


of the surgeons, Dr. F. Hall and Dr. H. Hall, "who, amidst a large practice, most philanthropically attend."

"The poor ye have always with you" was said two thousand years ago. Time was when the richer classes took little more interest in, and had little more in common with, the poorer classes than if they had been an inferior order of beings. And it is even now easy to bear the ills of others with fortitude. Even now many are not sufficiently alive to the enormous and incomparable evils arising from sickness and its too frequent result—poverty. The workman toils on as long as strength permits. At last some organ gives way, and the unfortunate sufferer is unable to work. As a consequence, the wife and family are often reduced to starvation. There are many ways of doing good with money. But we can scarcely imagine a better method than seconding the endeavours of hospital physicians and surgeons in the cure and relief of disease. And this notwithstanding the admission that the hospitals are oftentimes resorted to by those who should not receive aid from such institutions. The rich have not only the inducement to give which comes of the pleasure of giving, but they have a direct interest in the support of hospitals. For hospitals are schools of education of the rising generation of practitioners, and of extended experience of the present generation. When overtaken by sickness the rich will be probably attended by the one, and their children by the other class. Not only the sick poor, but the sick rich, constantly benefit from the teachings of hospitals. In conclusion, it may be remarked that all information about existing hospitals is contained in the "Hospital Annual," edited by Mr. Burdett.

WILLIAM MOORE.



#### ART. VI.—THE LATE HERO-WORSHIP OF DR. NEWMAN IN ITS CONSEQUENCES.

THE cultus of Cardinal Newman that was exhibited in England six months ago is undoubtedly a remarkable phenomenon, which deserves to be carefully examined. Our cousins on the other side of the Atlantic were astonished by it, by its fervency, by its permanence, and by its universality. Was it creditable or discreditable to the English Church and nation?

The first thing that strikes us about it is its generosity. For the last half of his life Dr. Newman had been assailing the Church of England with insults and disingenuous argu-

ments, and had put himself outside the flow of English life, which he looked upon as a spectator whose sympathies were elsewhere; and yet Churchmen, and men who belonged to no Church at all, vied with one another in praising him with effusive volubility. Why was this? In the case of Churchmen it was mainly because they would not forget the first half of his life, and the benefits which they believed they had received from him in their own spiritual life and in the defence which he then made of Christianity and of the Church of England. In the minds of many there was a belief that in old days he had been hardly treated, though they did not know exactly how. When he left the Church of England he had raised a pathetic cry, and had persuaded people that he would willingly have stayed where he was, had he been allowed to do so; and he possessed that art which men who attain to popularity alone have, of persuading people, however different in their sentiments, that he would have agreed with them had it not been for unfortunate circumstances which, against his will, compelled him to occupy a position that prevented him from disclosing his real convictions.

Another large class looked upon him with favour because, by becoming a deserter from the Church of England, he had led very many to believe that the difference between one faith and another was unimportant, and had in this way strengthened the hands of theological liberals, to whom he became dear as an antagonist of the institution which to them represented the maintenance of dogmatic faith in England. High Churchmen, Broad Churchmen, antagonists to the Church, and indifferentists, all thus conspired to praise him, and of course he had the lavish laudation of the members of the special body that he had joined, which has a greater influence over the organs of public opinion, owing to its resolution and narrowness, than according to its numbers and talent it ought to have.

Are the words "insults" and "disingenuous arguments" too strong to apply to Dr. Newman's manner of dealing with the Church of England? No one will say so who has weighed the polemical works that have proceeded from his pen since he became a member of the Church of Rome. What is it but a gratuitous insult to say that he dispenses with the trouble of examining into the claim of the English clergy to be a validly-ordained ministry, for it is sufficient to look at them to settle the question—and that from a member of a Church a leading member of which but the other day acknowledged that in a whole diocese in Italy there was not one of the clergy, whether bishop or priest,

that was leading a chaste life?<sup>1</sup> What could be more disingenuous than to construct an argument against Kingsley on the hypothesis that Liguori only allowed equivocation in extreme cases, and then to withdraw the hypothesis in an appendix without withdrawing the argument founded upon it; or than to defend the modern Román doctrine of Mariolatry against Pusey by citing a passage of Irenæus containing a misreading, which gave it the appearance of serving the purpose, and then, as before, to acknowledge the misreading in a note a hundred pages further on, without abandoning the argument founded upon it? Again, what are we to say of a controversialist instructed in history who declares the executions in Elizabeth's reign to be equal in atrocity with the massacres of Provence, and the *auto-da-fés* of Spain, and declares the Inquisition to be a Spanish, not a Roman Catholic, institution?

But all these things—we do not pause to enumerate them—were forgotten and forgiven. The English Church was like the sleepy lion in the picture, which would not be waked up and be made angry, however much his foes might run their spears into him. No doubt it was unkind of an old friend, and it could not be denied that he was unfair; but it was Newman, so let it pass.

The selection of Dr. Newman for excessive praise is not only an injustice to his comrades of past years. It is wrong in itself, for it ignores the great fault of his life. If we select for extravagant laudation a man whose most conspicuous act is in our eyes a wrong act, we are condoning that act, and excusing it so far as we are capable of doing so. A man may have many faults which, in the general estimate of his character, we may put comparatively aside, on account of other qualities. A man may have done bad acts, which may have been so overshadowed by good deeds that we may forgive and forget the former. But when the one act that is most remarkable in a man's life—the act by which he will live in history—is in our judgment a wrong act, we are no longer at liberty to give him our approbation, for he has become in the face of the world the living embodiment of that act, and to give him our praise is logically to justify it. Now, the act which distinguishes Dr. Newman from his compeers, and by which he will be known in future biographies, is his abandonment of Protestantism for Popery, Anglicanism for Romanism. Unless we can justify that act in itself, we have no right to make a hero of the man who performed it. It is not enough to be able to point to palliating circumstances. These may excuse the man

---

<sup>1</sup> Curci, *Vaticano Regio*.

to a greater or less degree, but they cannot make a hero of one who failed in the supreme moment of trial.

Extravagant laudation in such a case is not only unjust to others and wrong in itself, it is also dangerous in the highest degree. For it leads men to regard with indifference the act for which their hero is remarkable, and it will be well if indifference does not lead on to approbation. *Decipit exemplar vitis imitabile.*

A consequence of the hero-worship which we have lately witnessed was singularly manifested in the public press a few weeks after its intensity had abated. A question arose, entirely unconnected with Dr. Newman, as to a child's education, and astonishment was expressed that its present guardian should make the efforts that he did to prevent the child being brought up "in the religion of Cardinal Newman." Because it was Cardinal Newman's religion, it must be all right, or at least not objectionable. This is the logical outcome of the praises bestowed on the Cardinal, or, if not the logical outcome, the result which certainly will follow. And yet "Dr. Newman's religion" is that which our fathers, in their outspoken way, denounced as Popery.

Has it really come to this, that in the nineteenth century it should be a question in the Church of England whether the system of Romanism or that of the Church of England is the best for English children to be educated in, and for English men and women to profess? Was the Reformation a huge mistake? Did Cranmer, Latimer, and Ridley foolishly throw away their lives without cause when they chose the stake before the Mass, and thus kindled a light which they fondly hoped would never be put out?

"The Reformation in England," writes Bishop Cleveland Coxe, "preserved our catholicity, saving us from the innumerable manufactured articles of Roman credulity. To that event the Anglo-Saxon race owes all that distinguishes it from the Latin races in Italy, in Spain, in Portugal, in Mexico, and Brazil. But if the career which I have criticised was true to God, to the Scriptures, to the Creeds, and to the Gospel in its purity, then that Reformation was a curse, and not our blessing and our glory. If Newman was right, then the martyrs of Oxford and Smithfield were criminals, and those who deluged France with the blood of St. Bartholomew's Day were saints of God, and blessed was the Te Deum which the Pope sang in Rome to praise the Most High for a massacre that astounded the world. Mary the Bloody should have reigned as long as did Elizabeth, and her husband, Don Philip, should have sent the Duke of Alva to England to duplicate the cruelties with which he decimated populations in the Netherlands and horrified mankind. Yes, and the Inquisition should have been established in London, as it was in Madrid, and the Armada, which God dashed to pieces after the Pope had blessed it, should have been permitted to reduce our forefathers to the abject estate of the populations of nearly all the Latin colonies in America" (Annual Address, 1890).

If it be so, that the old battles must be fought over again, in God's name let them be fought, not declined as unsuitable to the spirit of the age. Protestantism has nothing to fear in its encounter with Popery. Our present danger rather is that we shall slide unconsciously out of one into the other, from not realizing the vital differences between them, and through being beguiled by the roseate colours with which imagination and craft have combined to invest our hereditary foe. "Speak gently of our sister's fall," sang Keble; but that was at a time when there was no danger in doing so, for the centrifugal instincts were strong enough then to overcome the attraction naturally exerted by so vast a body as Roman Christendom. "Pray for unity," said Pusey, when as yet men only contemplated unity in the truth, and therefore such prayers were harmless to themselves. "Do away with barriers between Christians and Christians," say amiable enthusiasts on one side, and all classes of indifferentists and latitudinarians on the other, unconscious that the permanent gain of such policy must be with those who are ready to receive but never to make concessions. There is a manly firmness in the tone of the Caroline divines, and, we will add, in the earlier Tractarian school, which contrasts favourably with the tenderness to error which would yield up the faith for fear of hurting feelings, and for the sake of indulging a spurious charity. "First pure, then peaceable," is the Scriptural order.

Is it, or is it not, an important thing whether, when the alternative is offered to us, we deliberately choose to belong to the Church of England or to the Church of Rome? What is it that the Church of Christ has been instituted for? Probably the answer that we should all give is, to maintain truth and to sanctify conversation. We do not believe that the Church can invent or discover or create new truths: we believe that its office is to preserve truth once for all delivered and revealed to the world by our Master Christ and His Apostles. Anything not so revealed is no part of the Christian faith, and if any part of the revelation is so developed as to be out of proportion with the other parts, truth, which depends on the due proportion of part to part, is so far lost. But if we compare the faith of the existing Roman Church with the once-revealed faith contained in Holy Scripture, and testified to by the early Church, we find the two faiths essentially different. The ordinary *practice* of uneducated Roman Catholics appears to consist in assisting at the mystical acts of their minister as he makes an offering for their sins day by day and week by week, in winning over to their side the goodwill and favour of some unseen powers, who will conciliate God in their behalf, and in unquestioning obedience to the precepts of their Church as

promulgated by its supreme governor, the Pope, or his inferior officers, the bishops and priests. The Roman Catholic *faith* is found in the three creeds, and in an especial manner in the creed of Pius IV., which contains the doctrines by which the Roman separates itself from the Catholic Church, and also in the dogmas promulgated by Pius IX. in our own lifetime. Would it be nothing, then, to have to believe (as the creed of Pius IV. requires), instead of the spiritual presence of Christ in the Holy Communion, that the bread is changed in substance into Him, and that He is eaten with the mouth and teeth? Nothing, to have to believe that the never-to-be-repeated sin-offering of Calvary is renewed by every priest who celebrates Mass? Nothing, that, contrary to Christ's command, the cup should be removed from the hands of laymen? Nothing, to have to profess that Christ instituted seven sacraments of the Gospel, although it is historically certain that He did not? Nothing, to have to believe that the souls of the faithful are, on their death, cast into a place of suffering, from which they are delivered by other people's merits and by Masses bought for money? Nothing, to have to address prayer to departed men and women, and to worship the images of God and the saints with the same worship as is addressed to their prototypes? and to pay adoration to their relics? Nothing, to have to regard tradition, not only as a valuable help for the interpretation of Scripture, but as a co-ordinate source, with it, of our knowledge of God's will, other sources being revelations made to saints or through the Bishop of Rome? Nothing, to consider salvation a prize won by man, God's grace assisting him, instead of a free gift of God for Christ's sake, involving after-responsibilities? Nothing, to have to declare the Roman the mother and mistress of all Churches, though it is historically certain that she is not? Nothing, to have to say that any other was free from sin, original and actual, beside our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ? Nothing, to have to regard a mortal man infallible whenever he declares himself to be speaking *ex cathedra*, and to have to bow down to him as the one Bishop and earthly ruler of the Church of Christ?

The burden of all these false doctrines, and many more growing out of them, unknown to Scripture and to Christian antiquity, is gratuitously placed upon their own necks by men who relinquish the Church of England for that of Rome, and, as a make-weight, they do not receive a single truth in addition to those with which they were already furnished; for they already possess all the articles of the Christian faith as contained in the Holy Scriptures, and summed up in the three creeds.

In respect to piety and the sanctification of life, we refrain from

drawing a comparison as to the morality of Roman Catholic and Protestant nations, because the difference between them may be plausibly said to depend upon other causes besides their religion; but if we find a low tone of morality in books authorized by either of the Churches, we have a right to charge that Church with being the cause of the state of morals to which its teaching naturally leads. The morals of St. Alfonso de' Liguori are the morals of the Church of Rome, and the morals taught by him are those which were satirized by Pascal in his "Provincial Letters." When Pascal wrote they were peculiar to a school within the Church of Rome; now they have been extended to the whole body by having been adopted by Liguori, the Doctor of the Roman Catholic Church, whose every word is approved by her. Cardinal Wiseman has told us with satisfaction that the saint's mild theology rules the decisions made in every confessional in England.

Would it be nothing to adopt as our own the moral theology of Liguori? Are we prepared to adopt the Italian, in place of the English, standard of truthfulness? May we, that is, be guilty of moral falsehood in deceiving our neighbour provided only that we do not do it by a material falsehood—that is, provided that we ourselves can put some true meaning on our words, though our neighbour understands them differently? Would there be no moral fibre lost to the nation if the Church taught that any man who had a reason for doing so might utter any false statement that he would, provided that he prefaced his sentence with the words "I say," and took care to mean in his own mind that he was only uttering the sounds that followed those two words, although the person whom he addressed believed him to be making a solemn affirmation of a fact? (*Theol. Mor.*, iv. 151). Would our courts of justice be what they are if witnesses on oath, who knew that the accused had committed a crime, were bound to deny that he had committed it unless there were other half-full proof to the fact? (*ibid.*, iv. 154). Would our households be improved by an unfaithful wife being justified in denying her sin to her husband as soon as she had been absolved from its guilt by the priest in confession (*ibid.*, iv. 162), and by the son being permitted to steal from his father from £12 10s. to 15s. every two months (*ibid.*, iv. 543), and by servants being allowed to make compensation to themselves by secret purloining if they are conscious that their wages are lower than they ought to be? (*ibid.*, iv. 524). Would our honesty be improved by altering "Thou shalt not steal" into "Thou shalt not steal more than an amount varying according to the person from whom the theft is made, from ten shillings to five pence"?

(*ibid.*, iv. 527). There are other departments of morals which we willingly pass by (*ibid.*, iv. 471), where the Anglican standard is incredibly higher than the Roman, and that for the good reason that the Church of England is content to inculcate principles derived from the Holy Scriptures, and the Church of Rome lays down a code of laws and rules drawn up by the ingenuity of men who are themselves affected by their age and their surroundings.

If it be said, "Oh, but these things would be no trial to you if you were once a Roman Catholic, because then you would adopt the judgment of that Church instead of your own, on the grounds of its inerrancy and infallibility," let us see what that implies. It implies that in morals you either cannot distinguish right from wrong, except by the help of the moral theologians, or that if you do recognise one thing to be right, and another thing to be wrong, you are yet bound to say that the wrong is right and the right is wrong, if ordered by authority, rejecting thus the supremacy of conscience. For example, if a thief charged with his crime were to say, "I say that I saw my neighbour commit the theft," would the human conscience have nothing to say as to the quality of that assertion until the unerring Church had told him whether it were right or wrong? And if the unerring Church told him that it was right, must he accept her judgment, and refuse to believe it wrong? In the second alternative he would have to smother his conscience; in the first he would have no conscience at all. Is this the state to which we wish to reduce mankind? It may be said, "But the Holy Roman Church never could say that such an assertion was justifiable; it is prevented by its inerrancy from doing so." But it has done so. We have already shown that when we have a reason for it we may say anything that we like provided that we preface our statement by the words "I say that," and then mean in our own minds that we are "saying," *i.e.*, uttering the following words, whatever they may be and whatever construction the hearers may put upon them; and as to the "reason" required for such form of speech, personal convenience, regard for reputation, fear of deserved punishment, or any such cause, is all that is wanted.

The case with regard to truth is the same as that of morals, with the exception that whereas the theory of inerrancy in morals is the destruction of the human conscience, in the matter of doctrines, it is the *sacrificio dell' intelletto*, and involves the notion to which Newman and Manning have hardily committed themselves, that we are incapable of understanding the events of history, except by the intervention and interpretation of the Pope.

How, then, are we to deal with the argument derived from Dr. Newman's example? It is no new difficulty. It has existed in almost every age in the Church, and will continue to emerge. So much so that it has become a proverb that the teacher's error is the disciple's temptation. We may go back to Tertullian and the argument of Vincentius Lerinensis. Tertullian's case is, indeed, a very apt illustration. Tertullian was a high and noble-minded man, ready to do battle or to die for the faith of the Church, remarkable for his literary power, greatly admired by his contemporaries, but he carried one side of the orthodox doctrines into an extreme. He had, by the natural constitution of his mind, an inclination towards asceticism. This inclination grew upon him, till at last it put on such exaggerated proportions as to drive out the faith and practice of the Church. His ascetic affinities led him to give up his position as an orthodox Churchman and go over to Montanism, where his natural inclinations could have full sway without being thwarted and restrained. Thus the man who had been the champion and the hero of the Church deserted her and became the ornament of the Montanist sect, which he enriched with the learning that he had brought from the Church, while he assailed the Church with the bitterness that he had borrowed from his new allies.

Vincentius instances Origen and Tertullian as men whose gifts and excellencies made their examples a temptation to their contemporaries, who were led by admiration of them to follow in their steps.

We do not enter into the question whether Vincentius's view of Origen is right or wrong. What he says is that he was a man of many gifts—rare, singular, strange; of great industry and patience, quick of wit, unrivalled in learning, so sweet of speech that honey seemed to drop from his mouth, so forcible in argument that he could make anything seem easy of acceptance; surrounded by friends and pupils who were ready to err with Origen rather than be right with anyone else; and that by and through these gifts he led many astray. To Tertullian he attributes similar qualities, and then adds:

And yet this man after all these things, this Tertullian, I say, not holding the Catholic doctrine, that is, the universal and old faith, being far more eloquent than faithful, changing afterwards his mind, did that which the blessed Bishop Hilary in a certain place writeth of him. "He discredited," quoth he, "with his later errors his worthy writings;" and he also was a great temptation in the Church. (*Common.*, c. xviii.)

And surely a great temptation it is, when as he whom you think a prophet, a disciple of the prophets, whom you esteem a doctor and maintainer of the truth, whom you have highly revered and most entirely loved, when he suddenly and privily bringeth in pernicious errors, which neither you can quickly spy, led away with prejudice of

your old teacher, nor can easily bring your mind to condemn, hindered with love to your old master" (*Ibid.*, c. x.).

Newman's most fervent admirers may find a singular appositeness in some of Vincentius's words.

FREDERICK MEYRICK.

## Notes on Bible Words.

### No. V.—"REQUESTS."

IN Philip. i. 4, for "in every prayer (*δέησι*) . . . making request"<sup>1</sup> (*τὴν δέησιν*), read *supplication*: "in every supp. . . making my supp." (Ellicott). (The article before *δέησιν* refers it back to the previous *δέησει*, says Lightfoot.)<sup>2</sup> Compare Ephes. vi. 18: "With all (every form of) prayer and supplication praying."

In Phil. iv. 6: "By your prayer (*τῆ προσευχῆ*)<sup>3</sup> and your supplication (*τῆ δέησει*)<sup>4</sup> let your requests (*τὰ αἰτήματα*) be made known unto God." [Présentez vos demandes à Dieu en prières et en supplications.]

For *τὰ αἰτήματα* see Luke xxiii. 24; R.V., "Pilate gave sentence that *what they asked for* should be done."

Derived from *αἰτέω*, the asking of the *Will*,<sup>5</sup> we understand *τὰ αἰτήματα* as the things desired—what the Will puts forward;<sup>6</sup> or, the subjects of our supplication (*materia δέησεως*, Beng.). See Ps. xxxvii. 4: "He shall give thee the desires (*αἰτήματα*) of thine heart." [On the Heb. a paper will be given in another CHURCHMAN.]

See Matt. vii. 7: "Ask (*αἰτεῖτε*), and it shall be given you." Cf. xxi. 22. James iv. 3, "Ye *ask* (request for yourselves) and receive not."

See the noun and verb in 1 John v. 15: ". . . whatsoever we *request* (*αἰτώμεθα*) we know that we have the (petitions, A.V.) *requests* (*τὰ αἰτήματα*) which we (desired, A.V.) have *requested* from Him."<sup>7</sup>

On "requests," see that charming book "Praying and Working," also Hooker, vol. i., p. 567:

Petitionary prayer belongeth only to such as . . . stand in need of relief from others. We thereby declare unto God what our own desire is, that He by His power should effect.

<sup>1</sup> Wyclif has "a bisechyngne." Meyer renders *δέησις* "entreaty."

<sup>2</sup> In Rom. i. 10, "making request" is *δεόμενος*. Ps. xxi. 2, "request (*δέησον*)."

<sup>3</sup> *πρ.* (*precatio*) is the general word for "prayer"; comprehensive: *δε.* (*rogatio*), special, implies sense of need. The former, says Bishop Lightfoot, points to the frame of mind in the petitioner, the latter to the act of solicitation. In *τὰ αἰτήματα* the *several objects* of *δέησις* are implied.

<sup>4</sup> By the specific prayer offered up when the occasion may require it.—Ellicott.

<sup>5</sup> Crenier. To ask for things; something to be *given*. Compare 1 Cor. i. 22.

<sup>6</sup> *Petitions* (see Archbishop Trench for particular boons. "Every longing of the soul is to be laid before God"—every desire "made known" toward, or before God. He knows; but He will be "entreated," enquired of, pleaded with. Ezek. xxxvi. 37.

<sup>7</sup> Bishop Alexander (S. Com.) gives: "The desires that we have desired from Him." The Bishop of Derry also remarks on the two conditions of prayer in these verses (14 and 15)—*confidence* (*παρρησία*, freely speaking; courage), and harmony with God's will.