

more. Even post-Tridentine Rome had passed away, and given place to the Rome of the Vatican dogma. And now Vaticanism hangs like a cloud over his dying hours, and, as regards churches and systems, he feels every prop and stay falling away from him. To accept all that he understood by Ultramontaniam would have cost him his soul; but he finds that, without such an article in his creed, he must be content to die, as he had lived, apart, and without much active sympathy. And yet, perhaps, we ought not to feel surprised at such a result. The Ultramontanes teach that without the absolute prostration of private judgment and opinion before the decisions most recently arrived at by the Roman Court and the Roman Pontiff, there is, to say the least, great peril as regards salvation. Mr. Sibthorp never did believe this, and yet, led by liturgical and devotional preferences, he had deliberately chosen to be a Roman Catholic. Now, then, he has to learn, even at the gates of death, that Rome was not the place for such converts. And hence he who, during life, had refused to make proselytes, appears now, at death, warning his oldest friend against a step which, now at all events, *he* seems to repent of.

The perusal of this painfully interesting biography will lead many to magnify the grace of God which prevented and followed his true-hearted but erring servant amid his repeated wanderings from the truth; but such will also sorrowfully reflect how much more happy, how much more useful he might have been, had he adhered to that pure faith of the Gospel which he preached in the days of his early ministry.

ART. V.—THE JESUITS AND THEIR ASSAILANTS.

1. *Die verderbliche Moral der Jesuiten.* O. ANDREA. Ruhrort. 1865.
2. *Doctrina Moralís Jesuitarum.* Celle. 1873.
3. *Der Jesuiten-Orden.* J. HUBER. Berlin. 1873.
4. *The Jesuits.* W. C. CARTWRIGHT. (Articles in the *Quarterly Review.* 1874.)
5. *Remarks on a Late Assailant of the Society of Jesus.* London: Burns & Oates. 1875.
6. *Discours devant la Chambre des Députés.* P. BERT. Paris. 1879.

THE expulsion of the Jesuits from Germany in consequence of the Falk Laws, and the more recent action of the French Government in the same direction, offer very instructive material to the student of ecclesiastical history. Examining, one by one, the various counts in the indictment against the Society of Jesus, and eliminating those which do not survive the test of dis-

passionate analysis, two charges of importance alone remain, namely:—

- I. That the Jesuits are actively opposed to the existing system of political and religious equality.
- II. That they have never abandoned the relaxed moral principles so long identified with their teachings.

With the former of these topics we do not propose to deal. It has been sufficiently demonstrated that there is perfect solidarity between the Society of Jesus and the rest of the Roman Catholic Church upon the questions of toleration and religious education. Both base their claim for a share in public teaching upon the principle of liberty, and both admit that they would reject the same plea should they ever obtain the upper hand.¹ Nothing can be more candid than this confession. Accordingly, if opposition to religious equality and the "principles of the Revolution" is to be suppressed, that suppression must logically embrace the whole body of opponents and not a part only. But an examination of the polemical literature of the controversy, and especially of the speeches of M. Paul Bert before the Chamber of Deputies last year, and of M. Ferry before the Senate, makes it abundantly manifest that the real point of conflict is upon the old battle-field of Pascal and Arnauld. If any doctrine is *distinctly Jesuitical*, according to popular opinion, it is that lax morality and hyper-ingenuous casuistry which have procured for the names of Bauny, Sanchez, Escobar, and Lessius, so unenviable an immortality. And if a *catena* can be proved to exist from these writers to Moullet and Gury in modern times, is there not ample reason for separate action against a Society which, so far from disavowing these individual teachers, numbers them among its brightest ornaments?

The literature of this controversy is already so vast that it makes a library by itself, and yet hardly one of the writers has succeeded in approaching it from a completely scientific standpoint.² Such an attempt, in Germany or France, at the present time, it would perhaps be unreasonable to expect. But in England, where the name of Jesuit no longer carries with it

¹ Or, as M. Veillot epigrammatically put it: "We claim liberty from you, because it is your principle; and we should refuse it to you, because it is not ours." That the Roman Church utterly rejects the notion of any compromise with modern culture was made clear in the *Syllabus* of 1864: "Anathema to whomsoever shall say that the Pope can and may reconcile himself with progress, Liberalism, and modern civilization." The action of the Vatican Council in no way abandoned this position.

² Reuchlin, in his "Pascal's Leben" (Tüb. 1840), and "Geschichte von Port-Royal" (Hamb. 1839), left nothing to be desired in impartiality of spirit. But the omission of a due examination of early casuistical literature militated against the accuracy of his conclusions.

terror and apprehension, the time seems ripe for a sober examination of the two following questions:—

- (a.) Whether the Jesuits were really the founders of lax morality?
 (b.) What is the nature and value of the pleas urged in behalf of their casuists?

All who are acquainted with the history of moral philosophy are aware that not only the germs, but the distinct statement of the doctrine of Probability, are contained in the writings of the Schoolmen.¹ Scholastic philosophy, indeed, brought the casuistical method with it inevitably. It was obviously necessary to contrive some solution to reconcile or account for the innumerable discrepancies between the *dicta* of confessors. The Pope could not possibly regulate all cases of conscience, nor could he provide books which could anticipate them. Accordingly, when A and B gave conflicting decisions about the moral quality of the same action under the same circumstances, it was declared that, since each of these decisions was *probable*, according to the judgment of its author, it might safely be followed by others in practice. And if once a basis of moral heteronomy be admitted, it is impossible to refute the logic of this consequence.

The first writer of eminence who expressly lays down the principle of Probability is Cardinal Antonino, a distinguished writer of the fifteenth century, canonized by his Church, and always regarded as one of the highest authorities on questions of morals.² He points out, in the introduction to his treatise upon the Conscience, that differences had prevailed in the *dicta* of the greatest teachers, even concerning matters necessary to salvation.³

¹ Perhaps the best *résumé* will be found in Wuttke's "Handbuch der Christlichen Sittenlehre" (Berlin, 1861), vol. i. The scholastic treatment of ethics is but scantily noticed in most English textbooks.

² S. Antonino (de Forciglione), born 1389 at Florence, died 1459. Archbishop of Florence, 1445. Took part in the Council of 1458. Canonized under Pope Adrian VI., in 1523. Of his many works a small popular treatise on Confession, known as the *Defecerunt*, from the first word, was published repeatedly in Latin and Italian. A larger *Summa*, in 4 vols. folio, appeared in 1478, and the whole of his works were reprinted in the last century by Mamachi and Remadellu, at Florence (8 vols. in folio, 1741).

³ Among numerous instances he mentions the following: "B. Thomas in IV. (that is, in his Commentary upon the fourth book of Lombard's *Sentences*) holds that it is not needful for one who has lapsed into mortal sin to make confession forthwith, except in certain most rare cases, and Richardus agrees with him. But Hugo de S. Victor and B. Bonaventura hold the opposite opinion. Now the sanctity and learning of all these teachers are known to the Church: and the opinion of neither side is condemned. Yet that of B. Thomas is more commonly followed, although it seems less secure. And so innumerable examples may be cited."—Antonin. *Summa Summarum*, pars i. tit. 3, c. 10, de *Conscientia*, sec. 10.

It is obvious that such a principle as this, and the practical consequences deducible from it, are identical with the more elaborated system to be found in the later Jesuit authors. Nouet, when replying to Pascal's "Lettres Provinciales" in 1657, had no difficulty in showing one flaw in the indictment—viz., in the accusation of having invented the doctrine of Probability.

"All men know," he wrote, "that there are moral maxims of two sorts: firstly, those concerning which all Casuists are agreed, because they are made certain either by the distinct voice of Scripture or the universal consent of the Church; secondly, those on which the opinion of writers is divided, and which can only be called *probable*. As to the latter, it is permitted to every one to select out of conflicting decisions that which pleases him best (*celle qui luy plaist davantage*), provided that it is really probable, that is, if it includes the following four notes established by Suarez.¹ Firstly, it must not run counter to any truth universally accepted in the Church. Secondly, it must be in agreement with common sense. Thirdly, it must be based upon some good authority (*appuyée d'une autorité sans reproche*). Fourthly, if it has not the approval of the majority of doctors, it must not be an opinion generally abandoned."²

It may be remarked, in passing, that Nouet's definition is of that which passes, technically, by the name of *Probabiliorismus*, and that the *dicta* of Escobar, Bauny, and others, whom he defended, could hardly stand the test of the four "notes." But on the main and fundamental question he is not only at one with Aquinas and Antonino, but even with so vigorous an anti-Jesuit as Jacques de Sainte-Beuve,³ as will be seen from the following decisions:—

CAS. 166: R. "It is beyond all doubt that . . . one may follow a merely probable opinion in what concerns only human law."

CAS. 27: Q. "May absolution be given to a penitent who has a probable opinion? R. The Confessor must absolve a penitent who adduces an opinion not in his (the Confessor's) judgment absolutely untenable."

It may excite wonder that the Jesuits themselves, instead of making futile charges of inaccuracy against their assailants, did not more often resort to this obvious and decisive defence. As a matter of fact, the only writer who systematically attempted it, De Moya (under the pseudonym of Amadeus Guimenius, in 1680), was promptly censured and silenced both by the Sorbonne

¹ He refers to Suarez, disp. xii. *de bon. et malit.* sec. 6.

² "Vingtième Imposture," p. 12. These pamphlets, now very rare, are sometimes to be met with bound up with the 8vo edition of the "Provinciales," of which a specimen may be seen in the British Museum.

³ Who was deprived of his chair of theology, and inhibited from preaching, in 1657, on account of his opposition to the censure of Arnauld. His "Résolutions de Plusieurs Cas de Conscience" were reprinted in 1705.

and at Rome.¹ The Church of Rome had begun to feel the real power of public opinion, and seemed not averse to allow the Society of Jesus to act as scapegoat, while continuing to benefit by the same system. And the Jesuits themselves, partly by *esprit de corps*, partly from a sort of vanity in their exaggerations of scholastic subtlety, were equally disposed to face the attack, and to claim sole proprietorship in the new morality.

Protestant controversialists, with one exception, were misled by this, and by their own scanty knowledge of the earlier development. Only Du Moulin, in his famous treatise upon the "Traditions of the Church," went directly to the fountainhead, and it will be seen that he censured precisely those laxities in the ancients which Pascal, a generation later, denounced in the writings of the Jesuits.²

It being clear, then, that the germ of nearly all Jesuit teaching is to be found in the pages of earlier writers, it remains to be seen whether the Society confined itself to a mere development of these existing principles, or whether they contributed any independent factors of their own to which the term "Jesuitical" can be legitimately applied. Hundreds of passages from Bauny, Escobar, and others, have been repeatedly quoted, which revolt the moral sense more than anything which could be adduced from writers of any other school. But, upon analysis, the decisions in question are resolved into simple propositions based upon an abundance of what is called authority in the Roman Church. It is not difficult, indeed, to understand the process by which the callousness and almost cynicism was acquired in dealing with delicate and painful topics. There is an unconscious as well as a conscious prurience, which induces men who lead retired lives to affect and seek knowledge in such subjects. And it is reasonable as well as charitable to suppose that many of these writers had no more unworthy motive than vanity in executing these dialectical *tours de force*. It was like a contest between mariners who should most nearly sail against the wind, or nearer to dangerous rocks without shipwreck. And it must be confessed that shipwreck, in the sense of a Papal condemnation, was by no means an exceptional catastrophe.³

¹ See Guimenius ad Innocent. xi. Pont. Max. Romæ, 1680, fol.; also "Avis à l'auteur d'un libelle," Paris, 1689. The censured doctrines will be found in the Abbé Boileau's "Recueil de diverses pièces."

² For instance, he quotes from Aquinas and Antonino the very same *dictum* with regard to restitution of immoral gains which Lessius reproduced. (See Thom. Summ. ii. 2. qu. 32, n. 7; and Antonin. p. ii. tit. 2, c. 5.) And from Navarre the doctrine that a man may be counselled to commit a small sin to avoid a greater one. (Navarre, lib. iii. *Consil de voto*, cons. 36, n. 2). This pernicious maxim was repeated by Vasquez.

³ Notably by Alexander VII. in 1660, though no casuists were mentioned

One class of decisions, however, must be left solely to the discredit of the Society, as being the outcome of a principle which was never admitted by any other body. This was in morally and theologically legalizing the gulf of caste between the *noblesse* and the peasants, thus borrowing the prejudices of society, and placing them in a setting of religious sanction.¹ The same error is seen in the virtual condonation of duelling which excited the indignation of Pascal.

Although, as has been seen, the real foundation of Jesuit laxity was so little understood that even a Jeremy Taylor, in his "Ductor Dubitantium," repeatedly blames the effect while approving the cause, yet the moral sense of mankind from the very first had risen in revolt. Passing over the onslaughts of Antoine Arnauld the elder (1594), Etienne Pasquier, in his "Catéchisme des Jésuites" (1602), and Saint-Ayran's annihilating criticism of Garasse (1626), the first exhaustive and direct attack upon the ethical teaching of the Jesuits was in the anonymous volume published in 1644 with the title, "La Théologie Morale des Jésuites." This work was compiled, there can be little doubt, by the recluses of Port Royal, Arnauld very probably acting as editor. It is remarkable that no literary critic of recent times has noticed that the "Théologie Morale" furnished Pascal not only with the materials, but even with the arrangement of them, in the "Provincial Letters."² All the topics in controversy, Probability, Direction of Intention, Equivocation, with their practical applications, were illustrated by a long series of quotation from Jesuit writers. A large portion of the concluding part of the work dealt with the theories broached by Cellot (in his "De Hierarchia") and the English Jesuits on the subject of the authority of bishops, to which Pascal only cursorily alludes. The war was continued throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in a series of campaigns in which the Jesuits, after the first victories over Arnauld, continuously lost ground. We have already noticed the two Bulls in which their relaxed doctrines were censured by Alexander VII. and Innocent XI., although no names were

by name, and Innocent X. in 1679; not to mention the decisions in the cases of Palafox and Tournon, and the *coup d'état* of 1773.

¹ Garasse, for instance, laid down the following doctrine:—

"When a gentleman strikes a peasant, this is a sin of anger which does not come into consideration (*qui n'entre pas en considération*). But if a peasant or a man of low extraction (*un homme de néant*) should have the audacity to strike a gentleman, the offence can only be expiated by his death."—*Somme*, livre ii. p. 194.

² Pascal appears to have also derived his amusing quotations from the *Imago primi sæculi* from Saci's "Enluminures," as well as some effective points drawn from the admissions of Petan in his treatise "Sur la Pénitence Publique."

directly specified. Not even the strong dislike to the Jansenists entertained by Louis XIV. could counteract the pressure of public opinion and the tacit hostility of the Gallicans. In 1667 Perrault compiled, or rather re-edited, the quotations of Arnauld and Pascal, under the title, "Morale des Jésuites, extraite fidelement de leurs livres;" and a still more bulky collection was published from 1669 to 1694, in eight large volumes, chiefly by Arnauld, who thus carried on the war from his exile. Even this was eclipsed, in the following century, by the vast collection known as the "Recueil des Assertions," drawn up by order of the Parliament from 1759 to 1762. Simultaneously with these onslaughts appeared the "Apologies" of Daniel (1690) and Cerutti (1762). The restoration of the Jesuits in 1815 was accompanied by a resumption of hostilities, in which the publication, by the historian K. H. von Lang, of the "Amores Marelli," was perhaps the most significant episode.¹

Coming to recent times, it remains to notice the crusade of MM. Libri, Quinet, Michelet, and Lerminier, in 1843, partly in lectures, partly in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*. Almost at the same time appeared the attacks of Ellendorf and Wild in Germany, and of Gioberti in Italy. The apologetic history of Créteineau-Joly can hardly be said to have carried off the honours of war, reserved for Ravignan on a later occasion. The German *Culturkampf* (1873-?) brought forth Huber's History of the Jesuits, together with a republication of the most damaging quotations from ancient and modern casuists, under the title "Doctrina Moralis Jesuitarum" (1874). Even in England a wave of the same current was felt in the joust, more literary than theological, between Mr. Cartwright and his brilliant although anonymous opponent.² But in all, or nearly all, of these works, the reader is fatigued by an iteration of the same quotations, often, obviously, from second or third hand, on the one side, and by apologies, irrelevant or self-contradictory, on the other. The assailants do not go to the root of the matter by examining the principles out of which the laxity of the Casuists was derived; the defenders, with some bright and conspicuous exceptions, instead of boldly pleading the authority of Aquinas, Antonino, Navarre, and Carlo Borromeo, prefer to urge pleas which do not deserve the name of arguments. The Abbé

¹ It was a Report, found in the Munich Archives, originally furnished by the Jesuit Superior, and therefore evidence of unexceptionable character. It appears that the miserable culprit persuaded his victims by aid of the casuistical plea: *licere ista omnia, modo absit consensus in voluptatem*.

² The articles, which originally appeared in the *Month*, were published separately afterwards. The felicity of the motto, *De secta hac notum est nobis quod ubique ei contradicitur*, is remarkable.

Maynard, for instance, declared that Escobar and his colleagues dealt merely with a totally imaginary state of society, or a state of nature.¹ It is hardly possible to receive such an assertion seriously. For what does it amount to? A man living in the seventeenth century (let us suppose) had an enemy who was slandering him. He wanted to know how he should act. Hearing that a certain Father Amico had published a very popular book of morals, he purchases it, reads in it that he may justifiably kill his adversary, and follows the advice.² Surely such a person would have had a right to complain if, upon appealing for justification to his mentor, he was suddenly informed that all this elaborate machinery of rules and distinctions had nothing to do with the actual world and society! We may safely conclude that if Escobar had announced this on the title-page of his books, Pascal would not have criticised its *thirty-sixth* edition.

This fact alone disproves another plea sometimes advanced—namely, that the errors of the Casuists were simply the paradoxes of a few obscure writers. Escobar's treatise, it has been mentioned, had reached its 36th edition in 1651.³ The "Aphorisms" of Emanuel Sa, and the "Medulla" of Busembaum, were even more eagerly read. The treatises of Laymann, Filliucci, Caramuel, Bauny, Amico, Lessius and Diana, had all been repeatedly reprinted. The notorious treatise of Sanchez *De Matrimonio* was to be found everywhere, and had received the express sanction of Pope Clement VIII., who called it "*the most complete and perfect treatise upon its subject.*"⁴ It is alleged, also, on behalf of these writers (as it has been urged recently, in similar cases even by writers of the Church of England), that their works were only intended for confessors, and that there can be no more evil in treating fully upon the circumstances of sin than in furnishing similar details in a "treatise of medical jurisprudence. But, in the first place, it may be remarked that this plea simply begs the question as to whether there is the intimate analogy here implied between medicine and theology—*i.e.*, whether a corrupt heart is as helpless without a human surgeon

¹ "Pascal, sa vie et son œuvre." Paris, 1850.

² "Cursus Theolog." v. disp. 36, sect. 5, n. 118 (p. 544, ed. Douai, 1640).

³ The full title of this edition is as follows: "Liber Theologiæ Moralis, viginti-quatour Soc. Jesu doctoribus resecratus: quem R. P. Antonius de Escobar et Mendoza, ejusdem Societatis socius, in examen Confessariorum digessit. Post 32 editiones hispanicas et 3 lugdunenses editio novissima." Bruss. 1651. 8vo.

⁴ "Tous le reçurent avec admiration et reconnaissance, comme une source merveilleuse de doctrine; tous répétèrent avec Clément VIII. qu'il n'y avait aucun ouvrage sur cette matière si achevé et si parfait."—Maynard, *Notice des auteurs Jésuites cités dans les Provinciales*, in his ed. of the L. Pr. ii. 467.

as a broken leg? In the second place, it must be asserted that very many of these books were written in the vernacular, and expressly for the public. The official approbation of Escobar states its fitness *publicis usibus*. And an equally notorious treatise by Tamburini, "Methodus Confessionis," has upon its title-page the words, "*tam pro confessariis quam pro penitentibus.*"

But no excuses of this sort, however ingeniously or indignantly they may be urged, can avail to clear the Jesuits from the accusation of having published books dangerous to morality. We have shown that they were only carrying out, with logical exactitude, the premises laid down by their predecessors. But they had no right to be logical, or rather that is no excuse, if these conclusions from Roman principles led to the results which Bossuet, in the Assembly of 1700, described as "monstrous errors," and which two Popes anathematized, after the moral sense of mankind had already pronounced sentence. And sincerity of purpose is no defence for a book, though it may partially screen its author. Every writer of this class has pleaded that he wished to benefit mankind by laying bare social sores, and has indignantly denounced his critics. Even the vilest of erotic scribblers have said the same. Who can gainsay them? The motive may have been the purest, but the effect of the book upon the public mind has to be judged apart, and by this standard alone the Casuists must stand or fall.

It has been abundantly demonstrated that some of the most dangerous maxims are still published in works bearing episcopal approbations, and are taught in French seminaries. M. Paul Bert established his case in a series of speeches likely to outlive the controversy which gave them birth, and which only suffered from the absence of any opponent in the *Chambre des Députés* capable of entering the lists against him.¹ The orators of the Right and Right Centre only contributed, by their exclamations and interruptions, to enhance the overwhelming effect of the arguments brought to bear in favour of the Bill. M. Bert had only to remind them that the Jesuits had been expelled from the country by the *Ancien Régime*, and excluded from a share in secondary education even under Charles X., in order to refute the assertion that Republicans alone were hostile to the Society.² He could quote the authority of the Duc de Broglie, the friend and contemporary of Guizot, against that of his son and successor.

¹ The able speeches of MM. Dufaure and Jules Simon in the Senate against clause 7 of the Ferry Bill in no way traversed this portion of M. Bert's accusation, but rested solely upon the Constitutional argument.

² The latter measure was introduced by the Villèle Ministry, and was enthusiastically welcomed by public opinion at the time.

But it was in his quotations from the writings of Jesuit teachers, authorized by their Superiors, and actually used in the work of instruction, that he roused the feelings of his hearers and silenced his opponents. From the latter he could have desired no more efficient aid than by their first blank denials, and then their naïve exclamations that such writers must be insane, or could not be Jesuits.¹ M. Bert clearly proved that very many of the old enormities of Escobar and Bauny were at the present day in full authority, and his guarded quotations from current books of so-called devotion revealed even more startling aberrations from the rules of wisdom and true piety. A Bossuet or a Fénelon would have been horror-struck at the pernicious stuff which French priests are found to write, and French bishops to sanction, for the use of the young.

But even M. Bert's logic did not escape the old fallacy which we have demonstrated in the case of his predecessor. Although admitting that the whole hierarchy has not only accepted but boasts solidarity with the Jesuits, although he adduced passages as reprehensible from the works of non-Jesuit authors,² yet his whole argument culminated in a denunciation of the Society alone. He did not perceive that his facts pointed to a far different conclusion. He did not realise, nor did any other speaker on that occasion, that the evil, the symptoms of which he had so clearly enumerated, was no mere excrecence which might be excised, but a radical and constitutional disease, and that its cause must be sought, not in the Society of Jesus, but in the whole system and principles of the Roman Catholic Church. It would be unjust to assert that reasons of party policy have caused the French Government to make a

¹ M. Paul Bert—"M. de la Bassetière me reproche d'habiller tout cela: je vais le lire tout nu. (Très-bien! très-bien à gauche.—Lisez! lisez!)"

M. du Bodan (a Member of the Right)—"Ce n'est pas possible: il y a des dames dans les tribunes!"

M. Paul Bert—Je le reconnais, et de là viennent toutes mes hésitations; mais avouez que c'est une situation étrange que de se trouver en présence d'un auditoire d'adultes, et de ne pas oser y lire ce qui est fait et écrit pour être lu par une jeune personne, M. du Bodau." (The book in question was "Méditations selon la Méthode de S. Ignace Sur la Vie et les Mystères de N.S.J.C." 4 vols. 1867.)

² Moullet, although often quoted as a Jesuit author, but was not a member of the Society, although he taught ethics at the College of Fribourg for some years. M. Paul Bert himself admitted "*que le monde Catholique tout entier s'est rallié aux idées, aux doctrines Jésuitiques*" (Discours, p. 66). But his conclusion—"par conséquent, lorsque nous trouvons ces doctrines exprimées par un membre d'une congrégation quelconque ou du clergé séculier, nous avons le droit de dire: ce sont des doctrines Jésuitiques!"—is precisely the converse of that which history has proved.

distinction which they do not believe to exist. In politics, an empirical treatment which ignores all but patent facts is sometimes the highest justice, because least liable to the possibility of error. No doubt can be cast upon the strict legality, although possibly upon the expedience, of the final course by which, in accordance with laws constitutionally passed and never yet repealed, the members of unauthorised Congregations have been expelled. The Jesuits share the condemnation of other illegal associations. If they have met with more severe treatment than the main body, it is simply the result of their self-chosen policy and of their more avowed hostility to the established Government. But while recognising that the cry for liberty comes with an ill grace from those who have always thwarted it, the student must feel that, in principle, no difference either of teaching or practice can be attributed solely to the Society of Jesus. Its members have only carried to inexorable conclusions the premises of the whole Church. A Jesuit is simply a logical Romanist.

JOHN DE SOYRES.

ART VI.—REMARKS UPON A SERMON

Preached before the University, and published in "The Cambridge Chronicle," on the Right Use and Interpretation of Scripture.

WE all, I suppose, recognise the right and the duty—the right in respect to his fellow-men, and the duty in respect to God—of every individual to exercise his own independent judgment in the interpretation of Scripture; and therefore we ought not to harshly condemn, nor attempt to authoritatively silence, any one because his opinions appear to us erroneous and dangerous. But while every one is justified in forming and defending his own interpretation of a passage of Holy Writ, no one, when propounding what he knows to be contrary to the doctrine of many who are highly esteemed in the Church, is justified in charging those who differ from him with ignorance, or prejudice, or party spirit. Yet this is by no means uncommon with men of a certain theological, philosophical, and critical school, who frequently speak and write upon subjects of controversy in an arrogant tone, as though they only had understood, and it were folly to contend with them. I have myself heard the modern notion, that the last twenty-seven chapters of the prophetic book which bears his name were not written by Isaiah the son of Amoz, spoken of by one of that school as admitting of no reasonable doubt, whereas he must have known