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FREUD'S PSYCHOLOGY AND FREUD'S VIEW ON CONSCIENCE

(Continued from *Vol. 5, p. 137*)

§7. PRIMARY AND SECONDARY (OR DISSOCIATED) CONSCIENCE

CONSCIENCE, essentially presupposing moral knowledge and moral insight (intuitive and intellectual), is not equivalent to such knowledge.

Conscience, essentially presupposing moral drives and tendencies as well as immoral inclinations and activities, is not equivalent to the moral drives.

Conscience, finding its most adequate and personally most intimate expression in moral emotional experiences, is only equivalent to those moral emotions, which somehow relate man to his personal moral guilt.

Conscience (bad, warning or good) may be defined as the emotional experience of one's personal relation to (actual, possible or the absence of) moral guilt.

Conscience as the experience of a moral guilt-relation refers man to a possible (or in good conscience: an avoided) danger, the danger of his highest personal welfare somehow being at stake—a danger, wittingly or unwittingly experienced as a threatening from some objective super-personal order not within man's power, might and sphere. This is the source of that serious and severe quality of conscience.¹⁰

Conscience may be either primary or secondary (dissociated).¹¹ In primary conscience man experiences as unity and undivided, as a whole personality his guilt before the Infinite Judge. In secondary conscience man dissociates himself into a "better and higher self" and a "guilty self"; his better self he identifies with the morally elevating drives essential to conscience, his guilty self with the immoral tendencies also essential to conscience; the better self accuses, despises, attacks and punishes his guilty self; here we have the phenomenon of self-chastisement and self-mortification. It is highly significant to distinguish these two kinds of conscience and to see their relation. The primary conscience is the original and genuine conscience; here the whole person is experienced as being guilty and in relation to a

super-personal and objective order ; on account of the depth and comprehensiveness of this experience there is no possibility of apology, of excuse, but self-accusation and self-chastisement,—there is no higher unguilty self, which could dissociate itself from the whole guilty self. When some relief of this first tension is experienced (the endurance of the tension having its limits), the possibility of changing the direction of the view from objectivity to one's own person is given, and at the same time the possibility of the morally elevating drives, essential to conscience, to explicitly assert themselves, with the result that the "better self" criticizes the "guilty self". The "better self" places itself besides the "Infinite Judge" and takes the right to judge and to punish the "guilty self" in his own hands. The experience of conscience is now only a partial experience in so far as one knows his "guilty self" to be his "own self" as well as the other "criticizing self"; the "criticizing self" is not experienced as guilty. The secondary conscience is genuine only in so far as it is founded in the primary conscience. The primary conscience is idio-archic and the secondary conscience founded on the primary conscience is idio-archic too. The secondary conscience, however, gives an opportunity of self-masking, of dissimulation: either "the better self" or the "guilty self" being taken to be the true and real self. When this happens the secondary conscience is unrooted and separated from its foundations in primary conscience. Idio-archic dominion is now lost, and the resulting conscious and unconscious experiences of guilt, or of guiltlessness (e.g. Pharisaism) become autokinetic and are no more genuine conscience. It is this autokinetic and dissimulated conscience (the autokinetic experience of guilt) that Freud has analysed, and has taken to be equivalent to real conscience. Disregarding the frame-determinations of Freud's analysis of this "unreal" conscience, it must be admitted that Freud has done psychology a great service in analysing these phenomena of "would-be-conscience". The analyses prove man's conscious and unconscious misuse even of what he takes to be conscience. Freud's error is in his identification of "real" with this "unreal" conscience.

§8. PROBLEMS OF DEVELOPMENT OF CONSCIENCE

Freud's analysis of conscience is a genetical analysis—the problem of the origin and evolution of conscience commending

itself to his pancausalistic viewpoint of psychical life. In agreement with our phenomenological analysis of conscience definite problems of the evolution of conscience are given. Disregarding the ambiguity of the term and concept of conscience in current literature and the corresponding ambiguities in viewing the origin and development of conscience and confining ourselves to what has been seen to be constitutive of conscience in our phenomenological analysis, the main *formal* problems of evolution of conscience are the following :

1. Does moral knowledge as an essential constituent of conscience originate and develop (*a*) momento-genetically, (*b*) ontogenetically, (*c*) phylogenetically, and (*d*) biogenetically ?
2. Do the moral drives and the immoral inclinations, which also are essential constituents of conscience, originate and develop momento-, onto-, phylo- and bio-genetically ?
3. Does conscience as an idio-archic and emotional experience of one's personal guilt originate and develop momento-, onto-, phylo- and bio-genetically ?

The momento-genetical origination of conscience is equivalent to the spontaneous, free and responsible activity as originating in some definite moment in the individual's life without being dependent as such on a series of preceding causes, although being related to the existent series of constellary conditions.

The onto-genetic development is the individual development from infancy to old age.

The phylo-genetic development is the social development of the race.

Under the bio-genetic development I understand the development posited by evolutionary theory, viz. the development of the lower animal species to the highly cultured human society.

Moral knowledge originates and develops momento-, onto-, and phylo-genetically. Moral and immoral inclinations and drives originate and develop momento- and onto-genetically ; and in so far as the dispositions of them is inherited also phylo-genetically. Conscience as the spontaneous experience of personal guilt originates momento-genetically only. Moral knowledge, moral drives and moral emotions being specifically human, and on account of our frame-rejection of man's evolution from animal being,—a bio-genetic evolution of conscience cannot be accepted.

Conscience, essentially pre-supposing moral knowledge and moral as well as immoral drives has therefore momenta of phylo-, of onto- and of momento-genetical determinations.

These problems of development are formal. The *material* problems bring us in contact with individual differences, individual circumstances, and individual modes of development within the formal kinds of development. They place us before the interactive play of the idio-archic and autokinetic activities in man, as well as of the psychically biotic and the psychically spiritual processes in man, as well as of the emotions, the drives, desires, will, the intuitive and intellectual processes, and so forth. Conscience's integration with the comprehensive field of man's activities requires a many-sided theory of development of conscience.

§9. FREUD'S INTRA-SUBJECTIVE DYNAMISM (AND CAUSALISM)

The above-mentioned problems of development and of evolution of conscience, indicate the necessity of recognizing essential limits to the causal explanation. An unlimited causal explanation, as it is undertaken by Freud, leads to psychical alchemy and gives a distorted and psychologized view of objectivity. Mechanical, organic, autokinetic and idio-archic causalities are qualitatively different and are mutually limited and confined. Objective relations and significances as well as axiological determinations constitute other limits to causality and causal explanation. A pancausalistic mechanism and dynamism cannot do full justice to the un-causal and to the non-mechanical momenta and factors of reality. This is of significance, when analysing conscience from a genetical point of view. The typical individually and profoundly personal momentum of conscience, for instance, may never be sacrificed to the causal and evolutionary viewpoint, it being the most fundamental and free constituent of conscience.

In conscience there is a definite subject-object relation, especially in primary conscience. The objective meaning and significance of guilt, in which relation the subject is placed, the objectivity of moral value, as well as the personal relation of man to the objective Infinite Judge transcend mere subjectivity. To eliminate the subject-independent momenta of objectivity essentially pre-supposed by the experience of conscience, thoroughly distorts this experience. Freud's pancausalism

and dynamism, however, of necessity lead him to disregard the role of objectivity essential to conscience, and compel him to explain conscience intra-subjectively. Thus conscience is bereaved of its objective significance and of its relation to objective reality. Guilt then is a tension between two psychical groups of forces, viz. the ego-forces and the super-ego-forces. To understand this tension, an analysis of the development of the ego and of the super-ego according to Freud is necessary. On the other hand, although Freud distorts the psychical facts in his pan-causalistic point of view (which is a *reductio ad absurdum* of the exclusive use of the inductive method!) he has undoubtedly penetrated most interesting depths of the workings of conscience, and it is worth-while to follow his analysis in order to disentangle the genuine truths discovered from their frame-determinations.

§10. THE EGO, THE SUPER-EGO AND CONSCIENCE ACCORDING TO FREUD

The infant, a small pleasure-seeking being, finds satisfaction in love and in being loved. Its affections towards its own body as well as towards its parents are of a sexual nature—the specific life-drives being sexual-drives (*libido*). This infantile sexuality (one could also say: this infantile desire to live) derives its first satisfactions from two sources (or objects): (*a*) from its own body (auto-erotism, especially in the forms of genital-, anal-, and oral-erotism), and (*b*) from its parents (for instance the son from the sucking of his mother, or in being caressed). These experiences and the educative ideals of the parents come in conflict. These conflicts lead to repressions as well as to the formations of the ego-group of forces and of the super-ego group of forces, the former group mainly developing out of the auto-erotic experiences (together with identifications), the latter group out of the sexual experiences relating to the parents.

The child is not born with an ego, nor with a super-ego, but produces or establishes them. They are groups of forces next to other groups of forces in the psychical domain. All these groups of forces, are with the exception of the preconscious system, relatively independent mechanisms or dynamic systems. They mutually conflict. (*a*) The child is born with a large unconscious domain of inherited forces, mainly of sexual and of mortal nature. (*b*) The child is born in reality—an external

system of forces. (c) The point of contact between the unconscious and reality is a small psychical system, the perceptual system, or, as we perhaps should say: consciousness. (d) This perceptual system leaves traits behind in another system: the preconscious system. This system is a latent and non-dynamic system, whereas the unconscious is active and dynamic. The preconscious is intimately connected with the perceptual system, and is at the same time instrumentary to the unconscious in aiding it to become conscious. (e) and (f) The infantile sexual experiences, their conflicts and resulting repressions lead to the formation of the above-mentioned two new systems of forces of the ego and of the super-ego. To the inherited unconscious is added the repressed unconscious. The influences of reality leading to infantile repressions modify a part of the unconscious, which part is relatively separated from the remaining unconscious (the latter being called the id) and which now occupies an intermediary position between the unconscious and reality. This modified and relatively independent new system of forces is called the ego. The ego is partly unconscious and partly preconscious. Other experiences now effect within the ego a change resulting in the relative separation of the super-ego from the ego. The ego is subject to the claims of the unconscious, to the claims of reality, and to the claims of the super-ego. It tends to harmonize them and is in this sense a kind of organizing mechanism of psychical life, although its organizing potentialities are rather limited. It endeavours to make the id submissive to the claims of reality, to enforce reality to satisfy the wishes of the id by means of muscle activity and to do this in accordance with the demands of the super-ego. Within the ego reason and sobermindedness develop.

The *ego* may perhaps be called the system of self-love, and is dominated by the pleasure-principle (the libido). Originally and still unformed the ego is auto-erotic, deriving its sexual satisfactions from the body. This auto-erotism in time develops to an enlarged system: the experiences of self-pleasure and self-love. This self-love is called narcissism. This mechanism of self-love is strengthened by identifications. The love of some person (object), known to the weak ego, is accepted and may be repressed; the enforced abandonment of the object effects a change in the ego, which is described as the establishing of the lost object in the ego—or an identification of the ego with the lost

object. We thus get in the ego a precipitation of the object-love in form of self-love or ego-love ; this is called an identification. (Should different identifications somehow resist one another, multiple personality may be established.)

After the formation of the ego, the *super-ego* is established. The experiences effecting this new mechanism of forces are called the Oedipus-complex. The first human beings—the first objects and satisfiers of love, as well as the first moral authorities and “repressors” of infantile sexuality, with which the infant comes in contact, are its parents. The attitude of the infant towards its parents is naturally affective. The nature of these affections is essentially the seeking and enjoying of infantile sexual pleasures—the source of many powerful and important conflicts. This “sexual” love towards the parents is rather complicated. The son has a positive feeling (love) towards his mother (the sucking of the breasts, for instance, giving “sexual” satisfaction) and a positive feeling towards his father too, developing into a father identification (the father-ideal within the ego). Both feelings remain for a time co-existent—until the intensifying of the sexual love for the mother and the perception of the father as an obstacle to the satisfaction of this love, effect a jealousy, a dislike, a negative feeling (sexual hate) of the father. Thus the Oedipus-complex comes into being. The relation towards the father is from now onward ambivalent : a relation of love and of hate. This ambivalent attitude towards the father together with the tender love of the mother constitute for the son a simple positive Oedipus-complex. Being psychically bi-sexual, the son's female tendency complicates this complex with an ambivalent attitude towards the mother and a tender love of the father. The shattering to pieces of this complex results in either an intensified father-identification or an intensified mother-identification. (For the son the intensified father-identification is the normal result, whereby his manliness is strengthened.)

This sexual phase, dominated by the Oedipus-complex and its annihilation effects a precipitation in the ego, which is constituted by the somehow compatible identifications of both parents. This change of the ego retains a relatively separate position, and comes into opposition to the other contents of the ego as an ego-ideal, or a super-ego. Henceforth man develops two egos, two mechanisms of forces besides the id and the

perceptual system, and thus multiplies the possibilities of conflicts—but also thus creates the possibilities of cultural achievements, of morals, of religion, of art, and so forth.

By the establishment of the super-ego the ego gained the mastery of the Oedipus-complex and at the same time submitted itself to the claims of the id. As representant of reality (the perceptual system) the ego is opposed by the super-ego, the solicitor of the id. Conflicts between the ego and the super-ego will reflect those between the unconscious and reality. The relation of the super-ego to the id is made more intimate by the fact that the id contains by inheritance the residua of innumerable former ego-existences of the fore-fathers, and that in producing the super-ego the ego possibly only resurrects former ego-structures. The super-ego roots much deeper in the id than the ego on account of this phylogenetic relation as well as on account of its origin from the Oedipus-complex.

Together with the establishment of the super-ego an important complex is formed, which plays a significant role in later life, and especially in the experiences of conscience. It is the *castration complex*. During the development and annihilation of the Oedipus-complex, as well as on account of the infantile auto-erotic practices (e.g. the son's playing with his penis), many parents (according to Freud) threaten the child with severe punishments (e.g. the cutting off of the penis). The child is sexually intimidated—the infantile sexuality is embedded. When discovering the lack of the penis by the girl, the intimidations and fears inspired in the boy by the parents, are again evoked. Such threats and experiences produce in him the fear of castration, which according to the psycho-analysts, plays an important role in later life. Thus the castration-complex is established. This complex does not only arise onto-genetically—its phylogenetic influence is established by heredity. The dread of castration for a thousand years may be acquired and inherited by the id and influence man's behaviour and development. Leaving aside the primitive races we find, according to the psycho-analysts, a mitigated castration even to-day in the ritual circumcision and practically something of the same effect in the celibacy of church-ordinates. The castration-complex manifests itself in dream-symbolizations, in different neuroses, in the fear of conscience, and so forth. The wish to cut a tonsure in some man's hair may be a masked intention to turn him into a monk, i.e. to

castrate him. In many feelings of inferiority this complex becomes manifest. Almost all forms of anxiety betray their origin of the castration-anxiety, and this anxiety may be taken to be a transcendental dread of death.

Conscience now is the super-ego in a special set of relations, to the other mechanisms of psychic life. Of these the central and fundamental relations which constitute conscience are those which effect a tension between the super-ego and the ego. The super-ego, as the heir of the Oedipus-complex, is a mighty exponent of the most important activities and love-destinies of the id, but as the imitation of (or identification with) the strong outer moral authorities (first the father and later the teachers, and other authorities), is the strong inner authority, who "feels itself" responsible for the ego. The commands and prohibitions of the outer authority remain in force within the inner authority, i.e. the super-ego, which, as conscience maintains the moral censorship. The presentations of the ego and the demands of the super-ego conflict, and this tension is experienced as a feeling of guilt. More accurately: the tension between the two systems of forces is equivalent with the super-ego's criticism of the ego, and this criticism is experienced in consciousness as the feeling (or emotion) of guilt. The normal conscious feeling of guilt is an expression of a judgment (criticism) on the ego by the super-ego. When this feeling is unduly intensified, it may be due to processes in the super-ego unknown to the ego, and to the non-submittance of the ego to the insinuations of the super-ego; in such cases repressed drives have influenced the super-ego—the super-ego knowing more of the id, than the ego. The intensifications of guilt-emotions may also be due to the acknowledgment of guilt by the ego and its submittance to the punishments of the super-ego. The feeling of guilt may however also remain unconscious, in which case the ego does not submit itself to the demands and threats of the super-ego and has the power to repress the feeling of guilt. One may even say that due to the origin of conscience in intimate connection with the Oedipus-complex (which belongs to the unconscious) a large part of the feeling of guilt must normally remain unconscious. Man is not only much more immoral, than he believes he is, but also much more moral than he knows himself to be. In all these relations the super-ego proves its independence of the ego, and its intimate relations with the id.

Of the different emotions of guilt (which may become manifest in sorrow, shame, compunction, penitence, fear, and so forth) the *fear* of guilt in conscience deserves a special attention. The higher authorities, which threatened the individual in its infancy with castration, and which were imitated in the construction of the super-ego, effected a fear, a fear of castration. This castration-fear is probably the kernel around which the conscience-fear precipitates; it is the castration-fear which continues as conscience-fear. The fear of conscience, as well as the fear of death (which also becomes manifest in the tension between the ego and the super-ego) are both recastings of the fear of castration.

The former conflicts of the ego with the love-drives and objects of the id (e.g. the Oedipus-complex) are continued between the ego and the heir of the Oedipus-complex, the super-ego. A very marked phenomenon in this conflict is *the seriousness*, the severeness, the strictness, the harshness and the cruelty of conscience—of the super-ego in its criticisms of the ego. Whence this *severity*? We find it also in all moral sentences and decisions—we find it in the moral “ought”, in the categorical imperative. Some cause of this severity may be found in the parents’ compulsion of the child to obey their commands, which the super-ego imitates by identification, when compelling the ego to obey. Freud, however, deems it necessary to ascribe this severity of conscience to much deeper factors, viz. to the influence of the *death-drives* on conscience. The death-drives are manifest in sadism, they are partly diverted to outer objects as aggression, they partly become harmless in being mixed with erotic components, but for the greater part they do unhindered their work—also in conscience. The more man limits his aggressiveness towards others, the more aggressive he becomes in his super-ego, and the more cruel does conscience become. In this aggressiveness we find in the super-ego a replacement of love of the ego by hate.

So in conscience, one of the highest developments of psychic life, the prime ordeal drives: the *death-drives*, which existed before the life- (sexual-) drives, gain influence. The severity of the moral law is ultimately reducible to the severity of “death”. The morality of influence in the super-ego is of a decomposatory nature: the ego is (in analogy with the protists, which are destroyed by the decomposition—products created

by themselves) overpowered by the super-ego. The *morality of society* demands more victims, than it is worth.¹²

§II. A CRITICISM OF FREUD'S VIEW OF CONSCIENCE

This novel theory of conscience will probably be called absurd by the man in the street. It is, as it stands, unacceptable to a Christian view of man and of life. But yet it struggles with profound problems such as are not found in less novel and perhaps more acceptable theories. One may even discover profound truths in the Freudian theory, which are not, I think, simply to be rejected. Some of these are :

- (a) There is no conscience without a conflict of tendencies.
- (b) Conscience is fundamentally an emotional experience.
- (c) This emotional experience is an experience of a tension.
- (d) Conscience is an experience of moral guilt.
- (e) In experiencing conscience man experiences himself in a relation of danger.
- (f) Conscience has a very serious character in consequence of this danger.
- (g) This danger is somehow related to death.

Although Freud and the Christian psychologist will interpret these mutually accepted theses differently, it is of significance to note these correspondences as well as the depth of the problems with which they are concerned. If Freud's researches lead him to begin with the conflicts essential to man's nature and to risk the allowing of the death-drives a dominating role in the experience of conscience—the relations of conflict and conscience and of conscience and death is for the Christian psychologists an even more burning scientific problem, especially if one acknowledges the intimate relation between conscience and conflict and between conscience and death posited in the third chapter of Genesis. The personal danger experienced in conscience relates man objectively to an infinite judge of his activities; should it be impossible and improbable to accept some subjective determination of conscience by or in relation to some principle of death? At any rate Freud places the Christian psychologist before a very definite scientific problem of unique import—his own solution of the problem challenging a critical answer.

The conflict of tendencies Freud explains autokinetically (the conflict of the ego-mechanism and the super-ego mechanism), whereas in genuine conscience idio-archic activities must be acknowledged. Freud sees the conflict only intra-subjectively, whereas in genuine primary conscience the conflict is experienced: (*a*) as one between man and his Infinite Judge; genetically, however, conscience is based on (*b*) the conflict between the morally elevating tendencies and the immoral tendencies. Freud subjectifies the axiological momenta of these tendencies, the moral values being subjective criteria copied from the dictates of society. Of an *objective* moral order, and of *objective* moral standards Freud's psychology knows nothing. In consequence the moral guilt has no objective significance and meaning, but is only a subjective tension between two dynamic mechanisms (*viz.* the ego and the super-ego). This tension—the criticism of the super-ego—is not to be understood teleologically, e.g. the super-ego positing some genuine end for the ego's activities and acknowledging objective criteria. There is *no* genuine teleology in Freud's theory of drives. There is as much teleology in Freud's system of dynamic activities (e.g. the drives seeking satisfaction, opposing repression, using symbolization or sublimation to attain their ends, etc.) as there is in a stone falling ("striving") to the earth (the end, or satisfaction), or in a balloon rising ("striving") to the heavens (the end), or in an oscillating magnet "striving" to attain the "rest"-position (the satisfaction, or the end). In a Christian psychology the objectivity of moral values, of moral standards, of moral guilt, of the implied moral guilt-relation of man to his Judge, of genuine ends, and of genuine teleology will always be defended. The influence of "moral authority" (the parents, the teachers, the church, etc.) on man and on conscience must be acknowledged. This however does not imply that the experience of conscience is objectively false, and still less that it is subjective only.

With reference to the castration-complex—one of the wild assumptions of Freud, and based on a false view of the facts supposed to constitute this complex—it must be noted that we have here some very profound problems. Rejecting the special sexual nature of this complex, we find in the experience of conscience something analogical to the danger of castration. In conscience we have the reassertion of idio-archic activity in contrast to the surrender to autokinetic sin-activities. The

surrender to autokinetic activity in general signifies ultimately *depersonalization*. In dream-activity, in the hypnotized state,¹³ in neuroses, in *Zwangphenomene*, in passionate experiences, in crowd-activities,¹⁴ etc. autokinetic processes dominate, which means that the psychic activities act on their own accord, that is: not under personal dominion, not idio-archically. Depersonalization was a danger before conscience was aroused, and becomes again a danger in secondary conscience unrooted out of primary conscience. It is a danger in immoral behaviour. In the fear of conscience the fear of depersonalization (and the fear of death, which is related to it) may probably play a role; this becomes evident when this fear is seen as an ontic¹⁵ fear; the ontic fear cannot be understood biologically or sociologically but only "theally"; it is the profound morally guilty fear of the Judge, man being ontically dependent on Him.

To criticize Freud's concept of the ego is here hardly necessary. With reference to the super-ego: there is no super-ego in the same sense as we generally accept the ego. Freud, however, ascribes to the super-ego the same actuality, factuality and concrete position as to the ego. On the other hand it must be admitted that although there *is* no super ego, our ideals of ourselves do influence our activities and have in this sense concrete significance.

Fully admitting the influence of the moral authorities even as examples on the formation of the ideals of our own selves, I think it absurd to see this relation sexualistically. Admitting too the role which self-love plays in moral activities—even in conscience—it is a false analysis of this phenomenon, when it is reduced to sexual satisfactions. It is not necessary to enter upon this analysis any further here. Only one interesting question may be put to Freud in this connection. Conscience may be aroused when justified self-love has been subordinated to unjustified dictates of moral authorities, represented subjectively by the "super-ego". In that case the ego should criticise the super-ego in the phenomenon of conscience. This however Freud does not allow. Is it impossible for the ego to admit former enslavement to wrong ideals given by the super-ego, and to feel worried about it in conscience, the super-ego thus being the culprit and the ego the criticizer?

That Freud drew our attention to autokinetic or "unreal" conscience and endeavoured an analysis of these phenomena—

that he analysed the abnormal feelings of guilt, even of moral guilt—that he estimated actual dangers of the consciously and unconsciously abnormal (autokinetic) feelings of guilt to the health and sanity of personality—that he pointed out that the morality of society may even demand victims—all these are merits, which may not be underestimated. The assertions of Freud that the morality of society demands more victims than it is worth—is in a sense true even of some Christian society. Do we not know of cases where morality was maintained and effected without true love, and where loveless, severe and harsh threats of punishment of hell prevailed, without acknowledging the love of God? Can it be denied that in such cases Christian morality demanded victims autokinetically enslaved to the fear of hell? The Christian faith is, as is known, no sentimental, timid and tender faith—but it is on the other hand a faith of love. A severe, loveless and self-righteous attitude of Christians may undoubtedly do much harm. The harm done and the victims demanded are however not to be attributed to Christian morality as such, but (*a*) to the irresponsible conduct of some Christians in maintaining the moral standards of society, and (*b*) to many of the so-called victims themselves in being originally inclined to their special kind of victimization.

In the criticism of Freud's view of conscience we have however begged the crucial problem.

It is possible to go a very long way with an unlimited causal explanation of conscience. Let us essay such an analysis with the use of the phenomenon of transference of emotions. An emotion may under certain circumstances be transferred from one object to another. Fear of an attacking snake may in a child be transferred from the snake to a dog, wagging its tail, and from this dog to any dog, and from any dog to any animal. Hate of a particular girl may be transferred to her whole family, and from the family to every one professing the same religion as the family. (A parallel series of phenomena we find in the phenomena of conditioned reactions.) It is not impossible that some individual should make the moral codes of society his own in a parrot-like way, without ever attaining an own idio-archic conviction of the truth of the moral standards accepted. His subjection to these standards has been effected by punishment and rewards, by pleasure and pain. We as yet have here no personal dominion of the convictions and actions. Likewise this individual may

have attained religious convictions and religious life in this way. On a certain occasion he did something of which his society or his own habit of judging disapproved. Fear of punishment, strengthened by former fears of punishment, masters him. This fear he transfers to the deity autokinetically accepted in his imagination. Autokinetic feelings of guilt (conscious and unconscious) combine with and intensify this fear. He may conduct himself exactly as another individual, who experiences genuine idio-archic and primary conscience. As far as an observer may judge outwardly no difference in conduct between these two "conscience-smitten" individuals can be discerned. Take for instance the case of Dostojewski's Raskolnikow: Is his intensive experience of conscience idio-archically normal or auto-kinetically abnormal? Where does genuine conscience begin and "unreal" conscience end? What are the criteria which distinguish between the "consciences" of the two individuals given above? If there is no specific criterion of distinction to decide when conscience is genuine and when not, and if the one is feasibly explained in a thoroughgoing causal way, why should the other not be likewise explicable, and thoroughgoingly explicable, in mere casual terms? If the fear of God in one case is nothing but a transplacéd fear of society to a god autokinetically accepted in imagination, what reason is there to maintain that the fear of the other, which does not differ in any way, as far as we can see, from the fear of the first, is a genuine fear of an objective and existent God? Do we not speak of the conscience of animals, e.g. of a dog—and does the dog not "conduct" himself almost in the same way as man with a guilty conscience? Yet it is maintained that the animal has no conscience, and principally cannot have the experience of conscience.

We must at this point distinguish between genuine conscience, autokinetic conscience and pseudo-conscience. The dog's conscience is no conscience at all and the dog's behaviour, as if it had a conscience, we call pseudo-conscience. This conscience is thoroughgoingly explicable in biological terms, and without the use of autokinetic and of idio-archic activities. It is nothing but complicated responsive activity. The memory of former punishments, when for instance stealing meat, and the appearance or the fear of the appearance of the master at the crucial moment of theft, may explain the dog's conscience-like

reaction. The dog, however, reacts in the same way, when perceiving or fearing to perceive a threatful attitude of some other stronger dog, well known to him in former fights. That the reactions in many children are many a time nothing but experiences of this kind of pseudo-conscience may be admitted. Only, the child has the possibility of genuine and of autokinetic experiences of conscience, and of discerning objective moral values—which we cannot attribute to animals.

In a thoroughgoing causal explanation of conscience, we may either endeavour to reduce genuine conscience to autokinetic causality or to responsive causality (the S.R. principle), or to partly responsive and partly autokinetic causality. There are phenomena, called conscience, which are explicable autokinetically (e.g. the experiences of conscience of abnormals, analysed by Freud) and other phenomena called conscience, which are explicable on the S.R. principle. Outwardly all these phenomena, together with those of genuine conscience—may not be so easily distinguishable, and in genuine conscience the other phenomena, called conscience, may partly play some role—and even generally do. To convince a consistent Freudian and a consistent Behaviourist of the factuality of genuine idio-archic conscience is almost impossible, in so far as generally accepted criteria of distinctions of these phenomena of conscience do not exist.

To do this one may endeavour to collect examples of the experiences of conscience, which can hardly be analysed either autokinetically or with the S.R. principle. Let us take the example of Judas Iscariot. He could not have had a fear of society, when he hanged himself, as he merited social praise for his betrayal. To explain this phenomenon on the S.R. principle feasibly is not so easy, if possible. To explain it autokinetically as a transplacement of some fear to the fear of the idea of God is not convincing. But still, collect as many examples as you may wish to—the Psycho-analyst and the Behaviourist will always find and risk explanations, however unconvincing and artificial—without finally admitting the presence of idio-archic activities, which their frames do not allow them to observe.

There is, however, another mode of refuting the unlimited causal explanations of genuine conscience. This is the appeal to your own experiences. If you discern an essential difference between genuine, autokinetic and pseudo-conscience, just as you

discern a difference between dreaming and waking consciousness, and if you are convinced of the genuine objectivity of moral values, of the moral guilt experienced, and of the existence of God, if you clearly see the nature of idio-archic activity, as it functions in genuine conscience—then it simply is impossible for you to explain all conscience unlimitedly causalistically. To prove your analyses of conscience to others, who do not accept your ultimates—your frame—is impossible, however much you may appeal to objective facts—they observing the same facts in the light of other frame-determinations. But then you may insist, that he, who is acutely aware of the voice of conscience in himself, has the most right to analyse it ; and you will find that those who are keenly sensitive to the summons of conscience, generally decline to analyse it either autokinetically or with the S.R. principle. The psycho-analyst may essay to refute your analysis by attributing it to your unconscious resistance to see the facts in their psycho-analytical light, but the only possible reply in this case is to point out to the psycho-analyst how he psycho-analytically is determined to be blind to the idio-archic activity, and how his psychic constitution necessitates him to see life psycho-analytically. To this argument may be added that, whatever the causes of some experience or other, the truth of the contents of the experience is not necessarily refuted with the disclosure of the pedigree of the experience. In this connection it may be well to draw the attention of the reader to Professor Jessop's interesting and important article on Psychology and Religion.¹⁶ Finally the connection of these phenomena with others and with your view of God, man and life will corroborate the distinctions between these phenomena you accept. It must be admitted that the application of these distinctions to particular cases will at times be extremely difficult.

§12. CONCLUDING REMARKS

In this article I have followed more the intention to give a positive and reconstructive criticism of the Freudian theory than to criticize it negatively. I am convinced that the Christian thinkers may learn much even from Freud. On the other hand it must be admitted that in this reconstructive criticism not much of Freudianism is left. The whole Freudian frame has to be shattered to pieces. Freudianism as a whole is unacceptable to Christianity. To the Christian view of things there is very

much that is perverse and absurd in the ideas of Freud. Not all points to be criticized could be touched upon in this article. But still I think that the Christian psychologist in his attitude towards Freud must follow the midway between a whole-hearted acceptance and a whole-hearted rejection of the Freudian psychology. He may batter the form to pieces, and reject the false material, but he would be unwise to lose the genuine material. The Christian psychology accepts sin to be an active principle in man. The methods and workings of sin, especially the unconscious influence of sin on man's doings and comings, may to a high extent be well understood in accepting Freud's genuine facts of man's universally conflicting nature, and of the destinations of the conflicts, but wholly disentangled from the frame-structures of his psychology.

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¹⁰ Compare my Phenomenological Analysis of Conscience in this QUARTERLY (1932).

¹¹ Compare my *Das Gewissen* (Cohen, Bonn), pp. 60-64, 171-172.

¹² Cf. with reference to this paragraph the following works of Freud: *Das Ich und das es, Teseits des Lust-prinzips, Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psycho-Analyse*.

¹³ The hypnotized state is partly auto-kinetic and partly conditionedly responsive—it is a depersonalized state conditioned (in reaction) on the suggestions of the hypnotizer.

¹⁴ Crowd-activity is partly also conditionedly responsive.

¹⁵ Cf. my *Das Gewissen*, pp. 149-154.

¹⁶ THE EVANGELICAL QUARTERLY, April, 1931.