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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CALVINISM FOR THE REFORMATION OF PHILOSOPHY

(Continued from *Vol. 3, p. 403.*)

VI

Now that I have come to the history of partial theism brevity is necessary. I shall merely indicate the main divisions, though I may at times go into greater detail.

INTRODUCTION

In the science of religion there are usually two contradictory views. The one believes that mankind advances continually; the other that there is no trace of such progress.¹

It would carry us too far afield to go into this matter in detail. But we must say just one word to indicate our own viewpoint. He who reckons with the Word-revelation must think that both of these views are very superficial. That which decides the matter of progress or retrogression is the attitude in respect to God and His Word. But as soon as one grants this, he stands above these alternatives, for all people do not agree in this matter of the Word-revelation. But then the theme of the rejection or acceptance of progress must be replaced by the difference in the attitude toward the Word-revelation and by the modifications of this difference during the various periods of history.

If we reckon with this, we no longer see the philosophy of a particular people, for instance the Greeks, as an unbroken unity which is hid during the time of the Middle Ages only to be revived again with its old power at the epoch of the Renaissance. No, for then we see that there was first of all a time in which the words of God were hidden from the peoples outside of Israel (A), and then a period during which the words of God were made known to the peoples outside of Israel, either fructifying their thinking, or else compelling contradiction (B). It is clear that such a division which is controlled by principles offers practical

¹ Dr. A. A. VAN SCHELVEN, *De idee van den vooruitgang*, Kampen, J. H. Kok, 1927; Dr. K. KUYPERS, *Theorie en Geschiedenis voornamelyk met betrekking tot de cultuur*, Amsterdam, H. J. Paris, 1931, pp. 129-136.

gain : patristics, for instance, is not set loose from its surroundings, but is left in closest contact with them, and the limiting reference to the beginning of the Renaissance also falls away.

Now that we have found a workable division, the question arises whether the history of partial theism may not be limited somewhat in this scheme of things. This can be done without surrendering even for a moment to a questionable Europeanism. Remembering the practical purpose of this publication, I desire to pursue the history of partial theism only in so far as it has significance for philosophic thinking in our own sphere of culture, and thus also for West-European philosophy.

In this chapter, as I have promised, I will not go farther than the time of the great Reformation.

(A) PARTIAL THEISTIC THOUGHT IN EUROPE BEFORE THE PREACHING OF THE GOSPEL

1. Another occasion for being brief is offered by concentrating our attention upon the Greek and Hellenistic philosophy, but naturally, not as if these stand entirely apart from the reflection of the peoples which surrounded them. Whoever entertains such a thought is holding fast to a prejudice which cannot any longer be maintained for any sub-division of South-European culture. But this danger of oneness can be avoided if one pays attention to the connecting links.

That these connecting links are important also for philosophy becomes clear as soon as one makes a closer study of THALES. A half century ago TANNERY¹ in his genial way already showed that this first Milesian had acquired his very extended knowledge in the sphere of arithmetic, geometry, irrigation-engineering and astronomy almost entirely in Egypt, which, as one knows, was open for the Greeks since the restoration under the Saïetic Pharaohs, of which hospitality the Greeks, in large numbers,² made use. His cosmogony is rooted in the myth—as was already seen in ancient times³—but not, as ARISTOTLE thought, in the Greek, but in the Egyptian myth.⁴ It is later on that Babylonian motives are added.

¹ P. TANNERY, *Pour l'histoire de la science. De Thalès à Empédocle* ², Paris, Gauthier-Villars et Cie, 1930, pp. 54-83; JOHN BURNETT, *Early Greek Philosophy*, 4th ed., London, A. C. Black, 1930, pp. 40-50.

² A. MORET, *Le Nil et la civilisation égyptienne*, Paris, La Renaissance du livre, 1926, p. 403.

³ AETIUS, I, 3.

⁴ See TANNERY, as above.

A myth¹ is a story concerning the origin of the world or the history of mankind such as could be told only by heathen, that is, by people who in their pseudo-religion did not recognise the boundary between God and the cosmos. The result was—and we remember here the great influence which THALES exerted not only upon the Milesians, but also upon the tradition of all of Greek philosophy—that this philosophy had a pagan character from the very beginning.

2. It is because of this, that, when the human need to worship something arises here, it must always direct itself to something within the cosmos: one sees this clearly in the theistic idea concerning creation or a part of it.

The first line—that which runs from PARMENIDES via SPEUSIPPOS to Neoplatonism—need not be discussed here because we are concerned only with the history of *partial* theism.

The second line soon reveals a difference.

On the one side there stand HERACLITUS and PROTAGORAS; and on the other side PLATO and ARISTOTLE. Both groups have this in common, that they regard a part of the cosmos as being sovereign. Their difference consists in this, that while the “Nominalists” say that this sovereignty has come up from below and thus they teach a certain evolution, the “Realists” think that the sovereign part of creation has come down from the higher to the lower region and they are thus advocates of the descent of these functions. In other words: the Nominalists view this sovereignty as having originated *a posteriori*, the Realists as existing *a priori* and as descending from above.

It can be understood now why the statement of the problem: “Realism or Nominalism,” cannot be accepted as long as one uses these terms in the historical meaning which is given them when thus placed over against each other. For both are partial theistic and imagine that God shares His sovereignty with part of creation.

3. This is very well known as far as Nominalism is concerned: the pride of HERACLITUS is notorious. But the great Realists of the ancient day are usually looked upon with more favour. And this can be understood when one calls to mind the many touches which the Eclecticism of heathens and Christians put on their image. But the farther research goes back to the

¹ DR. R. HÖNIGSWALD, *Die Philosophie des Altertums*, Probleme schichtliche und systematische Untersuchungen, München, E. Reinhardt, 1927, pp. 23-50.

original, the more it becomes clear how much the real image is unintentionally falsified. Imagine that in our time someone wanted to make consumption-communism obligatory upon those who are better situated, even to go so far as to have it control married life—would one put him in the category of the left wing or of the right wing? And then when one knew about this opponent that he was not only guilty of pederasty, but that he considered this sin to be a part of his pedagogical system, would one not warn the youth against such a leader? Well, such a leader was—PLATO!

Will you notice that I am not just taking the sin of a man so that in this indirect and impermissible way I may pass a superficial judgment upon the complex of his thinking? No, we are concerned here with nothing more or less than an ideal of state and of a pedagogical system!¹ And then one tastes very keenly the heathen quality in the thinking of anyone who preaches such ideals and constructs such a system.

“But,” so someone will very likely ask, “does this accusation of paganism touch *Realism*?” The answer must be: “Undoubtedly.”

Let me show you why this answer is unavoidable.

In the first place, will you remember that “Realism” does not stand here over against “Irrealism,” “Illusionism,” and similar terms? On the contrary, this “Realism” which is placed over against “Nominalism” has also been called “Metaphysical *Idealism*,” and that quite properly. What must we understand by that? This, that the ideas, notice, the results of our comprehending activity, are viewed as existing before our activity, and it claims that they have an existence outside of our thinking; it even values this extra-mental existence so highly that the advocate of this conception thinks that every other being has either entirely or partly come forth out of ideas! That is why this “objectivism” is nothing but rank humanism. Is already this error with necessity leading to an untenable conception as to the not-human earthly creatures, the part assigned to the leading figures of state in connection with the discovery of these overesteemed ideas, and their deification, which makes Realism for us wholly rejectable. Then it really makes very little difference whether PLATO and ARISTOTLE deify those who shape

¹ M. H. E. MEIJER, *Histoire de l'amour grec dans l'antiquité*, augmentée d'un choix de documents originaux et de plusieurs dissertations complémentaires par L. R. DE POGÉY-CASTRIES, Paris, Stendhal et Compagnie, 1930, pp. 84 and 124-146.

and lead the state, or whether non-philosophising heathen, as Isaiah describes them more than once, bow down before artfully-carved *idols of wood or stone*, leading figures of state belong to the kosmos as well as any work of art wrought by an artist.

So much about Realism in general. Just a word about the difference between PLATO and ARISTOTLE.

4. PLATO¹ was a born Athenian. He borrows the main scheme for his philosophy from the creative activity of the artists whose statuary had so greatly enriched Athens: the demiurge uses material and form, both of which are passive in his active hand, in order to give the material the form he desires. We find the same motif in his theory of knowledge, which views knowledge as a union of an individual *a priori* form which has been drawn from higher forms, with a given material. In the same way, one easily recognises the same idea in his project of an ideal state, where the enlightened despot draws the individual form for the life of the lower strata of the people from the state-life in general only to limit this life by its military form.

5. ARISTOTLE, notwithstanding a few points of agreement, differs widely from PLATO! He was born in Macedonia, where he was acquainted with a national life in which the ruler, although to begin with an outsider, yet integrated this national life and led it on to its completion.² Having crossed over to Athens, he was not able for some time to withdraw himself from the influence of PLATO. After PLATO's death, he spent quite some time outside of the Greek world, and as a result he came to stand farther away from his master.³ He still speaks of form and material; but these terms have with him an entirely different meaning from PLATO's use of them: form and material do not exist at the outset either without the other, so that an artist's hand is needed to bring them together; besides, according to his view, the form is not passive: no, form and activity are fused and the active form which is immanent in the substance rules the passive material and thus, as entelechy (having perfection), carries the thing from its potential condition to its goal. But human life is by nature equipped for social intercourse.

¹ For the newer literature on PLATO see H. LEISEGANG, *Die Platondeutung der Gegenwart*, Karlsruhe, i. Baden. G. Braum, 1929.

² F. GRANIER, *Die makedonische Heeresversammlung*, ein Beitrag zum antiken Staatsrecht (= Münchener Beiträge zur Papyrusforschung und antiken Rechtsgeschichte, Heft 13), München, C. H. Beck, 1931, pp. 1-54.

³ W. JAEGER, *Aristoteles*, Grundlegung einer Geschichte seiner Entwicklung, Berlin, 1923.

As a result the entelechy for this life is not an individual one, but brings social life to a unity. Thus a ruler integrates his people, and a scholar his circle of disciples.

6. We need also to make a distinction in Nominalism. First of all, between the Greek and the Hellenistic, and in the Hellenistic between the theory of EPICURUS and that of the STOICS, and finally in the last mentioned group between the so-called old and the middle-STOICS.

As far as the first point is concerned, the difference between the Greek and the Hellenistic Nominalism is seen especially in this, that the first is purely functionalistic,¹ and the second, especially with ZENO, is not at first of that character.

The second difference, that between EPICURUS and the STOICS, needs only to be mentioned: the materialistic ideas of the former were never united with Christian motives² so that they need not be spoken of here.

Matters were different with the Stoics. As we have said, we make a distinction here between the old-Stoics and the middle-Stoics who were strongly influenced by their contact with the Romans.

7. The first difference mentioned begins not with the result, but with the inner activity. There is really but *one* life which both displays and hides itself in millions of faces (prosopa). A form here is not an unchangeable, applied norm (PLATO), or a ruling power (ARISTOTLE), but merely the outside of the *one* life which is naturally entirely dependent upon the tension-size of activity which they call "physical" (the ousia according to the Stoic conception). It is from this point of view that the conception of the State and the theory of knowledge of ZENO³ the Stoic is to be understood.

We speak first of his view concerning the life of the State. The coryphæi of this school came up from the people, which was not the case with the great Realists. And that was in a time when, on the one hand, generals decided the lot of the nation

¹ W. Graf, UXXULL-GYLIENBAND, *Griechische Kultur-Entstehungslehren* (Bibliothek für Philosophie, 26), Berlin, L. Simon Nf., 1924, pp. 15-24.

² This is to be explained by the fact that EPICURUS, although not an atheist, does think of the gods, which seem to him—as they do to other Greek philosophers—to belong to the world, loose from human life: see ED. SCHWARTZ, *Charakterköpfe der antiken Literatur*, Zweite Reihe (2nd ed.), Leipzig, B. G. Teubner, 1911, pp. 42-45.

³ DR. D. H. TH. VOLIENHOVEN, *Het nominalisme van Zeno den Stoicyn*, in *Wetenschappelyke Bydragen, aangeboden door hoogleraren der Vrije Universiteit ter gelegenheid van haar vyftigjarig bestaan*, Amsterdam, N. V. Dagblad en Drukkery De Standaard, 1930, pp. 175-204.

without acknowledging them at all, and on the other hand—as happens in a territorial-state—the political interests of great masses of people approached the freezing point. Because of that, every project of an ideal state (PLATO) as well as all appreciation for a national state (ARISTOTLE) is lacking in the leaders of the old-Stoic school: the State is nothing more than an external thing: the citizens among whom they had a great following (these citizens having no offices and often no rights) tired of the countless arbitrary boundary lines, but being real cosmopolites, asked only about the immanent culture-spirit—the pneuma, in the Stoic sense of the word.

In the second place, we mention this school's theory of knowledge. It cannot proceed from the concepts and ideas: these are but results of conceiving and understanding, and thus are no more than the precipitation of the activity. And so observation and understanding are placed in the foreground here. In the very nature of the case, one can make little objection to this; but the Stoic does run aground with the thought that the theory of knowledge may neglect the results of this activity. In the long run it could not shut its eyes to this inactive factor which according to them was the non-physical. I must return to this point later on, so that I limit myself here to the main point. Now, the Stoics are entirely wrong in the way in which they view the relation between the inner result and the outside world. Nominalism has this in common with the Realists, that it includes both under one head. Difference is seen first of all, in defining the relation between idea and the outside world. The Realists very correctly recognise a relation between inner thinking and the outside world, but reckon the ideas to be part of the outside world. On the other hand, the Stoics rightly maintain that the ideas are results of inner activity and—according to their view lying at the circumference—belong to *us*, but reckon the outside world to be part of the circumference of the Self! From this they get their proposition that whoever knows the content of his own consciousness also knows the world, and because of this the theory of knowledge has as its task merely the analysing of one's own content of consciousness with the help of language.

8. Since the political life left the people of the Hellenistic period just as cold as did the plastic art of the classical period, it does not surprise us that the Stoics, who looked for the centre

of life in the Self, gained a great following in the kingdoms of the successors of Alexander the Great. At first matters were different among the Romans. To be sure circumstances changed there too shortly after 300 B.C. : in 275 the Ptolemies became friends with the Romans and in 268 Rome became part of the Hellenistic commercial world by the introduction of the silver money standard ; nor must we forget that the expansion-politics of Rome reached the outer borders of Italy about 250 : for with the conquering of those outside territories—in 241 Sicily became the first province—the new motif of military action, namely the advancement of commerce and manufacture, gets the upper hand over the old motif which had a view to helping along agricultural pursuits. But in spite of all of this, they still clung to the old theory in the matter of state officers, namely, that the State is autonomous and that its might is but incorporated in the officer-bearer. Although this conception is in the nature of the case pagan, we must admit that it certainly does not fit in with the Stoic disdain for the State.

But here, too, the course of events helped along the Stoics. Colonial politics deteriorated into loose farming and in this, as usual, those with the least scruples received the greatest benefits. The better elements regretted the change and pleaded for the maintenance of the old morals and warned against the individualism of the Greek philosophy. But to no avail : the young nobles looked with disdain upon these monitors and the Latin translation of a Cyrenaic writing put on the stage by ENNIUS, but thought that the Stoics who were much more serious were much less dangerous.

This approach was not left unanswered. Of the Stoics PANÆTIUS was the man appointed to bridge the gap. The first disciples of ZENO had already seen that one cannot get along merely with activity, and since ZENO had put activity and corporeality on the same plane, they now also admitted something non-corporeal, the so-called "asomata."¹ As long as one remained consistent, all the non-active needed to be brought under this head, that is, all that the Stoics were at a loss to classify : CHRYSIPPUS, for instance, called even time an *asomaton* since one could hardly view it as something active. At this point the criticism of PANÆTIUS begins : he was less of a fanatic for activity than were his masters and he also counts non-active

¹ EMILE BRÉHIER, *La Théorie des incorporels dans l'ancien stoïcisme*, Paris, J. Vrin, 1928.

time to be real. This change is so important for just this reason, that it placed him in a position to justify the historic consciousness which was present in a much greater degree in the Romans of that time than in the Greeks who had long since lost their hold of their old connections. The corrections which he brought in the theory of morals are equally important: the person rising up out of the *ousia*, a *prosopon* of the *one* life was, even though sovereign, not yet entirely loose from his surrounding: even external things can promote the inner happiness; which does not mean that one must stand apathetically over against the external world, if one but sees to it that the cheerfulness of the spirit, the *euthymia*, does not suffer because of it. And—last, but not least—*PANÆTIUS* perceived that the placing of the ethical above the juridical had this consequence, that the ethical life could not miss the State but could lean upon it in case this State and its cultus did not come into conflict with the cosmopolitan culture-spirit—later on called *humanitas* by the Romans—and thus took in the whole inhabited world—the *oikoumene*—and, since every person is an autocrat, has a mixed “form of state.”

The bridge was finished: the Roman aspirations for world dominion and the original Stoic who was an enemy of the State, had found each other. Young nobles, such as *SCIPIO ÆMILIANUS*, welcomed this theory with warm appreciation. They did not see that the lot of the Roman state was sealed with the advancing of this view. But it was to appear in a very short time how dangerous the guide was to whom they had entrusted themselves. The decay began here, too, in the higher circles: the office-bearers who had been infected by the Stoics did not any more consider themselves to be functionaries of a state which was autonomous according to the old Roman conception, but, as autocrats, and were soon speaking more of right than they were of obligation. This introduced the period of civil war. At the outset one of the parties sought the support of the people: in the time of *TIBERIUS GRACCHUS* the public assembly, which up to this time had been but an organ of the State, is placed for one moment—notwithstanding its great size!—on the same plane with the State, and a little later there breaks out the often unscrupulous strife between the *optimates* and the *populares*. It is no wonder when the Romans experienced more and more the results of the great migration of peoples which had been

going on for now a considerable time, that the idea of the principality should arise.¹ It is the old story: Nominalism first of all preaches that everyone is an autocrat, and then later when the practical consequences appear untenable, they honour the princeps, not because he is clothed with the highest authority, but only because he is the strong man, the *divus Augustus*, who can bring order out of the chaos. In that way it remains true to its point of departure, declaring that the individual is autonomous. The voluntarism which characterises the jurisprudence of the late-Roman period is thus seen to be at the same time a projection of Nominalism, and a reaction against its most consistent application.

Not the Gospel, but the Hellenistic philosophy razed Rome to the ground.

(B) PARTIAL THEISTIC THOUGHT IN EUROPE AFTER THE PREACHING OF THE GOSPEL

9. Now that we have stated what the chief content of the Scripture was, and have reviewed the most outstanding representatives of partial theistic views in the Greek and Hellenistic world, we come to a discussion of partial theistic thought in Europe after the preaching of the Gospel.

If we ask ourselves the question as to what the Christians who lived before the great Reformation did with the fundamental thoughts of Scripture, a sharp difference between two periods strikes us. In the first period, which lasted until about 1250, we find that many, in their need for a Christian philosophy, sought to find it in all manner of syntheses between Scriptural thoughts and Greek-Hellenistic motives; in the second period, in the time between 1250 and 1510, we notice the unsurmountable differences between those two elements that were formerly bound together so naïvely, and we note that the efforts after syntheses are greatly on the decrease.

I. THE PERIOD OF THE SYNTHESSES

10. In this period we can distinguish between the age of the Fathers and the Middle Ages.

¹ JULIUS KAERST, *Scipio Amilianus, die Stoa und der Prinzipat*, in *Neue Jahrbücher für Wissenschaft und Jugendbildung*, 5 (1929), 6, pp. 654-675.

a. The Syntheses of the Fathers

II. Now that I pass on to a consideration of Christian philosophic thinking which did not see the great differences between various pagan motives and the basic thoughts of the Scriptures, we need to distinguish very sharply between heart and function, the centre of life and the expressions of life, and—in correlation with it—between regeneration and conversion on the part of Christians. The question as to whether the thinkers who will come up later on for discussion knew God in the face of Jesus Christ is certainly not answered negatively when we say that we cannot agree with the results of their thinking. Whoever believes in the forgiveness of sins will not think in mean or low terms of the grace of God at this point. But that does not hinder him at the same time from bringing their conceptions up to the touchstone of the Word of God, and, if necessary, from uttering a disapproving judgment upon them.

In the second place, we shall do well to pay attention to the difference between those believers who accept the Word of God with a hearty faith, and who never feel the urge to work out the fundamental conceptions of Christianity, and those who, as long as this task of working out is not done, feel that there is a gap. The last named group as such are not at a disadvantage. But the impulse that they obey becomes injurious when their little faith leads them to join the Word of God with so much that is contrary to it.¹ That difference obtains in the period now under consideration. Upon careful reflection it appears that very often just those who in their time were hailed as coryphæi of syntheses, were weak in the faith. Without a doubt, there is hid in that fact a tragedy which we would gladly pass over. We are not animated in this research by a desire to uncover the weaknesses of these Christians. Rather, it behooves us to be mindful of the word: "Wherefore let him that thinketh he standeth take heed lest he fall." But the conviction that the injury which would befall Christian life in case we did not find out where it was mistaken, would gradually become immense, imposes on this research a task which may not be evaded.

¹ Do not confuse this view with that of HARNACK and others, who are of the opinion that the Gospel came up out of a milieu that was originally without culture! In the first place, that is historically not true. And in the second place, it leads one to this: that after he has shed a tear à la ROUSSEAU over the lost innocence of the first era, he goes on to link up the data of Scripture with the pagan motives in Hellenistic thought, which is necessary for the development of things. On the other hand, we must guard against the danger of overlooking the elements of good in Greek thought; for instance, there is a very true element in the criticism of Socrates on the sophists. And there is no reason why one should not recognise this. But this does not include permission to accept the pagan factors in this thinking.

12. That is why we like to examine everything which can in any way explain the mistakes of many Christians in the ancient times, although these mistakes cannot be extenuated.

There was, to begin with, the eclectic characteristic in all Hellenistic thought, which was more anxious to reach an agreement in its results—no matter how artificial it might be—rather than to point out the real distinctions between various tendencies. Just as, for instance, VARRO argued away the differences between the Academy, the Lyceum and the Stoics—and these differences were certainly not small—so others were happy to admit into their own religion products of Oriental derivation. Later on they were willing to permit of a new synthesis between this pseudo-religion and their speculative thought that ignored boundaries. All this proved to be very easy because they had become accustomed to identify philosophising with piety. The heathen among the Hellenists, as long as they remained impenitent, naturally overlooked the difference between true and false, between the Gospel for man and according to man, so that the word of the Kingdom was for them nothing more than one Eastern product among many others.

If it was difficult for the Christians in the Hellenistic world to withdraw themselves from the influence of this urge after syntheses, it was even more difficult to place themselves over against partial theism in the way of critical reflection. For this type of theism had the attraction for them, that it also recognised a boundary. Did not PLATO speak of a world-modeller? and did not "the good" (which in his cultural view of the world was the fitting project of the artist) as he spoke of it, at least if one was just the least bit generous, appear to be the same as the counsel of the God of the Scriptures? Did not the casting aside of polytheism on the part of a few philosophers, in favour of an equally pagan monotheism, e.g. the Mithras cultus, mean an approach to the Mosaic, "Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord"? And was not the ultimate principle of the Anti-materialists "ideal" and thus "spiritual"?

In the second place, we must not under-estimate the increased difficulty of the Christians due to the fact that the Jews did not succeed in keeping Hellenistic thought at a distance. I am thinking here of the apocryphal books, of ARISTOBULUS, and especially of PHILO. To secure the desired synthesis this Jew of Alexandria takes refuge in speculative exegesis, which he exploited

especially for the sake of his non-scriptural allegory. How unscriptural this was can be seen in that it did not see in the past a type of the—yet to come—present ; nor did it see in the cosmic interrelations—for instance, bread and body—a symbol of the religious relation between the Inseen and His people ; no, it considered the invisible of the cosmos to be a symbol of the invisible within the same cosmos. In this way it became possible for him to identify the God of Israel with that which was most general ; the creation of matter was too “ insignificant ” for this pseudo-god : matter originated indirectly, by means of the half-divine logos,¹ who gave their place to the ideas,² in which PHILo thinks he can recognise the angels of the Old Testament ! And to make the distinction between the heavenly and the earthly identical with the distinction which he makes between the rational-human, which he says belongs to the psyche, and the irrational-animal, which he thinks is present not only in the animal but also in man—to do this was a small accomplishment.

When the refractory children of the covenant spoke so much in the speech of Ashdod,³ is it any wonder that the strangers and those who lived near them could not learn the language of Canaan ?

13. Which partial theism had the greatest chance with these Christians who came from Hellenism ? Certainly not the two Realistic conceptions : these were both too scientific for this group, at least at the outset. Thus we come to the Stoics.

14. This state of affairs requires that we first of all enter more deeply into the development of that partial theistic motif

¹ UEBERWEG-PRAECHTER, *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie* I (12th ed.), Berlin, E. Mittler, 1926, pp. 575.

² Because the speculative view of the “ logos ” lives on in our circles, I should like to go into this a bit farther. It seeks support chiefly in John i. 9, where the Authorised Version reads : “ That was the true Light, which lighteth every man that cometh into the world.” Grammatically the word “ cometh ” (erchomenon) can be used with “ man ” just as well as with “ light.” And if the grammatical use leaves a choice, the exegete has a task. Now, in every text where the expression “ coming (or being sent) into the world ” is used (John i. 9, iii. 19, vi. 14, ix. 39, x. 36, xi. 27, 28, xii. 46, xvi. 28, xvii. 18, xviii. 37 ; 1 Tim. i. 15, and 1 John iv. 9) it refers to a coming as prophet of God with a message : in John iii. 19 and xii. 46, it is specially connected with “ the light,” and so the parallel with John i. 9 can be seen much more clearly. And in the series of Expositions of the Scripture Dr. C. BOUMA in his *Het Evangelie van Johannes*, Kampen, J. H. Kok, 1927, page 32, has also let go the older view, entirely in harmony with the context : for John the Baptist says : “ I am not that light,” and then there follows : “ the true light that lighteth every man, was coming into the world.” In this connection I quote Dr. BOUMA : “ it (the light) was rising over the world like the sun which climbs slowly until it reaches its zenith. In distinction from everything else that presents itself to wanderers as being light, He is *the true light*, the genuine, the only, the complete. That is why it could be said of Him that He *lightens every man*. This does not mean every person in the whole world, but every man who receives light, who comes to a knowledge of God. That man receives that light only through Christ.”

³ Compare Nehemiah xiii. 24.

which in ancient times was the last to come to power. Now, the history of the Stoics brings the historian of philosophy face to face with great difficulties. But during the past years we have gained so much because of the work of BREHIER, DEMPF, GEYER, VON SCHUBERT, SEEBERG and others, that the arrangement of their results and of the data which were known before, now presents a fairly unified sketch. Though more complete than my former publications on this subject, it is not meant to be a final word, but rather to incite to further research in this branch of the history of philosophic thought, which for us as Christians is so extremely important.

15. As we start, we need to remember that the Stoics modified their philosophy in the first centuries of the Christian era. The point of departure is again the embarrassment concerning the "non-corporeal."¹ As we have already pointed out, the fact that ZENO had said that corporeality was the same as activity, had as its result that the Stoics viewed all passivity as being non-corporeal. But this school had already existed so long among the Hellenists that it does not surprise us to notice that its distinction between "inner" and "outer" gradually becomes more and more confused with the distinction between the higher and the lower functions, with which, of course, it has nothing to do, since we find the difference between inner and outer wherever there is space—think of the physics of the world within the atom! So the blood-warm "pneuma" of Zeno, that courses through the entire body, makes room with Seneca for an "anima" which exists above "matter" or the organism. While this dichotomy of *functions*—which must not be confused with the punishment of the *non-functional* separation between soul and body at death!—has just as much or just as little right as has any other function-dichotomy, it does not surprise us later on to find the younger Stoics mixed up in an argument about the most desirable of the function-dichotomies of their day, a conflict which was foreign to ZENO and PANÆTIUS. Seneca draws a boundary between anima and corpus, and then he is forced to distinguish in the anima between the rational and the sub-rational; MARCUS AURELIUS, on the contrary, is inclined to distinguish between thought, which he calls "nous" or "pneuma"—and the lower, which he calls "sarx," in which he keeps

¹ BRÉHIER, *La Théorie*, etc.

separate the emotional and the organic.¹ It is no wonder that SEXTUS EMPIRICUS, misled by the younger Stoics, could no longer see the difference between PROTAGORAS the Greek, and ZENO the Phœnician, and even went so far as to put pseudo-Platonic expressions in the mouth of HERACLITUS,² on which road JUSTIN MARTYR followed him (SEXTUS). The real spirit of PLATO, intent upon technics and science, remained unknown to the younger Stoics, as they stood hostile to all *forming* and every *form*—here including the State.

16. Just by means of this metamorphosis the Stoics secured great influence upon the thinking of Christians. Even as was the case with the greater part of the Stoics—those who did not follow PANÆTIUS—so were they too nearly exclusively recruited from the circle of the common people. Ideals of state were far away, unattainable, and the appreciation of the State was difficult for them because the concrete state, with which alone they had to do, was thoroughly pagan. And speculation helped this school to carry its thoughts into the Scriptures, only to draw them out again by speculative exegesis. Thus they managed to give to the words “pneuma” and “sarx” as Paul used them the same meaning which they had with MARCUS AURELIUS! And so they took the word “pistis” (which Christians understand to be used in the Scriptures as meaning the highest function of the soul corrected by the Holy Spirit and believing in the Holy Scriptures, thus as meaning faith in Christ), and gave to it the meaning which it had for the Greek philosophers, namely that knowledge which rests upon observation, and, according to their view, is far inferior to the certainty of the self-consciousness. The conclusion was natural, namely, that the child-like faith in Christ does not presuppose knowledge—as the Calvinist teaches—and is not a fruit of the work of the Holy Spirit, but just the contrary: the pneumatikoi found “faith” only among the non-philosophically trained masses, which are satisfied with lifelike coloured oral or written narratives, in other words, with letters and sounds. They themselves, on the contrary, who knew and understood the Hellenistic philosophy, considered themselves to be above the

¹ A. A. W. M. LIEVEGOED, *Eenige termen der stoische kennisleer by Marcus Aurelius Antoninus*, Amsterdam, H. J. Paris, 1924.

² EM. LOEW, *Die Ausdrücke φρονην and νοειν bei den Vorsokratikern*, in *Philologische Wochenschrift*, April 6, 1929, columns 426-429, and April 20, 1929, columns 491 to 495; IDEM, *Heraklit von Ephesos, der Entdecker empirisch-physikalischer Forschung*, in *Rheinisches Museum für Philologie*, Neue Folge, 79, 2(1930), pages 123-152.

preaching and reading of the sacred history, and therefore called themselves the "pneumatikoi," or "spiritual people" in distinction from the masses whom they called "psychikoi" and "sarkikoi," that is, natural, or carnal people.

17. That these false ideas were found not only outside of the Church but also within it, can be seen from the monastic ideal which rose up in Egypt. This found support there on the part of many presbyters who were not satisfied with the development of the episcopate.¹ And there was really cause for this. For the church had not stood by the apostolic offices and the Scripture conception concerning them. On the contrary: they had over-estimated their own authority, albeit because of a great concern for the church members, and they had identified the church offices with the general-human offices of life among their neighbours, and besides, they had forgotten that the priesthood of Levi had received only a role of promise, so that with the fulfilling of the promises it naturally passed away. And so at the close of the first century the episcopate in the West was already viewed sacerdotally as a church priesthood. This brought about reaction, since the presbyters thought, and that not without cause, that there was danger that preaching would be pushed into the background. In this struggle against the highest church office the lower office often sought support from the pneumatikoi who placed themselves above the church and thus also above the church officers. And so the struggle for the restoration of the office of minister degenerated: they wanted to make the church a society of those who practised an asceticism which had been prescribed by a popular pagan philosophy.

18. It can be understood why the "Political Monarchianism" which originated in Asia Minor found no appreciation in this circle. It is true that this also was born out of partial theistic motives. But, in the first place, it would still be quite some time before the Eastern despotism which these monarchians had before their eyes would join itself with the idea of the Roman principality. In the second place, the basic motif—namely, the deifying of the ruler—might be partial theistic, but the result of applying this thought to the doctrine of the Mediator and the Holy Spirit was partial cosmistic. For according to this theory either the Father (MARCION), or the Son (CERDO), or

¹ KARL MÜLLER, *Kirchen geschichte*, I (2nd ed.), Tübingen, J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1924, pages 292-301.

the Holy Spirit (MONTANUS ?) was God, but neither of these three nuances was able to do justice to the revelation of the Scriptures about the threefold divine sovereignty. And in the third place, this Monarchianism was not sympathetic toward the followers of the Stoics because it was too political. The direct consequence of this political Monarchianism in the doctrine of the Mediator, the so-called dynamic Monarchianism and its Adoptianistic construction, met with the same difficulties with the pneumatikoi.

19. Matters were different with the "modal Monarchianism." It accepted the deity of the Son, and SABELLIUS also accepted the deity of the Holy Spirit, although the Father, Son and Holy Spirit were never viewed as being at one and the same time prosopa of the one God. Under the influence of this view TERTULLIAN succeeded in putting forth a view of the Trinity which rested upon the following propositions :

a. The relations between the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are similar to those of the thought (ratio), the word (sermo) and the gift (munus, charisma) in the individual man (the office is, he thinks, but a question of church polity and historical necessity).¹ The Holy Spirit, then, is highest. The conception expressed in this proposition could be called "super-ordination theory" in analogy with the term "subordination theory"—this latter, constantly monarchical, usually considers the Son and the Holy Spirit subject to the Father, as MARCION thought. Even as TERTULLIAN'S contradiction of (the precursor of) SABELLIUS, so this found entrance among all Christian pneumatikoi, and exerted some influence upon the dogma ; which will be pointed out later.

b. Matters were different in regard to TERTULLIAN'S second proposition which said that not all three "substantial Persons" of the Trinity have always existed : in Him, with a view to His work, and not merely in His work, there is something successive. This proposition did not receive as much approval among the pneumatikoi as the first : it was accepted by the pneumatikoi in the West, but those in the East who for once, because of their static thinking, did not fail, rejected it.

¹ H. KOCH, article in H. Günkel und L. Zscharnack in *Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, Tübingen, J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 2nd ed., 1927ff, vol. V, 1931, columns 1056-1057. This work will hereafter be cited as R.I.G.

c. Closely related to the former there is a third proposition of TERTULLIAN, according to which history is the succession of three stages which can be distinguished according to the three Persons, each of Whom controls one of these periods. The last and most glorious is the period of the Paraclete. As can be seen, time does not only have the distinction of earlier and later, as PANÆTIUS had said, but there is also the more and less complicated function. This proposition suffered the same fate as the second one; it drove a wedge between the Western pneumatikoi and their Eastern confederates.

d. The last-named thought is the bridge between TERTULLIAN'S Catholic and Montanistic period, in which he believed that the third period of world history had begun with MONTANUS. Notice: here we have Montanism, although a bit modified, inserted into the evolutionistic superordination theory. This fourth proposition found only a very small following, namely, only with those Western pneumatikoi who themselves had gone over to Montanism. To all others, also the non-Montanistic pneumatikoi both West and East, it seemed un-Christian.

e. Only the first of the four propositions had any real value for the positive forming of dogma. DIONYSIUS OF ROME (269) rejected not only the last, but also the second and third. All that is left is the superordination theory. However incorrectly, still it has worked for good in history, because it is due to its influence that DIONYSIUS OF ROME, and after him the church in its two decisions of the Councils of Nicea (325) and Constantinople (381) rejected the equally one-sided and incorrect subordination theory of the aristocratic Nominalism.

20. Stoicism meanwhile gained more success in the struggle about the offices of the church. The episcopacy, since it had deteriorated, did not have the power to put out the defenders of pneumatism because of their revolutionary anthropology; attempts were rather made to win them by making this concession, that their ideal was accepted, not for all the members of the church, but for the chief office bearers, who from this time on are called "spiritual men" and who, by linking up their sacerdotal consciousness of office with the Hellenistic over-estimation of a speculative asceticism, thought themselves to be more closely related to God than the "laici," "laity" or "the people."

21. This partial victory in the matter of the office was fought long before Nicea. At that time no one dared to think of an analogy between church offices and the kingly office. Before it could come to that, the conversion of CONSTANTINE had to take place. Neither the purpose nor the limits of this study permit us to linger long at the change of nearly every relation¹ which came as a fruit thereof. Two points claim our attention.

The first is the change from the principality-idea of the Roman Stoics to the Eastern Monarchianism. The difference between the two lies especially here, that the office now becomes hereditary; not an adopted son, but a relative, preferably his own child, succeeds the monarch. For the rights and the gifts are inherent not only in the person of the ruler, but also in his dynasty.² For a time this form of partial theism could not strike its roots in the West: that was one of the motives which moved CONSTANTINE, himself born in the East, to remove the seat of authority to Bzyantium.

The second point is the attitude of the Emperor in the Arian controversy. He who sees the line PANÆTIUS-AUGUSTUS-CONSTANTINE can understand why the last-named had to stand on the side of Arius. His dynamic Monarchianism in the doctrine of the Mediator was not only a result of the political Monarchianism, but also agreed perfectly with the interests of the court. Was the influence of the church so great that any state-craft which ignored this factor needed to be called destructive for the state, then, viewed superficially, the worst could be expected when the church ascribed deity to its Saviour. Meanwhile, just because this political Monarchianism, which was related to the doctrine of MARCION, was not popular, the opposition to ARIUS was strong at the very outset, also on the part of the pneumatists. The circle of the court under THEODOSIUS THE GREAT admitted defeat at this point. With that decision the unpopular wing of the Stoics were defeated on the point of the dogma of the Trinity.

22. The Eastern pneumatikoi held to the orthodox views both in the matter of rejecting the succession-idea, and in the battle against ARIUS. Matters *had* to be different in the development of the doctrine of the Mediator. For now the question

¹ Dr. H. H. KUYPER, series of articles in *De Heraut*, numbers 2599-2605 (1927), and 2607-2632 (1928).

² J. KAERST, as above.

was not if and how we can admit of a three-fold sovereignty in God, but the other question, whether He shared this sovereignty with man. And to this question the devotional Neo-platonism which, since PLOTINUS, was orientated more to the naturalistic Gnosticism than previously, answered "no" as decisively as the proud Stoics answered "yes." There were no points of difference among the various parties as far as the consequence of this theory was concerned for the statement of the problem in the doctrine of the Mediator. The court and the pneumatikoi, and among the latter both the evolutionists in the West as well as the static-thinkers in the East—in short, all supporters of the "freedom-philosophy," now that the struggle was concerned with the maintenance of the sovereignty of man, drew *one* line.

First of all, we must mention the *statement of the problem* to which the Stoics had to come after Nicea. In the Mediator we distinguish between the Son of God and our covenant-head, the man Jesus Christ, who since the incarnation continually remain united. Now, if not only the Son of God, since He is God, is sovereign, but if every man also has a sovereign part in him, then this last-named also applies to the man Jesus Christ. But then one must come to the conclusion that there are in the Mediator *two* sovereignties, and the question arises: "Do these two sovereignties within the Mediator tolerate one another?"

The *answer* to this question brought division, according to whether one accepted one or two natures in the Mediator, in the Stoic sense.

To understand this difference clearly, as existing within the Stoic group, we must pay attention to the significance which this school attached to the terms "nature" or "physis." Today we say that whoever believes that the Mediator is both God and man, ascribes to Him two natures. If one uses the word in this sense, then the doctrine of the two natures is, by the nature of the case, Scriptural. But if we think that the Stoics among the Christians used the word "physis" in this sense, we cut off immediately the way which leads to an understanding of the dual conflict which was waged here. For none of the men who were involved in this battle which was waged on two fronts denied this duality in the Mediator, and if they had their efforts would have had no meaning.

That this was not the case is clear when we remember that the Stoics agreed with each other in this thing, that they used the

word "physis" in an entirely different sense from that given it by the followers of Neo-platonism. These latter, ever since PLOTINUS used it to denote the lower half of the world-soul, which brings forth the individually differentiated psychai—that is, psychical functions viewed aprioristically—and they distinguished very sharply between this "nature" and the many spurs which differed from one another.¹ The Stoic use of the word was entirely different. They used the word "physis" in the sense of "sovereign individual."

If one sees this, there is much that becomes clear at once. In the first place, why the problem: "Do the two sovereignties in the Mediator tolerate one another?" can also be stated thus: "Must we view the Mediator as one physis or as two?" In the second place, whoever accepted this statement of the problem, no matter which of the two possible solutions he might adopt, was a Stoic. In the third place, the Holy Scriptures with its denial of the sovereignty of man not only rejects one of the two answers, but it refuses to accept the dilemma at all. And in the fourth place, Neo-platonism also, since it denied the sovereignty of the human nature, which it thought of in an entirely different way, cannot accept this statement of the problem.

23. Thus the path is cleared for a good understanding of the difference *within* the group of the Stoics; of the struggle between the Stoic monophysites and those duophysites who, themselves Stoics, have the statement of the problem in common with the Stoic monophysites, but who differ from the last-named group in their solution.

As first representative of the monophysite wing of the Stoics we mention APOLLINARIUS, a combatant against the Neo-platonism of PORPHYRIUS. In later years his error has been thought to be especially this, that he was a trichotomist. But that does not at all touch the main thing. It would do that in case APOLLINARIUS had brought this three-fold division in relation to any view of the Trinity, as TERTULLIAN had done. But tradition mentions nothing of this. One rather gets the impression that his theory constantly honoured the function-dichotomy, even though he—like SENECA and MARCUS AURELIUS—felt the necessity of splitting up one of these two function-groups

¹ MARG. TECHERT, *La notion de la Sagesse dans les trois premières siècles de notre ère*, in *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie und Soziologie*, Neue Folge, 32, 1 and 2, 1929, pages 1-27. This article traces the physis-idea of PLOTINUS and of the Neo-platonists who came after him, to the Gnostic conception of the "sophia."

into two parts. In his mind the chief concern is the difference between "spiritual" and "carnal." But he does not understand this difference as Paul does, as being a contrast of "being led by the Spirit," and "trusting one's self"; but he views it as did the Stoic pneumatikoi, as a difference between the autocratic and the non-autocratic part of man. Here the rather questionable trichotomy is hid behind a much more dangerous (function-) dichotomy of the pseudo-sovereign and his subject. It seems that at first he conceived of this sovereignty more broadly than later when he put it on the same plane with the "nous." But we cannot discover here more than a passing from SENECA's theory to that of MARCUS AURELIUS.¹ And his chief concern is to maintain this *sovereignty* of the higher in every man.² For although this human nous is to be distinguished from the divine³ because of its changeableness, nevertheless it is sovereign, that is to say, free from the will.⁴ In the doctrine concerning the Saviour, the problem for him is stated thus: "Can these two sovereign wills work together in the one Mediator?" Coming to this he seeks refuge in a negative answer: the human sovereign fell out to make room for the divine Logos, which in turn together with the remaining part of the systase (that is, after the human sovereign had fallen out of the human "systase") formed that which he had already called "one physis."

The dangerous basis of this theory will now have been put into clear enough light. I add just a word about its background.

To see the background it is necessary that we notice some of the motives⁵ of the worship of Mary which, although for a time existent only in the East, was found in the West also since 350.⁶

¹ R. SEEBERG, *Lehrbuch der Dogmenge schichte*, II, 3rd ed. Erlangen-Leipzig, A. Deichert, 1923, page 177, note 2.

² IDEM, page 176, note 3, fragment 150.

³ IDEM, page 176, note 3, fragment 151. Concerning the further treatment of this by OCKHAM, see paragraph 43 of this article.

⁴ IDEM, page 176, note 1, fragment 108.

⁵ Naturally, this is true merely of some motives. HEILER, in his article on *Marienverebrung* in R.I.G., III, 1929, column 2014-2017, distinguishes rightly between Eastern and Western, and ante- and post-Nicene motives. But within the Eastern mariolatry there is a clear distinction noticeable between Realistic and Nominalistic. The first can be found, for instance, in the old Egyptian Ra-worship with its queen of heaven Noet; cf. Dr. A. DE. BUCK, *De zeegepraal van het licht, Voorstellingen en symbolen uit den Oud-Egyptische Zonnediens*, Amsterdam, J. H. Paris, 1930, pages 39-42. The other in the Isis-worship with its mother-earth.

⁶ The newer discoveries of archeology show that this relation is very old. The first church dedicated to Mary, as far as is now known, was erected in Ephesus about 350; and at the same time a library in Rome was rebuilt into a church and called "Sancta Maria de Inferno," that is, Holy Mary, liberator from the punishments of hell. See article of *De Basilica van St. Maria de Meerdere*, in *Algemeen Handelsblad van Vrydag*, April 3, 1931, Ochtenblad, page 1.

In this worship there is the influence of heathen myths, to which Stoicism also partly owed its origin, and this influence can be seen in the idea of mother-earth, and of Aphrodite, "Our Lovely Lady of the Sea."¹

The Neo-platonists among the Christians, while although on other grounds² they were sympathetic toward this worship of Mary, absolutely rejected both the Nominalistic starting point and the conclusions of monophysitism. And partly through the influence of the great Cappadocians this view was rejected at the second œcumenical council in 381.

But that did not mean that the Stoic possibilities were all done away. While keeping the same alternatives, they could also choose the other of the two possible solutions! That is what NESTORIUS did, among others. Noticing the relation between monophysitism and the heathen motives which we have just mentioned,³ he taught along with the adherents of a Stoically conceived duophysitism, that the human "physis" Jesus, was equally complete as that of the Son: in both, on the basis of the ousia—think here of the terminology of TERTULLIAN—there arose a sovereign prosopon or a sovereign hypostasis.⁴ He spoke of the relation between the two as of two Stoics who were not only absolutely alike, but were also too proud to accept anything from each other without counter-achievements. Out of this there flows his idea that two sovereign persons can be bound only by moral relations, in which both parties make their contributions. The relation between God and man in the Mediator was no other than that between a Pelagian and his fictitious deity: the difference was here, as he thought, that in the Mediator the relation was established at the time of the conception of Jesus.⁵

As we view this course of thought, it appears that not only are the pagan mysteries put out of the way, but the notion of the real covenant is also gone: in this view of God one fails to recognise the God of the Scriptures as much as one fails to find the covenant of grace in the Stoic conception of friendship. And then, NESTORIUS does not only forget that this covenant is unilateral in its origin, but also that it lies secure in the unique relation

¹ See also Dr. G. VAN DER LEEUW, *Goden en menschen in Hellas*, Haarlem, de Erven F. Bohn, 1927, especially pages 60-65.

² See note 5 page 149.

³ (Prof. Dr.) G. C. VAN RIEL, *Het œcumenisch concilie te Epbese, 15de eeuwfeest*, in het *Alegemeen Handelsblad* of Sunday, June 21, 1931, Ochtenblad, page 13.

⁴ I shall discuss the hypostasis-doctrine more in detail later on.

⁵ SEEZBERG, as above, pages 214-220.

between God and man in the Mediator, which relation can nowhere in the cosmos find an analogy, neither in the relation between two people, nor in the relation between two functions of one and the same man.

To save their own solution the monophysites had to support the Neo-platonists at the time NESTORIUS was condemned in 431. But the Stoic blood crawled where it could not walk.¹ Some time later their leader CYRIL reconciled himself with a section of the Duophysites. Meanwhile the battle was definitely lost for Nestorianism. Its adherents left the church. In the East they were strong enough to establish their own church-group, which, as we know, has managed to stretch out its languishing existence up to this day. In the West they did not get along so well, even though we find their doctrine in many a Nominalist, among others in ABELARD.

24. The condition of the monophysites was different. The increasing Mary-worship helped them along. They had to be careful, as the experience of EUTYCHES taught them. After the defeat of NESTORIUS he conceived of the sovereign part in man much more broadly than even APOLLINARIS had done, and in spite of the protection of CYRIL was condemned in 451. CYRIL himself sought closer relations with other motives. He taught that only the "hypostasis" in man was sovereign. But the council of Constantinople had spoken—quite correctly—of the Son as being one of the three divine hypostases. And so the problem of the Stoics as far as the doctrine of the Saviour was concerned was stated for him as follows: "Can two sovereign hypostases tolerate one another in the same Mediator?" And his monophysitic answer was in the negative, and in the spirit of APOLLINARIS: in this case, that is, with the Mediator, there was no human sovereignty.²

What meaning did he attach to the word "hypostasis"? This question needs to be asked since this term was also used by the Neo-platonists; but had an entirely different meaning with them. According to them the "hypostases" were the individually differentiated offshoots of one being to which they were

¹ In this way more light falls upon the *essential* grounds which forced CYRIL to change his position in the union of 433, than the usual "psychological" explanation can offer. That this really explains nothing can be seen from the fact that even today such transitions and combinations take place, and the persons involved do not show those blotches of character which disfigured CYRIL.

² DR. AD. HARNACK, *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte*, Vol. II, 3rd ed. Freiburg i. B. und Leipzig, J. C. B. Mohr, 1894, pages 330ff.

bound by a common nature in Neo-platonic sense : they never existed by themselves, that is, without such a nature, and they were not sovereign. According to the Christian followers of this idea this was valid in theology as well as in cosmology : the Hypostases Father, Son and Holy Spirit are, as they view it, three specialisations of the one super-personal divine Being, and here the Being alone is sovereign. That is why Neo-platonism accepts both a human and a divine hypostasis in the Mediator, without feeling the need of doing away with either of them. When one remembers this, it can be easily understood why the "anhypostatikon" of CYRIL met opposition from the Neo-platonists in 451.

But the question as to what CYRIL meant by the word "hypostasis" has been answered only negatively. We can get a positive insight into the question only when we remember that he has difficulties with the gradual development of Jesus, a thing which is taught so clearly in the Gospel of Luke ii. 52. Out of this it appears that with him "hypostasis" has about the same meaning as the individual "entelechy."

It is interesting to see here that a Stoic—a more consistent one even than NESTORIUS—uses a term from ARISTOTLE to indicate his chief idea. But it is not anything more than a terminological approach. For this has nothing to do with that Aristotelian "Realism" which sought the unity of a people in its king, and the unity of a school in its leader : for monophysitism has as its point of departure the ("democratic") proposition that *every* man is sovereign, and it applies this general thesis to the man Jesus whom they scarcely see as the Christ. If one wishes here to speak of Aristotelianism, let him remember that he deals at this point with a Nominalistic *pseudo-form* of this system.

25. The first council of Chalcedon (451) condemned EUTYCHES in a decision that was difficult to bear even for the non-Eutychian monophysites, supplemented with a repetition of the rejection of Nestorianism. In spite of the personal reverence for their leader (CYRIL) which was expressed in this supplement, the monophysites saw the intention of this decision very clearly, as a result of which the disgust with the council was quite general in their circles.

They sought the chief guilt in Neo-platonism which, after its triumphs in the East, was now gaining many adherents due to

the rising influence of AUGUSTINE. And yet, the decision had not been purely Neo-platonic. For, even the Christians were not entirely satisfied with this system. Especially in North-West Africa many continued to oppose this theory which had met strong opposition here from the side of the chiliastic pneumatism of the Donatists, and the equally chiliastic product of the Tertullianistic superordination theory on the part of TYCONIUS.¹ Although AUGUSTINE not only rejected Pelagianism, but also the other two offshoots of the Stoics, still this school served him well. For along this way he reached the Scriptural results in his doctrine of the Trinity—think of the “filioque”—that is, along the way of a Neo-platonism which had been corrected of its worst faults by the Stoics. Many of the partial theistic Christian realists in the East had their eyes opened when Neo-platonism increased greatly with PROCLUS (410-485), and when it was “christianised” by PSEUDO-DIONYSIUS-AREOPAGITA between 480 and 500, and increased in influence in Christian circles. It can be understood that LEONTIUS OF BYZANTIUM (485-543) sought support elsewhere, being impressed by this danger. But instead of asking Holy Scripture, he, too, was intent upon a new synthesis with Hellenistic philosophy. The only difference between him and his predecessors was that he reached back to ARISTOTLE who had for so long a time been despised by Christians. Starting with the idea of the Hypostasis of the Son, he taught that He had two natures. To understand clearly the difference with Nominalism, we must notice here not only the difference in *terms* but also the difference in *meaning*. We then find the following: (1) Nominalism counts hypostasis the same as physis; the mono-hypostatic standpoint of CYRIL was necessarily mono-phystic, and the duo-physticism of NESTORIUS was necessarily duo-hypostatic. LEONTIUS, on the contrary—just as did the Neo-platonists,² but on other grounds—distinguishes between nature and hypostasis, and on that basis he could teach that the one hypostasis had two natures. (2) Nature here is not “individual sovereign” but something taken from a vague unity and

¹ K. MÜLLER, as above, pages 657ff, and AL. DEMPF, *Sacrum Imperium*, Geschichts- und Staatsphilosophie des Mittelalters und der politischen Renaissance, München und Berlin, R. Oldenbourg, 1929, pages 86-87, and 120-122.

² Whoever neglects the difference in the use of the term “hypostasis” with Stoics and Neo-platonists, will see that the Nicaenum must be called tritheistic. H. v. SCHUBERT, who was to be appreciated as a historian, says in his *Geschichte der Christliche Kirche im Frühmittelalter*, Ein Handbuch, Tübingen, J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1921, page 135, that the Cappadocians leaned toward tritheism and that the movement from realism to nominalism, began here. But there was no possibility of getting closer together, and the battle was already centuries old

individualised. (3) Although LEONTIUS distinguishes between hypostasis and nature, he does not separate the two; a nature never exists without an hypostasis, even though it be the hypostasis of another nature. So he comes to teach that the human nature of Christ was not "an-hypostatic" (against CYRIL), but "enhypostatic," that is, that the hypostasis of the divine nature also carries the human nature. (4) Everything depends here upon the question as to what LEONTIUS means by "hypostasis." Did this term mean for him the same as for CYRIL? No, because LEONTIUS is Realist and so we have to do here, at least as far as the old main contrast within Hellenistic paganism is concerned, not with a false, but with a *genuine* Aristotelianism, even though it was mixed with Platonic ideas and strongly christianised. "Entelechy" means here the deified leadership of a group, in this case of the pneumatic priests of the church. And the partial theism which one meets here does not lie in declaring an individual to be sovereign, but in the declaration of sovereignty on the part of the pneumatically conceived high-priesthood of the glorified Christ.

Whoever agrees with the writer of this article that the "enhypostitakon" of this Realist, and even the "anhypostitakon" of his Nominalistic opponents can express a Scriptural thought, must guard himself against the danger of identifying his own dogmatically correct views with the thoughts of LEONTIUS, because these, in view of the increased light which is falling upon them, were certainly not Scriptural. For when viewed a bit more closely it appears that they hide within themselves the germ of the Roman Catholic dogmatics. There is first of all his doctrine of the hypostasis with which this "Realist" intends to say that God shares His sovereignty with the glorified Christ in the clothing of his pneumatically conceived and ecclesiastified high-priesthood. In the second place, the two natures which are carried by this one hypostasis are, in his view, analogous to two constituent parts which Aristotelianism distinguishes within each non-office-holding human being. The conception appears in this, that he not only identifies the difference between soul and body with that of active form and passive material, but also speaks of these two parts as of "two natures"! That is why in this doctrine of the Mediator the Logos is not God, but a pure psyche, and thus—in the spirit of PHILO—a being between the hypostasis which we have just mentioned, and the hyle, analogous

to the Aristotelian individual "form"; and so the human nature shrivels up to a purely passive hyletic existence. Naturally, this anthropology with its theory of the half-divine form brings about in soteriology an over-estimation of the "bodily suffering" of the Saviour, and to a Semi-pelagian conception of grace. And finally, this doctrine of the entelechy includes, in connection with the pneumatistic view of the clergy (the "spirituality"), the idea that these as representatives of Christ form the necessary link between the deified High-priest and His people.¹

However unscriptural it was, we cannot withhold from this theory the honour that it fitted in with the state of affairs at that time. For ever since the first council of Chalcedon (451) the efforts of the emperors at Byzantium were constantly directed to make the church, which, alas, had already become a mass-church, a state-church. Out of this there grew the appeal of the priesthood both East and West² to its deified High-priest!

Why did then the Emperor JUSTINIAN support the formula of the second council of Chalcedon (553) which agreed with these conceptions, over against the opposition of the Neo-platonistic members—among others also the Augustinian? Not because he, the advocate of the monarchical principality-idea³—think of his view of the emperorship, culminating in the "princeps legibus solutus est" of the *Corpus iuris*!—found in it what he wished to have in the field of dogmatics, but because he did not like to have a permanent separation of the monophysites, for other than purely political reasons—here, too, the Stoic blood expressed itself!—and because he was naive enough in church polity to think that this formula with its purely terminological approach to the "one hypostasis" of CYRIL would end the strife of the parties.

Naturally, that did not happen. On the contrary, monophysitic and duophysitic advocates of the theory of the one hypostasis stood more sharply over against one another in 553 than the monophysite and duophysite Stoics had in the days of CYRIL. For although the Realism of LEONTIUS drew near etymologically to the monophysite wing of the Stoics because of

¹ UEBERWEG-GEIJER, *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie*, Vol. II, 12th ed., Berlin, E. S. Mittler & Sohn, 1928, pages 124-126.

² See below, paragraph 26.

³ H. v. SCHUBERT, *Der Kampf des geistlichen und weltlichen Rechtes*, in Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-historische Klasse, 1926-27, Zweite Abhandlung, Heidelberg, Carl Winters Universitätsbuchhandlung, 1927, pages 18-19.

his talking about one hypostasis, the old conflict between Realists and Nominalists was carried on with the same vehemence now that he concentrated upon the contrast (Realistic) duophysitism—(Nominalistic) monophysitism. And also in the practical field did the chasm yawn between the two groups of partial theists: for while the spiritualistic Nominalists felt themselves somewhat supported by the political monarchianism of JUSTINIAN in their disregard for the church offices, the Realists sought and found support in Rome. And this demands our attention now.

26. In Italy conditions were changed by this time. This was due to the invasion of the Teutons who were still largely Arian. During the time when the Byzantian court was still Arian, a part of the East-Teutons had accepted Christianity, and that in its Arian form. Because of this they could hardly be looked upon as barbarians; and the imminent danger which they represented had been overcome by the covenant which THEODOSIUS THE GREAT had made, whereby they were taken up in the Roman army, although not in the Roman state (392).¹ So they kept their own heterodox priests, who were not confined to a geographically defined diocese, but to a group which was bound together by blood-relationship and personal contact, and which, due to the fact that the Byzantian court continued to be anti-Arian, was still further isolated from the rest of the people. This era formed the transition to the period of the invasions which led in 410 to the plundering of Rome and (after the conquest of Spain (415) and West-North Africa (430) by the East- and of France by the West-Teutons) to the announcement of the kingdom of the Teutons in Italy (476), whose first king, after his recognition by the emperor, soon saw his power over the domain which had been delegated to him by the emperor united with his kingship in a personal union.

One thing and another confronted these Teutons with new problems. In the agrarian law of the villages the office of king meant very little at the outset. It increased in significance in the ensuing conflict. Kings were chosen from old and respected families which were thought to be related to the gods. That is how the theory of the "kingship by the grace of God" originated, which expression in those days had a purely pagan content. In

¹ Dr. A. DORSCH, *Äussere Kultur und Wirtschaft*, in *Vom Altertum zur Gegenwart*, Leipzig and Berlin, B. G. Teubner, 1921, pages 29-40; also H. v. SCHUBERT, *Staat und Kirche in den arianischen Königreichen und im Reiche Chlodwigs*, München und Berlin, R. Oldenbourg, 1912, especially pages 37-76.

the conquest of peoples who were formerly entirely strange to them it became impossible to retain the fiction that the state not only rested upon family relations but was itself a family-relation. But the old rule of the "ius circa sacra," that the owner of a piece of ground was also the owner of a temple or sacred building erected upon that ground—the Roman "cuius regio, eius religio"—was strictly maintained; so strongly, in fact, that the ruler claimed the right to appoint the bishops, a thing which the Byzantian emperor had never done, even though the local bishop might be a will-less tool in his hand, since the church was in possession of quite a strong organisation before the great change brought about by CONSTANTINE. The church was right when it considered this interference in purely internal matters to be unjust; and whereas the new government was anti-orthodox, this procedure was positively dangerous. Meanwhile it was forced to stand upon its own feet, since the Byzantian court was in collusion with the Monophysites, and, since the transition of some Teuton kings in Gaul to orthodoxy, found no following in Italy. It made use of the situation in rounding off canon law which, without bearing that name, was supposed to support the papal system. It is surprising that already in the time of Justinian a view of the West discloses this: Pope BONIFACE II (530-534), dared to speak of a "priestly papacy of God's grace,"¹ in which the king of the Teutons was denied the right to appoint bishops, which conception is the Western counterpart of the theory of LEONTIUS. Even though BONIFACE had to surrender his premature triumph and be accused of lese-majesty, still one thing and another argues for the inner power of the papacy. Its position was strengthened by its isolation which came to an end when about 565 JUSTINIAN conquered Italy, and it can be explained that the Realistic Duophysites looked with confidence to Rome in their conflict against the Stoic court and the popular Stoicism of the Monophysites. But the Aristotelian Realism, known in the West especially because of the theological writings of BOETHIUS (480-525), could not begin its tedious undermining of Augustinianism before GREGORY THE GREAT (590-604) succeeded in quieting the Augustinian criticism of the decrees of 553.

27. The Monophysites were not in a position to do very much, in spite of the oblique support which they received from

¹ H. v. SCHUBERT, in above art., pages 19-21.

the court. They had never over-estimated the terminological approach in 553. Indeed, they could hardly overlook that since just in those days (about 550) the keen-minded JOHANNES PHILOPONUS of Alexandria was their leader.¹ He did not only oppose PROCLUS, but worked along the line of CYRIL in an attempt to join the Aristotelian terminology with the Nominalistic theses. That he tried to put Realism out of the doctrine of the two natures as LEONTIUS taught it, by denying in these two the individualisation of the general and viewing them as being from the very beginning individual attributes of the mono-physically viewed God-man—a view that is found later in one of the students of ABELARD—is certain. It is also important—and this will help us to find the Nominalistic line in the West—that his union between ARISTOTLE'S idea of substance—naturally, loose from his “Realistic” doctrine of essence—and the Stoically conceived idea of hypostasis, led him to tritheism, a consequence of Aristotelianising Stoicism that we find later, among others, in ROSCELLINUS. And it is valuable for what follows just to mention here his theories of knowledge and of death and—last, not least—his impetus-idea, because all of these later on influenced the West, especially the pneumatism of OLIVI, and the Franciscan Nominalists who were ruled by him. PHILOPONUS stated his theory of knowledge in a tract about the functionalistically conceived psyche, in which he distinguished very sharply between reason as a sovereign part of the individual and that which is subjected to its power. In his doctrine about death he denies the identity of the resurrection body with the present body. That is completely in harmony with the theory of the old-Stoics, according to which the sovereign part is not separated from the psycho-organism, but absorbs it.² He very likely came to this idea by taking the expression “spiritual body” not as Scripture does, namely as the ripened fruit of the natural body, brought about by the work of the Holy Spirit at the time of the resurrection from the dead—that is, related to the first Adam—but in the sense of thinking relation-point! Finally, his impetus-idea which in the fourteenth century led the Nominalistic physicists in Paris to their discovery which we will mention again later on—this idea appears to be Aristotelian-Stoic.

¹ UEBERWEG-GEIJER, as above, pages 123-124.

² ERNST BENZ, *Das Todesproblem in der stoischen Philosophie*, Stuttgart W. Kohlhammer, 1929, page 129.

28. The history of the Monophysites as a *party* after PHILOPONUS can be quickly recorded. A new attempt of the court to win it over by use of a term borrowed from the Neoplatonism of PSEUDO-DIONYSIUS-AREOPAGITA—the monenergistic struggle—was checked about the year 635 by the Realists who sensed Apollinarianism—and rightly so; and the proposal of the court to lay down arms with the word “monothelism” was rejected: especially MAXIMUS CONFESSOR opposed this from the Realistic side at the Lateran Council of 649. But this reconciliation-politics had lost all sense: Egypt was conquered by the Saracens in 647.¹

Meanwhile it is of importance for the history of Western philosophy to say that there were already in this period Monophysites who showed that they were getting nearer to the Neoplatonic position. The first traces of this can be seen in SEVERUS OF ANTIOCH who died in 538 and thus was an older contemporary of JOHANNES PHILOPONUS. SEVERUS² was the appointed man for such a combination; born in a Monophysitic milieu, but trained in the writings of the Cappadocians, he could see that the modification which PSEUDO-DIONYSIUS AREOPAGITA had brought in the system of PROCLUS could be given a Stoic interpretation. But also in this individualistic construction, which was debated as early as 533,³ and which returns with the “monenergists” of the seventh century, we have to do with a purely terminological agreement, and thus with a form of *pseudo-Neo-platonism*.

29. The entrance of the Arabians into North-East Africa robbed the absolutist court of its Stoic ally in the South. The definite change in the proportionate strength of the parties, as a result of this, helped to determine the end of the struggle in the matter of worship of images. Here, too, Scripture scarcely played a role, and then less in the church than in the court. In this conflict between the pope and the emperor for the power in the church there was also a philosophical element. The

¹ G. KRÜGER, art. *Monotheliten*, in P.R.E., 3rd ed., Vol. XIII, pages 401-413, especially 412.

² G. KRÜGER, art. *Severus von Antiochie*, in P.R.E., 3rd ed., Vol. XVIII, pages 250-256. The conflict among the Monophysites, in which SEVERUS stood opposed to JULIAN OF HALICARNASSUS, must be left without discussion because of lack of time here. It seems to have run parallel with the one between CYRIL and EUTYCHES. See the inclusive article of TH. HERRMANN, *Der Streit zwischen Severus von Antiochia und Julian von Halikarnass in der neueren Beurteilung*, in *Theologische Blätter*, 7, (1928), column 32-36.

³ H. EIBL, *Augustin und die Patristik*, München, E. Reinhardt, 1923, pages 383-384. Characteristic of the relations is that the Aristotelianising orthodoxy of LEONTIUS PSEUDO-DIONYSIUS challenged as a trustworthy witness. It is much different from MAXIMUS CONFESSOR in the latter struggle between Neo-platonic duophysites and pseudo-neoplatonic duophysites.

Stoics, for instance, despised the images as belonging to the visible, out of which the ruling sovereign had arisen, but which he had left far behind; on the contrary, it fitted perfectly in the scheme of the Realists: the Neo-platonists viewed them as expressions of a higher life, the Aristotelians as media for teaching—think here of the expression “books for the laity” in the Heidelberg Catechism—while the Platonic thought could justify them as symbols.

30. Nominalism also lost territory in the West, since not only its dogmatic ally failed it here, but also its economic basis fell away.

As far as the first is concerned: one Teuton ruler after another turned his back on Arianism. From the economic point of view the rise of the feudal system signified a no less important modification. The gifts of the Merovingians to the bishops whom they had appointed made it necessary for them since they could not cultivate the soil themselves to look around for vassals. This system shot its roots deeper when CHARLES MARTEL, in order to punish certain bishops who had hesitated to help him in his conflict with the Saracens, took their domains from them and gave them to his lords. The period of migrations and the Teutonic-territorial-states which arose out of it was thereby passed.

What remained of the old state of affairs was the idea of a national church which certainly was not in accord with the ideal of the unity of the world-church which thought to possess the entelechian top of the priesthood in the deified Christ. The union of the feudal state and the world-church signified for Nominalism that its last chance here was past. But this belongs to the next period.

(To be continued.)

D. H. TH. VOLLENHOVEN.

Amsterdam.