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Our Lord Jesus Christ

IT is especially significant therefore that the recent Church Assembly passed by a large majority the Archbishop of York's motion that the Church of England should officially appoint delegates to "The World Council of Churches." This project of a World Council of Churches has arisen out of the natural development of the two Movements known as "Life and Work" and "Faith and Order."

The debate in the Assembly was of a very high standard, so that we in the gallery, who lacked background, were swayed for or against the motion as speaker followed speaker.

The Archbishop of York expounded the history and hopes of the Council, while the Bishop of Gloucester sat beside him like an old lion shaking his mane and longing for the moment when he might rend the Archbishop's arguments in pieces. But he had to wait while the motion was most persuasively seconded by the Bishop of Chichester, whose face shone with heavenly light as he spoke. Yes, we were persuaded, quite persuaded, the motion must pass. Then came the Lion, and after him the equally devastating Tiger in Canon J. A. Douglas. Their contention was that it would be a grave error to attempt to form a "World Council of Churches" in the midst of a world at war; when nations were ranged against each other; and when two of the three great blocs, namely the Roman and the Orthodox, would abstain from participation. The argument naturally swayed a strong element in the Assembly. Had not the Council had the audacity to include even one or two Churches who did not practise water baptism? Impossible! The Church of England could not any more than Peter align herself with anything so "unclean!"

And so the battle raged, though in gracious Christian spirit, backwards and forwards, as in Acts xv.—on the same fundamental issue, "Is the Church an Institution founded on loyalty to rules and regulations, or is it the Mystical Body of Christ, called out and indwelt by the Spirit of God?" Can its membership, its life, its power, be summed up in statistics, or is it only "the Lord knoweth them that are His?"

In commenting on the success of the debate His Grace the Archbishop of York has written, " I value it especially as a witness to the world of the fellowship in Christ of all those who believe in Him. You are probably familiar with the ' Affirmation of Unity in allegiance to our Lord Jesus Christ ' which was an act of the World Conference at Edinburgh in 1937. It is, of course, contained in the official report. That was an affirmation in words only—very striking, but words ; this is an act. And it is valued especially by the younger Churches—China, Japan, India, and various parts of Africa—as a means whereby they can enter into fellowship, through their delegations, with the longer-established Churches. This is a strength to them in their stand against Paganism."

The affirmation is obviously taken from Paul, " Grace be with all them that love our Lord Jesus Christ in sincerity." That is the basis of Apostolic Unity in Diversity, the parable of which is the Body with its members and Christ the Head. Strangely enough, the " Catholic " conception of the Church is a Union with Uniformity. This inevitably leads to Paul's astonished question, " If they were all one member where were the Body ? "

If the diversity of nearly sixty Churches of many nations has reached a unity of " allegiance to our Lord Jesus Christ " surely the hour has come for Evangelicals to " Close the Ranks," as Bishop Ryle exhorted. There is something lacking in us if, at such a time as this, we cannot Close the Ranks and bear a united witness to " our Lord Jesus Christ." If those four words are given their full Scriptural significance then there is no doubt that the whole revelation of God is in them. Therefore to keep faithful to the apostolic conception we need the addition of those other four apostolic words " according to the Scriptures." Christendom was first divided by personalities—Peter, Paul and Apollos ; next into Churches ; now into Societies. These are necessary members, but they are not the Body. The members belong to the Body, but the Body to the Head. The members minister to the Body, the Body serves the Head. (1 Cor. iii. 21-23).

So let us Close our Ranks, and find a way to bear together the Apostolic Witness to " Our Lord Jesus Christ, according to the Scriptures."

Principles of Biblical Criticism: The Real Issue

THE REV. G. W. BROMILEY, M.A.

(In the "Church Gazette" of February last, "Ignoramus" stated, "It cannot be denied by anyone acquainted with the facts that the present position of Evangelicals is unsatisfactory. They are still divided on the Biblical issue, on which no advance towards unity has been made in the last thirty years." This article points the way to Reconciliation.)

MUCH harm is wrought by want of thought. In many fields of life the old adage is true, but in none more so than in the seemingly academic, but in reality extremely important field of Biblical Criticism. Biblical criticism is a subject upon which it is difficult to hold sane and thoughtful views. All the forces at work in the life of a man, upbringing, education, Christian experience, even from a worldly standpoint Bible reading, tend to give him either a deep-rooted prejudice against it, or an even more unreasoning, wildly extravagant satisfaction in it. To take an example which brings us very close to the heart of the matter, the modern theological student will either be an opponent of Biblical criticism, in spite of certain grudging concessions which he cannot help but make, or more likely he will quite frankly be a sceptic, and in most cases a jubilant and happy sceptic, in matters of Biblical accuracy. And in either case his attitude will be one of unreasoning prejudice, indicative of a basal failure. In either case there has been the failure thoughtfully to estimate criticism for what it is truly worth and to grasp the important principles which must underlie it.

This failure is not on one side only. It is characteristic of both Evangelicals and Modernists alike, to adopt the invidious antithesis of current terminology. In the past Evangelicals have been wont to lay the whole blame for the

modern distrustful attitude to the Bible at the door of the Modernists (and, of course, there is much justification for this view), but, on the other hand, they themselves have not been wholly free from guilt. Evangelicals are to blame in that they have not only fought sceptical criticism, but also they have denied and decried criticism itself. Their attitude has been purely negative and destructive. Instead of meeting the scepticism of hostile critics with a sane and constructive work they have tried to fence in the world of the Bible, to isolate Biblical, or sacred, history from ordinary secular history, and to answer historical criticisms with dogmatic assertions. This attitude of prejudice has reaped its own reward in a more hostile criticism and in a withering contempt of Evangelical theology.

The time has surely come when the bitter and unreasoning controversy must be brought to a close. Prejudice must be put on one side and the whole matter of Biblical criticism thoughtfully and quietly reviewed. By both Evangelicals and Modernists alike an effort must be made to put criticism in its proper setting, to understand its true nature and functions, and to enunciate and apply the true principles which all sound criticism must observe. It was the great French writer, Ernest Renan, himself an early and hostile critic, who saw in the history of thought three broad stages: the stage of a primitive syncretism, that of criticism, and the final stage of synthesis.[1]

In the sphere of Biblical criticism there is a valuable lesson here. The old unquestioning view of the Bible has been shattered by an attitude of ruthless enquiry, which seems to have destroyed its unity. But although the work of analysis is by no means completed, although we are only on the fringe of a true historical appreciation, yet there is hope that an age of synthesis is not far distant, when faith and knowledge will meet, to their mutual enrichment. But if this synthesis is to come, it can only come when criticism is acknowledged by all and when it is set upon a truly historical basis. Hence the need at this time to re-examine the position in a bold and thoughtful spirit.

In the first place, what is really implied by Biblical criticism and how far is it a legitimate process? It is at this elementary point that the confusion begins and the gulf is

[1]Renan: L'Avenir de la Science, pp. 301 f.

fixed. For the average Evangelical criticism suggests an interference of reason in realms from which reason ought rigidly to be excluded, and carries with it the further suggestion of scepticism. Criticism is therefore condemned out of hand as illegitimate, or at most condoned as a necessary and unpleasant evil forced upon us by ungodly agnostics. Even with the younger men, many of whom would dissent from this view, there still remains the feeling that criticism must be undertaken for apologetic reasons, but not in and for itself. With the Modernist the case is entirely different. The Modernist also sees in criticism an applying of reason to faith, but he rejoices in it. Criticism is a purging of faith by the God-given faculty of reason, the bold dispelling of superstitions and false traditions, the correction of religion along the lines of scientific investigation. Criticism is not only legitimate : it is an imperative duty.

That these two attitudes should clash was a foregone conclusion, but the tragedy is, not that they have been unable to understand each other, but that in neither case has criticism itself been truly understood. Of course there have been the many exceptions, but in general this statement is true. Perhaps the word criticism is itself unfortunate, since it carries with it from the outset the suggestion of scepticism, but at any rate criticism has been misunderstood on both sides as scepticism. With the Evangelicals it is an attack upon faith, to be denounced out of hand. The Evangelical has seldom stopped to ask whether it is criticism itself or only a perversion of it which should be denounced. With the Modernist it is a weapon to break down an unreasoning faith, to emancipate the human mind from the shackles of a dead orthodoxy and superstition, in some cases to destroy faith altogether. The Modernist has seldom stopped to ask whether it is criticism itself or only a perversion of it which truly serves this purpose. In neither case has criticism been understood and the result has been a wholly unnecessary struggle, a sullen defensive hostility on the one hand matched by a provocative scepticism on the other.

Biblical criticism itself, however, is not scepticism, and a little thought will show that it is a wholly healthy and legitimate function. That it has largely been interpreted as scepticism is due to the Evangelicals themselves, who

ought much earlier to have realized that there is a place for sound Biblical criticism and that it is a legitimate and even necessary process to which they ought to apply themselves. That criticism is not scepticism is amply proved by the way in which the labours of true scholars, who have arrived at orthodox conclusions, have been respected, if not always accepted by the more liberally disposed. It is an idle fiction to suppose that any work which is conservative will be rejected out of hand. Otherwise how are we to explain the presence of Bigg's masterly defence of the Petrine authorship of 2 Peter in the International Critical Commentary, to cite but one example of many ? It is only slight, unreasoning, biased, unscholarly and denunciatory books, of which there are, alas, only too many, which will fail and deservedly fail to gain a hearing. The time has come when Evangelicals must recognize the crying need for a sound criticism and apply themselves to it without prejudgments and in a spirit of devoted scholarship.

Already the need for the " lower " textual criticism has been universally acknowledged. Obviously it is of importance that the original text of Scripture should as far as possible be ascertained and the versions and translations corrected. And yet even in this field the use of the admittedly imperfect but more correct Revised Version is still regarded with suspicion in many quarters. Granted that for purposes of public reading it is inferior, its use is indispensable if we wish more correctly to know and to understand the original text. And further research which will lead us closer to the original word ought to be encouraged by all who profess to love the Word of the Living God.

Historical and even literary criticism is a no less legitimate function, and it is difficult to understand why there should still exist prejudice against them. Just as the original words must be a subject for research, so also the manner of writing, the circumstances, the events recorded, the persons portrayed must be regarded as a proper field for literary and historical investigation. Even from a superficial point of view it is clear that in the Bible we have a collection of documents which if genuine are of supreme importance, and which must be studied and assessed by the historical investigator. From first to last the Word of God treats of historical events. Large sections are historical records pure and

simple. Granted that the study of history is itself legitimate, then it is obvious that Biblical history, which must be of such tremendous significance for the understanding of the Ancient World, is also a proper field for historical research. Indeed such historical study is vitally necessary even for a proper understanding of much of the Bible itself, notably of the prophetic books, where there are so many references to contemporary events, customs, fashions, etc., quite unintelligible without a knowledge of the background in which they are set. Biblical criticism in its true sense, extricated from the tangle of false doctrinaire questions which has been woven around it, means quite simply the study, evaluation and interpretation of Biblical events as history, and to a lesser degree the assessment of the Biblical books as literature. Once the true nature of criticism is grasped, it is difficult to see why so useful and necessary a process, which has such a valuable contribution to make even to faith, should be shunned and feared on the one hand or prosecuted solely as a branch of sceptical thought on the other. Is it too much to ask that our neurotic fears and perversions should be abandoned and the way paved for a prosecution of Biblical criticism as a department of general historical and literary investigation?

This then at root is the true nature of Biblical criticism; it is an investigation into the events recorded in the Bible as history. But if this is so, then it is clear from the outset that its functions are strictly limited. The misunderstanding of criticism has led in many cases to a gross overstepping of these functions and to a consequent abuse of criticism as a whole. For this liberal writers are in the main responsible. They have failed to realize that true criticism, which is historical investigation, cannot and must not be treated as a weapon in the war of dogmatic ideas. That it will have its repercussions, and possibly serious repercussions upon such questions as that of Inspiration or the doctrine of the Resurrection is of course inevitable, but it must not be fashioned into and used as a weapon in doctrinal controversy. To use it in this way is radically to mistake its function, to misuse it.

Criticism in its early days, centred, as it was bound to do for lack of other material, around the Biblical documents themselves and it was quickly discovered that

there were many difficulties and seeming discrepancies in the texts, not all of which could be ascribed to errors in transmission. The deduction was made that much of the documentary evidence was unreliable and that the whole picture presented by the Bible, and more especially the Old Testament, was false. On the basis of such evidence as existed this was not altogether an unfair but it was certainly a rash and hasty judgment. A truly scientific investigation would have jumped less readily to conclusions. But criticism was over-reaching itself, as is clear from the fact that these early and tentative critical results were immediately pressed into service against cardinal points of the Christian faith. Even more significantly, Hebrew history was itself reconstructed, foolishly and without any evidence at all, in accordance with the philosophical views of the critics, who, sharing the optimistic progress-view, felt that the Hebrew nation must have evolved out of very primitive scattered tribes. There were of course many patient investigators who had the wisdom, whilst noting the difficulties, not to commit themselves to such engaging but wholly unhistorical theories, but rather quietly to continue in the search for truth. On the whole, however, the function of criticism was gravely abused, and criticism transformed from a necessary scientific investigation into a weapon of theological and philosophical controversy.

At the present time it must be noticed that the evangelicals themselves are in grave danger of similarly abusing the functions of criticism. After many years in which the tide seemed to run strongly against the Bible, modern archaeological investigation has overthrown much overhasty theory and re-established facts of Biblical criticism hitherto questioned. The temptation is strong to use the evidence of archaeology in support of the doctrines of faith, but this is a temptation which must be resisted. The function of archaeology, as of criticism, is not to support any doctrines, but to ascertain the truth. If at certain points there is no doubt but that the Biblical record is substantiated, then the fact may be noted, but archaeology must not be prosecuted solely for apologetic reasons, nor must its findings be deliberately misapplied in that direction.

Historical criticism is only legitimate in so far as it remains an investigation into the actual events, as they happened,

irrespective of doctrinal or other implications. The Evangelical, of all men, has least to fear from such an investigation, and least reason to pervert it, if he truly knows the Bible as the Word of God. He can push forward confidently with a true and impartial study, not rushing hastily into ill-founded theories but waiting patiently until the work is completed, allowing the facts to speak for themselves. The pity of it is firstly, that he has been so backward, so timid, so hesitant in undertaking such a task ; secondly, that when once the tide turns in his favour he rushes at once into the same misapplication as did the Modernists, overreaching himself in the same way, imperilling the whole course of future investigation, inviting the retribution which historical research inevitably metes out upon those who mistake her functions.

Biblical criticism is a study of the Bible from a historical point of view. Its function is to give a reasonable, clear, accurate and well-substantiated picture of the events of the Bible as they actually happened, and in their relation to the larger questions of world history. The further and perhaps most important question remains to be considered : What are the main principles which will and must underlie all such criticism ? This question, it will be noticed, is one which follows naturally upon, and is closely bound up with the question as to the function of criticism, and it is one which will enable us to a large extent to determine the real character and value of all critical work.

And here again it is clear at the outset that the majority of critics have been gravely at fault through a failure to notice, let alone to observe, the principles of serious investigation. It is almost incredible that the glaring weakness of the Modernist method should not long since have been exposed, but for the most part Evangelicals have been content to decry the results, and the hostile spirit from which they sprang, without concerning themselves with the curious methods by which they were obtained. In consequence the historical study of the Bible, taken as a whole, has never been conducted on the sound lines of true historical research, and the Evangelicals themselves give little indication of commencing such sane and thoughtful investigation. The need is urgent to pick out and to emphasize these main principles, not only as a means of exposing false work, but

in order to help Evangelical scholars—and the way is clearing for a revival of Evangelical scholarship—to avoid the old pitfalls.

In the first place it is clear that the investigator must as far as possible approach his material without bias. It is inevitable that he should have a point of view, which will give him a predisposition towards certain conclusions. If he has found the Scriptures to be the Living Word of God to his soul, he certainly will not expect to find them unreliable or faulty in secular matters. If he has been nursed in rationalism he will have a desire to overthrow the authority of the Bible (which is the great bulwark against rationalism) by demonstrating its " obvious " inaccuracies. This predisposition cannot be avoided—indeed investigation would be completely soulless without it—but at any rate it must be rigorously held in check lest it degenerate into a prejudice which affects the strictly impartial assessment of evidence. Once an investigator begins to guide his researches into channels which will give desired results, then at once his work is brought under suspicion and its value lost.

But this has only too evidently been the case in matters of Biblical criticism. On the Evangelical side, there is scarcely a writer who has not approached problems of history with the result already firmly established in his own mind. The Evangelical has sifted the evidence only in order to find points in support of that result. Consequently from an historical point of view Evangelical writings are in the main worthless, and a greater service is rendered the Evangelical cause by those independent investigators who do happen to have arrived at " conservative " conclusions.

But the Modernists themselves are not blameless in this matter. In some cases by way of reaction, in order to show their complete impartiality, in others out of a complete hostility to the Bible and in support of a non-Christian Weltanschauung, they too have approached the Scriptures with the verdict already given against the sacred record; and with a spirit intent on destruction they have picked out and emphasized only the evidence which supports their own contention.

True Biblical criticism is not undertaken in a partisan spirit, or in support, conscious or sub-conscious, of theological or philosophical ideas. It has no preconceived ideas.

It does not start with its conclusions. True Biblical criticism is an impartial survey, undertaken by honest and scholarly men, with the sole object of establishing the historical truth or error of events recorded in the Bible, of reconstructing Biblical history, and of interpreting it in its relation to the larger history of the nations as a whole. It is a mystery that Evangelicals have not had the faith themselves to undertake such an examination, confident that the evidence, impartially reviewed, will in no wise prejudice their acceptance of the Living Word. If only scholars would be content to rest upon the facts, and be done with their own shaping of the facts for other purposes, how history and faith alike would benefit! But no: the impatient mind of man must leap beyond the facts to some hurried and often fictitious conclusion upon which he may build, and the result is a wide tangle of words from which neither history nor faith can ever profit.

First, Biblical criticism must be an impartial investigation. Secondly, it must be patient. The study of any branch of history demands perseverance. Facts are not made plain in a moment, nor may details be dovetailed together at any given time. Material is often painfully slow in coming to light, and the sifting of it is the work of many years. The brilliant conclusion which resolves the whole issue is almost certainly a quack conclusion. History (and particularly ancient history) knows few assured results, at any rate in the sphere of detail. But how few scholars have the patience to wait until all the material is available. They must rush into print with what at most can only be interim results, and announce them as authoritative and final, often to the confusion and delay of a thorough investigation. Of course results must be published before all the material is available, otherwise there could be no progress at all, but the patient investigator will frankly recognize their interim character and eschew the folly of erecting general theories upon them.

Investigation must be impartial and patient, and it must also be scrupulous. All material must be given its due weight and thoroughly tested. Results must not be obtained by sleight-of-hand and cunning tricks, by the over-emphasizing of one point at the expense of another, by the ignoring of unsuitable evidence. The writings of the Modernists make

pitiful reading in this respect. Only too often awkward evidence is spirited away, or supporting facts produced from nowhere, merely at the whim of the writer. Only too often the flimsiest conjectures upon a stray text are adduced with solemn protestations as conclusive proof. Now an undesirable text is mutilated, or glossed away ; now a false antithesis is made ; now two theories are left hanging in the air, tied together and each supporting the other. Much so-called criticism is nothing more than a clever, academic juggling of this nature, an instrument which, once one has mastered the technique, may be used to prove anything or everything, quite apart from historical reality at all. The true Biblical critic guards himself against this temptation. He is always scrupulously careful in his use of evidence. He does not gloss away on *a priori* grounds. He does not base one theory upon another. He gives to every point of evidence its full weight, and if the result does not conform to a preconceived pattern, he is content to wait, and if necessary to revise the pattern ; he does not shape the results to fit the pattern.

It is perhaps hardly necessary to add that the true critic will be strictly honest, and yet the human mind is so tortuous, so easily self-deceived, that perhaps a word or two on this subject would not be out of place. The matter of honesty is of course one upon which we cannot speak for each other, but only for ourselves. If certain obvious dangers are pointed out, it will be clearly understood that no particular examples are in mind, since there is no evidence available. Now it is obvious that every critic enters the field with an underlying honesty of purpose to discover the truth, but from the very outset, quite apart from preconceptions, there is one consideration which is likely to cause him to swerve ever so slightly from the path of strict honesty, namely, that of his personal reputation. Other factors are at work, but this is perhaps the most potent and the most subtle. He commences his research with a thesis for some degree, and the temptation is great to bring out some new and startling theory on the basis of very slight evidence, or perhaps to play for safety by adopting views which will be acceptable in professorial circles. Or his reputation is established by some solid piece of research, and then new evidence comes to light which overturns his whole work. How he struggles against the evidence instead of welcoming it as a further valuable

contribution! Professing himself unable to accept it, when all the time, subconsciously, he is unwilling. These are practical considerations—and there are of course many more, personal jealousies, instinctive reactions, etc.—which the honest critic will take into account, watching himself lest he should be deflected at any point. How easily the whole course of criticism may be imperilled by slight subconscious dishonesties, the perverting or ignoring of evidence, which have as their aim the obscuring rather than the establishing of truth.

Biblical research, however, must also be bold and imaginative. Historical study cannot be purely academic, since it deals with the doings of people, not with abstract principles or mathematical equations. The sifting of meticulous detail may even confuse, unless it is accompanied by an imaginative feeling for the personalities concerned. Historical study is only truly successful when it can reconstruct: in this connection it is significant that the debt of modern historical study to the Romantic Movement is so large. So to know a period, so to immerse ourselves in it, that we can catch the spirit of it, that is the aim of all true historical study. Of course this bold, imaginative spirit will lead us into mistakes. But the very mistakes will be a means of advance, so long as they are not allowed to harden into dogmas. And time after time apparently irreconcilable discrepancies of the letter of evidence will be found to possess an inner harmony of spirit. May it not be that discrepancies such as those in the Saul narratives are only the formal discrepancies which occur when two accounts, an official and a more personal, or biographical, run side by side? Is it not true that many of the difficulties of the Bible are due to the fact that the documents are treated rather like mathematical equations or jig-saw puzzles than living narratives about living people?

One word of caution is, however, necessary at this juncture. There is a false imaginativeness as well as a true. In the first place imaginativeness must not be allowed to degenerate into unbridled speculation, with the aim of producing spectacular results. History must be felt and relieved, but an imaginative reconstruction is only possible on the basis of thorough and patient investigation. Secondly and above all reconstruction must not be determined by intellectual concepts. The fashionable reconstruction of the Hebrew Conquest, as

stated by Oesterly and Robinson in their standard text-book[1] is an example of the historical method falsified, since it rests on only a few scraps of real evidence, artificially and academically isolated from the Biblical text, and is predetermined by the critics' own views of what ought to have happened.

First, criticism must be impartial, secondly patient, then scrupulous and strictly honest, fourthly bold and imaginative, and last of all, in many ways the most important point, it must be conducted along certain fixed and proper lines of enquiry. Up to the present time, it has been sadly true that the bulk of criticism has been conducted along false lines. The reason for this has been the lack of corroborative outside evidence which would enable investigators to make a thorough study, such evidence having been extremely slow in coming to light. Even yet the Bible is upon many points our sole evidence, and of course as long as there is no confirmation either way, speculation will continue to run riot usurping the name and functions of a proper enquiry.

What then are the marks of a true enquiry? In the first place surely it accepts such evidence as there is until other evidence comes to light either to contradict or to substantiate. And even if in the available evidence there are discrepancies, unless the solution is obvious judgment will be suspended until there is further evidence which will either resolve the discrepancy or enable to distinguish between the true and the false. In any case, where the available evidence is so slight, it is surely the grossest folly to build up an "authoritative" and "assured" reconstruction upon the tattered ruins of that evidence.

Yet that is what has happened in the field of Biblical criticism. With the Bible as the only evidence, investigators have made it their business to discredit the Bible, to set it against itself, to ruin such evidence as it does afford, and then calmly and shamelessly, on the basis of a few stray texts (the inner core of truth) and the theories of Professor X to give a complete and unbiased account of what did happen, for which there is absolutely no true evidence at all.

The root of the trouble all along has of course been the lack of corroborative evidence. For want of something

[1] History of Israel I.

better to do, active minds have been forced to work upon the Bible itself, and minutely to examine the text in the hope of reaching from that alone some final conclusion. But without corroborative evidence final conclusions are out of the question, and likely to be grossly misleading, as in the case of the fall of Jericho, to take but one example. If only the brains and ingenuity had been expended upon useful preparatory tasks rather than upon idle destructive speculation, a sane textual criticism, a tabulation of discrepancies to be resolved or balanced, a listing of points for archaeological or other verification, a more diligent enquiry into other possible lines of evidence, a general attempt to understand the historical, intellectual, social and cultural picture as we have it in the Bible as a whole, as well as possible amendments required, then the ground would have been cleared for a true reconstruction once the evidence began to come in, as it is doing to-day, and there would have been no cumbering tangle of useless, unsupported theory to impede advance.

Secondly, any real enquiry will be marked by a determination to discover and to make use of any available lines of evidence. Instead of idling away the time in a constant rehashing of unprofitable, because wholly unsupportable theories, it will seek to broaden the field, testing the documents available, not only by the more fallible internal methods, but also by the surer external. In this respect archaeology, with its opening up of ancient documents and inscriptions, its verifying of historical fact, its sidelights upon sociology and culture, its opportunities for the study of comparative philology, is of central importance. Only as further facts do come to light in this way will it be possible to study the Bible from a truly historical point of view and to gain a clear and accurate understanding of the Ancient World. It is along these lines that a true assessment of Biblical history will proceed, not along the old false lines of a continuous juggling with the text in order to support *a priori* theories.

Again a true enquiry will be marked by a use of only non-subjective methods. Personal intuitions have a certain limited value in historical study, in that they often give the clue which leads to the solution of a problem (this is true, of course, in all branches of science) but, on the other hand,

they cannot replace objective evidence. This is a fact which ought to need no emphasis at all, but unfortunately many critics have seen fit to ignore it in the field of Biblical criticism. Time and time again, particularly in the matter of disputed authorships and passages, personal intuitions, subjective judgments, have been allowed to usurp the place of concrete evidence. The bulk of the evidence adduced in support of composite authorship is, strictly speaking, of this character, depending in the last resort upon impressions, and possibly misunderstandings, rather than upon real evidence. Passages are pronounced late, because they are felt to be late, and certain words, often rare words, are found not to have occurred in earlier writings, just to give the argument an appearance of reality. In a strict enquiry these subjective impressions are bound to remain, but they must not be allowed to influence conclusions in any way without the full support of concrete evidence.

Finally, all enquiry must be marked by the reserve characteristic of true scholarship. Evangelical scholarship has always been too confident of ultimate results for reserve (perhaps Modernism has taught a lesson here) but after all there is no real antithesis between the confidence of faith and reserve in historical knowledge. Faith often knows without seeing. Modernism for its part has also been conspicuously over-confident. Like some noisy ebullition of impatient immaturity, having noticed a few awkward facts and conceived a few philosophic fancies, it advanced to take the world by storm with assured results.

This stage has almost passed. Investigators have begun to see that our knowledge of the Ancient World is so fragmentary, so imperfect and probably so prejudiced that there is little indeed that we do know with certainty. Before we can fully appreciate the story of the Bible, a long road of difficult investigation must be travelled, and even then many difficulties may never be cleared. But the difficulties are after all due to our lack of knowledge rather than to ignorance on the part of the writers, and on such matters there can be no voice of assurance. We can only keep our own convictions and wait upon the evidence as it is slowly accumulated and woven into pattern. Above all we must not try to hurry the matter. Our understanding of the

Ancient World must be of slow growth, but it will be none the less sure in the long run.

These then are the main principles of Biblical criticism. A necessary historical investigation, it must be conducted without ulterior dogmatic ends, a patient, scrupulous, honest and imaginative study, in which the evidence is properly weighed, corroborative evidence sought, merely subjective judgment excluded and a proper reserve kept to forbid all hasty and ill-considered pronouncements. Properly understood and properly conducted, there is no reason why criticism should not cease to be a stumbling-block and become an indispensable companion of faith. The realisation of this ideal is in our own hands. It is we who must understand and we who must conduct. The opportunity is present. Already a different spirit is abroad. Surely in this sphere at last Evangelicalism will assert itself, to the advancement of human knowledge and the vital enrichment of faith.

OUR BIBLE AND THE ANCIENT MANUSCRIPTS.

By Sir Frederic Kenyon, G.B.E., K.C.B. (*Eyre & Spottiswoode.*) 10*s.* 6*d.*

This book would be an excellent one to study in connection with the above article and the one which follows. It tells how the text of Scripture has come down to us and is illustrated by a large number of photographs of ancient papyri, manuscripts and early printed versions.

In this day of criticism we are thankful for a man of first-class scholarship to champion the accuracy and uniqueness of God's Word. Many have written of these things, but, as the *Spectator* says, "Few indeed could claim the authority of one who has had many years of service as the Director and principal librarian of the British Museum. There are many who are anxious to learn how far the Bible is still trustworthy and Sir Frederic is at pains to show that nothing has happened that need disturb the faith of the weakest."

This was written in connection with Sir Frederic's latest book, "The Bible and Archaeology" (Harraps, 15*s.*). But it applies equally to both.

The real point is, are we who realize that "faith comes by hearing and hearing by the Word of God" using these books? Specially the lecturers at our Theological Colleges? Facts are fuel to faith.

Inspiration in the Light of Versions

(*Written in* 1879 *when the Revised Version was begun*).

H. B. TRISTRAM.

THERE are sometimes periods in the history of religious thought when questions which at other times have agitated the Church have lain so long dormant that men's beliefs, while still sound dogmatically, have become, as it were, practically fossilized and lifeless. Such has been (I am speaking only of its action on the general untheological mind) the subject of the inspiration of the Word of God, its mode and its limits. Few of our ordinary lay Churchmen would be able to explain, even if they cared to think, what is the exact meaning of the term *Inspiration*. Practically, in quiet times, this may not be of much consequence. So long as the Bible is received as the voice of God speaking to man, so long as each definite statement is accepted when it comes to us under the sanction of that Book, it may be well to pass over the *mode* of inspiration, while simple faith receives the message with undoubting reverence and acceptance. A Church which had been ignorant of heresies throughout the whole period of its existence might not require the Nicean expansion of the Apostles' Creed, and might be only bewildered and perplexed by the refinements and dogmatic niceties of the Athanasian formulary. Now, for two centuries and a half the Authorized Version has been the sole text-book of the English-reading student of the Bible. Launched without legislative or ecclesiastical enactment, it has, by its own intrinsic merits, absolutely superseded and supplanted every predecessor, not only in the Church of England, but in every English-speaking Protestant community in the world. Not one of the many other versions can now be procured, excepting as typographical curiosities, and almost all of them at prices which no other printed books save Shakespeare, have ever reached.

This universal acceptance of the one version has not been without its effect on the popular mind, in its impressions of

the meaning of Inspiration. Familiarity for generations with the *ipsissima verba* of the Authorized Version has led to an unconscious acceptance of the English words as being themselves literally inspired. Very often the preacher who suggests an interpretation differing from the received one is half suspected of irreverent audacity, or of "free-handling." How many popular errors are founded on half-texts wrested from their context, and twisted to suit the prevalent view! The passage, "Know ye not that your bodies are the temples of the Holy Ghost?" is continually appealed to as a proof of the necessity for assurance of personal salvation. In a series of lessons on Confirmation, published forty years ago, under the sanction of an eminent prelate, every passage in which the word "confirming" or "confirm" occurs in the New Testament was adduced as a proof of the Apostolic authority of the rite of Confirmation. "At the name of Jesus every knee shall bow" is appealed to as commanding an outward obeisance, in utter contradiction to the letter and spirit of the original (ἐν). But it is needless to multiply instances.

Now, we may reasonably anticipate that in the forthcoming Revision many archaisms will be modified, as well as mistranslations corrected, while we may well trust the learned divines, who have been so long employed on this work, not needlessly to change the form of sentences, or in any way to modernize the diction, so as to impair the dignity and noble simplicity of the grand old English Bible. But still changes there must be. How will these affect the popular belief? To many they may prove a rude shock; but yet, I believe, a shock which will be productive of much ultimate benefit, and will establish faith upon a firmer basis. Even as it is, not the uneducated alone are apt to pin their faith to their own interpretation of the words of the Authorized Version, and even in disputed interpretations of historical records to maintain their own view as though it were a matter of orthodoxy connected with the soul's salvation. This surely is none other than an exhibition of the same spirit which persecuted Galileo. On the universality of the flood, for instance, the common belief that it covered the entire earth, founded simply on the rendering that it covered "all the high hills that were *under the whole heaven*," loses all its support from Scripture, when we find that the same Hebrew words are used elsewhere in a very limited

sense, as in Deut. ii. 25, where "under the whole heaven" can only possibly mean Canaan and the nations immediately adjacent. Had the original, instead of the Authorized Version, been appealed to, the elasticity of the Hebrew expressions would, as soon as recognized, have prevented many an apparent conflict between Revelation and Science. In all these difficulties as to the interpretation of Scripture, the controversialist much needs to offer up the prayer of St. Augustine, when perplexed as to the meaning of the inspired writer, "Do Thou, O Lord, either reveal that same sense to us, or whatever other true one pleaseth Thee, that whether Thou discover the same to us, as to that Thy servant, or some other by the same words, *Tu tamen pascas nos, non error illudat.*"

Now, if the Revision had been presented to the English public at a period of stagnation, or of tacit and indifferent acceptance of religious truth, the new rendering might in the course of a generation or two have become thoroughly naturalized and familiar to all classes, and have come into general acceptance without stirring any incidental questions. We can scarcely expect such results at present. The Bible is generally and fiercely, if not indiscriminately, attacked by avowed opponents on very different grounds, all, however, converging to one point—viz., that it is *inaccurate*—whether it be in its history, its science, its moral teaching, matters not. We of the Clergy must, to meet these foes, and to meet the difficulties they will raise, while unfurling the standard of Inspiration, know very clearly what we mean by it, and we must bring the subject before our people far more prominently than many of us have heretofore done. We must enable every man to give a reason for the faith that is in him. In the first place, we must beware that Christians be not led away by the plausible but pernicious sophistry that the Bible *contains* the Word of God. We maintain, on the contrary, that it *is* the Word of God. To hold otherwise, would be to admit the pruning-knife of every self-constituted arbiter, whose "higher criticism," "inner-consciousness," or "historical theories," would lead him to excise passages, chapters, verses—aye, and whole books—and to arrange and rearrange authorships and chronology so as to suit his preconceived theories. It would give full scope to the shallow and unscholar-like captiousness of a Colenso, and

to the ingenious audacity which mutilates and transposes the prophecies—*e.g.*, of Isaiah or Daniel—and thereby changes prediction into annalistic records.

We maintain not the Inspiration of a version, and, so far as the English reader is concerned, *verbal* Inspiration is impossible, but we must maintain *plenary* Inspiration. And this can be held as much of a carefully revised version as of an original. We welcome the new version if it casts light on disputed passages, and corrects the inappropriate expressions which have been already referred to. We shall be glad that it shall not be left to each scholar, preacher, or orator, to decide, *e.g.*, whether the text be right which says, "Thou hast increased the nation, and *not* increased the joy," or the margin which reads "and hast increased its joy."

Again, there is a sense in which, I presume, few will contend for the *verbal* Inspiration of the whole original, or that a Divine Providence watched over the transcribers of MSS. and prevented a mistake of a point or a comma. The vast numbers of various readings, increased as they are by the exhumation of each newly-discovered MS., would at once render this impossible. But the *plenary* does extend to the *verbal* when the word is important to the sense, and especially to the doctrinal teaching; and in such cases when find we ever a discrepancy? Look at Gal. iii. 16, where Inspiration has guided the word "*seed*," not "seeds."

There are three leading views of Inspiration. First, that every idea and *every* word is inspired, or directly indited by the Holy Spirit's influence. This seems scarcely tenable without hedging it with so many limitations and safeguards as to transcription, as to render it scarcely the simplest mode of setting forth the doctrine. Second, that the ideas but not the words were inspired. This seems even more perilous, and however hedged and defined, must leave open the door to every subtle device of unbelief and false doctrine. Third, that **every idea is inspired, and every sentence and word so far as to prevent anything being written which is inconsistent with truth.**

This last definition appears to present fewest difficulties, and to be the most easily definable—not that it is without its difficulties. The *mode* of Inspiration must ever be a difficulty and a mystery. If it were not a mystery it would not be Inspiration, it would not be divine. In maintaining

this latter view, we maintain that this inspiration is *plenary*, and that it is *superintendent*.

By *plenary* we understand that the person inspired was superhumanly guided, not so as to lose his personal identity, shown in his diction or his mode of thought, but to express only what the Holy Spirit dictated in words which, if his own, yet were superhumanly directed to enunciate the matter; and that the writer was so guided even when in many cases he but dimly guessed, or had no understanding at all, of the true meaning of what he wrote. (1 Peter i. 10, 11.)

By *superintendent* we understand, that when recording facts, as the story of creation, the description of battles, the records of nations or of families, the writer was so guided as to be preserved from writing anything contrary to historic truth, and that therefore historic error has no place in the narrative. That in recording speeches or letters, such as the speeches of Job's friends, of Gamaliel, of Tertullus, or the letter of Claudius Lysias, the sacred penman was both divinely directed to indite them, and was guided to indite them truly and accurately.

And if we are, as we must be, perplexed by difficulties under any view about solitary and isolated expressions which are not verbally accurate, but which convey truth—*e.g.*, "the setting of the sun"—we must remember that the Bible had, while necessarily using human language, and clothing eternal truths in the ideas current in each writer's time, to fulfil an impossible condition—impossible for man and possible only for God—it had to belong to all generations, and to speak intelligibly to men of every stage and diversity of culture and civilization. This it still does. It still has its lessons for rich and for poor. It still exercises the same power, whether to raise from stolid brutishness the fishing Indian of Western North America, or to resist and correct the tendency of every form of higher civilization to exhaustion and decay.

If our new Revision brings us nearer, not only to this idea but to the correct idiom of the original, so far as Oriental phraseology can be naturalized in Occidental expression, it will be a gain to every Christian student; and among its incidental benefits not the least will be that it will compel us of the Clergy to train our flocks in clear and definite views of the meaning of Inspiration; that they may have an answer to give to him that asketh them.

Of Tact

E. H. BLAKENEY.

TACT may be defined as a ready and delicate sense of what is fitting in our dealings with others, so as to avoid causing needless offence on the one hand, and to conciliate on the other. Delicate tasks, not only in the political arena but also in the circumstances of everyday life, require fineness of instinct, and a due regard for the "imponderabilia" in all human relations. And that is just where tact comes in.

There is also the positive side. The tactful man, like the gentleman, will bear and forbear; though candid, he will not be harsh in his verdicts on his fellows; though impartial in his judgments he will be tolerant, making allowance for human weakness and error; kindly in his attitude towards those that differ, he will be scrupulous in steering clear of anything that might needlessly provoke resentment. In discussion he will endeavour to evade collisions that do not advance the argument, nor will he indulge in cheap retorts, even though tempted to do so, knowing that he loses more than he gains in a momentary victory won by such means. He will be anxious to see his opponent's point of view, giving him credit for honesty of intention, whenever possible. This does not mean that he should not hold his own in dealing with an opponent; but he will try to speak the truth in modesty, with a tender regard for idiosyncrasies of attitude and temper.

No more beautiful example of this can be found than in Paul's letter to Philemon, where, with exquisite insight and understanding, the great Apostle makes his point without ruffling the sentiments or self-esteem of his friend, while he pleads with him to show mercy to his runaway slave. There is a yet higher example of tact in our Lord's dealing with the woman of Samaria: He knows her sordid past, and says so: but with what perfect tact He refers to it! Similarly in the case of the woman taken in adultery. He does not condone her sin, as His final words show; but there is no harshness

there, only a massive pity, which must have left an indelible impression on His hearer. Such is tact when revealed in the supreme degree.

The tactful man will never indulge in exhibitionism, or mere party spirit, being well aware that such things are indicative not so much of any firm hold of truth as of a desire to emphasize some personal and particular point of attachment, or to win a momentary triumph over an antagonist. In his inmost soul he is sure that this is not the way to convince. Argument alone, unless kept within due limits, rarely convinces; it is too intellectual in its appeal, and the intellect is not everything. Far otherwise: "the heart too has its reasons" as Pascal so finely observed. If our object is to win an opponent we must use persuasion. This is the better line of approach. For how hard it is to keep the temper in discussion, to evoke light rather than heat in the conduct of affairs!

Not that the disentangling of the body of truth from the meshes of error ought ever to be forgotten, as a primary end in any controversial question. Truth must be our first concern—"truth ever, truth only the excellent" as Browning exclaimed. But to achieve this end requires assiduous care, and a tender appreciation of human fallibility. We do ill to force upon someone our own (perhaps deeply cherished) convictions, clear enough to us but difficult for him readily to grasp. Gentleness in dealing with error; a willingness to listen to another, even when we cannot agree with him; a reluctance to trample on another's feelings; a willingness to concede a point where no high principle is involved: all these virtues are part and parcel of that tact which, at its best, is one of the Christian graces.

There are times and occasions when a resolute stand must be made, when justice and truth compel us to attack what is morally corrupt in thought or expression or policy; yet even in these cases there should be a studied avoidance of acrimony. To show ourselves, in some unguarded moment, "willing to wound, and yet afraid to strike," can but engender needless opposition to views which, more wisely and tactfully put forward, might achieve the purpose we have in view. The natural pride of the spirit, the reluctance to admit ourselves in the wrong—these difficulties must be frankly dealt with. Orientals are apt to lay stress on what is

called " saving face " ; and this should be borne in mind whenever we attempt the task of bringing another's opinion into line with our own.

Consider how political, as well as social life, could be calmed and sweetened if only problems and hard questions were dealt with in a conciliatory temper. Tact in handling such matters—not seldom of vital consequences—might frequently bring to unity and amity those who are too ready to imagine that truth is to be found only on the side they have chosen to champion. Truth indeed is one ; but the approaches to Truth may be many and various. Consider, too, the need for tact in our discussions and disputes on religious matters. Given the grace of tact, half our difficulties (not seldom connected with words rather than with realities) might be solved, and theological differences robbed of their recurring acrimony. It is a consummation devoutly to be wished. And the same thing holds good in what, after all, concerns the majority of men most intimately—their domestic life.

Another point : we make a mistake if we overlook humour as an ingredient, and a delightful ingredient, in tact itself. Humour is hard to define, and perhaps no complete definition is possible. Like the word " poetry," it can be felt instinctively even when it cannot be formally expressed. Humour is a lambent thing, which, playing half mockingly, half tenderly, about the mind, gives to its happy possessor a curious yet delicate charm. Unlike wit, humour is a thing of the heart rather than of the head. It readily sees the amusing side of life, or the small absurdities we are apt to indulge in when off our guard, yet it is ever charitable to the failings inherent in our common humanity. It is true that a man may be conscious of the ridiculous without possessing any real humour—in the right sense of the term ; and, so far, he lacks something that adds immeasurably, though perhaps unconsciously, to the grace of life. The tactful man, if he is " totus teres atque rotundus," will surely have some portion of humour in his composition. It will, so to speak, suffuse his personality as light through a painted window suffuses a room, or as sunshine dipping suddenly from a cloud will transform and glorify a landscape.

I believe we have lost much in our reading of the Gospels by not observing places where the " humour " of Jesus is

suggested or revealed. In the stately periods of the Authorized Version this feature of our Lord's attitude to life does not readily emerge. But it is there. Yes (it will be said), that may be; yet it is never reported that He laughed. Nevertheless He must have done so—He who was deeply human in His outlook and His sympathies, and who knew what was in man. Perfect love, we are told, casteth out fear; yet love itself in some unaccountable fashion may be touched with humour; and this cannot be cast out, save to the impoverishment of personality. And the man of ready tact, cognizant of this, will not be slow to welcome the gift of humour—for gift it is—as a genuine endowment of the spirit. It has its place, if only a subordinate place, in the hierarchy of virtues.

Tact may not, it is true, resolve all our doubts or remove all the harshness and vulgarities of life; but it will do much—that "touch-faculty" of which Ruskin wrote, when he described it as "a fineness and fulness of sensation beyond reason"; the guide of reason itself, uplifted in the spirit of kindness, and sanctified by the gospel of peace.

THE CHALLENGE OF CALAMITY

S. Nowell-Rostron, M.A., B.D. (*Lutterworth Press.*) 7*s.* 6*d.*

We are glad to be able to commend this "Study of the book of Job," from the pen of one of the vice-presidents of the National Church League, as a solid contribution to the study of Biblical literature.

A number of passages in the book might have been written for these very days. Certainly the message of the book is most apposite for our own times. From this point of view, the title is most fitting. Job's problems frequently are ours, and one wishes that many of us could face them with the same unshaken faith that God is, and that He rules, which Job himself most tenaciously held in spite of his complainings and bitter words.

The book is in the form of a commentary, and with the help of its full notes and copious references, the student is provided with a guide towards an understanding of the message of the book.

The summaries and analyses of the various speeches are most helpful, and the many side glances allowed to the reader help in an appreciation and estimation of the various characters and their views.

There can be no question that the book reaches a great height in its examination and exposition of God's answer to Job. The chapter, "The Living Redeemer," is excellent. "In this chapter Job reaches the climax of his despair and from it by a leap of faith he rises to the summit of his hope" (p. 110).

E. HIRST.

Original Sin

THE DEFENCE OF AN UNPOPULAR DOCTRINE.

T. MILLER NEATBY, M.A., M.D.

I.

THOSE who heard Principal Whale's recent broadcast talks on " Facing the Facts," must have rubbed their eyes (or their ears!) when they found themselves listening to something like a rehabilitation of such almost obsolete doctrines as " Original sin and total corruption."

The Victorians, intoxicated by the revived new-old doctrine of evolution, believed with a faith " more sanguine than scientific " (to use a phrase of the late Sir Frederick Pollock) in progress all along the line. The amazing advances in material prosperity that they witnessed encouraged them to believe that poverty would soon disappear, and the advances in science, and especially the supposed discoveries of the biologists, made them confident of an unlimited social development and then final elimination of crime and evil.

In January 1894, McClure's Magazine, an American monthly with a very large circulation, contained an article entitled " The Edge of the Future," by a Professor Herbert Nicholls, presumably a teacher of psychology. In this article occurred the following pathetic, if somewhat comic, vapourings : " The new science of psychology will determine the mental laws exactly : the laws of the individual and of society. . . . It will compel men to live by these laws, because it will make them plain to all men—as plain as the law of gravity. The world will then go forward, because it will see how. We shall then have a higher manhood, because its type will be clear to us. We shall have a new art and a new literature, because we shall know the secrets of beauty. Psychology will secure to man wealth and art, wisdom and happiness, by making man capable of them."

That is nearly fifty years ago, and we have had plenty of "new art" and "new literature" since then, though whether they have originated in a knowledge of "the secrets of beauty" is open to grave doubt. But "wisdom and happiness"! Such facile anticipations recall Carlyle's pungent definition of optimism as "a fool's way of looking at things" (The oddest thing, perhaps, is that "the new science of psychology" of which Professor Nicholls wrote in the 'nineties has itself been shelved in favour of the newer science of Freudism, a philosophy of the rankest pessimism, which certainly makes no promises of "wisdom and happiness.")

Over against these empty dithyrambics may be set the following eloquent passage from the 1924 Bampton Lectures (*The Ideas of the Fall and of Original Sin*), in which the Rev. N. P. Williams says: "The countless graves in which the most vigorous of the race now sleep, and the living legacy of mutilation, blindness and madness which the great catastrophe has left behind it, have decisively refuted the dogma of a necessary moral progress implicit in mental evolution."

This conclusion, formally correct, is in reality just and sound only if by "mental evolution" is signified the "mental evolution" of the Germans who provoked "the great catastrophe." (If the language is more generally intended, the conclusion is unsoundly drawn; for the ghastly horrors of the war were largely due to the chivalrous ardours and high ideals of men who refused to bow to Germany's brutal and unrighteous aggression).

But the aphorism is sound, that moral progress is not necessarily implicit in mental development. Clear ideas do not help us one inch along the road to virtue and honour.

And now the Principal of Cheshunt College reminds us, as some neo-Darwinians (notably Professor J. B. S. Haldane) have recently done, that evolution as often as not goes backwards instead of forwards. "Regress," he says, "is a fact. There is positive and deliberate evil in man's make-up . . . and we are all being forced by the bitter facts of experience to look once again at what earlier generations called Original Sin." And he goes on to speak of the back-door retribution which has overtaken a generation which

kicked St. Augustine out at the front door because of his intolerable doctrines of original sin and total corruption.

Intolerable doctrines! Yes, indeed. The carnal pride of man's heart revolts against doctrines which assert not only the deep depravity of his nature but his fundamental inability to set himself right. But there are other causes for the revolt, of which we shall have to speak.

In the first place, however, since one's most important duty, next to verifying one's "facts," is to define one's terms, we have to ask what exactly is meant by "original sin." The expression is theological, not scriptural, though firmly based upon Scripture. *Sin* is here used not of actual overt *sins*, but of that wrong bias or taint in the soul, that sinful principle of alienation from the life and mind of God, from which the overt acts proceed. ***Original*** sin is such a principle or bias or taint, dating from the very beginning or origin of the individual life and transmitted by heredity from our first parents—"original" in a double sense.

The Ninth Article of Religion runs thus: "Original Sin is the fault and corruption of the nature of every man, that naturally is engendered of the offspring of Adam; whereby man is very far gone from original righteousness and is of his own nature inclined to evil, so that the flesh lusteth always contrary to the spirit . . . And this infection of nature doth remain, yea, in them that are regenerated."

In reading the strictures upon Original Sin hereinafter quoted from clerical authors, it should be borne in mind that all clergymen of the Church of England have signed their adhesion to the Thirty-nine articles.

The quotation just given expresses fairly closely the teaching of St. Paul, as we shall endeavour to show. It is important to note the terms used therein. For Dr. Montgomery Hitchcock, writing in the March number of THE CHURCHMAN in strenuous criticism of the twin doctrines of the Fall and Original Sin, appears to assume that "sin" and "guilt" mean the same thing and that "original sin" is synonymous with "original guilt." This is the error of St. Augustine, of whom Dr. Bicknell says (*Sin and the Fall*, in "Essays Catholic and Critical"): "Going beyond the teaching of St. Paul he insisted not only on original sin, but on original guilt."

The phrase "original guilt" is unfortunately contained in our second Article. Dr. Simpson's claim (*Fact and Faith*) that "original guilt" more nearly represents the dominant idea of the New Testament on this subject than such phrases as taint, corruption, disease, we shall show to be ill-founded. It is quite likely that the framers of the Articles signified by the phrase "original guilt" the "infection of nature" spoken of in Article Nine, but "guilt" is an unfortunate word, imputing blame.

Dr. Hitchcock rightly contends that guilt denotes "moral blameworthiness" and cannot exist apart from responsibility. His quarrel is not so much with the "original sin" of the Ninth Article as with Augustine's exaggerated version. Indeed Dr. Hitchcock allows, as something certain, that "congenital tendencies to indulge certain instincts may, like predispositions to certain physical diseases, be handed down." How near to the orthodox doctrine he comes in these words, is doubtful. Certainly the case could with justice have been put much more strongly, as thus: "Congenital tendencies to indulge certain instincts *in a sinful way* are *always* handed down, differing only in this article of universality from predispositions to certain physical diseases."

"Sin" is a state—a state that universal experience assures us will certainly issue in overt "sins" when the age of responsibility is reached. The failure to distinguish between the use of "sin" and "sins" in the Bible is productive of confusion in more connections than one.

The chief evidences for the doctrine of original sin are two: the witness of human experience and the witness of Holy Scripture.

1. *The Witness of Experience.* The doctrine of an inherited bias which produces sinful acts has received as ready a response from men of all sorts as almost any other Biblical doctrine.

"To believe in original sin is to face the facts," says Dr. Bicknell (*op. cit.*). Man, when he listens to the inner oracle, hears a voice from depths far below the level of his self-expressions in word and deed. He realizes that the evil words and works that his conscience condemns are no chance answers to some external provocation, but are the fruit of some evil root in the deeps of his being, the ex-

pression of a nature fundamentally wrong, radically estranged from the life of God. For most people possessed of even a rudimentary ethical sensibility are continually being pulled up by the consciousness of such a conflict as St. Paul's when he found in himself a law or principle of sin such that, when he would do good, evil was present with him—an indwelling sin which, like an active partner, took the lead and did itself the evil thing (Rom. vii. 21, 20).

The sense that the evil thing we do springs from some deep innate perversity of the will is not the high attainment of the Saint or the Apostle; it is one of the commonest of experiences. When Dr. N. P. Williams (*op. cit.*) says: "The ordinary man may feel ashamed of doing wrong, but the saint . . . is ashamed of being the kind of man who is liable to do wrong," he fails to do justice to an almost universal sense, in men of conscience, of *sin* as distinguished from sins—the sense that expresses itself in the words, "It is not so much what I have done as *what I am* that is wrong."

Poets with the insight to which poetic genius gives force and point have been quick to perceive something "wrong" —*wrung*, that is, from the divinely ordered harmony: the sinful nature: the Original Sin of theology.

> "Our life is a false nature—'tis not in
> The harmony of things—this hard decree,
> This ineradicable taint of sin,
> This boundless upas, this all-blasting tree."

Thus the unbelieving poet, Byron. Even more directly writes the believing poet, Robert Browning, of one who

> "Launched point-blank his dart
> At the head of a lie, taught Original Sin,
> The corruption of man's heart."

A greater poet than these taught long ago, in much more poignant tones, a similar lesson. David had been overtaken by grievous sins, which he made no attempt either to deny or to palliate. In deep penitence he acknowledged his transgressions and declared that his sins were ever before him. But underneath the foul acts of sin that had polluted Bathsheba and murdered Uriah and caused scandal in Israel and stunk in the nostrils of God, David saw something deeper. "Behold, I was shapen in iniquity, and in sin did

my mother conceive me." This is language which has its deep equivalent in the experience of thousands.

Dr. Montgomery Hitchcock (*loc. cit.*) seeks to turn the obvious testimony of the Penitential Psalm by alleging that the intimacy of married life was considered, as it still is, by many unclean. The psalm, however, provides its own natural exegesis. David is troubled about his *sins*: "Hide thy face from my sins and blot out all mine iniquities." But he is also troubled about his *sin*—that sinful nature which will issue in yet more sins: "Create in me a clean heart, O God, and renew a right spirit within me." Dr. Hitchcock's suggestion is anachronistic. The Jews ever attached the very highest respect and sanctity to the relationship of marriage, and *per contra* had no sympathy with the fictitious value attached later by a corrupt Christendom to the state of virginity.

II

Facing the facts, we are bound to believe in original sin. But whence comes it? Not from God: we cannot believe that God made man so. "The true foundations of the theory of the Fall and of Original Sin," says Dr. N. P. Williams (*op. cit.*), who himself denies the Fall of Genesis and the Biblical account or Original Sin, "are psychological, based on bedrock facts of ethical and spiritual experience." And again he says: "The conflict between the hypotheses of an inherent tendency to evil in man and of the infinite goodness of God who created man could only resolve itself by the assumption that human nature was not what God meant it to be, and that some historical catastrophe must be postulated to account for this otherwise inexplicable fact."

Our spirits witness to original sin. But whence and by what channel comes that original sin? That we have derived that deep-seated perversity of the will by inheritance from our ancestry is mere common sense. When he sees that invariably—and quite independently of his environment—this bias manifests itself as a child grows to years of responsibility, the plain man has no difficulty in drawing the inference. Dr. Bicknell, who says that "to believe in original sin is to face the facts" shrinks apparently from facing any further facts. To the questions, "What is the connection between the sin of Adam and the universal sinful-

ness of his descendants ? Is the tendency to sin transmitted by heredity ? " he can only reply, " The passage (Romans v.) gives no answer to such questions." This point we shall deal with under the witness of Holy Scripture.

The idea that men inherit a tendency to evil by natural generation in much the same way as they inherit physical peculiarities seems to be a stumbling-block to Dr. Bicknell, as it is to some others. " It comes," he says, " very near to reducing moral evil to a physical taint." Dr. Simpson (*op. cit.*) deprecates metaphors taken from disease, such as " the fault and deformity of nature " of the Anglican Reformers, the " corruption of man's heart," and so on, " which may easily cover notions of heredity as dubious as they are materialistic."

Such figures Dr. Simpson seems to regard as alien from the Biblical view of sin. " It is the devout imagination," he says, " not the sacred narrative, which speaks of Christ as the Good Physician." But our Lord Himself said : " They that are whole need not a physician, but they that are sick " —language that certainly implies that He regarded Himself as a Physician and sinners as men suffering from a form of sickness.

And why are such notions " materialistic " ? How do they reduce moral evil to a physical taint ? Is such transmission any more " materialistic " or " physical " than the transmission of mental and temperamental tendencies and aptitudes, tricks of mind, temper and disposition ? Yet these are unquestionably as much transmitted as are physical traits and peculiarities, though, seeing that matter cannot think or feel, the process is past our comprehension.

So much with regard to heredity is beyond doubt and was well known long before Darwin and Mendel.

Dr. Bicknell, who holds that to believe in original sin is to face the facts, considers it rash to explain original sin by heredity, because that would be a case of transmission of an acquired characteristic, which the dominant school of biologists strongly denies. But the evidence of science (even if the intransmissibility of acquired characteristics were granted) is entirely irrelevant in the present connection. The doctrine of the Fall involves a unique, we may say a supernatural, break and distortion in the relations of God and man—such a dividing line, ushering in such an entirely

new condition as " fallenness " (to use Dr. Bicknell's own word), that it is beside the mark to attempt to apply to the conditions of life before the Fall the implications of our modern (and still only partial) knowledge of genes or units of heredity.

Dr. Hitchcock also—somewhat unguardedly—commits himself from the biological side when he argues that " the doctrine of original sin requires the sacrifice of the sinless nature of Christ." Undoubtedly, if the Virgin Birth is denied, it becomes embarrassingly difficult to maintain at once the doctrine of original sin and the doctrine of the sinless nature of Christ; for in that case Christ had two human parents, both infected with the taint of original sin. If the Virgin Birth is upheld, the case is changed. As the present writer wrote two years ago in defending the Virgin Birth (*The Christian*, February 10, 1938), " Experience tells us what happens when both parents are infected with the sinful bias, but yields no answer to the question, ' If only one of the parents is human and therefore tainted with sin, will not the child be also so tainted ? ' "

The assumption of Dr. Hitchcock, and of the Romish divines who invented the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception in order to get round the supposed difficulty, that the one tainted parent will necessarily transmit the taint is not justified. It fitted the old Galtonian Conception of heredity, but the Mendelian theory on which modern research in heredity is largely based teaches that traits and qualities are transmitted from one parent unmodified by the other. Mendel showed that, if a pea of a tall strain is crossed with one of a short strain, all the offspring are tall, tallness being what is termed a " dominant." Sinlessness might, therefore, conceivably, as a Mendelian " dominant " ; be transmitted uninfluenced by the " original sin " present in the Virgin Mary.

These are but one or two of the objections raised against original sin on scientific or quasi-scientific grounds. But the whole conception is declared to be contrary to the findings of science. " The conflict between the teaching of history, natural science and palaeontology, on the origins of the human race, and that of the ecclesiastical doctrine has led all along the line to the victory of the scientific view " (It is not quite clear whether this is Dr. Hitchcock's obser-

vation or a quotation from Emil Brunner's *Man in Revolt*, which Dr. Hitchcock reviewed in the March CHURCHMAN.) "Science," says Dr. Hitchcock, "repudiates the doctrine of the Fall as untrue."

By science, of course, is clearly meant the theory of evolution as applied to human origins. Dr. N. P. Williams (*op. cit.*) refers to it quite directly. "Biology proclaims the unbroken continuity of man's descent from the brutes, and anthropology can find no room for paradisal perfection." A bold claim! Many biologists may proclaim it, but biology itself has never shown it.

Let us suppose, however, that, taking our stand upon the very doubtful evidence at our disposal, we maintained that man's bodily frame was derived by descent from the brutes. What then? What about his moral and spiritual nature? Can we speak of "man's" descent and leave out the greater and nobler part of him—that part, in fact, in virtue of which he is truly man?

Biology can tell us nothing about the spirit of man. And yet this is what we are dealing with when we talk of original sin. Professor Alfred Russel Wallace, well known as the co-discoverer of the revived doctrine of evolution, was unable to account upon evolutionistic principles for the spirit of man, and postulated, therefore, at a certain stage in man's development, an intervention of a Higher Power. In other words, while proclaiming the descent of man's body from the lower animals, he acclaimed ***man himself*** as a creation.

It is odd that so many theologians have elected in this matter to follow the more materialistic Darwin rather than Wallace. But their choice has, of course, greatly influenced their attitude to original sin. It has in fact notably degraded the Christian doctrine of sin. Evolutionistic theologians derive the sin of man from the uncurbed instincts of the brute—a derivation which may (somewhat dubiously) explain the grosser "animal" sins but takes no account of spiritual sins.

Dr. Tennant (*Origin and Propagation of Sin*, Hulsean Lecture) made—so Dr. Bicknell tells us—the first attempt in this country to reinterpret the doctrine of original sin in the light of biology. "So-called original sin he regards as the survival in man of animal tendencies, useful and necessary

at an earlier stage, but now felt to be an anachronism. Our consciousness of divided self is due to the fact that these animal impulses are only in process of being moralized." But, as Bicknell well points out, it is not the possession of these animal tendencies that is the real problem, but the universal failure to control them. Whence this lamentable and universal failure to " moralize " the surviving instincts of the brute ? Whence, indeed, but from that sinful bias that we call original sin ?

Dr. Hitchcock takes much the same view of original sin as does Dr. Tennant. " To the physical or organic unity of the race we owe our instincts, appetites and passions in stronger or weaker form. This is our universal inheritance—the material out of which the will makes good or evil, and which are not in themselves good or evil until they have been made so by the will. Here is ground both for individual freedom and for universal sinfulness." But, if the instincts and appetites of the brute are of neutral moral complexion, how can they account for " universal sinfulness " ? It is the will, we are told, that makes these neutral instincts to be good or evil. Why, then, the " universal sinfulness " unless the will is itself corrupt ? And so we come round to the orthodox doctrine of original sin—that innate bias towards evil that caused St. Paul to say that " they that are in the flesh cannot please God."

But indeed it is impossible to explain sin except upon the basis of a spiritual nature, and, as Wallace said, it is impossible to derive a spiritual nature from the brutes.

This derivation of sin in man from the instincts of the brute results, as Dr. Bicknell said, in an underestimating of the gravity of the situation. And this is true in more ways than one.

Dr. Tennant, for instance, speaks of " Animal tendencies, useful and necessary at an earlier stage, but now felt to be an anachronism." Is this, from an ethical point of view, a satisfactory account of Nature as we know it ? Can we suppose that this Nature is a reflection of the Divine counsels? Do we not feel that the mind of God is better expressed in the words, " They shall not hurt nor destroy in all my holy mountain ? "

No, Dr. Williams here is right when he remarks that " to explain evil in Nature, no less than in man, we are

compelled to assume a fall." Dr. Williams, however, argues —speculatively, not to say mythologically—for a vitiation of the world-soul by some pre-cosmic catastrophe, by which the life-force was tainted. The predatory blood-stained violence of Nature is itself due to some kind of fall. It is useless to tell us that we are not "fallen": that we are merely the inheritors of animal instincts. How did the animals fall? The Bible teaching is clear that the First Adam in his fall dragged down nature with him, the earth itself being cursed for his sake, even as in the Second Adam the whole creation that groans and travails together until now earnestly expects the manifestation of the sons of God.

THE ASSURANCE OF GOD

By Canon Patrick Carnegy. (*Longmans.*) *7s. 6d.*

Here is a book that gives the Scriptural way of Salvation, and of holiness. The word "Assurance" in the title is used in a very full sense. It means not merely assurance of Salvation, but also full confidence in God and in His grace, that brigns a joyous, loving spirit, and victory over sin. It means the full assurance of understanding (Col. iii. 2), the full assurance of faith (Heb. x. 22) and the full assurance of hope (Heb. vi. 11). It implies all that is meant when one can say "The Lord is the Rock of my Salvation"—that is, He gives me full confidence, that nothing can move.

This book is written in modern theological style and language, but it often quotes, and approves, the language which John Wesley and D. L. Moody used. It will much help the parson with his sermons, and the Bible-class leader with his message; and, it is to be hoped, will help the seeker, who is convicted, and wants to find Christ as his own Saviour.

The titles of the nine chapters are all suggestive and their order is logical and consecutive. The first chapter is called "The certainties of God." To have these "certainties" is to have a vital, overcoming, soul-winning religion. Such was the religion of the early Christians. But assurance is largely lost to-day due to "The Challenge of Modern Scepticism." The Sceptic is seeking for truth, with his intellect. The Christian enquirer is seeking a Person with his heart.

So "The need of Revelation." Christianity is much more than a system of Ethics. It involves the right relationship to God; established through the Son of God. Thus assurance needs a Revelation of "God's Work for Man" in Christ through the Incarnation, Crucifixion, Resurrection and Ascension. Christ Himself was the message from the Father to a world of sinners, and "The Reasonableness of Faith" calls for Man's response of faith.

Thus, this book deals helpfully with the Christian life and experience and we warmly commend it.

BARCLAY F. BUXTON.

The Christian Doctrine of God

THE REV. J. W. AUGUR, M.A.,
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THE Report of the Commission on Christian Doctrine has had a mixed reception and Evangelical Churchmen in particular have had good reasons for challenging some of its findings. It is however, generally admitted that it is an extremely important statement of the Church's doctrinal position and it must not be ignored. It has been pointed out that the numbers of copies sold suggest that not one half of the clergy can have read it, and I fear that the proportion of Evangelical clergy who have done so, is even less satisfactory. In this paper I propose to examine a statement in the Report, which will be approved by every type of churchmen.

On page 80 we read, " It may be that there are theological propositions accepted in the church which will always be found neither to need nor to be capable of revision, and in that sense may be ' final ' ; if so, they are final not in the sense that they are exempt from examination, but in the sense that examination invariably leads to their reaffirmation." Christianity has never faced a sterner conflict than at present. In Germany and Russia, the challenge is not to this or that Christian doctrine, but to the foundation truth of the very existence of God. If there is one Christian proposition which is definitely " final," it is our belief in Him. Our religion is based on the idea that there is an unseen order and that our supreme good consists in our harmonious adjustment to it. We do not accept this blindly in submission to the authority of some supposedly infallible church or creed. We accept it because there is no other way in which we can understand the Universe and man's place within it. The Christian Church therefore offers its own interpretation

to the world, based on its own experience of God. This supreme and fundamental belief can be and should be rightly examined in every age and this study was never more important than it is to-day.

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

Some kind of *belief in a Supreme First Cause* is held universally. All over the world mankind has always believed in a God. Not, of course, God as we understand Him, but a mystic Being or Beings, with whom it is possible to enter into some kind of relationship. When Christ came into the world there were many religions, but only one nation which maintained strenuously that there was one God who had revealed Himself to them and that the worship of other gods was a hateful superstition. When the Gospel led to the organization of the Christian Church, it came into conflict with other religions on many points: and when its doctrine of God was challenged it became necessary to offer ethical and philosophical reasons for this belief.

At first, stress was laid on Conscience. "Belief in God," said the apologists, "is an opinion implanted in the very nature of man." Man's consciousness of himself involves the consciousness of a power which is not himself, and which has an objective existence. The consciousness of inperfection involves belief in a perfection which must exist above and beyond all things. The fact that we can think of the existence of a perfect Being gives some ground for the assumption that He is. This reasoning is known as the *Ontological Argument* and the schoolmen used it in this way: "My reason had a beginning, therefore it must have had an external Creator." Or again, "I feel myself to be an accountable being, therefore there must be One superior to me, who can reward and punish; otherwise my existence would be an absurdity and a contradiction."

The *Cosmological Argument* is similar in character, but it is concerned mainly with material Causes and Effects in the Universe. Whatever is, must either have a cause or be self-existent. This material world is not self-existent for it changes continually, producing fresh phenomena every day. The dissipation of energy involves the fact that the present constitution of things cannot have lasted for ever—

there must have been a beginning in time otherwise, to use a familiar illustration, the clock would have run down long since. We are therefore led back step by step to an ultimate cause of all things, whose self-existence is thus demonstrated.

This reasoning was developed by Paley into the deeper *Argument from Design*. He contended that the beautiful order and wonderful arrangement of the Universe and the adaptation of means to ends proves that a Wise and Benevolent Intelligence created the world. This is the main line of argument in his Natural Theology. The modern apologist is inclined to reject it because it proves too much—for there are a multiplicity of circumstances which mar the happiness of creation. Earthquakes, famines, pestilences recur continually; all animals prey on and torture each other and unscrupulously powerful individuals in the human race are responsible for much sin, sorrow, and misery. How then can we believe that the Creator, even if He is benevolent, is all powerful? John Stuart Mill's answer is that He must be limited by conditions over which He had insufficient control.

There is, of course, *a Christian solution* of the problem, both in regard to man's wilful shortcomings and to the whole creation, which groans and travails in pain waiting for redemption. We believe that God has given to mankind a unique knowledge of Himself through Christ—He is the Eternal Father and God is Love. This belief remains constant from one generation to another, though its expression and definition is modified and revised continually. Imperfect conceptions of God are not imperfect because they are partial, but because they deny or ignore the perfect. In the mediæval world the half-awakened mind peopled the unknown universe with imaginary dangers and multiplied mediators and intercessors until God became far off and remote. The Reformation was mainly concerned with the restoration of the one God to His position at the centre of all Christian theology and in close contact with His children on earth. Some recent developments of Anglo-Catholicism show that a similar reformation will soon be needed again.

Then there is *the Argument from Values*.

Canon Barry has pointed out that "the traditional triad of absolute values is unsatisfactory and artificial" in a presentment of Christianity to the average man. It is not

easy to make him understand that if he wishes to do the Will of God, he must earnestly seek to apprehend the inner meaning of Goodness, Truth and Beauty. They are not three co-equal absolute "goods," for they mutually involve one another. He also points out that Knowledge is a better word than Truth in this connection—"Truth is a quality of propositions; what is meant clearly is true knowledge. . . . Where one is present there is the whole trinity—for what constitutes any of them 'values' is precisely the goodness which they share in common."

What then do we mean by absolute values? "The current idiom talks so much about values as almost to make it into a 'blessed word' which serves to conceal confusion in our thinking. . . . It is better to drop the word which suggests all manner of abstruse speculations and substitute the word 'goodness.' This does convey a definite meaning to all of us and we can generally recognize it when we see it. The things we live for, which we regard as good, are what we call our 'values.' A man may live for whisky, or for dividends, for his wife and children, or for the New Jerusalem. Whatever he lives for, that is what life means to him. That is what he believes to have 'value.' And normally we appraise the worth of a man by a scale of values which he appears to acknowledge." If we accept this contention of Canon Barry in his *Relevance of Christianity*, some highly important consequences follow. The idea of "value" is easily related to the idea of an Eternal Purpose and in this sense "values" explain the universe. They are the reason why it exists and there is a kinship between this line of thought and the Christian doctrine of the Logos. "All things were made by Him and without Him was not anything made that was made . . . He was in the world and the world was made by Him." This theory of "values" is the basis of the Christian Theism in Dr. Inge's *Confessio Fidei* and Dr. Temple's *Christus Veritas*.

There are some who say that *Religious Experience* means the abandoning of objective values and a falling back on the purely subjective statement, "I value what I value." In one sense this is true, for we cannot define what we mean by goodness, for it is in itself something ultimate. Nor is truth true because thinking makes it so. If the mind makes or constitutes truth, then what it makes is just not what we

mean by truth. Truth is there for minds to discover, yet there is no truth unless there is a mind to know it and we get to know it by experience. Experience therefore has a real evidential value, for, to quote again Canon Barry, "Apart from any relation to any subject nothing could be said to possess value. No valuations, no value. What we call beauty would not be beautiful if there were no subject to enjoy it. It exists in that specific experience. This does not mean that beauty is subjective in the sense of being merely a matter of taste or in the sense that the subject's enjoyment invests the thing with the quality of beauty. It means simply that the idea of beauty presupposes both the beautiful object and the subject of that experience, and is significant only in that relation."

If in this quotation we put in the word "God" instead of beauty we can deduce on the same grounds that personal religious experience justifies an assumption that He really exists.

What do we mean by Divine Immanence? Modern theologians aim at keeping Transcendence and Immanence in a correct poise and perspective. It has not always been so, for stress has been laid first on one to the exclusion of the other and vice versa; but now, in every branch of the Christian Church, we emphasize belief in a holy and living God, who is "the Determiner of destiny, the Source of spiritual values and the Guarantor of the human prerogative." In other words, God is realized as being both Transcendent and Immanent. He is the immanent creative Spirit revealing Himself in the life of the whole universe. He is both the First Cause and the Abiding Ground.

In these dark and difficult days it is valuable to relate all that has been stressed in this article to the strife and warfare now going on. How does a Christian belief in God bring light into our darkness and peace into our souls? Surely because the core and essence of the Christian faith is that the God we know and worship is not only the Creator of the world, He is also its Redeemer and Saviour. It is His will that the whole world, the whole of human thought and enterprise shall be gathered within the power of His redemptive purpose. In the present conflict the issue is perfectly clear and plain—it is between the power of evil on the one hand and the power of God on the other. Can there be any doubt about the ultimate result?

Low Churchmanship

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THERE is in logic a fallacy known as "ambiguity of terms" when the same word is used in an argument in two different senses. Such ambiguity is frequent in arguments about "High" and "Low" churchman, and it is not surprising in view of the changes of meaning undergone by these words in the course of 250 years.

At the end of the seventeenth century a "High" churchman believed in the Apostolic succession of bishops, disliked dissent on principle, and was a Tory in politics; those churchmen who did not make such claims for the bishops and were Whig in politics seem to have been termed "Low." Akin to the "Low" churchmen, but distinguished from them were the "Latitudinarians" who disliked party strife and wanted a comprehensive reformed national church with a simple Christian creed. The three parties may perhaps be illustrated by Archbishop Sancroft, ejected as a non-juror; his successor in the primacy, Archbishop Tillotson; and Gilbert Burnet, bishop of Salisbury.

In the eighteenth century Low churchmen and Latitudinarians tended to merge, and were often bitterly opposed to a new party that developed during that period, the Evangelicals. Hence at the end of the eighteenth century the parties within the Church of England were "High" "Low" and "Evangelical." During the nineteenth century "High" churchmanship acquired a new meaning through the Oxford movement; Evangelicals came to be identified (perhaps wrongly) with "Low" churchmen; and a new Latitudinarian or "Broad-church" school developed under such leaders as Dr. Arnold and Dean Stanley. At the end of the nineteenth century the parties were classified as "High, Low and Broad." To-day these terms are out of fashion and are sometimes replaced by "Anglo-Catholic, Evangelical, Modernist." The new terms are misleading, for

there are High churchmen who are not Anglo-Catholic, and Broad-churchmen who resent the label "Modernist" (which should be restricted to those who combine scientific criticism of creeds with the sacramentalism of Catholicism); there are also Low churchmen who are not Evangelicals, and the purpose of this article is to explain that position.

"Low churchmanship" only implies a low or modest view of ecclesiastical institutions as contrasted with those who place a higher value on church, ministry and sacraments; it has no necessary connection with laziness, intolerance, or dislike of ritual.

A low churchman regards churches as Christian friendly societies; he may value his own membership in a particular church but he will not worry over Christians who belong to other churches or to no church; he cannot think that a church possessing Apostolic succession is a truer church than those which have no such bishops; and while he is a happy and loyal member of the Established Episcopalian Church in England he may, when in Scotland, be equally happy in the Established Church of that country which is Presbyterian. He therefore differs from the "High" churchmen who regards episcopally governed churches with Apostolic succession as parts of the "Catholic Church" from which the non-episcopal churches are excluded.

Again, a low churchman agrees that a church needs a commissioned ministry, but does not think that the minister possesses spiritual powers denied to the laity; he respects a minister (of whatever denomination) who is competent as a teacher, a leader in worship, and (if a parish minister) as pastor, but he does not like the word "priest" and can only use it of the clergy of the Church of England on the understanding that it is an abbreviation of "presbyter" which has no sacerdotal significance. He does not wish the clergy to have too much power, and he is glad that in the Church of England the supreme tribunal for deciding what is or is not according to its standards is the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. If he is a clergyman he will take care not to intrude where he is not wanted or to interfere unbidden in the souls of those who do not desire his guidance.

Further, he takes a lower view of the sacraments than the High churchman. He values the two sacraments as the rites respectively of initiation and fellowship in a Christian

friendly society, but he does not see in either of them anything of a "miraculous" nature. While he himself observes the Lord's Supper with care and reverence (whether he communicates frequently or occasionally) he cannot place upon that rite of remembrance and fellowship the value assigned to it by some communicants; while he would like his fellow-churchmen to meet him at the Lord's table, he cannot press the sacrament on those who do not desire it; he probably does not think of "making the Lord's service" the chief act of worship every Lord's Day." As to the details of its administration he may not have any definite views; he may prefer the traditional practice of communion after morning service, or he may have found a blessing in evening communion, or he may prefer an early celebration. Questions as to the position and dress of the celebrant possibly do not interest him; he may prefer to take the north end position at an unadorned table, but he knows that a "low" view of the sacrament may be held by a minister wearing a chasuble such as is common in the Lutheran church of Norway, just as a rigidly "high" view may be taught by a minister standing at the north end of the table.

But though a low churchman takes a low view of church ministry and sacraments he takes a high view of the Gospel which every Christian church is commissioned to teach, the Christian view of God, Duty and Destiny; he realizes that the present misery of the world is due to the rejection of that Gospel, and he would like to do all in his power to further that Gospel as our only hope of sanity, safety and peace; he would therefore like to work with, and not against, those churchmen who repudiate the title of "low."

He turns first to the Evangelicals, whether conservative or liberal. He has much in common with them, insistence on the right of private judgment, rejection of sacerdotalism, and a similar view of the sacraments; but he may be unable to utter some of the phrases associated with Evangelicalism or to share the view of Biblical inspiration held by the more conservative Evangelicals. Yet the association of Low churchmen and Evangelicals might be good for both; the low churchmen might act as a check on extravagance and intolerance; the Evangelicals might save the low churchmen from coldness or want of vision.

With the Broad-church group he also has much in common in regard to Private Judgment, the ministry and the sacraments. Probably he also accepts a measure of Biblical criticism which 50 years ago would have marked him as a Broad churchman; but he does not wish to go as far as some members of that group have gone and he is nervous about what is vaguely termed "Modernism."

If, however, Low churchmen, Broad-churchmen, and Evangelicals could work in harmony they would constitute a strong "Protestant front" in the Church of England and would remove the fears now felt in some quarters that an Anglo-Catholic revolution may eject from an unprotestantized Church those who insist on the Protestant right of Private Judgment.

When a low churchman approaches a high churchman he must feel that a great gulf is fixed between them by such doctrines as that of Apostolic Succession. Yet there are High churchmen and High churchmen; sometimes, when the position has been frankly stated on both sides, it is possible for a low churchman to work and worship to a considerable extent with those whose estimate of church ministry and sacraments is so different from his own. If so, a low churchman may perhaps be a "liaison officer" between two groups which, though often opposed, yet belong to the same communion.

It may be said that the Low church group ought not to exist and that its members could be absorbed by either the liberal Evangelical group or the more moderate of the Broad-church school; and as a matter of fact some who ought to be called "Low churchmen" are to be found in the Modern Churchmen's Union and probably also in the A.E.G.M. The term, however, does apply to some who cannot call themselves either Evangelicals or Broad-churchmen, and their existence should be recognized even though the term "Low churchman" is now seldom heard.

Possibly in reading this description some may have recognized their own position and are therefore shown up as low churchmen in spite of themselves. They need not be ashamed of the title; though in the eighteenth century low churchmanship was often associated with sluggishness and worldliness, those sinister associations have long since passed away; and to-day, among those who are trying to proclaim

the Gospel of Christ within the comprehensive fellowship of the Church of England, there is certainly a place for those who, while maintaining the Protestant right of Private Judgment, are unable to label themselves either Evangelicals or Broad-churchmen ; the simplest description of the position that we have reached (perhaps after making trial of other positions and parties) is that of LOW CHURCHMEN. They have no organ or organization to express their views, but in the opinion of the writer of this description there is a place and work for them, alongside the other Protestant members of the Church of England, in such a Society as the National Church League, which exists for the maintenance of the principles we value most.

THE EPISTLE TO THE GALATIANS

By Martin Luther. (*Protestant Reformation Society.*) 5s.

One of Martin Luther's greatest works is his commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians. The Harrison Trust has recently published an abbreviated edition of the commentary, edited by the Rev. John Prince Fellowes, from the English Translation of Erasmus Middleton, B.D. This edition contains all the doctrinal values of the complete work.

The message of the epistle is as much as ever needed to-day. " The doctrine here laid down by St. Paul is the necessary knowledge of all true Christian life." St. Paul was " a chosen vessel " to explain and interpret under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, the meaning of Christ's life, death, and resurrection. His training in the Old Testament, his wonderful conversion, his salvation by grace alone, his invasion by Christ, and his time spent in Arabia under the Teaching of the Holy Ghost taught him the meaning of justification which he has given us in three short memorable sentences : " Justified by grace," " Justified by His blood," " Justified by faith." Luther learnt this from the Apostle, and in his commentary has expounded it in detail. Every verse in the epistle is commented upon, and the truth is given in distinction to error, in the fullest detail. Justification is shown to be " not of works." Law is to shut up all to Christ, to convict, condemn, restrain and compel men to seek relief from its errors in the death of Christ. The exposition of the third chapter is specially valuable when Christ is shown to have made Himself so one with sinful man that He can bear his curse as his substitute and set him free to serve God and keep His law as a son in his Father's house.

The book is well printed in good type. We commend it with John Bunyan's testimony to it, " God did cast into my hand Luther's commentary on Galatians." He came to prefer it, " excepting the Bible, before all the books that I ever have seen."

W. TALBOT RICE.

"Archbishop Laud"

by

H. R. TREVOR-ROPER

(Macmillan, 21s.)

A SURVEY BY THE REV. C. SYDNEY CARTER, D.D.

FUTURE historians will probably describe the present age as the most critical and transitional in the history, not only of this country, but of mankind. As to what the "new civilization" will be is as yet in the balance! But there is little question that the seventeenth century in England was a transitional period in thought and ideas between mediæval and modern political and constitutional ideals and progress. It is essential to bear this in mind in estimating the character and achievements of such an outstanding personality as that of William Laud who was born well inside the period of despotic Tudor rule and who spent all his active career when the clash of the old and new order was at its height. The seventeenth century saw the rise to prominence of the "third Estate" with its determination to challenge the despotic exercise of power permitted by the necessities of the times to the Tudor Sovereigns. This rising spirit of independence was displayed in the House of Commons in the struggle for the right of parliamentary and popular control of the Executive. Parliament then made the modern claim, now long recognised, that sovereignty must reside in the "King in Parliament" through the responsibility of His Ministers to the Legislature. Laud, however, soon gave his full allegiance to a party of sycophantic courtiers who were backing up the mediæval and absolutist principles of the Tudors made more dangerous by the special Stuart theory of the supreme divine right of kings. It was in effect a clear contest, in the language of Prof. Seeley, as to whether Parliament was really the "Government-making organ?" Laud's aim and policy was in practice, virtually to dispense with Parliament and make the Sovereign the sole source and fountain of all executive authority both political and ecclesiastical. Because in his

"ideology" the Church was the spiritual part of the State, while the State, or the Crown which embodied it, was the absolute and supreme Governor of mankind to whom all must be subject. As Lord Acton declared of this period, "the State oppressed for its own sake," and as Laud regarded the Church as part of the State, he looked to the State to oppress all men so as to achieve his great ideal of one uniform and rigid type of worship and doctrine and of religious and social discipline.

Mr. Trevor-Roper, in his faithful and comprehensive delineation of Laud's career, shows clearly that its success was largely due to his deliberate policy of intrigue and backstairs influence which at length enabled him to secure Royal favour and obtain coveted ecclesiastical positions and promotions. He proves, however, that Laud sought these commanding positions not for personal or avaricious self-aggrandisement or outward pomp and splendour, but for his sincere and single-minded aim of restoring the wealth and dominating influence of the Church and especially of its hierarchy. Laud had evidently been a close student of Bishop Gardiner's book on "True Obedience," for in similar language to Gardiner's he asserted that "the King was God's immediate vice-regent on earth so that one and the same action is God's by ordinance and the King's by execution, and the royal power is God's power." But in spite of these almost blasphemous claims for Kingly authority and also of the ardent sponsorship of George Villiers—the royal favourite, it was with great misgiving that at length James I gave Laud his chance to achieve his later fame. His first patron, the Earl of Devonshire, proved an unfortunate venture, since Laud rashly married him to a guilty adulteress. But Bishop Neile, of Lincoln, befriended Laud and made him his Chaplain and gave him preferment. In this cure, however, he figured far more as a non-resident place-hunter than as a faithful parish priest or diligent shepherd of souls.

By rather doubtful practices Laud became Vice-President of St. John's College, Oxford, in 1611. In 1616 he became Dean of Gloucester, and Bishop of St. David's in 1621 and of Bath and Wells in 1626. He secured London in 1629, and finally reached the Primacy in 1633 on the death of Archbishop Abbott. Laud was installed by proxy at St. David's

and apparently only spent a month in residence there, while his increasing immersion in State affairs at Charles I's court left him practically no time to shepherd the flock in Bath and Wells.

Having been a conspicuous delinquent himself, Laud was determined to enforce residence most stringently on other Bishops. He required them to live permanently in their dioceses and (contrary to his own example) not to hang about Court angling for preferment.

Mr. Trevor-Roper's story enables us to follow not only the detailed steps of Laud's rise to power, but also his arbitrary and despotic methods of government for the Church during the eleven years of Charles I's absolute rule of "Thorough." Laud regarded the bishops as little more than Erastian agents for the centralization of government enabling them to enforce their authority with their own Courts and legal powers. Through their pressure and his own high-handed actions he silenced, often in a cruel and heartless manner, all opposition to his own special Church views and principles. Even the order for the removal of the Communion Tables to the East End of the church was procured by the personal authority of the Crown. Puritan and Calvinist clergy were deprived, fined and imprisoned. Their Private Chaplainces and Lectureships were suppressed and their endowments confiscated. All religious disputation was forbidden. On account of his bitter hatred of Calvinism he tried to deprive the Foreign Congregations of their rights of separate worship in England and he had little sympathy with the distressed and persecuted "Reformed" pastors of the Palatinate. He even presumed to alter the phraseology of the Royal Briefs which ordered collections for their relief. As a Judge in the Star Chamber and High Commission Courts his partisanship was displayed in a peculiarly discreditable manner. He concurred in the most severe and brutal sentences on those who had dared to challenge his views. Cases like those of Alexander Leighton, Henry Sherfield and William Prynne are specially revolting. His exertions to secure the downfall and ruin of Bishop Williams and his shameless rejoicing at his success, show a most vindictive and fanatical spirit. The quaint contemporary historian, Thomas Fuller, certainly no enemy of Laud's, admits that "he always concurred with the severest

side and infused more vinegar than oil into all his censures." From a very thorough and impartial survey of Laud's life and actions Mr. Trevor-Roper can only describe him as a man of very narrow outlook, and he declares that he had "not a mind which could appreciate the advantages of the innocence of diversity."

But in all fairness this verdict should be tempered with the recollection that Laud had fully imbibed the spirit and outlook, not by any means then dead, of the intolerant mediæval churchman. He had inherited as a "damnosa hereditas" the intolerant persecuting spirit of the Middle Ages and he secured a position of pre-eminence and power which enabled him to apply it. Apparently also his personal character was not specially attractive. He was, says our biographer, "neither an agreeable nor a convivial character" and "lacked any common humanity." It is also singular that one who was such an unrelenting oppressor of the Puritans should have been in his own personal life as severe and ascetic as any of them.

Mr. Trevor-Roper is, however, only re-affirming the verdict of older historians on Laud when he describes him as "having a little mind which could not brook any opposition or disagreement with his own views or treat any such offender as a friend." This is a similar conclusion to that of S. R. Gardiner's, who says, "Genius he had none, no power of sympathy with characters opposed to his own, no attractive force whatever. Men were to obey for their own good and hold their tongues." It would not seem over severe to assert that Laud with his absolutist and almost totalitarian methods, displayed all the intolerant fanaticism of a Jesuit champion of the Papacy and that probably only the accident of birth, time and country prevented him from being a second Ignatius Loyola.

But there is distinctly also a credit side to be considered. Laud was very devout, even if somewhat superstitious, and his industry and energy, and sincere zeal for the advancement of the Church as he envisaged it, were unceasing. As Hallam says, "he had placed before his eyes the aggrandisement first of the Church and next of the royal prerogative as his end and aim in every action."[1] He did much, therefore, to enrich individual benefices and bishoprics by

[1] Const. Hist. 322

recovering tithe impropriations and property from those who had inherited the Church lands alienated by Henry VIII.

He was tireless in his efforts to raise funds for the repair of St. Paul's Cathedral, and he was most generous with his own private benefactions to charitable and worthy objects. At Oxford when Vice-Chancellor, he restored, in his usual high-handed and severe way, much-needed discipline, and promoted scholarship by the founding of valuable Lectureships. Although some of his actions seemed to indicate, especially to those who were naturally apprehensive and perhaps over suspicious of Popish principles and propaganda, a leaning towards the Roman Faith and worship, Laud was not really a Papist, but a convinced and well-instructed Protestant, even if of a strong anti-Calvinist type. He twice refused the offer of a Cardinal's hat, because, as Fuller graphically puts it, "the fashion thereof could not fit his head who had studied and written so much against the Romish religion."[1] There is no reason to doubt the sincerity of his protestation at his trial: "I will die with these words in my mouth that I never intended, much less endeavoured the bringing in of Popish superstition upon the true Protestant religion established by law in this kingdom." It is scarcely possible that Laud should have possessed any serious Romish leanings when he concurred in the Canons of 1640, the seventh of which declares that "at the time of Reforming this Church from that gross superstition of Popery it was carefully provided that all means should be used to root out of the minds of the people the idolatry committed in the Mass." That Laud was no coward was clearly evident from his refusal to escape from the Tower and so avoid his trial and certain condemnation.

Mr. Trevor-Roper's excursions into the history of the English Reformation leave us with the distinct impression that he has been content to rely on partisan "Anglo-catholic" treatises which usually consist of startling but quite erroneous dogmatic assertions unsupported by any real evidence. Mr. Trevor-Roper almost invariably employs this deceptive but discreditable method of misrepresenting actual historical facts. Even his ecclesiastical terminology is scarcely that of the strictly impartial historian. He nearly always incorrectly confuses the terms Puritan and

[1] Ch. Hist. 3.280.

Calvinist and bestows the epithet "heretic" on them, and "orthodox" on the Arminians whom he describes as "high Churchmen," a term not then in current use.

It was the Vice-Chancellor of Oxford who declared that it was due to James I's "experienced wisdom" "that Popery hangs its head, that Arminianism is repressed and that Puritanism does not lay waste our borders."[1] Even Heylin, Laud's admirer, denies that "Puritan and Calvinian are convertible terms—all Calvinians are not to be counted as Puritans, whose practices many of them abhor and whose inconformities they detest."[2]

The House of Commons declared in 1626 concerning Montague's writings that he had "endeavoured to raise factions among the King's subjects by casting the odious and scandalous name of 'Puritan' upon those who conform to the doctrines and ceremonies of the Church."

Mr. Trevor-Roper asserts that Henry VIII's legislation "implied that the Crown could dictate doctrine," whereas Henry expressly declared that "Christ is indeed *unicus et supremus* as we confess Him in Church daily; it was *nimis absurdam* for us to be called *caput ecclesiae representans Corpus Christi mysticum.*" "As to sacraments and spiritual things," Henry freely admitted, "they have no head but Christ."[3]

Mr. Trevor-Roper's assertions concerning the indefinite nature of the Elizabethan Religious Settlement are almost gems of inaccuracy and mis-statement. The following are typical specimens: "The ecclesiastical forms so loosely prescribed in her reign had been issued on the most indeterminate authority"; "The Advertisements which ordered the use of Cope and surplices were enacted simply by the Queen and Archbishop"; "Elizabeth's Church was so comprehensive that it was capable of any inconsistency without exceeding the limits of its jurisdiction"; "The Thirty-nine Articles managed to sanction almost any known doctrine"; "Between the Scylla of a hostile Roman Church and the Charybdis of Genevan doctrine Elizabeth and her obedient bishops cruised with agility and success." This is followed by the amazing assertion that the Elizabethan

[1] *Works of A. Toplady* 249.
[2] *Life of Laud* 119.
[3] *Cranmer's Works* 2.224.

Bishops "did not greatly care whether the Communion Table was or was not an altar."

Now the chief "ecclesiastical form" ordered in Elizabeth's reign was the 1559 Prayer Book, which instead of being "loosely prescribed on most indeterminate authority" was passed by the 1559 Act of Parliament under most stringent penalties for "any whatsoever Minister who dared to use 'any other rite, ceremony, order or form' of services than those mentioned and set forth in the said book." "The Advertisement was certainly enacted simply by the Queen and the Archbishop," but in direct conformity with a concluding Clause of the same Act of Uniformity directing her "with the advice of the Metropolitan to ordain and publish such further ceremonies or rites" for edification and due reverence, in order that Elizabeth's Church should *not*, as Mr. Trevor-Roper grossly misrepresents it, "be capable of any inconsistency," but that, as Elizabeth herself ordered, "the whole realm should be brought to one manner of uniformity"[1] For as Bishop Jewel declared, "She was unable to endure the least alteration in matters of religion."[2] Elizabeth herself was certainly a little more "comprehensive" than her "Church" which desired to exclude specific Lutherans, whereas she sought an invitation to join in the Lutheran Synod of Magdeburg in October, 1577, and so express the unity of "Christian Princes who profess the Gospel against the errors and heresies of the Pope," and "though there be some slight discrepancy in the nature of our teaching . . . in the substance of the Faith and truth of things we do not differ."[3] Such a definite statement of her "Religious Settlement" completely disproves Mr. Trevor-Roper's extraordinary statement that "Elizabeth and her obedient bishops cruised with agility and success between the Scylla of a hostile Roman Church and the Charybdis of Genevan doctrine," while the still more startling misstatement that "they did not care whether the Communion Table was an altar and whether the sacrament were or were not the body and blood of Christ" is contradicted by definite and clear contemporary evidence. Bishop Guest, about the only bishop credited with Lutheran sympathies, strongly

[1] "*Parker's Corres.*" 224-6.

[2] *Zurick Letters* 1.149.

[3] *Troubles at Frankfort.* 225-6.

objected to a suggestion in 1559 to restore the 1549 Consecration Prayer because " it prays that the bread and wine may be Christ's body and blood : which is a doctrine which has caused much idolatry."[1] Moreover, Parker and his brother bishops presented learned petitions to the Queen against the use of Altars as " contrary to the Scriptures and the Primitive Church " pointing out the inconsistency of " taking away the sacrifice of the Mass and leaving the Altar standing."[2] This resulted in a Royal Injunction ordering the substitution of Communion Tables for Altars in Churches.

It was certainly not the view of contemporary Churchmen that the " Thirty-nine Articles managed to sanction almost any known doctrine " since the first Commentary on them by Thos. Rogers (Archbishop Bancroft's Chaplain) was written to prove the unity of the Church of England with all neighbouring Reformed Churches " in the most important and fundamental points of religion." Bancroft evidently accepted this view as he circulated Rogers' " Catholic Doctrine of the Church of England," as the Commentary was styled, throughout his Province. Moreover, he condemned the Papal system as drawing people " from the sure trust and confidence in Christ's death to Masses, pardons, and I know not what intolerable superstition and idolatry."[3] Similarly, Archbishop Parker in the ninth of his " Eleven Articles " of 1561, condemned the " propitiatory Sacrifice of the Mass as most ungodly and injurious to Christ's one sufficient sacrifice." There is not a line of reliable historical evidence to prove Mr. Trevor-Roper's statement that the Elizabethan Bishops took up a via media position between Rome and Geneva on the crucial doctrines implied by the terms " altar," " sacrifice of the Mass " and transubstantiation. Archbishop Whitgift declared that all who resort to the Mass " offend God in being present at an idolatrous service."[4] Rome fully realised that Elizabeth had taken her stand definitely on the Reformed side in doctrine. Pope Pius V in his Bull of 1570, declared that Elizabeth " hath abolished the Sacrifice of the Mass . . . and hath commanded books

[1] Cardwell *Hist. of Con'fces* 2.53.
[2] Strype Annals 1.160-2.
[3] Sermon p. 36 1588.
[4] Works 2.234.

containing manifest heresy, drawn up according to the precept of Calvin—received and esteemed by herself—to be observed also by her subjects."[1] Mr. Trevor-Roper asserts in spite of all this clear evidence that " Elizabeth's Government refused to yoke itself to any body of doctrine." Yet it was this very Government which passed the Act of Uniformity and required the clergy to subscribe the Articles of Religion and made all Popish recusants recant " the Mass as abominable sacrilege being a scarifice for the quick and dead," and even imprisoned all who " willingly heard Mass."

Mr. Trevor-Roper is most unsympathetic and sarcastic concerning the apostolic and Christ-like life-mission of John Durie, to bring about Christian Reunion, and does his best to discount the cordial appreciation of Laud for this noble project. He also never fails to express caustic and cynical criticism of Calvinism, but he can scarcely correctly claim Hooker or Whitgift as " Arminians," if he will trouble to read the former's Sermons, or the latter's strong approval of the " Lambeth Articles " of 1595. We might add that in several of his " obiter dicta " Mr. Trevor-Roper's language might well be interpreted, although we hope mistakenly, as if he regards religion merely as a hypocritical but useful camouflage for self-seeking and material advantage.

We must, however, thank him for a most careful and interestingly written account of a life and character usually too highly praised or too fiercely condemned. His contribution to the general history of the early Stuart period is one of real merit and it certainly gives abundant evidence of laborious and painstaking research amongst contemporary State papers and trustworthy documents. It will undoubtedly be of very real value to the ecclesiastical historian, and is likely to be a standard and comprehensive source of information for students on the life and activities of an outstanding post-Reformation Primate.

C. SYDNEY CARTER.

[1] Cardwell *Doct'y Annalls* 1.364-5.

Book Reviews

ENGLAND UNDER THE STUART KINGS

By F. G. Llewellin, B.D., D.Litt. (*Protestant Truth Society.*) 3s.

Dr. Llewellin has already given us instructive examples of his historical studies, especially in the Tudor period, and we are therefore glad that he has expended his time and labour to bring the Stuart Kings under careful review.

In this new book of 190 pages most of the leading characters in Church and State are passed in review and their careers interestingly delineated and their influence faithfully recorded. We thus see clearly how they made their contribution to the varied and changeful scheme of the National life in this critical epoch. In this way the aims and ideals of Laud and Strafford are clearly portrayed as well as their unwise absolutist and sometimes cruel methods of attaining them.

There is a running and rapid summary of the political and constitutional events of the seventeenth century as well as a short but graphic account of its leading characters, especially those of prominent Restoration Churchmen, while a rather unusual excursion into the by-path of social and economic conditions of the period is especially welcome. The book is well illustrated and made more useful by an Index. It is just the short summary of events of this most fateful period of our National history which should be very valuable for a busy layman. He will find in its pages all of importance which he needs to learn.

C. S. CARTER.

CHRISTIANITY IN THOUGHT AND PRACTICE

By William Temple, Archbishop of York. (*S.C.M.*) 1s.

This is a book of supreme value and great importance. It consists of the Moody Lectures which were delivered at the University of Chicago in 1935-6 and they contain a remarkable forecast of the coming world crisis. One quotation will serve to illustrate the sound, practical commonsense of the author :

" I believe the political problems of our generation and of that which will follow ours are truly problems in theology, and that the answer to the questions that are being raised will be given this way or that, broadly speaking, according as men do or do not believe that personality in man has a status independent of all earthly associations and allegiances because of its kinship with the personality of God."

The Lectures were concerned mainly with the relations between

Philosophy and Religion, and they move along the lines of the Hegelian triad of thesis, antithesis and synthesis. Dr. Temple points out that this is a process which never reaches an ultimate conclusion, for it consists of something which is always moving on. There is, of course, a sharp distinction between mediæval and modern philosophy and he urges that the supreme need in every civilized country is to construct a synthesis which will gather together the vital excellencies of both. He selects for a close analysis the important problem of the nature and status of personality and in his last chapter he deals with Christian Ethics in relation to individuals and groups.

It will help those Christians who are puzzled and anxious about their personal response to the call of King and Country. The Archbishop writes, " There is one really strong argument against the use of armed force ; it is that none of us are good enough to use it without moral deterioration. As soon as fighting begins, passions are released which strangle high aspirations and the spirit of truth is stifled in the hearts of men. Yet I cannot hold that this is a valid reason for refusing the perilous duty ; it is a cogent reason for spiritual discipline in preparation for it . . . The Christian may fight to preserve his country from invasion or to uphold defined justice among the nations with which his own is in contractual relations ; but he must not fight for his faith, nor to defend his life when that is threatened because he is a witness to that Faith ; for to fight for the Faith otherwise than by argument and by appeal is to betray it."

J. W. AUGUR.

THOUGHTS IN WAR-TIME

By William Temple, Archbishop of York. (*Macmillan.*) 4s. 6d.

This book can be taken as the sequel to the Moody Lectures of 1935-6, for it puts into practice the conclusions which Dr. Temple then arrived at in view of the coming world struggle. What is the duty of a Christian in time of War ? At the present time we are all conscious of the tension between the absolute claims of religious faith and the relative judgments involved in political action. This tension cannot be ignored, and the Archbishop believes that every Christian should face it in the light of actual facts and with the conviction that War is a Divine Judgment. This, broadly, is the line which runs through all his religious and political addresses since the war began, and in this volume he has published the most important of them together with several articles which have appeared in certain periodicals. They have a lasting value, for they are built up on eternal foundations. Preachers and teachers will read and study them with much profit.

The Appendix includes the remarkable essay by the late Canon B. H. Streeter published in 1915, on " This War and The Sermon on the Mount." Amongst many other pregnant utterances, he declares that " the Sermon on the Mount is not to be read as a set of rules and regulations but as a battle song."

J. W. AUGUR.

THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND

By Herbert Hensley Henson. (*Cambridge University Press.*) 7s. 6d.

In the series " English Institutions " a place had to be found for that most typical of English institutions, the Church of England, a source of constant surprise to its sons and of continual bewilderment to aliens. The choice of one to write such a book must have given the General Editor considerable anxious thought. From many points of view the former Bishop of Durham fills the requirement as well as any other. His ability is unquestioned ; his experience of Church life has been varied ; he has passed through several stages of development in his own views, and he has now the necessary leisure for such a task. The result of his work is an odd but interesting volume, always readable and characteristic of Hensley Henson. Of necessity the early pages are historical in character, though the volume itself is not intended to be a careful historical survey of the Church. This section of the book contains much that is debatable, but Evangelicals will notice the warm tribute which is paid to the character and work of Cranmer, whose martyrdom, it is stated, made permanent his life's work of giving order and meaning to the English Reformation. The varying fortunes of the Church from the Elizabethan settlement to its " frank subjection " to the State at the end of the seventeenth century are characteristically set forth.

The " subjection " of the Church to the State occupies a fairly large proportion of the volume, and it is obvious that the whole volume proceeds from one with whom that particular grievance is ever present. He is convinced that the only reasonable solution is disestablishment and that the solution will not long be delayed. As may be expected, the rejection by Parliament of the Proposed New Prayer Book, in many quarters now considered to have been providential, is made a major complaint of State interference with the Church's liberty.

On the question of Bishops, the author has much to say, both in connection with the mode of appointment and with their " lordly " state. He will have a great deal of support in his suggestion that an effective episcopate, really in touch with modern life and thought, will have to surrender a good deal of its pomp.

The parochial system, education, the establishment, and the parochial clergy provide chapters, always interesting, usually provocative. We wonder how far the author is justified in his patent lament over the decline in the " standing " of the clergy. It is true that the ranks have been greatly extended and that the public-school no longer provides the bulk of ordinands, but it is questionable whether in general training they are less worthy than their predecessors.

There is something severe about the author's logical reasoning, and, of course, the Church of England by its history and its " compromise " provides an admirable target for any sharpshooter. In this case the one who shoots can claim the privilege, granted to one who lives sufficiently deeply, of indicating blemishes and weaknesses with a view to amendment and improvement. There is no doubt that Hensley Henson enjoyed writing this book and those who read, though they will frequently register non-agreement, will certainly find pleasure and profit.

STOIC, CHRISTIAN AND HUMANIST

By Gilbert Murray, LL.D., D.C.L., Litt.D., formerly Regius Professor of Greek in the University of Oxford. (*London: Watts & Co., G. Allen & Unwin.*) 5s.

This is a little book consisting of only four essays; but its importance and its significance are not to be measured by the number of its pages. Professor Gilbert Murray has so long been before the public, first (and foremost) as a brilliant *littérateur*, secondly as an enthusiastic advocate of the League of Nations, that he requires no introduction to readers anywhere. In a fairly full preface he tells us that he has more than once been moved to make a systematic attempt at stating his religious position, "comprising a profound belief in ethics and a disbelief in all revelational religion." And then he proceeds to give us a little bit of autobiography, to show how it is (or was) that he came to hold those views. He knows that what he has written may alienate, or at least pain, some of his friends; but he could not keep silence on subjects of such vital importance. We do not propose to review the book in detail; suffice it to say that—admirably written though it be—this volume is, in considerable measure, an attack on Christianity as a "faith" and a "revelation." This is particularly noticeable in the second half of the work, in the two chapters on (1) the conception of another life; (2) what is permanent in Positivism. There is, indeed, no vulgar attack on Christianity such as sometimes meets us in publications by the Rationalist Press Association; Prof. Murray is too great a gentleman to descend to such methods. For all that, and despite the fact that (as we cannot help believing) within the inmost being of the old Professor there is (what Tertullian called) the "anima naturaliter Christiana," it is painful to know that he has definitely and finally rejected the Gospel; and that he has used his learning, his skill, and his persuasiveness to undermine what is—after all—the One Hope of the World. He has brought himself to assume that "men accepting these mystical forms of belief" (*i.e.*, the belief that there *is* a personal Being who is a God of Love and of Justice) or some theistic form of faith, do so not "because they believe it to be true, but because they are convinced that it is good for other people to believe it." No doubt, there are such people; but Christians, in any true sense, they could not be.

The rest of the book calls for nothing but cordial admiration; rarely has the Stoic philosophy been set forth with more clarity and insight, while the opening chapter on Paganism at the time of Christ is a model exposition. This makes us all the more regretful that Prof. Murray should have thrown in his lot with those who, themselves "without hope or God in the world," are doing their best to destroy that hope, that faith in God and Christ, in the lives and souls of others.

THE BEGINNINGS OF GNOSTIC CHRISTIANITY

By L. Gordon Rylands. (*London: Watts & Co.*) 15s.

The author of this work, in order (he tells us) to guard against misapprehensions, wishes us to understand by Gnostic Christianity, not the doctrines associated with such writers as Valentinus and

Basilides, but the Christianity of Paul and the Fourth Gospel. His attitude to Christianity might be inferred from the fact that he regards the conclusions of such men as Bousset, Loisy, and Guinebert, as more or less indisputable. But he goes a good deal further than most modern criticism, even of an extreme type, would allow; and in a previous book he has endeavoured to prove that no such person as Jesus ever walked this earth—that He is, in fact, a fictional character round which has crystallized floating legends, and beliefs in a coming Messiah. A man who holds such views ought not to be taken seriously; his bias is too sharply pronounced. The author of the *Golden Bough* has this comment to make on all such attempts to disprove the historicity of the main Gospel narrative: "The doubts which have been cast on the historical reality of Jesus are, in my judgment, unworthy of serious attention." Sir James Frazer's opinion would be that of all but a handful of crotchety intellectuals. Most of Mr. Rylands' new book may be dismissed as unsound; but the two chapters on the Odes of Solomon contain matter of interest for scholars.

E. H. BLAKENEY.

THE MISSIONARY CHURCH (A Study in the contribution of Modern Missions to Œcumenical Christianity).

By W. Wilson Cash, D.D., (C.M.S., Salisbury Square, E.C.4.) 7s. 6d.

When the leader of our largest Missionary Society writes a book commended by the Archbishop of Canterbury as a book "which ought to enlarge the mind, quicken the imagination, and stir the spirit of all who read it," then it is a book to be read not reviewed.

Speaking as a missionary of nearly twenty-five years service, I would say that it should be read by every missionary secretary, by every member of a missionary committee, by every missionary leader in the field, and if possible by every missionary; and not only so but by every parson and minister throughout the country, not only because they have the responsibility of keeping alive the missionary cause at home, but also because the book itself embraces things which are of special importance to the Home Church including present-day challenges and the Œcumenical outlook.

It is delightful to take up a book on such a subject written by a man who was one of the seven pioneers of the Egypt General Mission, and to whose trust God has now committed the leadership of the Church Missionary Society—a man therefore with a full-orbed experience of all kinds of missions, and, better still, of very clear experience of Christ in his own soul.

In every way this is a great book recording great facts, facing great problems, and expressing great principles. It sets before us how God's world-wide purpose is progressing in and through evangelisation.

Here in one volume are the big issues with which, in the view of the Archbishop, "all Christian people" should be concerned. One quotation will suffice, "The point I seek to make throughout is this, that God is at work and is taking the initiative."

ALFRED BUXTON.