no clear conception of a knowledge not rooted in the life, of "him that knoweth to do good, and doeth it not."<sup>1</sup>

Socrates was eminently practical. He "knew nothing that was good unless it were good for something;"<sup>2</sup> and *εὐπραξία* ("good doing") was to him the goal of man's endeavour. But Plato built upon his master's simple thesis an abstract and complex edifice of transcendentalism. With Plato, indeed, as with Socrates, "well-being" depended not upon outward things,<sup>3</sup> but upon the possession of moral beauty and goodness. In the *Gorgias* (470 E), he makes Socrates say to Polus, "The man or woman that is gentle (or 'fair') and good, I say is happy; but he that is unjust and evil is miserable." In the *Symposium* (202 C), it is said that "the happy are those who are the possessors of things good and fair." And again (205 E): "By the possession of what is good are the happy happy (*εὐδαίμονες*)." Virtue was the fitness of the human soul for its proper task;<sup>4</sup> virtue was the soul's health, and vice the soul's disease; and a virtuous life far exceeded any other in its benefits to the possessor, as ensuring that regularity of imagination, that tranquillity and in-

<sup>1</sup> James iv. 17.

<sup>2</sup> Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, iv. 6, 3.

<sup>3</sup> Comp. *Republic*, x. 613 A.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.* 353, 444.

ternal harmony, which was the soul's proper happiness.<sup>1</sup> And in the fourth book of the *Law*, he says, "One who is blessed with virtuous habits passes a life more happy than one under opposite circumstances in every particular whatsoever." With Plato again, as with Socrates,<sup>2</sup> perfection, and therefore perfect happiness, was attained in proportion as the divine was, by wisdom or knowledge, approached most closely; for the ethical end of man was ὁμοιώσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν<sup>3</sup> ("resemblance to God as far as possible"). But here Plato left Socrates behind, and, soaring in theoretical speculation far above and beyond matter, space, time, and even being, he conceived of an Absolute Good, the Idea of the Universal Good, existing *per se*, and not in any individual object, and to which every actuality remained perpetually inferior. In the *Republic* (vi. 505 A) he asserts (of course, as always, through the Platonic Socrates) that the "essential Form of Good is the highest object of science;" and again (509 B): "The good, far from being identical with real existence, actually transcends it in dignity and power." From the identification of this "Idea" with the Divine Reason (τὸν ἀληθινὸν καὶ θεῖον νοῦν—*Philebus*, 22 C) and with the δημιουργός ("world-builder," *Timæus*, 28)—the absolutely good, working himself out in generated things—we conclude that it was Plato's Supreme Deity.<sup>4</sup> It is this Idea, then, that, as "God," he holds up, in the *Theætetus* and elsewhere, for imitation; and the highest happiness fell to the lot of those alone who by knowledge (σοφία, φρόνησις, ἐπιστήμη) attained the power

<sup>1</sup> Albinus' *Introduction to Opinions of Plato*, chap. xxvii.

<sup>2</sup> Comp. as before, *Memorabilia*, i. 6, 10.

<sup>3</sup> *Theætetus*, 176 B.

<sup>4</sup> Comp. Ueberweg's *History of Philosophy*, vol. i. p. 122—a book to which the writer would here make a general acknowledgment.

of taking flight<sup>1</sup> (*φυγή*) from the inevitable evil of the imperfect phenomenal, and finding their fullest satisfaction in a pure intellectual contemplation which culminated in the cognition of the Ideal Good.<sup>2</sup> Plato's *σοφία* ("wisdom") accordingly takes precedence of Socrates' *εὐπραξία* ("good doing"); the intellectual rises higher than the practical; and transcendental ascetic mysticism is the only effectual counterpoise to the iron necessity of evil which weighs down mankind.

Aristotle was an observer of facts, and, unlike Plato, kept, for ethical purposes, near the ground. "We must start," said he, "from the things that are known."<sup>3</sup> Following this rule, he, broadly speaking, discarded from the province of ethics the immortal, the divine, and the ideal, and restricted it to the empirical definition of the highest practical good attainable by man as an active social being.<sup>4</sup> This highest practical good he held to be well-being, or happiness,<sup>5</sup> and to be the result of the performance by each man of his special work<sup>6</sup>—the effect of the virtuous activity of the soul under the guidance of reason (*ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατὰ λόγον*, and also *κατ' ἀρετήν*), and having pleasure as its complement.<sup>7</sup> He defines virtue (*i.e.*, the proficiency in willing what is conformed to reason) to be "a habitude" (*i.e.*, a developed potentiality), "by which a man becomes good, and by which he will discharge well his own work."<sup>8</sup> In this way the will was distinguished from the intellect, and virtue made to consist in a formed state of the will rather than in a wise insight; and "well-being" was involved in the development of the highest tendency in man's nature, the joy in the

<sup>1</sup> *Theaetetus*, 176 A.<sup>2</sup> *Republic*, 519.<sup>3</sup> *Nicomachean Ethics*, i. 2.<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.* i. 4.<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.* i. 2, 7.<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.* i. 6.<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.* x 4.<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.* ii. 5.

doing of the good contributing the complement of pleasure.

Yet while Aristotle confined ethics to the social and human sphere, he did not shut the divine out of view: he only considered human morality something not to be predicated of the gods,<sup>1</sup> who occupied a plane so much higher as to be essentially different for all ethical ends. The gods, in his opinion, had no scope for the exercise of the moral virtues, and consequently could find their blessedness only in contemplation—that is to say, in the energy of the pure intellect.<sup>2</sup> Man, on the other hand, so far as he is man and a compound being, will find his happiness in the moral virtues; but, so far as he is divine, in the intellectual. “For the life in obedience to the intellect will be divine in comparison with human life.”<sup>3</sup> And “the energy of the Deity, as it surpasses all others in blessedness, must be contemplative; and therefore, of human energies, that which is nearest to this must be the happiest.”<sup>4</sup> The most perfect happiness, therefore, must be outside the ethical sphere; and on this necessity was founded Aristotle’s distinction between the inferior ethical or practical virtues, and the superior dianoetic virtues, or developed activities of the pure reason (*διανοία*).<sup>5</sup> And as the reason is the best part of man, “each man’s self,” “the ruling and the better part,” so “should he do everything with a view to living in accordance with it;” by which means, the pure intellect being the link with the divine, he would be “striving to make himself immortal,” and therefore to attain the most perfect bliss. With Aristotle, then, the happiness of the in-

<sup>1</sup> *Nicomachean Ethics*, x. 8.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* x. 7, 11.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.* x. 8, 11.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.* i. 13.

tellect is something separate, and the intellectual life, rather than the moral, gives scope for "well-being" in the highest sense.

The Stoics refused to regard happiness, or its complement, pleasure, as in any way an end, but represented *εὐδαιμονία* as the natural result (*ἐπιγένημα*) of virtue ("Pleasure," said Seneca, "is the companion, not the guide, of our course"): while virtue was defined to be *τὸ ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν* ("living in conformity with nature"), "which," said Zeno, "was to live according to virtue; for nature is our guide to this."<sup>1</sup> The Pantheistic basis of the Stoic ethics naturally affected their conception of happiness. Zeus was the "soul of the universe:" the human soul was an *ἐπίσπασμα τῷ θεῷ*—"a part severed from the divine." Hence their definition of virtue ran, at full length, as follows: "The virtue of the happy man, and the smooth flow of his life" (*εὐροία βίου*, equivalent to *εὐδαιμονία*),<sup>2</sup> "consists in a course of action exhibiting the harmony of the divinity (*δαίμων*) in each individual with the design of the Controller of the universe."<sup>3</sup> But this "Controller" possessed no real personality; he was the "consciousness of the universe," its "creating and working force," at once Fate and Providence, from whom all transitory personality came, and to whom it would in due time return. Under this impersonal unbending necessity evil found its place, not as in itself a good, but as "not unuseful." So Plutarch quotes Chrysippus: "Evil in some way becomes consistent with nature, and, so to speak, is found useful to the universe, for otherwise good would not be useful." And again:

<sup>1</sup> Diogenes Laertius, Book vii. *Zeno*, chap. liii.

<sup>2</sup> Stobæus, *Eclogæ*, ii.

<sup>3</sup> Diogenes Laertius, Book vii. *Zeno*, chap. liii.

“It is not possible to take away evil altogether, nor is it well that it should be taken.” And such was the general opinion of the Stoics, though Cleanthes, in his “Hymn to Zeus,” appears to modify it into the conviction that “evil is overruled for good, and made to harmonize with the plan of the universe.” It will be observed that in the theory we have described there is no presupposition of morality; nor is the law which harmonizes the “All” anywhere clearly asserted to be subordinate to the moral. In fact, if we may accept the statement of Origen,<sup>1</sup> the Stoics held “no act, as such, to be either praiseworthy or disgraceful; and even those acts that were most criminal they held to be good when done with a good intention.” The original vital instinct tended, they thought, neither to morality nor to happiness, but to self-conservation (*ἡ αὐτοῦ σύστασις*)<sup>2</sup>—an end secured only by the highest of human faculties, the reason, which led to virtue as the true means of living in harmony with the all-controlling law. Seeing, then, that the intellect is the highest faculty, obedience to the intellect is man’s highest duty;<sup>3</sup> and virtue attained by contemplation, not pure contemplation *per se*, contains within itself the highest happiness. But virtue was by Zeno made equivalent to *φρόνησις* (“practical wisdom”)—alone sufficient for happiness, because it rendered men superior to pain; and the Stoical idea of happiness was, after all, little if anything more than the absence of pain,<sup>4</sup> that is to say, the absence of all emotion; for emotion seemed to them to be neither natural nor useful, but to

<sup>1</sup> *Contra Celsum*, iv. 45.

<sup>2</sup> Diogenes Laertius, vii. *Chrysippus*, 85.

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, *De Repug. Stoic.* ii.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*

result from the overbalancing of the practical judgment.<sup>1</sup> The "wise man," or "sage" (a being whom the Stoics had to confess was, in the true sense, "past finding out"), could claim equality with Zeus in all things essential. Zeus and he were equally profitable to one another. But even the "sage" found at times the limits of his power in his contest with evil; and therefore, since life was a "non essential," as soon as he discovered that—like the Stoic's pattern, Cato, after the ruin of the Roman Republic—he could no longer make headway, and live honourably, he was allowed to turn his back upon the enemy, and bring his life to an end by the *εὐλογος ἐξαγωγή* ("the rational exit from existence"), alike the climax of his self-government (*ἀνευπύθυνος ἀρχή*) and the termination of his happiness.

Epicureanism (to which we may give a passing word) could, strange as it might appear, claim a close kinship with Stoicism. Epicureanism, it is true, made pleasure its aim. ("We say that pleasure is the beginning and end of happy living.")<sup>2</sup> Nay, further: it maintained that there were no pleasures which had not a sensuous origin. But the "pleasure" of Epicurus consisted not in a positive, but in a negative—in an absence of pain or disturbance (*μητέ ἀλγῶμέν μῆτε ταραβῶμεν*), and that in the mind rather than in the body, "since the soul suffers from that which is past and present and to come."<sup>3</sup> All pleasure was good, and all pain evil; but before accepting a given pleasure, or rejecting a given pain, the consequences must be weighed (*συμμέτρησις*), and the keenest foresight was his who discerned

<sup>1</sup> Seneca, *Ep.* ix.; Plutarch, *De Repug. Stoic.* ii.

<sup>2</sup> Diogenes Laertius, x. 128.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* x. 137.

that virtues and pleasure grew inseparably together.<sup>1</sup> "It is impossible," said Epicurus, "to live agreeably without living prudently, decently, and uprightly; nor prudently, decently, and uprightly, without living agreeably,"<sup>2</sup> Insight and calculation enabled the "sage to be happy even in the bull of Phalaris:" he had only to be free from the mental pains of remorse and superstition, and fully to realize the natural limits of life. The Epicurean *ἀταραξία* ("absence of disturbance") and the Stoic *ἀπθεια* ("absence of emotion") met like extremes: the Stoic, spurning happiness as an end, and making for wisdom as the means to his highest good—"harmony with universal law"—and accepting the good things obtained by wisdom and harmony only as adjuncts, and the Epicurean aiming at the Stoic's adjuncts by way of the Stoic's highest good, both alike were bent on eliminating the mutabilities of human existence.

Cynicism exaggerated independence, and sought happiness in sardonic indifference; and, as to the Hedonists, who searched for it in the pleasures of sensation (the enjoyment and control of which were to the "sage" the only advantage of intellectual culture), they can hardly be reckoned as at all typical of Greek philosophic thought.

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<sup>1</sup> Comp. Ueberweg's *History of Philosophy*, p. 210.

<sup>2</sup> Diogenes Laertius, x. 132.