

Interpreting Scripture (Part 2)

JOHN GOLDINGAY

2 Narrative Texts

Discussion of poetry, metaphor and symbol leads easily into consideration of narrative texts, for biblical narrative, like poetry, needs to be interpreted as literature if it is to be interpreted adequately. As Leland Ryken observes, the Bible 'is in large part a work of literature', not a systematic theological treatise. Like TeSelle, he stresses that its theology and ethics are expressed in poems 'about the weather, trees, crops, lions, hunters, rocks of refuge and human emotions such as love and terror and trust and joy'; the interpreter who does not seek to appreciate Isaiah or the Song of Songs as poetry, then, will not interpret them adequately. Even more clearly the Bible's stories are literary works, experiential and concrete theology, 'full of the usual ingredients of literary narrative – adventure, mystery, brave and wise heroes, beautiful and courageous heroines, villains who get their comeuppance, rescues, guests, suspense, romantic love and pageantry'. Thus 'most parts of the Bible resemble the world of imaginative literature . . . more closely than they resemble the daily newspaper or an ordinary history book'.¹⁹

Whether fundamentally factual or fundamentally fictional, a story creates a world before people's eyes or ears. In this respect, it is similar to a painting or a photograph (which again may be fundamentally fictional or fundamentally factual). It portrays the world that we live in, but 'arranged into a meaningful pattern, in contrast to the fragmented pieces that make up our moment-by-moment living'. It calls us back to the essential, the enduring, the fundamental, the truly real. It portrays for us 'both a better and a worse world than the one we usually live with, and demands that we keep looking steadily at them both'.²⁰ It may do that by conventions that are highly 'unrealistic', such as those of C. S. Lewis's fantasy stories or Coleridge's *Ancient Mariner*, but this does not mean it is remote from reality. It may actually be closer to truth than documents which are completely factual but quite shallow or insignificant.

Historical factuality is an important aspect of many biblical narratives, yet even narratives which are fundamentally historical are not

mere archive or chronicle. Indeed, any writing of history involves making sense of data by bringing to them some vision of meaning capable of turning them into a story with a beginning, middle, and end. Facts do not speak for themselves; understanding them is always a hermeneutical enterprise. And the plots and configurations of history-writing are the same as those of literature (or vice versa).²¹ Considering the features which make narratives more than collections of data is of great importance if we are to *understand* them. These features of their aim and method give works such as Kings or Ezra, Matthew or Acts something in common with fictional narratives such as the parables or the largely fictional stories (as I take them to be) of Ruth and Job, Esther and Jonah.

All these biblical stories create a world before our eyes and ears. It is a world in which God promises blessing and shows he is prepared to overcome all manner of obstruction, resistance, and delay in order to keep his word. It is one in which God hears the cry of an oppressed and demoralized people, rescues them from their affliction, and draws them into a near relationship of worship and obedience in relation to him. It is one in which a woman's life falls apart but is remade through the extraordinary loyalty of a foreign girl and the extraordinary love of a kinsman. It is one in which a prophet runs the other way when God calls him, has to be re-directed by means of some foreign sailors and a bizarre monster, succeeds against his will in drawing his audience to repentance, but never comes to accept the nature of God even though he understands it quite well. It is one in which an extraordinary Galilean teacher and healer loses his life but regains it and promises to be with his followers always. It is one in which Palestinian artisans and Greek intellectuals begin to turn the world upsidedown by preaching about this man.

The world into which these stories invite us both attracts us and makes us hesitate to be drawn into it. It makes us draw near and draw back equally by its realism and by its vision. It is ruthlessly true to the suffering and the sin that run through life and history: deprivation, animosity, fear, anxiety, hunger, guilt, injustice, immorality, loss, frustration, disappointment, grief, failure. This draws us because we want to be able to face these realities, to take account of them, to overcome them. It also makes us draw back lest these realities cannot be comprehended or overcome and lest to face them will thus bring a further pain that we can hardly bear or a cost that will be too high to pay. Stories can thus both reassure and challenge, support and confront, reinforce and unsettle; they may offer identity or disturb it. Different stories may 'work' more one way or the other; some stories that are a comfort in one context would be false comfort in another (e.g. Chronicles if it were written in the time of Amos), some stories that are disturbing in one context would in another be a kick to a man already down (e.g. Kings in the time of the Chronicler).

Different types of story work in different ways. In the most intelligible introduction to structuralism in biblical studies that I have discovered, J. D. Crossan remarks that 'myth establishes world. Apologue defends world. Action investigates world. Parable subverts world'²² Yet the best stories hold together comfort and confrontation, as they reflect life itself in holding together suffering and hope, cross and empty tomb, life in its gritty reality and death in which are the seeds of resurrection.

The Bible portrays a world in which the realities of sin and suffering can be faced, comprehended, and overcome, because active in it is also a God who blesses, who intervenes, whose providence works behind scenes, who refuses to give up when we insist on doing so, who in Christ walks earthly soil and in the Spirit walks in the midst of his people. He finds his way to us in the midst of these very realities.²³ This portrait draws us, because we would like to live in such a world. It, too, makes us draw back, because we wonder whether that world actually exists. If we are to live in that world, we have to be drawn into it the way a child is drawn into a story.

Indeed, we only really understand a story if we allow ourselves to be drawn into it. The parables, as the new hermeneutic has interpreted them, illustrate this point most clearly. Here Jesus begins by portraying the world that his hearers know well – the world of sowing and harvest, of shepherding and labouring, of weddings and funerals, of Pharisees, tax-gatherers, priests, Levites, and Samaritans. He thus draws his hearers into his stories, because these stories manifestly relate to their world. They are at home in these stories, nodding in understanding as they unfold. But then Jesus's stories eject out of that world and somersault into a topsy-turvy one in which the tax-gatherer finds God's favour, the Samaritan does the right thing, and people get a day's pay for an hour's work. The parables certainly create a new world, but the price is the destruction of an old one. They are understood only by those who are drawn into them and go through this world-destroying, world-creating process. Indeed, a good story has the power to draw you into it almost against your will. Story is characteristically open-ended, imaginative, experiential; it has the last word.²⁴

It is not only the parables that require a personal involvement if they are to be grasped. A narrative such as the story of Jesus, Simon the Pharisee, and the loose woman (Luke 7:36–50) requires an entering into the world of each participant as well as into their common world if one is to hear it aright. The scientific ideal of objectivity in interpretation has its place, especially in interpreting instruction texts, but it is not up to interpreting story or prayer adequately.²⁵ The gospel story is designed to make something happen to people when they are drawn into its everyday but extraordinary world. It does not merely offer itself to the intellect. It addresses the whole being in the power of

that reality that it portrays and that created it. It draws us into face to face involvement with the God of Israel and the Lord Jesus Christ active in our world, grasps us, and changes us as we come to link our story onto the one related in the biblical narrative. A 'language-event' takes place.²⁶

The Bible came into existence because people wanted others to share its world. The narrative texts of Scripture are as practical in purpose as the overt instruction texts. They are not *just* literature. To put this point another way, these texts which speak in the past tense, and refer to things that happened in the past, covertly relate to the future; by portraying a past or an imaginary or an other world they issue a promise, a challenge, or an invitation which opens up a future or a possible world. Even (especially) the Bible's stories about Beginning and End, while making a claim about linear history, also function like myths in that, because they portray a time when things are as they should be and are seen as they are, they 'provide a paradigmatic or exemplary symbolic complex which is so raised above ordinary experience that it provides a norm and shape for it'.²⁷

Narrative texts thus seek the same commitment as instruction texts, though they achieve this aim by a more subversive means. They may be expected to imply the same beliefs and imperatives as instruction texts. But the story fleshes out the overt information and challenge of the didactic; perhaps the latter would be unintelligible without the former.²⁸ The story may sometimes express its didactic point quite overtly (cf. John 20:31); but this is rare, because if the story's didactics is too overt, the story itself becomes contrived and ceases to work as a story. It has to work indirectly, subliminally, if it is to work at all.

Characteristically, in instruction texts the form (the actual words the writer uses) is dispensable. The contents can be summarized, commented on, re-expressed, without necessarily losing anything. The ideas expressed in the words are what count. A story, however, cannot be paraphrased or summarized without losing something. The content comes via the story form and only via this form. The medium *is* the message. Admittedly, "narrative . . . is *translatable* without fundamental damage" in a way that a lyric poem or a philosophical discourse is not'; it is easier to understand another culture's stories than its thought patterns.²⁹ But narrative cannot be turned into straight didactic. The crucifixion story does things to the reader that a statement of the doctrine of the atonement does not. The latter will help me appreciate the story of the crucifixion more fully, and such a theology does need to be worked out, as happens in Scripture's own instruction texts; theology is not to be reduced to story.³⁰ Yet Christian theology is parasitic on the Christian story; the story gives it its raw material, and it is finally the story it serves, because it is the story (the gospel) that matters.

By describing narrative texts as a literature which opens up a world

that we may enter, I have set an explicit or an implicit question-mark alongside two common traditional ways of interpreting scriptural narratives, as designed to offer examples of the behaviour that God does or does not approve, or as aiming to recount things that actually happened in history. Tradition does not in theory place exclusive emphasis on these two views of narrative; but homiletical practice has come close to an exclusive concern with the former, and exegetical practice has come close to an exclusive preoccupation with the latter. Ever concerned to polarize from tradition when it perceives it, fashion is currently inclined to be very dismissive of both 'moralizing' and historical positivism.³¹ As usual, it is half right and needs to be considered with a cool head.

Three of the five New Testament narratives explicitly inform us of their purpose in writing: it is to tell us about Jesus in order to encourage in us a securely based faith in him (see Luke 1:1-4; John 20:31; Acts 1:1-5; we can here fudge the question of whether they refer to initial faith or ongoing faith). It is a fair inference that the aim of the major Old Testament narratives, as well as that of Matthew and Mark, is comparable: it is to encourage faith and hope, repentance and commitment, in relation to Yahweh the God of Israel. Both Old Testament and New Testament relate God's story; it is his person and activity which are the narratives' supreme interest and which come into clearest focus.³²

Human beings setting us examples are thus not a central feature of Scripture. One should not exaggerate the point: there are stories where pointing to a good example is a subordinate concern. There are also stories where human initiative, bravery, faith, or fortitude are central (e.g. Ruth, 1 and 2 Samuel, Ezra, Nehemiah, Esther). Yet even here it is doubtful whether they are exactly 'examples to be followed', partly because the characters are rather out-of-the-ordinary for that (foreign heroines, Israelite kings, young princes, Persian officials, exiled queens), partly because it is as such that they, too, become part of God's story. Further, God's story advances despite as often as through human co-operation. Here, too, it is not a question of 'examples to be avoided'; the story is too realistic to think that they will be. Rather it portrays for us a world in which human sin and tragedy are real, but God's grace and providence are bigger, and invites us to flee from moralizing to grace. The story of what God has done in Israel and what the God of Israel has done in Christ recounts the once-for-all events upon which the faith is based (its aetiology) and the characteristic pattern of events which it can look to see repeated (its paradigms). It offers mirrors for identity, not so much models for morality.³³ It portrays a world that should be, once was, and therefore can be again.

This takes us to the other traditional focus for the interpretation of scriptural narratives, the task of investigating how factual they are.

This concern often assumes that the question 'Is the story true?' can be reduced without remainder to the question 'Is the story historically factual?', and further that understanding what the story means can be reduced without remainder to establishing what are the historical facts that underlie it. These two assumptions explain much of the popularity of textbooks such as Bright's *History of Israel*, which has a reasonably conservative estimate of the Old Testament's historical value and can be presumed, by recounting Israel's history, to be giving the reader an understanding of the meaning of the Old Testament.

These assumptions are mistaken. Some of the best stories in the Bible, the parables, are historically not true. They are fiction. Fiction's advantage is that it is not limited to representing what has happened; it can also represent what could happen.³⁴

Indeed, all biblical narrative is concerned with what could happen, not just with what has happened. As we noted earlier, even narratives which are fundamentally historical are not mere archive or chronicle. The Books of Kings offer the nearest thing to straight historiography in Scripture, but they, too, relate more than historical fact: they comprise a nightmare review of the history of Israel's relationship with God, an acknowledgment of the justice of the judgment of God, designed to draw Israel into an act of confession and thereby to open up the merest possibility of her having a future with God once again. The truth of the story involves much more than mere historical factuality, and the understanding of it is little furthered by books called *A History of Israel*.

This does not mean that the whole Bible could be fiction. Crossan asks, 'is story telling us about a world out there objectively present before and apart from any story concerning it, or, does story create world so that we live as human beings in, and only in, layers upon layers of interwoven story?', and answers that the second is the case; God is unknowable and 'we can only live in story'.³⁵

The creativity of the teller of Bible stories is well acknowledged. These stories do not claim to be directly God-given, as prophetic words do. They were works of the creative human imagination, as are stories outside the Bible. Acknowledging them as Scripture, however, implies that these particular stories do actually reflect God's story. Their world may have been imagined, but we are not shut up to Crossan's gloomy view that it is merely imaginary. They are not stories which have sense, but lack reference.³⁶

Part of the grounds for this conviction is the fact that the stories do commonly reflect factual history. They are more than history, not less than history. The belief that their vision of reality, their world, is true has part of its basis in the events they point to as evidence for that vision.

Nevertheless, narrative exists in order to offer a patterned portrayal

of events, to render a world, and this central aspect of its importance is ignored when interpreters are preoccupied with discovering *what* historical events are referred to by the various biblical narratives (the open, critical approach to the task) or with proving *that* historical events are referred to by the various biblical narratives (the apologetic, conservative approach to the task). These concerns equally distract the interpreter from the task of interpreting the narrative itself.

Concern with the scientific factuality of Genesis 1 offers an instructive instance of the way in which a concern to investigate the historical events referred to by a narrative distracts attention from its actual meaning. Various aspects of the chapter's message (its world) become clear when one considers it in its contexts in the literary work to which it belongs (Genesis–Kings; Genesis–Exodus; Genesis 1–11 and 12–50; Genesis 1–2 and 3–11) and when one considers its own internal dynamic (e.g. its double climax in the creation of man and in God's rest; its structured form with its recurrent features – God speaking, God seeing, God calling). Theologically, as the beginning of the Bible story, it is a most exciting chapter. Most of its excitement has been missed, however, when the focus has been placed on the relationship between its picture and the historical/scientific facts about world origins.

Similarly, such a focus is more of a hindrance than a help in interpreting the gospels. Matthew and Luke offer markedly different accounts of Jesus's birth, the beginning of his ministry, and his resurrection appearances; but if the interpretive task concentrates on looking behind or in harmonizing these differences, it ceases to follow the story Matthew or Luke told, the world they portrayed.

Investigating the history that lies behind a narrative can indeed fulfil two functions related to its interpretation. One, referred to above, is that if a narrative makes historical claims, the validity of these claims is a necessary, though not a sufficient, condition of the truth of the narrative. The other is that examining the differences between the events themselves and the narrative's presentation of them (what they included, omitted, emphasized, re-ordered) will help us to perceive aspects of the interpretation the narrative gives them. Comparing a new version of a story with an earlier one can also further the task of interpretation in this way.³⁷

A concern with the historical events underlying a story, or with the sources that underlie the final form of it, is still extrinsic to interpreting the story itself. Equally extrinsic to the story are the intentions of the author – except in the cases of Luke, John, and Acts, where (like Woody Allen and Hitchcock as directors, and some experimental novelists, I suspect) the author inserts himself for a moment into his story. We often speak of interpreting a work in accordance with its author's intention, but that intention is elusive, in the case of the biblical books, except insofar as it is embodied or stated in the text itself.³⁸

Knowing something of a narrative's historical background helps one to interpret it; Genesis 1 again offers an example, since various features of it apparently gain their significance from its exilic context and an awareness of that context enables us to spot those features. In the case of the parables, their significance can hardly be appreciated if one is unaware of the resonances of words such as 'Pharisee' and 'Samaritan' in the vocabulary of a first century Jew. Without this we inevitably miss the scandal of Jesus' claim that God preferred the taxgatherer's prayer to the Pharisee's or of his impossible juxtaposition of the word 'good' and the word 'Samaritan'.³⁹

Often general features of Israelite or first-century life are an important part of the taken-for-granted background to biblical narratives. Nevertheless, the general value of efforts to establish the precise historical context of biblical narratives has been overrated. We can rarely (never?) place them geographically and historically with certainty and precision. Indeed, this may be inherent in their nature. Teaching texts work by revealing their background, intention, and message. Narrative texts work by being more reserved about these.

The key to the purpose and meaning of biblical narratives does not lie in data external to the text. It lies in the text itself. One perceives its meaning by means of an act of imagination, a guess, an intuition (more or less inspired), an act of divination.⁴⁰ Beginning from an insight – or rather a striking possibility – suggested by some aspect of the story, one jumps into the midst of the story and considers whole and part from this vantage-point. Tentative purported insights thus have to be systematically explored and tested; interpretation requires a demanding combination of sensitivity, openness, enthusiasm, imagination, the rigour and slog of hardwork that develops ideas and tests them.⁴¹ I do not wish to be reading an alien insight into the text (or more likely a marginal one into the centre of it): this is an important insistence of Hirsch⁴² against the more fashionable approach represented by Kermode, who tends to take the view that it is more important to be interesting than to worry about being right. I believe, for instance, that Genesis is the story of God's blessing – originally given, deservedly compromised, graciously promised, variously imperilled, partially experienced. That view is suggested by verbal clues in the text itself, but it must be tested by considering how the book's various episodes relate to this theme.⁴³

Other biblical stories are more sparing in the clues they scatter, and leave us uncertain about their meaning. Is Jonah about how God deals with a reluctant prophet, or how he deals with a foreign nation, or even how he deals with a repentant Israel? What is the structure of Matthew, or Mark, or Luke? Responsible interpreters may formulate very different views on such questions. Indeed, others may not accept my understanding of Genesis, objectively clear and compelling though it seems to me.

Perhaps literary works have various meanings in different contexts or for different readers? This view offers openness and scope to the interpreter, but threatens arbitrariness. To insist (as Hirsch therefore does) that literary works have only one meaning (though they may have many applications or be capable of having fresh significance in different contexts) offers objectivity but threatens woodenness and makes much diversity of interpretation difficult to understand. Perhaps one should seek to appropriate some of the virtues of each of these views whilst sidestepping their critics, by affirming that part of the greatness of a good story may be a complexity which cannot be encapsulated in a single formula ('the story is about x'). Different readers will thus spot different facets of it. Interpreters may then be able to agree that there are several such facets: Ruth portrays how a Moabitess comes into the centre of the life and faith of Israel *and* how Yahweh takes an Israelite woman into terrible loss and grief but out the other side *and* what was the ancestry of King David.

Interpreters may also be able to agree on meanings that do not belong to the story – not so much because author or readers could or would not have envisaged them but because they are not natural to the story. Another preacher's instinct is to seek to reconstruct the psychology of biblical characters, because understanding our own and other people's feelings is so important in our culture. A theologian's instinct, on the other hand, is to seek to formulate the work's message in theological terms. But narratives rarely deal directly with either theology or the inner workings of the person (those concerns find nearer analogues in the material considered in sections 1 and 3 of this paper), any more than with mere historical facts or moral examples. An interpreter needs to be able to recognize when a text refuses to answer his questions, when to press it will be to overinterpret it.⁴⁴

To describe narratives as living portraits of an alternative world helps, finally, to align them with the future concern of books such as Daniel and Revelation and helps to interpret these. These books take the symbolism of didactic and the linear portrayal of narrative and projects them onto the future. They arise out of contexts when the implicit promise of past narrative is insufficient: apocalyptic portrays a future which contrasts with the unhappy present, a world which should be, will be, and perhaps therefore can be.⁴⁵

The existence of such forward projections of the line of biblical narrative draws attention to the further fact that each biblical story, while self-contained, also forms part of an over-arching story extending from creation through the life of Israel and the Christ event to the new Jerusalem. This is of relevance to interpreting Scripture in that it means that no one biblical narrative can be finally understood out of the context of this overarching biblical story. Act 1 and Act 2 (Old Testament and New Testament events) can only be understood in the

light of each other.⁴⁶ The exodus cannot be understood out of the context of the exile – nor vice versa.⁴⁷

3 Prayer Texts

Biblical narrative grows as a new generation links its own story onto the story of God's dealings with his people in the past. The narrative from Genesis to Kings in all probability developed in this way. Certainly Chronicles – Ezra – Nehemiah adds the experience of the post-exilic community to the story of Israel up to the exile. Luke adds part of the story of the early Church to his gospel; here in Acts the 'implied author' explicitly introduces himself (the 'we passages'). In his letters Paul, too, links his story onto the story of Jesus (e.g. I Cor. 15:1–11). How do we go about interpreting material in which people explicitly focus on relating their own experience?

One major tradition of studying interpretation over recent decades has treated written texts in general as the reflection of the particular historical (concrete, existential) experience of their authors, to which the interpreter can gain access through his own analogous historical experience. This tradition's insights on interpretation provides us with a suggestive way in to interpreting prophetic or Pauline texts which directly reflect personal feelings, attitudes, and experience (e.g. Hosea; Jeremiah; Phil. 3; Rom. 7?)⁴⁸ The material in the Bible which is most naturally susceptible to this approach is prayer texts such as the Psalms which, unlike most narrative or teaching texts, explicitly speak of the feelings, attitudes, and experiences of their authors.

The beginning of communication between people (parents and infants, foreigner and native, counsellor and client) depends on two things they share. One is objects both can point to: mummy, daddy, teddy; tree, house, food; experiences of fear, loss, anger. The other is a mutual interest in these objects and a mutual involvement with them. If either party is not willing to look in the direction that the other points, there can be no communication. In a parallel way, the beginning of our ability to hear what the Bible is saying is that we share things with it (we are also human beings relating in the one Spirit to the same God on the same basis) and that we want to grow in that understanding, relationship, and commitment to him which is expressed in these texts. Communication begins, then, on the basis of a shared interest in something people have in common. If a lion could talk, we could not understand him.⁴⁹

Communication then develops by means of an ongoing conversation between such people. At first we only approximately grasp what the other person means; our categories of apprehension are rough and ready. A persistent, careful listening to the other person is needed if one is to come nearer to understanding what they are pointing to. We never *totally* grasp someone else's perspective, but that is the ultimate goal we nevertheless strive toward. Two friends or a married couple

will recognize (perhaps ruefully) that they will never fully understand each other: yet they may well also recognize that they do understand each other a bit better each year. Their understanding develops as both are prepared to keep asking questions of each other and listening to each other's answers; to keep revealing themselves to each other and being open about how they see things. Asking the right questions is of key significance in a personal relationship, because they enable other people to express themselves to us.

Something similar is again true of the Bible. A strange conversation is involved, of course, because the outward form of the answers we shall receive from it are fixed. One aspect to the conversation, then, is that in seeking to discover the significance of these answers, I need to identify the question to which this text is a response. So I keep coming to it with the questions I can bring on the basis of what I have in common with it, and it keeps responding. As particular aspects of its meaning grasp me, this enables me to formulate some further, fresh question which may free new facets of its meaning.

In an ordinary personal relationship, however, I am not merely concerned to understand another person. In learning to look at the world through their eyes I hope not only to understand them, but to understand the world. For I recognize that my own perspective on reality is limited by the fact that it is *my* perspective; it may be as good as anyone else's, but that does not mean I have nothing to learn. One of the devastating fruits of close friendship or marriage is the discovery that there are other perspectives on the world than my own. It is a positive fruit, however, because it can offer me the opportunity to broaden my horizon. So it is, again, with the Bible. I seek to empathize accurately with the psalmist in his situation before God, so that I can look at God and at life through his eyes. Thus understanding involves learning to stand where someone else stands, seeking to look at the world through their eyes; and our shared involvement in the topic we are discussing is an indispensable aid towards a shared understanding. In parallel with this, our understanding of Scripture is facilitated by our sharing in a relationship with the God to whom the psalmist also speaks.

There is, however, a negative aspect to this feature of understanding; the involvement of which I have spoken is a potential liability as well as a potential asset. It may encourage us actually to identify our experience or our way of looking at things with the ones we are seeking to understand. We squeeze other people into our own mould and thus misunderstand them; we subsume what we think we hear within the categories of what we think we know already, and thus miss distinctive features of what is said.

In a similar way, again, the experiences, needs, and desires we bring to the biblical text ('what rings a bell with me') are both an asset and a liability. They give us a starting point in asking questions of the text,

but they may hinder us from hearing the things that the text was saying which do not correspond to what we have experienced or what we are already interested in. We listen to the text's answers to our questions, but ignore other aspects of the text which do not relate to these questions. As we may put it, only part of the text is 'relevant'. But if our questions, arising out of our experiences and interests, are to be our way in to understanding the text itself, then realizing that the text is actually the answer to a question rather different from the one we asked must lead, not to our ignoring these other aspects of the text, but to our seeking to formulate a new question which will open the way to hearing some of these other aspects. Generally, we hear 'as though we know already, and can partly tell ourselves what we are to hear. Our supposed listening is in fact a strange mixture of hearing and our own speaking, and in accordance with the usual rule, it is most likely that our own speaking will be the really decisive event'.⁵⁰ Thus a Latin American Roman Catholic perceives how prominent is the theme of political and national liberation in Scripture, which people in more privileged situations have often taken little note of, but he misses the equal emphasis on spiritual liberation which also appears even in books such as Exodus. A North Atlantic evangelical notices the stress on personal salvation but misses the emphasis on the Church. An Israeli Jew (or a Christian supporter of Israel) finds it so easy to identify with the story of the conquest of Palestine in Joshua that he may miss other features of the story such as God's concern to be fair to the existent inhabitants of Palestine. Our social context is thus particularly influential on what we are able to hear and what we miss. Some prayer texts (e.g. Ps. 72) and some other parts of the Bible are difficult to hear in an industrial rather than an agricultural society. Perhaps we need to imagine ourselves in a developing country rather than a developed one in order to interpret them.⁵¹

The Church's familiarity with and its commitment to Scripture is thus both a liability and an asset with regard to interpreting Scripture. Its familiarity gives us a way in to understanding it, but it may mean that the cutting edge of what it says is blunted; conversely, unfamiliarity with Scripture may enable us to hear it quite freshly, or may make it difficult for us to hear it at all. Participation in the realities Scripture speaks of helps us to perceive them there and to respond to them; a purely clinical, analytical understanding misses the most vital dimensions of these texts. Yet this same assumed identification with Scripture unwittingly hinders our perceiving aspects of the text that do not already have equivalents in our faith. Those who are most committed to the biblical gospel may be hindered from understanding that gospel precisely by this loyalty.

In John, Jesus himself reminds us forcefully of this point. Those who are committed to doing God's will will recognize teaching that comes from God (John 7:17). Yet those who were most familiar with

the scriptures and had committed themselves most unequivocally to following the scriptures had most difficulty in perceiving what they were pointing to. A further aspect to the charismatic nature of interpretation appears here. Interpretation involves the Holy Spirit not only because our imagination needs the shafts of intuition the Spirit has to give, but also because our wills need the softening that the Spirit has to effect if we are to be open to costly new insights on the meaning of Scripture for us. Interpretation is a moral issue. This relates to the fact that when we say 'Jesus is Lord' or 'Yahweh is a great God' we are not merely conveying information but declaring our commitment and our worship (the 'deep structure' of these statements is similar to that of declarations such as 'We believe in Jesus Christ' or 'We praise you, O God'). For such true statements to be truly interpreted, to be authentic on my lips, part of their significance must be to indicate my commitment – even if Bultmann went too far when he implied that 'Jesus is Lord' indicates mainly or even exclusively that commitment ('for a certain performative utterance to be happy, certain statements have *to be true*').⁵²

We have to seek to understand texts in their historicity; but we have to do so out of our own historicity, the assumptions and horizons which affect how we see and what we see. My personal situation and context shape the way I read just as the author's situation and context shaped the way he wrote, and I have to reflect as carefully about the former as I do about the latter. The image of the merging of horizons (Gadamer) has thus come to be used to describe the process of interpretation. I inevitably view the world from the vantage point where I stand, which fixes a horizon for me. If I can look at it from someone else's vantage point, however, my horizon is broadened. I can see reality more fully.

My historicity means I am not only in a different context from that of the text; I am in a later one, and all that has happened in between the emergence of the text and my own life both links me positively to the text and makes it difficult (impossible?) to hear the text as I would have done when it was first uttered. *The Waste Land* in 1972 is a different poem from the poem that was printed in October 1922 in *The Criterion*: familiar and famous, not new and exciting; fixed in a certain period of the past, not contemporary; located in the midst of the total T.S. Eliot corpus, not at the culmination of his then corpus.⁵³ Elvis Presley's records of the 1950's can be appreciated now in a way they could not then, even though (or rather because?) they cannot now strike us with the shock and offensiveness that they then had. The Old Testament cannot be the same for the reader who comes to it as a Christian as it was for the believing Jew of pre-Christian (or post-Christian) times.

Further, my historicity makes some texts more difficult for me to hear than others. In the 1920's Romans suddenly became audible again

in Germany, as had happened in the sixteenth century. Over the past 25 years I Corinthians 12–14 became audible again in many parts of the world. Of course, the Luther and the Barth for whom Romans came alive – let alone those who suddenly made sense of I Corinthians 12–14 – themselves misheard their texts in marked ways. But at least some appropriation of them was now going on.

It is partly because different texts can be heard at different times that understanding a biblical text is not a once-for-all act. I can perceive aspects of it today, but miss others, which I may be able to see tomorrow. One generation becomes blind to insights that were once well appreciated (hence the value of using the commentaries of other centuries), but is in a position to perceive things long-neglected. The story of biblical scholarship does include some ongoing development of insight and emancipation from error, like that which characterizes the story of science. More fundamentally, however, it is the story of an attempt to appropriate the biblical message on the part of each generation in its context, and it follows a zigzag line in which insights are sometimes lost, sometimes regained.

A further aspect of our historicity is that the Bible as a whole is separated from us by the deep gulf which divides us from the biblical world (worlds, indeed), a gulf carved out by differences in people's beliefs and assumptions, in how they think, behave, react, feel, and experience life, which are unmentioned by the text itself because they separate not author and original reader but author and modern reader. Dennis Nineham often returns to this theme.⁵⁴

One may question his more extreme statements doubting whether any satisfactory understanding of the Bible is possible – with the theological inference he builds on these, that contemporary Christian faith cannot base itself on the Bible. His work is valuable, however, because it presses on us the depth of the gulf referred to above. Understanding the Bible is a demanding exercise, like understanding Philo or Origen, Chaucer or Shakespeare. To appreciate these works in their original significance (like fully understanding any other human being) is an ultimately unattainable goal, yet it remains the interpreter's aim even while he recognizes that his having to view them in their later context is itself an aid to other aspects of their interpretation. The works themselves can transcend the gap that separates us from them, and in some ways the passage of time gives us a perspective which makes them easier to interpret.⁵⁵

How, then, are we to perceive where lie the differences between our own experience and perspective and those witnessed to in the text? How may we safe-guard against misreading our experiences and perspectives into a text which really speaks of different ones? One of the chief significances of the methods of biblical criticism lies in the distancing from the text that they can give to the person who identifies with the text. Critical methods treat the text as an object independent

of me; this may be a bad way to start reading the Bible and is certainly a bad way to end doing so, but on the way it may facilitate the move from a first naïveté to a second, post critical naïveté, a move via a hermeneutic of suspicion to a hermeneutic of recovery.⁵⁶ The highly cerebral exercise of learning the biblical languages has its place here. The task of translation is, after all, the culmination of the act of interpretation, not a mere preliminary to it. It is an attempt to express the meaning of the words I have sought to understand. It parallels the counsellor's attempt to re-express in his own words what the client said to him, to establish to both parties that he has heard aright. A person can indeed get an accurate enough understanding of a biblical text from a translation (better, by comparing translations). But there are insights as to the nuances of the text that seem to come only through close attention to its actual words, as counselling demands close attention to the very words of the client. Understanding something in a foreign language via an interpreter is quite possible, but you are bound to miss something, unless the material is of a very down-to-earth kind. Sharing someone's language is part of being willing and able to listen to them at all.

Another concern of criticism is to consider the Bible against its social context, seeking to identify the conventions of speech that lie behind its various texts. As we have noted, in any culture there is a range of attitudes, assumptions, ways of thinking, and ways of behaving that all who live in that culture accept without thinking about them. To such an extent are they taken for granted that we are not even aware that we *are* taking them for granted until we enter another culture which does not do so, and which has its own habits and assumptions. Now for us the Bible is such another culture, and one aspect of the complex task of understanding it is to come to discover what are its conventions of thinking and speaking. Form criticism deals with one aspect of this task, by seeking to identify the basic genres or forms which appear in a literature, and the social context (*Sitz im Leben*) to which they belong.

That such study is to be expected to illuminate our understanding of a literature can readily be illustrated from our own culture. The various items that may come through our letterboxes (a letter from a friend, an advertising circular, a bill, a wedding invitation, a greetings card . . .) each have forms of their own. The kind of paper that is used, the format, the language, the opening and closing phrases, all constitute signals that take us a substantial way towards understanding the meaning of each item before we examine what the words actually say. One can imagine, then, how difficult it would be for people in Africa in three thousand years' time to understand this material, given their unfamiliarity with the conventions which we take for granted.

This is our own position in relation to the Bible, as a wide-ranging collection of works from a different age, a different culture, a different

civilization. Form criticism, then, seeks to recover the way things were said and written in that world and to devise the right kind of question-and-answer procedure that will open up the distinctive meanings (and expose the distinctive sets of possible misunderstandings) that belong to each genre.

As it happens, form-critical study of prayer texts has been a particularly fruitful exercise. The Psalms themselves were among the first subjects of the pioneer form-critic Hermann Gunkel, who analysed basic ways of speaking to God represented in the Psalms. His work was taken further by Sigmund Mowinckel, who looked at the Psalms systematically as the vehicles of Israel's corporate worship, the expressions of her self-identity, and the means of her mutual fellowship.⁵⁷

Although such study takes us into the shared conventions of prayer texts, form is not all; a person uses form to express something unique. Comparing examples of various genres helps one to perceive the individuality of particular prayers and praises. Psalms 95 and 100 (the *Venite* and *Jubilate*), for instance, are psalms of praise with close parallels to each other, except there is nothing in Psalm 100 that corresponds to the closing stanza of Psalm 95, where the movement of communication turns from man-God to God-man as God invites his enthusiastic worshippers to shut up for a minute and listen. (It is ironic that this last, individual section of Psalm 95 has now come to be omitted from worship!).

Sometimes the individuality of an author takes up a familiar form in order to make it do something quite different. My mail includes advertisements which are personalized in the hope that I may treat them as 'proper' letters; newspapers include 'advertisement features' designed to attract the credence given to editorial matter, or satire which could be taken by the unimaginative (or the person from another culture) as a serious leader. So in the Old Testament Amos uses the form of an oracle of judgment on the nations to soften up Israel for an oracle of judgment against her, the form of an invitation to worship to indict Israel about the true nature of her worship, and the form of a funeral dirge to picture Israel fallen by God's judgment (1:3-2:16; 4:4; 5:1-2).

Such creative individual use of forms makes clear that texts such as the Psalms which reflect basic forms are not mere formal, institutional texts written to order for an institutionalized cult. They reflect the real experience of nation and individual. Claus Westermann has especially emphasized this; it is significant that he came to his research on the Psalms from the background of the experience of the Confessing Church in the 1930's and from his personal experience of prison camp. Walter Brueggemann has taken this study further in the light of Ricoeur's work on hermeneutics, seeing the Psalms as representing various stages of personal experience of orientation or equilibrium,

disorientation, and re-orientation in a new faith.⁵⁸

In discussing how we interpret prayer texts, we have brought together two contrasting approaches to interpretation. One begins by assuming that our experience and that reflected in the text are parallel, so that the one can be understood in the light of the other; it emphasizes the link between the two human experiences. The other approach seeks to distance the interpreter from the text and look at it 'objectively' in the light of its context rather than in the light of his experience. It is the differences between these two approaches which make them so important to each other. On its own, the objective, critical approach to Scripture falls short. It falls short of the modern reader's hope (who learns nothing from Scripture which can relate to his faith), and it falls short of the ancient text's hope (which was written and preserved in order to speak for and to people in their relationship to God). Barth points out that it is precisely in following where the text in its humanity points, in treating it historically, that we have to grapple with the divine reality which is its concern.⁵⁹

On its own, the approach which hastens to identify its concern with those of the text also easily falls short because it can encourage us to use the text merely to confirm us in the religious beliefs we had before we read it. We assume that the experience to which the text witnesses mirrors our own; we look down the well and see ourselves. So here objective, critical approaches can help us to respond in trust and obedience to the scriptural texts themselves, because they help us actually to hear these texts aright. (Ricoeur remarks that Freud in his *Moses and Monotheism* 'thought he could economize on biblical exegesis' with the result that 'he found, at the end of the analysis, only what he knew before undertaking it')⁶⁰ 'Whether in terms of the current "contextual" emphasis in the World Council of Churches, or in terms of the charismatic movement, a polarization has emerged between the pre-occupation with present experience and the study of the New Testament . . . The hermeneutical task is to establish a relationship between two sets of horizons; those of the New Testament itself, and those of the interpreter's present experience and conceptual frame'⁶¹

The statement of course applies to Old Testament study too, and has a history going back long before the WCC and the charismatic movement. Indeed, the central tragedy of the history of biblical study over the past two centuries is that the objective, distancing, critical approach to Scripture and the obedient, trusting, experiential approach have proceeded in substantial independence of each other. The one is appropriate to the scholarly game and the exam tread-mill, the other to the believer on his knees praying or on his feet preaching. He is brought up on the second approach, struggles with the first approach to get a degree, and reverts with relief to the first when he escapes from his tutor's eye. It is the application of the Bible in the contemporary world that counts; there is not enough time for the

luxury of the distancing, critical approach. In fact, however, our contemporary application of Scripture will be shallow and/or pre-determined by the insights and experiences we bring to Scripture if we concentrate exclusively on the question of contemporary application. Conversely, as we give ourselves seriously to understanding a passage for what it first meant to its writers and readers, the question of its application to us will often solve itself.

For an odd thing can happen when we do concentrate on that objective understanding. As we seek to enter the concrete fact of that past moment when some people – very distant from us – met with God, suddenly we find ourselves in that situation, and see ourselves confronted by that God. We realize that it is in one sense a totally different situation from any we know, but it is our God meeting the same flesh and blood in Christ as we are; we can appreciate their testimony and make our response to that same God. So we meet God precisely through entering into a particular situation whose distance from ourselves we emphasize – through, not despite, that distancing process.

It will be evident that the kind of historical study that can lead to this insight is not the mere analysis of sources and reconstruction of events that biblical study has often concentrated on. Such procedures can clarify what is unclear because of our historical distance from the text and thus remove some of the disadvantages of not being the writer's original audience, but they do not in themselves help us to grasp the point he was making. The old Russian icon had to be "discovered" not only physically – in that all the soot and more recent layers of paint have been removed – but also spiritually; we have learned how to look at it.⁶² So it has to be also with Scripture. Critical procedures open up the possibility of interpretation and help us to check purported interpretations, but they are not the task of interpretation itself. We only understand Scripture as we think ourselves into the text's perspective and let it interact with our own.

A reversal of movement in the process of interpretation thus takes place. As we noted in section 1, I started as the subject, speaking, asking questions, being objective about the Bible, seeking to avoid reading into it the views I already hold, the experience I already have, or the commitments I already accept. Then suddenly it becomes the subject, speaking, addressing, asking questions, challenging my views, my experiences, my commitments; I am the object on the receiving end of its scrutiny. This exciting moment then unveils whether I really regard the Bible as the word of God in the words of men, by acting on what I hear.

In the case of prayer texts and other works that directly reflect an author's own experience, that movement naturally has a different dynamic from ones we have considered in sections 1 and 2. There a word is spoken to me (or at least I put myself into the position of those

to whom it was addressed). Here a word is spoken for me. The text is given to me to articulate on my behalf an experience, an attitude, a belief, a prayer. My 'response' to it is to use it in this way; to allow it to call forth from me the praise, the prayer, the act of commitment, the protest, the declaration of trust that the text itself expresses. As well as having implied authors, texts have implied readers or ideal readers, and interpretation involves becoming such readers.⁶³

Sometimes, admittedly, we find ourselves uncertain as to what kind of reader is anticipated by a text. Some texts are ambiguous. Sometimes this is because we lack the right information which would enable us to see the text's meaning. At other times, however, ambiguity is built into the text itself; it is there to put further questions to the reader, who learns precisely by having to decide how to read the text.⁶⁴

Although this 'receptionist' approach to interpretation is often appropriate to narrative, it comes into its own with prayer texts, which speak to me by asking me what (if anything) I would mean by taking this text on my lips. I as the subject questioning the text may be unable to discover whether a psalm which expresses a love for God's law arose out of a 'legalistic' attitude – it can be read that way; or whether a Psalm which praises or laments in stereotyped ways arose out of genuine praise or prayer – it need not be read that way. The text as the subject questioning me, however, penetrates to my inner person (cf. Heb. 4:12) to discover whether I have the prayer, praise, or commitment to express by means of this text; not just to discover whether, but to evoke that response to God by offering itself as a vehicle for it.⁶⁵

NOTES

- 19 *Triumphs of the Imagination*, IVP, Leicester 1979, pp 22, 94.
- 20 *Ibid.*, p 85, quoting Northrop Frye's *The Educated Imagination*, Indiana UP 1966.
- 21 Cf H. White, *Metahistory*, Johns Hopkins, Baltimore 1973; 'Interpretation in History', *New Literary History* 4, 1972–3, pp 281–314.
- 22 *The Dark Interval*, Argus, Miles, Il. 1975, p 59.
- 23 Cf A.N. Wilder, *The New Voice*, Herder, New York 1966, pp 61–2.
- 24 So W. Brueggemann, *The Creative Word*, Fortress, Philadelphia 1982, pp 61–2.
- 25 See further H.-G. Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, Sheed and Ward, London 1975, e.g. pp 274–305.
- 26 Fuchs's term: see A.C. Thiselton, 'The Parables as Language-Event', *Scottish Journal of Theology* 23, 1970, pp 437–68; R.W. Funk, *Language, Hermeneutic, and Word of God*, Harper, New York 1966, pp 20–71.
- 27 Beardslee, *Encounter* 36, p 305, cf *Literary Criticism of the New Testament* Fortress, Philadelphia 1970, p 21; J. Barr, *Explorations in Theology* 7, SCM, London 1980, pp 36, 126–7.

- 28 Cf D. Tracy, 'Metaphor and Religion', *Critical Inquiry* 5, 1978-9, p 102; G. Ebeling, *Theology and Proclamation*, Collins, London 1966, p 174.
- 29 H. White, 'The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality', *Critical Inquiry* 7, 1980-1, pp 5-6, quoting R. Barthes.
- 30 Cf D. Ritschl and H. Jones, 'Story' als Rohmaterial der Theologie, Kaiser, Munich 1976.
- 31 See e.g. L. Keck, *The Bible in the Pulpit*, Abingdon, Nashville 1978.
- 32 See Dale Patrick's *The Rendering of God in the Old Testament*, Fortress, Philadelphia 1981 on this process.
- 33 So Sanders, *IDPSup*, p 406.
- 34 So R. Scholes and R. Kellogg, *The Nature of Narrative*, OUP, New York 1966, pp 120-1, following Aristotle's *Poetics*; cf N. Frye, *The Secular Scripture* Harvard, Cambridge, Mass. 1976, p 19; Tracy, op. cit., p 100.
- 35 *The Dark Interval*, 9, 40-1; cf F. Kermode, *The Sense of an Ending*, OUP, New York 1967, pp 36-40.
- 36 Cf P. Ricoeur, 'Response' (to essays by Crossan and others), *Biblical Research* 24/25, 1979/80, p 79; also D. Greenwood's illuminating discussion of 'Poststructuralism and Biblical studies' in R.T. France and D. Wenham, eds., *Gospel Perspectives* 3, JSOT, Sheffield 1983, pp 263-88, and F. Lentricchia, *After the New Criticism*, University of Chicago, Chicago 1980. The classic historical treatment is H. Frei, *The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative*, Yale UP, New Haven 1974.
- 37 See classically G. Bornkamm's study of Matt. 8:23-7 in *Tradition and Interpretation in Matthew*, SCM, London 1963, pp 52-7.
- 38 See D. Newton-De Molina, ed., *On Literary Intention*, Edinburgh UP, Edinburgh 1976 for the debate on 'intentionalism'.
- 39 Cf A.C. Thiselton, 'Understanding God's Word Today', in J. Stott, ed., *Obedying Christ in a Changing World*, Collins, London 1977, 1, p 107, quoting J.D. Crossan, *In Parables*, Harper, New York 1973, p 64.
- 40 So F. Kermode, *The Genesis of Secrecy*, Harvard UP, Cambridge Mass. 1979, pp 7, 16-17.
- 41 Cf E. Haller, 'On the Interpretative Task', *Interpretation* 21, 1967, p 161.
- 42 Cf E.D. Hirsch, *Validity in Interpretation*, Yale UP, New Haven; *The Aims of Interpretation*, U. of Chicago Press, Chicago 1976.
- 43 I have sought to do this in D.J. Wiseman and A.R. Millard, eds., *Essays on the Patriarchal Narratives*, IVP, Leicester 1980, ch. 1.
- 44 Cf Haller, op. cit., p 160.
- 45 Cf Beardslee, *Encounter* 36, p 305.
- 46 So J. Bright, *The Authority of the Old Testament*, SCM, London 1967, pp 202-3.
- 47 Cf Goldingay, 'The Man of War and the Suffering Servant', *Tyndale Bulletin* 27, 1976, pp 79-113. There are illuminating discussions of biblical narratives in K.R.R. Gros Louis and others, eds., *Literary Interpretations of Biblical Narratives*, 2 vols; Abingdon, Nashville 1974 and 1982; R. Alter, *The Art of Biblical Narrative*, Basic, New York 1981; J. Licht, *Storytelling in the Bible*, Magnes, Jerusalem 1978; D. Rhoads and D. Michie, *Mark as Story*, Fortress, Philadelphia 1982; and books on the parables such as Crossan's *In Parables*.
- 48 Cf L. Alonso Schoekel, *The Inspired Word*, Burns and Oates, London 1967 pp 137-42.

- 49 L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, Blackwell, Oxford 1976, p 223.
- 50 Barth, op cit., I, 2, p 470; cf W.W. Johnson, 'The Ethics of Preaching', *Interpretation* 20, 1966, p 423.
- 51 On this problem, cf R.L. Rohrbaugh, *The Biblical Interpreter*, Fortress, Philadelphia 1978.
- 52 J.L. Austin, *How to Do Things with Words*, Clarendon, Oxford 1962, p 45; cf A.C. Thiselton, 'The Use of Philosophical Categories in New Testament Hermeneutics', *Churchman* 87, 1973, p 96.
- 53 H. Gardner, *The Waste Land*, Manchester UP, Manchester 1972, pp 1-2.
- 54 See *The Use and Abuse of the Bible*, Macmillan, London 1976; *Explorations in Theology* 1, SCM, London, 1977; recently 'The Strangeness of the New Testament World', *Theology* 85, 1982, pp 171-7, 247-55.
- 55 On this issue from a theological perspective see J. Barton, 'Reflections on Cultural Relativism', *Theology* 82, 1979, pp 103-9, 191-9; Thiselton, *The Two Horizons*, Paternoster, Exeter 1980, pp 53-60; S. Coakley, 'Theology and Cultural Relativism', *Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie* 21, 1979, pp 223-43; F.G. Downing, 'Our Access to Other Cultures', *Modern Churchman* 21, 1977, pp 28-42; and from a literary perspective, see G. Steiner, *After Babel*, OUP, London 1975, pp 1-31; Gardner, *The Business of Criticism*, OUP, London 1959, pp 25-51; L. Trilling, 'The Sense of the Past', in *The Liberal Imagination*, Secker, London 1951, especially p 187.
- 56 Paul Ricoeur's terms: see e.g. *Freud and Philosophy*, Yale UP, New Haven, 1970, pp 28-36, 496.
- 57 See e.g. H. Gunkel, *The Psalms*, Fortress, Philadelphia 1967; S. Mowinkel, *The Psalms in Israel's Worship*, Blackwell, Oxford 1962.
- 58 See C. Westermann, *Praise and Lament in the Psalms*, Knox, Atlanta 1981; W. Brueggemann, 'Psalms and the Life of Faith', *Journal for the Study of the Old Testament* 17, 1980, pp 3-32; Brueggemann alludes to Ricoeur's *Interpretation Theory*, Texas Christian University, Fort Worth 1976 and *Conflict of Interpretations* Northwestern University, Evanston 1974, as well as works referred to in notes 18 and 56 above.
- 59 Op cit., I, 2, pp 463-70.
- 60 *Freud and Philosophy*, p 349.
- 61 Thiselton, *Churchman* 87, p 98.
- 62 N.S. Trubeckoj in *Readings in Russian Poetics*, L. Matejka and K. Pomorska, eds., MIT, Cambridge Mass. 1971, p 119.
- 63 Cf R. Cohen, M.J. Valdés and O.J. Miller, eds., in *Interpretation of Narrative*, University of Toronto P., Toronto 1978, p 5.
- 64 Cf P.D. Miscall, *The Workings of Old Testament Narrative*, Fortress, Philadelphia 1983, on this aspect of the Abraham and David stories; S.E. Fish, e.g. 'Interpreting the *Variorum*', *Critical Inquiry* 2, 1975-6, pp 465-85.
- 65 Cf Brueggemann, *JSOT* 17, pp 17-19.

The Revd Dr John Goldingay is Registrar at St. John's College, Nottingham.