

Numerous similar instances might be given, but there is no advantage in overloading one's subject, and enough has been written to convince any unprejudiced person of the benefits which cycling confers. Like all other forms of exercise it may be abused, but so long as the rider can eat, drink, and sleep well, he is not in much danger of overdoing it. We must beware of arguing from the abuse against the use. It has been well said, "There is a danger in eating one's daily food; we may eat too much." Still, food is a necessity of life, and so is bodily exercise, though it is hard to persuade some people. Dr. Stables very well puts it thus:

"I met J—— D—— one morning about two years ago. He was healthy enough looking to all appearance, though somewhat stout to a medical eye. Age nearly fifty.

"'Doctor,' he said, smiling, 'I read your article on "Exercise" in the —— last night.

"'Did you?' I replied; 'I hope you benefited by it.'

"'Not a bit,' he said bluntly. 'Look at me. Do you think there is anything the matter with me? I never bothered about exercise, and, what's more, I never will.'

"Nor did he. He was found dead a month or two after this near his bed. Post-mortem revealed a feeble, fatty, and ruptured heart."

God has given into our care a body which has a wonderful power of adaptation to surrounding circumstances. We have our responsibility to it as well as to those higher powers which are likewise a Divine gift. If the Apostle could say, "I pray God your whole spirit, soul and body be preserved blameless unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ," should we not do well to remember that there is a right regard for the body, and that due and fitting attention to it will bring with it its own reward, spirit and soul alike blessed.

W. E. RICHARDSON.

ART. III.—MOLINISM.

The Controversy on the Doctrines of Grace (*auxilia gratiæ*) in the Church of Rome.

FEW readers in this day of railway reading, when the cream of the greatest authors is hastily skimmed and served up to the public in the most condensed form, could venture to plunge into the depths of the profound and exhaustive "History" by the learned Serry, which extends to close upon 1,500 pages of double columns spread through a folio

of unusually ponderous dimensions.¹ Yet the materials of this most instructive history of the great conflict between the Dominicans and the Jesuits, on the doctrines of grace, are of such supreme importance that the reduction of them to a few readable heads may be acceptable, at least to those who are unable to wade through the interminable sea of narrative and document which the treatise of the great French divine opens to the student of this important controversy—one which extends itself to every branch of the Christian Church, and was no less energetically carried on by the Calvinists and Arminians at Dort than by the Dominicans and Jesuits at Trent. At the present time, however, this long warfare has a special interest from the fact that it is the longest, the strongest, the most eloquent of every protest which has ever been made against the infallibility of the Papacy; the most convincing proof that on the most vital and practical part of Christianity the popes have been absolutely unable to exercise their powers of settling controversies or defining doctrines—that the *charisma* is a mere useless appendage, the *gratia gratis data* has not enabled them to fix the doctrine or to define the meaning of the *gratia gratum faciens*, without which Christianity has neither motive power nor practical result.

The doctrine of Aquinas, which was substantially that of St. Augustine, was made by Loyola the rule and text-book of his order in regard to the “assistances of grace.” While it did not attempt to clear up all the mysteries which are involved in the motions of grace and free-will, or to make any artificial concord between truths which, though difficult to reconcile in theory, have been practically reconciled in the lives of good men in every age, it was a doctrine, nevertheless, “according to godliness,” and left the broad statements of Scripture without those artificial distinctions which proved so great a snare to all who in later ages have professed to be “wise above that which is written.”

But this prudent reserve did not last long. The Council of Trent opened a battle-field to the religious orders, as well as to the Scotists and Thomists, which involved every religious question and extended over the whole region of faith. Lainez, who with Salmeron represented the Jesuits in that great assembly, conceived the dangerous project of introducing a new theory on the doctrines of grace, by assigning to the human will an initiative, or at least a co-ordinate influence, in the work of renewal, while St. Augustine had in all his teaching vindicated the absolute reign of grace. Many of the Fathers of the Council protested against the new

¹ Venice, 1740.

doctrine as Pelagian, and it does not appear to have commended itself to the Council, although the traces of the struggle are very clearly visible in the conflicting passages which occur in the chapters and canons on Justification, in which there are distinct indications of concessions on either side. Still, the Tridentine doctrine is not in direct conflict with that of St. Augustine, the third canon specially upholding the doctrine of the preventing grace of God leading into faith, and preceding and directing the will into the reception of it. There is no doubt, however, that in the debates in the Council an open Pelagianism was asserted by Ambrosius Catharinus, and other allies of the Jesuits. Between the first and second Councils of Trent (for we must ever remember that the Council of 1552 was as distinct a body from that of 1562 as our two Convocations of the same date) a congregation of the Society of Jesuits was held, in which Lainez was elected General of the Order. This took place in 1558, and inaugurated that new system of divinity which has since been the distinctive badge of the "Society" in all its teaching and in all its conflicts. It is described as an "*accommodatior utiliorque theologia*"—and most accommodating it has been to human nature, and most useful to its authors and to their politico-religious aims. About the same year the famous Molina invented what he termed his "*scientia media*," which professed to reconcile by way of a *via media* the ancient and modern theories, a work in which he was assisted by Fonseca, Suarez, Vasquez, and Mendoza. In 1581 one Prudentius Montemayor published theses in its defence at Salamanca, which were immediately opposed by the learned Dominican, Bannes—and were censured by the faculty of Divinity of the University.

Claudius Acquaviva (A.D. 1584), the fifth of the now long succession of Generals of the Society, next comes upon the scene. Associating with himself a number of divines of all the Latin branches of the Church—England, happily, having no place in the list—he undertook a commentary on the writings of Aquinas, in order that he might force the text of that great divine into a non-natural sense, and that the "angelic doctrine," as Serry observes, "might be mutilated by means of a new comment." "An arduous work," as he continues; but no work, either of invention, corruption, or mutilation, is too arduous for the mind of a Jesuit, as was proved by Gregory de Valentia, when arguing before the pope himself, he corrupted the text of St. Augustine in order to strengthen his case. The same unscrupulous policy was illustrated by the Jesuit editors of the works of Cardinal Contarini; by Lainez, when he argued from the forged

decretals (then already detected) in favour of the Petrine claims; by Santarelli, when he changed the words of St. Paul (2 Cor. x. 8), "Our authority which the Lord hath given us for edification, and not for your destruction," into "*potestas nostra quam dedit nobis Dominus in cœdificationem ET destructionem vestram,*" gathering therefrom that the Apostle claimed a right to punish the faithful after the Roman fashion; by the Jesuit forgers of the "Chronicon" of Lucius Fl. Dexter; by the Jesuits in China, when they dictated the imperial letter against the unfortunate Cardinal de Tournon, the legate; and by countless other members of the Society, which seems unable to touch a single document, ancient or modern, without corrupting it, unless it is able to effect the still more important object of suppressing it altogether.

With the same fatal ingenuity they cast off the "intolerable yoke" which their great founder had imposed upon them, and cut away their bark from the safe moorings of Aquinas, causing it to drift into the Pelagianism which he had so anxiously avoided and so uniformly denounced. The work of the associated divines was, however, strenuously resisted by the more grave and prudent members of the society, and was denounced by Philip II., of Spain, as "*temerarium, periculosum, jactantiâ plenum.*" At last the book was forbidden by the Inquisition. Undeterred by this rebuff, the Society, which never sinks in the stream but to rise again with new vigour a little further on, put forth a revised version of its work in 1590. But this the Jesuit rulers, with their usual wisdom, kept within their own borders and did not put forth publicly before the world. Admonished by Clement VIII. to adhere to the teaching of Aquinas, as prescribed by their founder, and to *explain* his doctrine, Acquaviva escaped from the duty in the ambiguity of the term, and in 1599 put forth the doctrine that the society "was not so tied to St. Thomas as not to be permitted to recede from him at any point." The assertion of this doctrine may be regarded as the point of departure of the Society, not only from its first principles, but from all the other religious orders, and its entrance into the new theology (and, alas! morality), of which one of its most eminent members, Caramuel à Lobkowitz, wrote: "*Tota theologia nostra nova est; non multum temporis perdo in libris legendis.*"

But it did not enter upon this perilous path without a solemn protest from the "Præpositus Generalis" of the order, Muzio Vitelleschi, whose words are much to be observed. "The opinions of some members of the society, especially in things pertaining to morals, are far too free, and not only endanger the existence of the society itself, but even threaten

to do signal injury to the whole Church of God. Let them, therefore, with all diligence, provide that all who teach or write should in no case use this rule in the choice of their opinions—‘*tueri quis potest, probabile est, autore non caret*’—but let them agree in those opinions which are safer, and are of customary use among divines of gravity and influence, which conduce most to morality, and are calculated to nourish and advance piety, and not to lay waste and destroy it.” This was the first stage of that general declension of the Society from the laws of its institution which is so clearly marked in the bull of its suppression in 1774 by Clement XIV. His assertion that it had within itself the seeds of jealousies and divisions *ferè ab initio* takes us back to the incidents of its earliest history—to Acquaviva, and even to Lainez himself.

In 1585 the pretext of directing the studies of the order enabled them to put forth a work, “*De Ratione Studiorum*,” of which Acquaviva was the author. This contained thirty-four propositions, its divisions being these: On Scripture, Providence, Predestination, Reprobation, Grace, and Justification. The University of Louvain, which was the scene of their publication, appointed a committee of divines to examine the work, who passed a censure upon every one of the articles it contained.

It was now high time for the infallible chair to interpose its authority, and no less a person than Sixtus V. comes into the midst. Wiser than either the Jesuits or their opponents, this skilled diplomatist enjoins silence and removes the case to Rome, evidently seeing that the controversy had gone too far to be closed by the mediation of any inferior authority.

It was left to Innocent XI., at a later period, to approve of the censures of the Belgian divines of the thirty-four propositions of the Jesuits. Sixtus V. appears to have remitted the subject to his successors, being engaged in temporal conflicts more congenial to his singularly unspiritual nature. But in the meantime the disputants on either side were multiplied, and the warfare had become hotter and more incapable of any peaceful accommodation or even momentary truce. The pontiffs who preceded Innocent XI. had successively renewed the prohibition of Sixtus V., and Innocent, though the first to give any sign in regard to his own judgment on the subject, did not commit himself to the stronger testimony of a bull. Innocent XII. appears to have taken the same course as his predecessors, and the Belgian and German divines were for awhile quieted.

But in the meantime a new and most important factor in the controversy, and one in whom it afterwards in a great degree centred, appeared in Spain in the person of Ludovic

Molina, who in the teeth of the prohibition against commenting on Aquinas' doctrine produced a work on the "Concord of Free-will and Divine Grace." By birth a Spaniard, he was forced to produce his work in Portugal, for the primate of Spain, the Archbishop of Toledo, had prohibited its publication in that country, and the devotion of the Cardinal Albert of Austria, who presided over the Inquisition in Portugal, to the Society, encouraged him to transfer his abode to that kingdom, and there to produce a treatise which on its appearance convulsed all the Churches of the Roman communion. Its publication at Lisbon in 1588 was followed by several other editions.

Molina, if not the first to discover, was the first to reduce to a systematic form the doctrine of the *scientia media*; in other terms, the knowledge which God possesses of what would certainly happen as the result of conditions which were not carried out. The doctrine is best explained by the incident in 1 Sam. xxiii., where David asks God whether Saul would come to Keilah—"And the Lord said, He will come down." Then David asks again, "Will the men of Keilah deliver me into the hand of Saul?" And the reply is, "They will deliver thee." In consequence of this knowledge David departs out of Keilah, and neither of the predicted consequences come to pass. Here there is a knowledge, not of a thing which actually occurred, but of one which would occur under certain circumstances which never happened.

Now it does not appear that the notion of a *scientia media* such as this would affect any doctrine except that of an absolute predestination, and would not necessarily and in itself disturb the *auxilia gratia*. But Molina followed it up into these, so as to give to the will of man in the matter of salvation a co-ordinate power with the will of God as exercised in grace, and thus to introduce a kind of semi-Pelagianism, which rapidly developed into what the Augustinian doctors denounced as Pelagianism proper.

The Dominicans, whose jealousy was early aroused by the triumphant advance of the Jesuits towards a supreme authority in the doctrines of the Church, at once joined issue with the Fathers of the "Society" at this point, and a controversy was opened which threatened almost to bring about a schism in the very centre of the Roman communion. The Franciscans rather leaned towards the Jesuits, but the learning and vast influence of the Dominicans, whose order of friars preachers gave them a special means of propagating their opinions, more than counterbalanced the skill of the Jesuits and the uncontroversial influence of the Franciscans. As in the case of every long-sustained controversy, the subjects of contention

became enlarged and the field widened. The Augustinian doctrine, which attributed all to grace, and which (as being also that of Aquinas) the Jesuits were bound to maintain in all its integrity, became gradually so contracted and explained away that the Pauline theory of justification by faith was seriously impaired; the Jesuit Bastida affirming in an address to the pope that "free-will was the preponderating influence in our justification."¹ The respective claims of free-will and grace were contended for by the two orders with a zeal and acrimony which not even the papal prohibition was able to allay, and the contest became rapidly too subtle and too metaphysical to enable the ordinary reader to take the slightest interest in it, or even clearly to understand it. In the meantime a new phase of the controversy appeared. The famous Cardinal Bellarmine entered the lists in the defence of his order, and the scene of warfare was at once transferred to Rome, in which all such conflicts in the papal kingdom must converge at last.

The Court of Rome was now compelled to break the "*obsequiosum silentium*" it had imposed on the Church, and, according to its precedents in such cases, appointed a commission of cardinals to examine Molina's book. Serry observes that it was matter of surprise that Bellarmine, who in all his discourses and controversies had hitherto vigorously defended the doctrines of Augustine and Aquinas on the *auxilia gratiæ*, should thus suddenly appear as the champion of Molina and his anti-Augustinian theories. But the rule of the order is that new opinions should be submitted, not (as was the ancient usage) to the Church, but to the Society.² And as the Society, though at first divided in its opinions, had, with its accustomed *esprit de corps*, adopted the cause of Molina, its most illustrious member was compelled to join in the defence. It must appear even more strange to the Protestant reader that the pope, who might have settled the whole controversy in the plenitude of power which he always claims, should adopt the second-hand method of a commission or congregation to determine it for him. It would seem that the boasted *charisma* or *gratia gratis data* of infallibility breaks down whenever it is reduced to practice, and that the gigantic machinery of the papacy is too ponderous to apply to any question of doctrinal doubt or difficulty, however important or even vital. Perhaps the possibility that a bull might not only terrify but even scatter the flock, made it expedient that

¹ "Liberum arbitrium esse eam causam, quæ in justificatione præponderat."

² Constit., p. 3, c. i., lit. O. Serry, Ed. Ven. 1740, p. 151.

an intermediate authority should come in, and as the wheels of the Vatican chariot, like those of justice, move slowly, the delay might wear out the patience of the combatants, or more important events might relegate Molina and his works to their first obscurity. However this may be, eight meetings of the commission were held during the year 1599.

The Jesuits took advantage of the delay by endeavouring to avert the censure which, it soon became evident, would be pronounced against them. They strove to persuade the Bishop of Forli, the theologian of Clement VIII., to authorize a compromise, and allow both the tenets of the Jesuits and their opponents to be maintained as equally probable. But the bishop reminded them that they had charged the Dominicans with Calvinism for maintaining the Augustinian doctrine, which precluded the possibility of any composition or compromise, and recommended them to await the decision of the congregation upon the merits of the whole question. They then employed two of their divines, Vasquez and Peres, to write against the doctrine of "natural predetermination" (*physica prædeterminatio*), while new defenders of Molina appeared in Spain, in Cobos and Bastida. At last the censure was formally promulgated, while Bellarmine calmed the anxieties of his Spanish friends by assuring them that the cause was still before the pope, and nothing had been finally decided.

The Society, thus encouraged, applied again for a conference between the belligerents, after having some time previously addressed the pope in the person of Molina himself, in a letter humbly asking for a copy of the decision of the Congregation, and praying, as being himself the chief party in it, to be heard in his defence. Presently an appeal was made to the Roman Catholic universities of Germany, but with little or no result. The pope referred this appeal of the Jesuits to Cardinal Madruzio, who had himself been present at Trent, and therefore knew something of the mind of the Council on this subject, and added Cardinals Bernerius and Bellarmine to the number of the commission. The replies of the Society to the interrogatories of the cardinal were so unsatisfactory, from their irrelevancy and ambiguity, that he was unable to give any judgment on them before his death, which happened on April 20, 1600. This event opened a new prospect to the Society, which entered at once upon a fresh course of intrigues, endeavouring on the one hand to delay as long as possible the judgment of the pope, and on the other to bring about their great object of a conference. For this latter end they employed Achilles Gagliardi, a skilful manager, to bring about privately what they had failed to effect in a public manner.

But these efforts were as unsuccessful as the former, and in 1601 the pope submitted the matter to a fourth examination; and here we must observe that each examination involved several, and sometimes many, sessions of the Congregation, so that the fourth *examen* includes thirty-seven sittings. Finally the decisions of the body were handed in to the pope, who seemed very little desirous to give them his *imprimatur*, for he returned a somewhat evasive reply to the deputies who represented them, and presently turning to a Carmelite delivered an harangue for over two hours against the doctrine of the *scientia media*. But when he saw the mountain of documents which he had to encounter he observed, "It seems to me very long. If it took you a year to make it, a year will scarcely be enough to enable me to read it" ("Mi pare molto lungo. Se voi siete stato un' anno di farlo, a me non basta un' anno per leggerlo").¹ Then a qualm of conscience seems to have affected him, from the thought that Molina had not been heard in person, both being mere pretexts to enable him to temporize, and to put off the evil day of a papal definition as long as possible.

But the secular powers could hardly suffer this apple of discord to be tossed about in their dominions without applying to the pope to put an end to the dangerous game. Accordingly, Philip III. of Spain urged the Roman Court to pronounce its decision, which the pope, as usual, promised to do. The Jesuits, alarmed at this sudden danger, determined to enter upon a new and bolder plan of campaign. Hitherto they had acted the part of the patient and suffering lamb; now, however, they assumed that of the lion. They stood forth boldly in defence of their cause. Fear might be more potent with the pope than obsequious devotion and entreaty. They threatened an open schism if the censure should be promulgated with the papal sanction. They put forth before the pope the most flagrant theses, in which the Pelagian doctrines were openly declared; no longer concealed in scholastic language or confused by metaphysical statements. "And all these propositions" (exclaimed the pope) "are the doctrines of Molina! They affirm that by a certain compact between the Father and the Son, grace is given to everyone who does what is natural to him" (*quod in se est*). "Thus it is in the power of man to obtain grace as often as he does thus. Therefore grace is no longer grace, since it is given when I wish, or because I have done what is in me to do. You cannot escape this conclusion. Hence we ought to attribute our justification to our free-will, which neither

¹ Serry, Hist. Cong., p. 256.

Augustine nor the Holy Scripture admit." He ended by declaring that "such a doctrine was as opposed to true theology as any one possibly could be."¹

But notwithstanding all this resistance to their doctrine in the highest quarters, the Society ventured yet another step, and threatened an appeal to a general council, that final tribunal which the Church of Rome has ever dreaded, and whose functions and rights it has so daringly usurped ever since the Council of Constance declared its supreme authority over the papacy by dethroning the three antipopes and electing Martin V.

The unfortunate pope, wearied out and almost torn in pieces by the factions surrounding him, at last resolved to open another inquiry, which was to be conducted in his own presence. But before we enter upon this new phase of the history, we cannot withhold from the reader the various methods by which the Jesuits succeeded in terrifying the aged pontiff into the decision to reopen a controversy which had been so exhausted as to leave not a single pretext for a re-examination, and which needed only the fiat of infallibility to close it for ever.

Serry enumerates five successive schemes by which the society endeavoured to prevent, or at least to delay, indefinitely the decision of the pope on the controversy.

The first was the fear of a schism, which they assumed would certainly be opened by any pontifical judgment upon it. The second was to betray the pope into the belief that Molinism had been so eagerly embraced by the University of Paris, that there would be great danger in an adverse decision. Thirdly, they threatened the proposition of a general council, which was ever a vision of terror to the pontificate. Fourthly, and this was a method which they have systematically employed to force upon the Church their new doctrines, they conjured up visions and revelations, a method by which, even in our own day, the idolatrous devotion of the Sacred Heart has been imposed upon the Roman Church. The fifth, and this was the boldest as well as the most curious of all, was the thesis they put forth, that it was not *de fide* to believe that Clement VIII. was pope and the successor of St. Peter. This attempt was made in the University of Complutum (Alcala de Hanares), in which they proposed for discussion the question, "Non est de fide hunc numero Papam, exempli gratiã, Clementem VIII. esse verum Papam, . . . Major pars Concilii adhuc ante confirmationem Pontificis est infallibilis veritatis" (page 277).

¹ Serry, p. 262.

But the influence of the "Most Catholic King" soon dissipated these schemes, and the pope referred the theses of the Complutensian doctors to the Inquisition, which last institution managed, in the interest of the Society, to entangle the king in the controversy, by which means the pope was deterred from interposing authoritatively in the matter.

Meanwhile, the audacious thesis of the Jesuits brought them into a fresh collision with their ancient foes the Dominicans, and the redoubtable order of friars preachers at once opposed them on the new ground of the papal authority. The Jesuits, whose resources seem as infinite as their skill in employing them is unequalled, took refuge in the pretence that the theses were simply advanced for disputation according to the usual academical form, and accordingly as fictitiously opposed them as they had designedly advanced them. But the learned Dominicans, Bannes and Zimmel, had already taken up arms in defence of the pope, and the former had obtained from him a brief applauding his zeal and devotion to the Holy See. Thus supported, the pontiff resolved to open a fifth examination into the Molinist doctrine and work, which was to be held in his own presence. The main proposition which he himself started was, "Which of the two attributed more efficacy for good to free-will—St. Augustine or Molina?" Scarcely had the disputation on this point been fully opened, when the Jesuit Gregory de Valentia, arguing for Molina, misquoted the words of St. Augustine (*De Civ. Dei*, l. xix., c. xiii.), putting "*et ipsam immortalitatis pacem*" for "*ipsam scilicet immortalitatis pacem*," which entirely altered the meaning of the passage. Convicted of his error before the pope himself, Valentia, overcome with the shame such an exposure had brought upon him, retired to Naples, and died a few months after.

It would be needless, and indeed might well exhaust the patience, and perhaps confuse the mind of the ordinary reader, to follow the argument through the sixty-eight sessions of the Congregation. Clement VIII. did, however, during the long argument, express his conviction, at great length, that the doctrine of Molina was in direct opposition to that of St. Augustine; but death came to his relief, to save him from the necessity he so much dreaded, of being compelled to condemn it.

His immediate successor, Leo XI., dying within the month of his election, the papacy devolved on Paul V. (Borghese), and with the new pope new schemes for preventing the settlement of the controversy were devised by the untiring skill of the Jesuits. They again addressed themselves to the Court of France, which again declined to interfere. Turning to Rome, they again induced their old champion, Cardinal Bellarmine, to promote their cause with the pope, in whose election he had

taken an active part. He put forth a treatise on free-will and the efficacy of Divine grace, which was presented to the pope, and answered by the learned Dominican, Lemos. Meantime the Society endeavoured to nullify the conclusions arrived at in the Clementine Congregations by proposing that these should be ignored in a new examination, which should treat the whole subject independently of any previous decisions. They then endeavoured to stave off the inquiry on the pretext that the question was not *de fide*, and might be left an open one.

But Paul V. was of too stern and sturdy a nature to yield to these intrigues. He determined to reopen the case, and instituted a new Congregation to determine it. Bellarmine, with his usual subtlety, endeavoured to introduce new difficulties in the expectation that the conclusions of Clement and his own theses would be considered together. But the Congregation simply accepted the former as representing the mind of St. Augustine. In the fifth session of the Congregation the pope closed the disputation with a definition of effectual grace which, while it contained a saving clause in assertion of free-will, declared that "God by His effectual grace not only moves the will to good works (*ad actus liberos bonos*) by internally persuading, inviting, exciting, or otherwise morally attracting it, but also truly, properly, and actively, and in this sense by a physical motion, acts upon the will *salvâ ejus libertate*, predisposing it so efficaciously (*præmovendo ita efficaciter*) that this effectual prevention of God, surely and infallibly, though freely, brings it into consent" (*ipsam determinat ad consensum*). This foundation having been laid down, the Congregation proceeded to argue the question from the Scriptures, the councils, and the Fathers; the bearing of it upon the doctrines of Calvin being discussed in the twelfth session. After the seventeenth, Paul V., wearied out like his predecessor with this endless and minute controversy, which seemed at last to be merely a logomachy, resolved to put an end to it. But the Jesuits, stronger in real power than the strongest of the popes has ever been, interposed new obstacles to the settlement of it. Paul, delayed but not daunted, commissioned his consultors to prepare a Bull on the subject, which they presented him for his approval. The instructions to the consultors declare the things to be defined—enjoin that all be done secretly, and their several conclusions not revealed to one another.

But the Fabian policy, which had made every effort to close the controversy hitherto impossible, maintained its influence to the very end. The pope hesitated and forbore to take the last step—and the delay was occasioned, not only by the fear

of the spiritual consequences which must follow his decision, whatever it might be, but from the quarrel which had arisen between the Court of Rome and the Republic of Venice, which threatened every day to break out into an open warfare. The Jesuits, with that worldly wisdom which was their characteristic qualification, saw in a moment that a successful move might at once give them the game. They entered the lists with all the zeal and enterprise of their order, and became the most eloquent and successful of the champions of the papacy against the Republic and its irresistible advocate Fra Paolo Sarpi, who has left us its history written with his wonted vigour and accuracy. The discussion of the doctrines of grace ceased with the threatened opening of a more material warfare. Silence was rigorously imposed on the combatants, who were soothed with the promise that "at a more convenient season" they would be heard again.

This prohibition was declared in 1611 and renewed by Urban VIII. in 1625. The Jesuits, with their accustomed audacity, claimed this decree of suspension as a judgment in favour of their order and its protégé Molina, and even took up as a new and most popular weapon for advancing their cause, the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception, which was opposed to the fundamental principle of the Society, which was to follow the doctrine of Aquinas with absolute and implicit obedience. For Aquinas was the ablest and most determined opponent of that strange novelty which had its first suggestion in the hostile pages of Scotus.

The principal conclusions which must present themselves to the reader cannot but be these: first, that the *charisma* of infallibility, though very grand in theory, is utterly useless in practice, and that those who claim it are unable to solve by it the most important and practical doctrines of Christianity, although able to encumber and complicate them by the subtlest and most fruitless definitions; secondly, we find that a Bull is not really the product of the possessor of the gift of infallibility, but is drawn up by subordinate officials, the pope contributing only his signature. Bishop Ricci justly observes: "We may remark here, once for all, that the modern decisions of the popes can never have the authority which the old ones deserve, not because the power they possess in themselves is diminished, but because such decisions are for the most part the resolutions of Congregations composed generally of mere simple clerics, and not the judgments of the pope deciding with the whole of his clergy."¹

It must appear, moreover, that every Christian Church has

¹ "Apol. contro la censura ad alcuni libri publicati in Pistoja," p. 82, n.

arrived at a knowledge of the *auxilia gratiæ* with more practical success by the mere study of the Scriptures, than the Church of Rome has attained to, with the aid of all the skill and subtlety of Jesuits, Dominicans, Franciscans and seculars, even though her greatest champion, Bellarmine, was included among the combatants.

ROBERT C. JENKINS.

ART. IV.—INSPIRATION.

WHAT do we mean by inspiration? It is not defined in the formularies of the Prayer-Book. The word is, I believe, only twice used in the Bible—once in Job, where Elihu says, “There is a spirit in man, and the *inspiration*¹ of the Almighty giveth them understanding;” and once in 2 Tim. iii. 16, where we are told that “all Scripture is given by *inspiration*² of God”—but neither of these passages helps us to a definition of what is meant by inspiration. It seems to me that the only true way to arrive at what inspiration implies is to examine the materials that may be presumed to exhibit the unknown entity, and to determine its nature by a process of induction. For instance, to begin with St. Paul’s statement as our first landmark, “All Scripture is given by inspiration of God.” It matters not whether we take this as a predicate, or render “every God-inspired Scripture is also profitable” etc., because in either case inspiration of some kind is assumed and asserted. And there can be little doubt that it is assumed and asserted as the characteristic, special and peculiar, of the Old Testament. For instance, St. Paul did not include among God-inspired Scriptures the writings of Menander, Epimenides, or Aratus, which are even quoted by himself. At least, I think we have no right to assume, and cannot suppose, he did this. Thus we infer, therefore, that St. Paul recognised certain features of the Old Testament which distinguished it from all other books. What are these features? The Old Testament claims in many places to be the record of special Divine communication—“The word of the Lord came unto me,” and the like. This is only to be regarded as a direct falsehood, or as a mistaken truth, or as the actual truth. With the first we need not concern ourselves; but we must determine how far the persons who made use of this formula were protected against self-deception before we can be sure that we have in what they

¹ In Job it is *neshamah*, breath.

² In Tim. it is *θεόπνευστος*.